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

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	To	
KILOMETERAGE	Earning	
	Dead	
	Relief	
	Deptt.	
	Total	
No. of Single Trip		
Consumption	M. Oil	
	D. Oil	
	Petrol	
Average		
No. of Passenger Carried	Upper	
	Lower	
Luggage in Kgs.		
By Luggage Rs. P.		
Earning Ca		

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

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

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

COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

L. P. JACKS.

"The best teaching of international morality must take, at present, indirect forms."—JOSIAH ROYCE.

I.

RECENT events leave no room for doubt that the public opinion of this country gives strong support to the principle of collective security. But there is considerable room for doubting whether the British people would be willing to commit the safety of their country, or Empire, to the collective protection afforded by the League of Nations, even if this were firmly established. The increase of our armaments to the point deemed necessary for self-defence seems rather to indicate that we prefer, in the event of danger arising, to be in a position to defend ourselves independently. Are we to see in this nothing more than a prudent measure of collateral security intended to provide for the contingency of the League being unready, unable, or perhaps unwilling to shield us? Or is it the policy of a proud and self-reliant nation that "fears no foe in shining armour," and wishes the world to know it—*nemo me impune lacessit*? Or, at least, may there not be at the back of the public mind a feeling of

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reluctance (which can hardly be deemed blameworthy) to involve other nations, through the collective action of the League, in responsibility for protecting an entity so powerful as the British Empire and so well able to protect itself? The matter is obscure. But, however obscure the motives at work may be, the fact seems clear that our support of collective security, as a benefit to mankind at large, is mingled with a desire to be independent of it, at least for the present, so far as the safety of our own Empire is concerned. A confused state of mind, not peculiar to our own country, though perhaps more evident here than elsewhere.

Under these circumstances it would be highly instructive if a Ballot were taken, supplementary to the Peace Ballot, on the following question: "In the event of the British Empire being attacked by a foreign power, which of these alternatives would you prefer, (1) that the Empire should seek shelter under the collective wing, or (2) be strong enough in arms to defend itself singlehanded." Phrasing the question somewhat differently, "do you prefer your country (1) to be dependent for safety on the joint action of the League, or (2) to be fully competent and solely responsible for its own defence?

What would be the answer of our statesmen? Of the leading newspapers? Of our patriotic prelates? Of the public at large?

The recent utterances of statesmen and of their supporters in the Press fail to elucidate the matter. On the one hand they announce a policy of giving strong support to collective security, which suggests a leaning to the first alternative. On the other, and almost in the same breath, they urge that Great Britain "must be as strong in the air as any other single power," which suggests a leaning to the second. But can we (or any other nation) honestly claim to be supporting collective security while taking vigorous measures to render ourselves independent of it? Clarification is obviously needed at this point.

What, then, is it that collective security is intended to secure? If the question be dismissed as unnecessary, since the answer is on everybody's lips, it may be pointed out that the answer currently given today differs from that of twenty years ago. Then, and for some time afterwards, it was customary to define the object of collective security in terms of the Wilsonian formula—"to make the world safe for democracy." For well-known reasons this answer has now been abandoned in favour of one both simpler and more

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general—peace, peace for the nations, peace permanent and universal, the peace of a settled world.

Since the word has more meanings than one, for there is a peace of death as well as a peace of life, we need an answer more precise and positive. Peace of what type and how conceived? Here again the answer is readily forthcoming. Peace for the nations, under the security of international law, such as the citizens of a well-ordered state enjoy under the security of their domestic institutions, each nation sitting under its own vine and fig tree, none daring to make it afraid. *Pax civitatis* broadened out into *pax mundi*. An aggregate of nations, now living in unstable and dangerous relationships, transformed into a community of nations, a peaceable confederation, an organic whole. Is not this what most of us would answer if confronted with the question "what is collective security intended to secure?"

So much being taken for granted, there at once rise into view certain important differences between the methods employed by the state in conferring collective security on its citizens and the methods now adopted or proposed for conferring it on the nations at large. The differences are considerable.

(1) The state is not indiscriminate in protecting the lives and property of the citizens. It pays regard to the manner in which their lives are being conducted and their property has been acquired, and makes distinctions accordingly. It gives security to the honest man, but not to the thief; to him who respects the life of his neighbour, but not to him who assaults it; to the property which is legally a man's own, but not to the manifest gains of the burglar or the pickpocket. Collective security for the law-abiding; collective insecurity for the others. The first implies the second, and would be impossible without it.

The collective insecurity of the law-breaker in his own country is reproduced in the "sanctions" imposed by the Covenant on the breaker of international peace. But the reproduction is little more than a shadow of the original. For, not only is the League of Nations without armed forces of its own for coercing a member in rebellion against its authority, the point commonly dwelt upon in this connection, but nothing or next to nothing has been done so far to restrain a would-be rebel member from arming himself to any extent he considers necessary for the pursuit of his lawless purpose—a state of things of which full advantage

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has recently been taken by Italy, with such results as we see. Taking the two things together—the collective authority unarmed, the rebel armed at discretion—defiance of the former by the latter is always possible for any of the member states which happens to be minded that way, and arms itself accordingly. Needless to say the collective security afforded by the state to its law-abiding citizens is on a very different basis.

(2) This protection is not given to the citizens for nothing. Under the form of taxation they have to pay, and pay smartly, for the security they enjoy. Civilised states are costly institutions, the fees of the most expensive club in the world being little more than a drop in the bucket compared with the charges made by the state for the privilege of sitting at ease under our vines and fig trees, none daring to make us afraid. All things considered, this is the largest item for which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to make provision in his yearly budget, which might be justly regarded as fixing the scale of fees for membership of the National Security and Happiness Club; for the rich man, "revelling in great possessions," an income tax to check his revels, with devastating death duties in prospect; for the poor man, taking his ease in his inn, a formidable impost on his pot of beer and pipe of tobacco; and all remorseless and ineluctable as the laws of Rhadamanthus. Such is the price of collective security in civil life.

Turning to collective security of the international type, there seems to be a general expectation that it can be had on much easier terms. That the nations are not wholly unwilling to pay for it is sufficiently proved by their acceptance of the sacrifices involved in applying economic sanctions to Italy, sacrifices, however, which are not very great. But the full cost has yet to be realised, nor is there any method as yet in existence for distributing the cost among the various contributors at all comparable either in exactitude or efficiency to the method just considered. There is a general compact to combine for collective security, but the terms of contribution are left unspecified.[1] It seems to be understood that, in the event of circumstances making it necessary, the member states would contribute armed force for the restraint of lawless aggression, but if the question be

[1] Article 16 of the Covenant states that the Council will "recommend" to the various Governments the contributions of armed force expected of each. Many people would be glad if their income tax and death duties were similarly "recommended" by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

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asked to what extent would this obligation fall upon Great Britain, France, Norway, the Republic of Haiti, there is no answer. Apparently we must trust Providence to see to it that, if military sanctions were adopted, each contributor would pull his weight. So loose an arrangement is certainly unbusinesslike and dangerous, as a likely cause of quarrel among the keepers of the peace. In any case the analogy we are considering reminds us that armed force is not the form in which the state exacts contributions to collective security. It seems rather a throw-back to the feudal system, where vassals paid their dues to the sovereign by furnishing a sufficient quota of armed men, with this difference, however, that the quota was specified in that case, and is recommended in this. A precarious arrangement!

(3) Collective security in the domestic form is conditional on the citizen remitting his quarrel to the jurisdiction of public law. He must "leave the government to do the fighting," if fighting there is to be done. He is not at liberty to destroy his enemy if he can, nor to threaten him with lethal weapons. Except in cases of emergency, when the arm of the law is not available to protect him, the taking of the law into his own hands is forbidden. The principle of collective resistance by the state is here combined with that of non-resistance by the individual, except in so far as he resists his opponent by handing him over to the law.

Under the international pacts now existing, or proposed, the conditions are widely different. While combining the forces of a whole for the protection of the parts, the right of the parts to independent belligerency in their own defence is left standing. Thus, under the terms of the Covenant, Ethiopia is entitled to the collective support of the League against the aggressor, but there is nothing to prevent her fighting her own battle to the best of her ability and arming herself accordingly; facilities have actually been created for enabling her to do so. This, certainly, is not the practice of the state in dealing with the private quarrels of the citizens. To bring the two into line, the collective resistance of the League to Italy would involve non-resistance on the part of Ethiopia. Difficult as it might be, the Ethiopian would have to change his skin to that extent.

The consequence of this, the inevitable consequence, is the race for armaments. Were collective security effectively in being under any existing pact, and were confidence in it established, it would clearly be unnecessary for any state, the British or another, to arm itself to the limits needed for

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self-defence. Nor, indeed, would it be permitted, in view of the obvious dangers to peace involved in such a proceeding. But being permitted, and confidence not yet existing in the security afforded by existing pacts, the inevitable consequence is that each nation will arm itself up to the point deemed necessary for fighting its own battles unassisted—which is precisely what most of them are now doing. What else is meant when we are told that "we must be as strong in the air as any other single power"? This, indeed, has been advocated on the ground that we must do our share in supporting collective security. But is the motive truly stated where so described? Does it not rather lie in the need, or the supposed need, of putting the British Empire in a position where it will be able to defend itself by the strength of its own right arm? And is not the motive everywhere the same? Germany has been quite explicit about the matter. Nor does it seem to have been sufficiently considered that the more powerful a nation makes itself for independent belligerency, self defensive or other, the greater becomes the difficulty of imposing collective restraint upon it, in the event of its policy becoming offensive to the others. As a nation now apparently retired from the career of conquest (after considerable achievements in that department) we British are wont to consider ourselves immune from the restraints and penalties decreed for nations still in that business. But we have great possessions, and the rest of the world, with its striking inequalities in national resources, may not always approve of our sitting tight on them, and certainly will not if equality, as well as liberty and fraternity, should ever become an international slogan. Perhaps some foreshadowing of this mingles with the zeal of our statesmen for collective security when they urge upon us the necessity of becoming as strong in the air as any other single power. And since other nations are arguing to the same effect, and halting in the same manner between two opinions, is it not obvious that competition in armaments must inevitably result and lead in the total to an accumulation of armaments vastly in excess of what collective security would require? Nothing analogous to this condition of dissociated personality can be found in the methods adopted by the state for giving collective security to its citizens.

(4) The difference just mentioned suggests another of similar import. While the state protects the citizen in the enjoyment of whatever property he stands legally possessed of for the time being, it gives him no security for the main-

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tenance either of his income or his capital at its present level. Under a system of periodical assessments it treats the distribution of wealth as fluid, adjusting the contribution demanded according to changes that have taken place since the last assessment. Against such change it provides no barrier, neither forbidding the poor man to increase his possessions nor confirming the rich man in perpetual possession of what is already his.

Turning to the collective security which international pacts are intended to establish, we are at once confronted by two striking differences.

In the first place, existing inequalities in territory and command of material resources, not less conspicuous in their way than the parallel inequalities between rich and poor in our cities, and certainly not less provocative of strife, are here treated not as fluid, but as fixed, the richer nations being secured in their great possessions under the same provisions which secure the poorer nations in theirs. By this arrangement encroachment by poor nations on the property of rich is ruled out no less effectively than the converse. Taking the map of the world, with the fixed territorial divisions there laid down, as the basis of the compact, each nation, under the collective security provided, may now sit tight on whatever lies inside the boundaries assigned it on the map, on condition of attempting no encroachment on what lies outside.

Needless to say, the fulfilment of this condition is far more difficult for some nations than for others. There are some, such as Germany, Italy and Japan, whose command of the earth's resources is less than they need or, at least, think they ought to have. There are others, such as Great Britain and the United States, which have already acquired enough for their needs, and have no reason for desiring or claiming more, fortunate nations now in a position to retire in comfort from the business of territorial acquisition. The bargain is obviously one-sided. And the more so when we reflect that the need for collective security is itself most unequally divided, being vastly greater for weak nations, like Ethiopia, than for strong nations such as our own. Some of the latter might be fairly considered as strong enough to look after the defence of their own interests, and would certainly be so considered by their weaker neighbours were the need of defending them to arise.

Before analogy can be claimed between the two types of collective security, it is obvious that provision will have to

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be made for a greater fluidity in the distribution of national wealth. Here again we seem to be in the presence of a throw-back to an earlier state of society when the division into classes and the corresponding inequalities in the distribution of wealth were treated as permanent and sacrosanct.

> "God bless the squire and his relations
> And teach us all to keep our stations"

is here translated into international terms.

(5) In a well-ordered state, as we have seen, the citizens meet and transact their business as unarmed individuals, the state undertaking to settle their quarrels and forbidding them to shed each other's blood except, as Carlyle used to say, "a little from the nose at election times."

The nations of the world, on the other hand, in their relations *inter se*, confront one another in arms. It is true that the statesmen assembled at Geneva do not sit at the council table like cowboys playing poker, with pistols ready to settle unpleasant differences. But they appear as representatives of armed nations and—if we are to follow those who have recently urged an increase of British armaments—the weight of a nation in council is not unrelated to its weight in guns. This fact, and the knowledge of it shared by them all, temper their mutual confidence with mutual fear. Not a favourable atmosphere for the establishment of collective security on a lasting basis.

The force of *habit* has also to be reckoned with, for nations no less than individuals (perhaps more so) are creatures of habit, the roots of which, in their case, strike deep and spread wide. War-making, as a way of settling their disputes, is a characteristic habit of states, not less difficult to shake off than gambling for the gambler or drunkenness for the drunkard. This habit carries an enormous momentum, the force of which can be measured by the total armaments now existing in the world. With none of the nations, not even with the most militaristic, is war-making a reasoned policy, the reasons presented for it, which are many and plausible—Treitschke philosophies and such like—being afterthoughts invented to justify an inveterate habit, itself the most unreasonable thing in the world. However ingeniously the more pacific states may disguise the fact from themselves they are all—with inconsiderable exceptions—war-making structures. Their social structure lies enclosed within a military framework which limits and conditions their internal organisation, a framework more

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visible, indeed, in some than in others, but the dominating reality of which is clearly revealed in their armaments and in the appropriation that armaments carry in the yearly distribution of their revenues. And not only are they war-making; they are also largely war-made. If war be eliminated from the causes which have made the nations what they now are, either by the enlargement or the reduction of their power and resources, the form and pressure of every one on world affairs would be unintelligible. What wonder, then, that war-making, as a mode of national self-assertion, has acquired the force of a habit? How else comes it to pass, as in the late war, that millions of peaceable men to whom bloodshed is abhorrent, may suddenly find themselves involved, exactly they know not how, in human slaughter on a colossal scale? They are victims to the war-making habit of states. So, too, is Christianity when, at the price of some discomfort, it pronounces its blessing on "a just war." The conflict between the war-like habit of the state with its God of war, and the peaceable habit of the citizen with his God of peace, is among the deepest of our time—the will of peaceable peoples *versus* the habit of war-making states.

Viewed in the light of the considerations just adduced, the problem of collective security may be defined as follows. Politically, it is the problem of evolving a peaceful policy from the joint action of armed and war-making units. Psychologically, it is the problem of breaking a habit for which the structure of these war-making units is adapted and equipped. Viewed from either angle the problem presents difficulties which are absent from that of maintaining law and order in a civilised state.

(6) The last difference to be mentioned is the most important of all, for it is the source of the others. It lies in the fact that the two types of collective security, the domestic and the international, operate in different moral atmospheres and under different moral standards. The domestic operates in an atmosphere where pure selfishness stands discredited and the duty of bearing one another's burdens, in spite of much lip-service, is practised voluntarily, though by no means universally, and extensively embodied in various social institutions maintained by the state. All this is absent from the policy of states in their mutual relationships. The altruism which consists in bearing one another's burdens is here not recognised, still less practised. The moral standard, thinly disguised under polite diplomatic conventions, is egoistic, and never more conspicuously so than in these days

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of self-contained nationalism. It is true that we British sometimes picture the Empire as a benevolent institution among the nations, and in the United States, whose mission in the world was once defined by President Wilson as "to serve," orators occasionally indulge in similar language about their country. But foreigners, noting how tightly the British sit on their vast possessions and the Americans on their enormous stock of gold, to say nothing of the tariff walls surrounding both of them, are not likely to admit that either country is an exception to the general rule of national egoism, or less selfish than their own. Nor is the axiom that Great Britain can do no wrong so widely accepted abroad as it seems to be at home.

The League of Nations was the first attempt, on the great scale, to break down the habitual egoism of states and to introduce an element of altruism into their relations one with another. The principle of "bearing one another's burdens" is clearly recognised as an international obligation in the provisions made by the Covenant for mutual support against an aggressor. This may be justly reckoned a turning-point in human history. Unfortunately, however, the Treaty of Versailles, in which this altruistic experiment was embodied, surrounded the Covenant with other provisions which restored egoism in its most vindictive and dangerous form—a fatal discrepancy of which the world has been bearing the consequences ever since. It caused the secession of Germany, had much to do with the abstention of the United States, and has acted throughout as a check to the growth of confidence in the League's *bona fides*. At the time when the Treaty was drawn up it almost looked as though the framers of it were determined to kill their own offspring; the fact that the Covenant has survived the blow is perhaps the best evidence we have of its vitality. As the present writer ventured to point out at the time,[1] when such views were anything but popular, the altruistic principles embodied in the Covenant could be made effective on one condition only—that of *national self-renunciation all round*, a line of action to which the rest of the Treaty gave no encouragement but showed rather that the victorious nations were as firmly rooted as ever in

> "The good old rule . . . the simple plan
> That they should take who have the power
> And they should keep who can."

[1] HIBBERT JOURNAL, October, 1919, in an article entitled "Why We Are Disappointed."

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Professor Niebuhr, in his much criticised book, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, maintains the thesis that, as nations become more powerful and more efficient in their internal organisation, they become progressively incapable of dealing with their fellow nations on lines other than those of pure self-interest. If he is right, collective security of the international type is clearly impossible, and the best we can hope for is that the world will ultimately be dominated by some nation which has made itself powerful enough to subjugate the others, with innumerable wars in the interval between now and then. This much at least we may concede to Professor Niebuhr, that the problem of evolving a common unselfishness from a group of incurably selfish national units, each armed to the teeth for the protection of its own interests, is clearly insoluble. But human ingenuity has no bounds, and the course of events has its own way of making mock of irrefragable logic. So long as the League of Nations remains in being, we can hardly abandon the hope that means may yet be found for the refutation of Professor Niebuhr's formidable thesis.

II.

In an age when the development of international trade has long been tending to make the world an economic unity, it would certainly cause surprise to "an observer from another planet" that more advantage has not been taken of this as a means to the establishment of collective security. It would surprise him, I think, to observe that the nations, with so promising an alternative under their hands, still remain obstinately wedded to the highly precarious method of peace-keeping compacts between their governments, as the only method by which this problem can be solved.

The ethics of the economic world are by no means above criticism, but it may be fairly said that in respect of one important virtue, that of keeping a contract, the moral standard of business institutions, such as banking and insurance, is on the whole superior to that of political governments. As recent events clearly testify, mutual loyalty between nations, as represented by their governments, is at a very low ebb, while the virtue which consists in "swearing to one's own hurt and changing not," if it exists at all as an attribute of states, exists only in shifting patches, and cannot be generally counted on in a crisis.[1] And since it is precisely

[1] It may be said that Great Britain displayed this virtue by keeping her pledges to Belgium in 1914. But Germany broke hers. What is the

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on this quality that international compacts depend for their fulfilment, their value as lasting guarantees of collective security cannot be rated very high. On the other hand, when an insurance company pays to its policy-holders the sums due to them in consequence of some disaster against which they have insured, it clearly does so to its own hurt, but makes no bones about the matter, when once the loss is certified, never treating its contracts as "scraps of paper," on the ground that keeping them is no longer advantageous to its own interests.

Moreover, the economic world has evolved fiduciary institutions, of many types, operated by persons known as "trustees," and though, again, the record of trusteeship has its dark spots, there can be no doubt that a fiduciary institution of the business type which can be relied on to observe its contracts is more easily found than a government which can be relied on to keep its treaties. On the whole, it seems clear that the spirit of trusteeship, indispensable to any lasting agreement, is more highly developed and endowed with a higher code of honour in the economic sphere than in the sphere of international policy.

All this points to the conclusion that the basis of collective security should be sought on economic grounds; that the most promising line on which the League of Nations can develop is that of a fiduciary institution under the management of international trustees; and, further—on a wide survey of the politicians of all nations—that trustees of the type needed are more likely to be found among men trained in the trusteeship of business who have proved their competence as fiduciary agents.

III.

> "Begin to make visible the community of mankind, not merely, as at present, in the form of alliances which are ambiguous, and at times irritating, and of arbitration treaties which are likely to be broken at some passionate moment when they are most needed, but in the form of a sufficiently large board of financially expert trustees, whose membership is international, whose services are duly compensated from the funds of the trust, and whose conduct is guided by plainly stated rules which have the substantially unanimous consent of all nations concerned in the plan."

value of a Treaty if only some of the parties can be trusted to keep it? A History of Broken Treaties has yet to be written.

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The above are the words of a distinguished philosopher. They are to be found in a little book bearing the title *War and Insurance*,[1] written soon after the outbreak of the Great War by Josiah Royce, Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, a Gifford Lecturer, and the author of many well-known philosophical works.[2]

The sentence quoted reveals our philosopher as sharing the doubts which have been expressed in this article as to the peace-keeping value of political compacts between armed nations, and it would be easy to show, by more extensive quotations, that his reasons for doubting were similar to those already enumerated under six heads. None the less, he was in full sympathy with the general object of the League of Nations, the project of which was in the air at the time his book was written. It fell into line with a thesis, at once religious and philosophical, to the establishment of which he devoted philosophical powers of no mean order. He was wont to describe his thesis as "the Hope of the Great Community," and to argue that in this hope, and in the action to which it leads, we find both the anchor of religious belief and the fulfilment of our vocation as human beings. The whole duty of man, as he conceived it, lies in the first words quoted above, "to make visible the community of mankind," the first and the last commandment, the fulfilment of which measures the worth of the individual to the universe and to God.

This doctrine, of course, was by no means new, at least in essence. It was Royce's way of propounding his belief in the Holy Catholic Church composed, according to him, of all who are loyal to the cause of "the Great Community." But his application of the doctrine was novel. He was not content to define Utopia and leave the way to it an open question. He knew that the mere ingemination of peace would do nothing to deliver the world from the woe of combat, and that ideals of love and brotherhood are not realised by making them the commonplaces of hortatory elocution. Would you "make visible the great community"? Then you must have, not moral inspiration only, but a definite technique and a scientific basis. Is collective security your ideal? Then you must equip your ideal with a businesslike method and you must find trained, competent, expert and trustworthy agents for the application of it. Nor

[1] The Macmillan Company, 1914.

[2] An article on his philosophy by Paul E. Johnson appeared in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for July, 1935.

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is it necessary to invent a new method for the purpose, nor to conjure up a new type of man, nor to wait for a general reform of human morals. There are already in existence many types of community, many forms of human association, many varieties of incorporation, which provide their members with collective security on specified lines, which make contracts to that effect, and can be trusted to keep them. Which of them has the best claim to rest on a scientific basis? Which has the best record for trustworthiness? Which has proved itself most fertile in resource, most flexible in application, most rapid in extension, most triumphant in overcoming difficulties at first deemed insuperable? Which stands pre-eminent in creating a common interest out of interests which diverge and collide when acting in isolation? Which, in fine, has done most to convert the Christian precept "to bear one another's burdens" from a moral ideal floating in the upper air of pious dreams into a businesslike undertaking resting on a scientific basis and with feet visibly planted on the earth?

You will find what you are seeking, answered Royce, in an institution, familiar to the economic world, which has solved, in its own field, the very problem which the internationalist would solve in his, that of giving the collective security of a powerful incorporation to each of its component units, themselves individually insecure, and does this, moreover, by the exact methods of actuarial science and a highly developed technique. It is the institution known as Mutual Insurance.

Is there no possibility, then, of extending this beneficent and trustworthy mode of procedure from the narrower fields where it now works to the wider field of the international horizon? Would not a contract between nations framed on that model, or a series of such, be well in keeping with the needs of a world already feeling after economic unity and seeking the means to make it effectual? And would it not offer, in virtue of its self-protecting technique, a security far more solid and likely to last than a political compact between nations standing one to another in the dangerous relation of armed units, liable at any moment to repudiate their pledges under the stress of emergency, and ready to let their solemn engagements go the way of the devil's resolution to become a monk? Would it not inspire a firmer confidence?

That the idea of insurance is not altogether foreign in this connection is suggested by the arguments of various eminent persons who have lately been urging an increase of our own

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armaments as "a form of national insurance." The argument is attractive, but reduces itself to absurdity when we reflect that if every nation proceeds to "insure" itself independently in this manner, as indeed most of them are now doing, a situation will be created in which *none* of them is insured, the position of each becoming progressively insecure the more the others insure themselves in this way—a situation suggesting our former comparison of a group of gamblers gathered round a table for a friendly game of cards, each "insured" against possible unfriendliness on the part of the others by a sufficient six-shooter in his hip pocket. Our philosopher's idea of international insurance, as a means to collective security, can hardly be more impracticable than this.

The idea, unfortunately, was not fully worked out, the author's life being cut short before he could complete what he had begun. From the rough and tentative sketch he left behind it appears that he was far from recommending any sudden or wholesale application of his method. He would plant an acorn, not a full-grown oak. He would begin with any form of national risk which actuarial science, after thorough exploration of the matter, might declare to be internationally insurable. Of these he was convinced that more than one could be found among the many risks to life and fortune to which nations, as nations, are exposed.[1] His study of the history of insurance, so timid and circumscribed in its origin, so firm and penetrating in its present hold on social life, further convinced him that a beginning once made in any international form, a rapid extension would follow; that with each new advance peace-keeping forces would be liberated and war-making forces tend to subside; that war would thus progressively become impossible until the war-making habit was broken, and the world finally delivered from the "woe of combat."

Whatever the form chosen for the beginning might be, it was to be backed by an adequate International Fund contributed by the nations as policy-holders, and administered by internationally chosen Trustees. Nor was this to be undertaken as a purely philanthropic enterprise. Following

[1] Risks connected with the means of communication between nations (shipping, aircraft, cables, wireless, etc.) have been suggested as suitable for the beginning of international insurance. If war risks were included, such as damage to life and property by air raids, coupled with the condition that an aggressor nation forfeited its own policy, the peace-keeping effect of the arrangement would be almost decisive. To start with, however, nothing so ambitious need be attempted.

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the lines of insurance as now practised, it was to make good business for the participating members. Our philosopher was not of those who regard a profitable business enterprise as necessarily immoral. And to critics who declared that his international fund was impracticable his answer was, not more impracticable than an international police—an answer which reveals at a glance the broad significance of Royce's proposal. It lay in his judgement that an international *fund*, administered by the trustworthy methods of insurance, was a more promising security for peace than any form of international *force*, disposed of by an uncertain diplomacy and composed of elements whose mutual loyalty was not assured. It points to the gradual supersession of armed diplomacy by insurance, as the basis of collective security.

Such is our philosopher's hint of a possible line of advance, starting from familiar ground and using a well-tried method, by which we might *begin* to make "the great community" visible on the earth, and begin in a businesslike way. As a hint to creative thinking, in a region where the demand for creative thinking far exceeds the supply, it seems to deserve more attention than it has received, and especially from business men. It should also be of interest to those who believe that religion will have something to do in helping to solve the problem of collective security. It sprang from the depths of a profoundly religious philosophy.

> "I still believe," writes our author in the last of his published essays, "that if insurance of the nations, for the nations, by the nations once appeared in a practicable form, it would thenceforward not vanish from the earth, but would tend, more than any international influence has yet tended, to make the community of mankind visible, and so to further gradually, perhaps slowly, the cause of peace. . . . At no point would any fundamental transformation of human nature be needed as a condition to its possessing a genuine, peace-making, potent influence. Once constituted . . . it would gradually discover new enterprises, and with each it would increase both its direct working and its indirect furthering of the cause of humanity. It would stand in opposition to none of the other peace-making influences. It might well tend in the long run to transform international relations." [1]

[1] *The Hope of the Great Community*, pp. 76 and 91; The Macmillan Company.

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From the above summary, and from the quotations given, it will be seen that what our author was aiming at, in this novel proposal of his, was the formation of a beneficent international *habit*, which might check and finally overcome the dangerous habit of war-making, now threatening the nations with ruin. In this he deserves credit for a sound psychology. For dangerous habits, whether of nations or individuals, are not to be overcome, as the practice of many would suggest they can be, by denouncing their wickedness, nor by proving their unreasonableness, nor even by calling for a change of heart in the name of religion, or a change of mind in the name of philosophy. Against these methods of direct attack, the power of habit, when firmly established, stands unshaken—a truth which moralists, propagandists and hortatory persons in general are somewhat slow to assimilate. It is the habit of habit, if such words may be used, to defy all arguments against it, and yield only to its own kind. It begins to weaken through the growth of another habit, contrary to that in possession, and dies out as the newcomer drains its energies—the method of indirect attack, which must often begin at a point far removed from the final objective, and always requires much patience and businesslike skill. Of all this our philosopher seems to have been well aware. And this, I take it, is the meaning of the words quoted at the head of the present article: "the best teaching of international morality must take, at present, indirect forms."

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

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THE NEW REVOLT AGAINST REASON.[1]

RENÉ FÜLÖP-MILLER.

[*Note by translators :* Born in 1891, René Fülöp-Miller belongs almost wholly to our perplexed and turbulent century. His remarkable genius derives from a father of Huguenot descent, belonging to a family of refugees in Transylvania and from a mother who was a member of the Russian Orthodox Church, and could trace her lineage back to Macedonian princely houses. The author's peculiar detachment from conventional thought is partly due to the mixture of bloods, and partly to the mingling of religious and national traditions. In part, also, it may be accounted for by his adventurous life ; and by his having been compelled, though a pacifist, to serve in the Austrian army.

Books of his that have appeared in English translation from the German original are the following : *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism ; Lenin and Ghandi ; Rasputin, the Holy Devil ; The Power and Secret of the Jesuits ; Ochrana ; Leaders, Dreamers, and Rebels.* The last-named has just been published by Harrap. The article here published was delivered as a lecture in German. The HIBBERT JOURNAL is the first to publish it in any language. In it, Fülöp-Miller, who is a " New Psychologist," shows that though he regards subconscious workings as of primary importance, he is far from being himself in revolt against reason.]

WE have all been brought up to believe in reason. There has been inculcated into us, and handed down to us as a precious heritage, an outlook on the world which is wholly dominated by reason. From youth upwards, we have been insistently taught to pride ourselves on man's capacity for solving the riddles of the universe by reason.

[1] Translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul.

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Especially during the last two centuries, political revolutions and reforms have aimed primarily at the replacement of unreasonable elements in the social and political structure of society by reasonable ones. Leading intelligences of Europe have championed such a victory of reason in the political world. The Enlightenment, liberalism, democracy, socialism—every one of these political movements has been sustained by the conviction that the relationships between one human being and another can be regulated by reason, that a lack of reasonable understanding is to blame for all social injustices and distresses, and that, consequently, by means of reason, every defect in the existing social and political order can be removed.

Electoral systems, laws, commercial treaties, welfare work, and the like, have, therefore, been strenuously rationalised; and whenever irrational features were found in these institutions handed down from earlier times, those concerned were eager to expunge them. A few years ago it still seemed to most of us that we could look forward to the speedy establishment of a world-wide realm based upon universal federation, a planned economy, international courts of arbitration, and social justice.

One of man's most ancient wish-dreams appeared to be undergoing realisation before our eyes. For millenniums, this wish-dream has found expression in all the great civilisations; now the dream was to come true!

Faith in reason finds expression in the Sanskrit *Upanishads*, which date from before the sixth century B.C. We are told there that "vidya," rationalist insight, will prevail over "maya," the deceptive world of illusion. "Vidya" will render a true knowledge of the universe possible.

Once more, Greek philosophy, whose teaching marks the opening of European mental development, proclaimed the victory of rational thought. Heraclitus went so far as to declare that the atmosphere was full of reason, so that man was continually breathing-in reason. The Eleatics (about 500 B.C.), insisted that we must decide everything by reason. Then came Socrates (put to death 399 B.C.), who taught that men must strive to be clear and logical thinkers, not allowing their intelligence to be led astray by unreasonable influences, but learning the rational control of their feelings and impulses. According to Socrates, man lives in order to know, and must subordinate his whole existence to the dictates of reasonable thought. Even morality and virtue were regarded by Socrates as forms of intellectual cognition, and therefore

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capable of being taught. For him, immorality and vice were solely due to a lack of understanding.

The rationalism of classical philosophy gave rise to many attempts to regulate political systems by the light of reason. Reason was the alleged foundation of Hellenic democracy; and the Greek ideal of a rationalised political order is reflected in the Republic of Plato, ruled by learned Guardians. Turning to Rome, we find Roman Law as the most splendid and enduring product of classical rationalism—Roman Law, which still, in great measure, dominates juridical thought.

The task of controlling life, in all its manifestations, by reason, begun in antiquity, was enthusiastically resumed by Western civilisation in the days of the Enlightenment. Such men as Voltaire, Diderot, and Montesquieu, made it the chief business of their lives to illuminate even the darkest corners of the universe with the " light of the understanding."

The apostles of the Enlightenment regarded the cosmos as a huge mechanism whose laws could be discovered by the powers of rational thought. As soon as man had ascertained the laws regulating the various processes of nature and human life (social and economic laws included), it would become possible for him to interfere in these processes, and modify them purposively as he pleased.

The boldness of this idea exercised an extremely powerful influence upon eighteenth-century minds. As regards the impression aroused by the French Revolution, which aimed at such a rational ordering of society, Hegel wrote :

> " Not since the sun had been fixed in the firmament with the planets circling round it, had man been standing on his head, that is to say on his reason, and moulding reality in accordance therewith. The revolution was a splendid dawn. In those days we were all profoundly moved, and a wave of spiritual enthusiasm ran over the world."

In Paris, the new dominion of reason began in the year 1793 with a festival in honour of the " Goddess of Reason." The proceedings were inaugurated by an elaborate ceremony in the cathedral of Notre Dame, where Chaumette, attorney for the commune of Paris, delivered the principal address. For the first time, he said, in a building hitherto devoted to the uses of religious superstition, the sublime voice of reason was making itself heard.

From those days of the Enlightenment down to our own, rationalist thought has continued to celebrate triumph after

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triumph. Science has unriddled numberless secrets of nature. Simultaneously, technical advances—the practical applications of science and logic—worked miracle after miracle, giving man increasing control over the forces of nature, to a degree excelling the boldest wish-dreams of earlier generations.

Thus there gradually became established that philosophy into whose realm all but the youngest of us were born. Man's faith in reason was so abundantly confirmed that it was hardly possible for him to doubt in the universal saving power of rational thought.

Such was the mental situation of Europe as recently as half a generation ago. Since then, however, a change has come over the spirit of our dream. To-day a revolt against reason has become general. That which was our greatest pride, is now contemned. Instead of worshipping reason, people incline to glorify whatever is unreasonable, contra-reasonable—the irrational, the instinctive, the elemental.

Blood, force, myth, race, nation; these are to-day the prevailing catchwords; these concepts, we are told, must guide us in developing the new social and political systems. States have been established whose leading principle is not the pursuit of a rational aim, and whose laws are not in conformity with the outlook of rational humanity and democracy. They proclaim their faith in the irrational powers of feeling, in impulses which, until recently, were unanimously looked upon as prejudices, as fallacies which had neither been proved nor were capable of proof.

Contemporary Europe regards this revolt against reason with astonishment not untinged with sympathy. Everywhere we see deserters from the camp of those who believe in reason, go over with banners flying and drums beating to swell the ranks of the rebels against reason.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that for the majority, to-day, the ideas of their parents and grandparents concerning the possibility of general progress under the signs of reason, the brotherhood of man, universal humanity and democracy, have lost convincing force. The flame of these ideas no longer burns brightly; their truth seems questionable, their sublimity has become dubious.

The new rebels sing a siren's song, which to many seems much more alluring than the promises of the children of the rationalist Enlightenment. They proclaim a wonder-world of mythical experience; they trumpet the glories of action, of dynamic, the power of the instincts.

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The first who, at about the turn of the century, began to talk in this way was the Frenchman, Georges Sorel, the spiritual father of fascism. While his associates continued to believe firmly in progress and humanity, Sorel proclaimed the reign of force, and dwelt upon the incalculable elements in the making of history.

He insisted that the all-powerful influences which determined the movements of mankind were unconcerned with reason or unreason, with humaneness or cruelty. Again and again an elemental force had surged up out of depths inaccessible to reason, and this force had swept away the previous achievements of mankind. According to Sorel, history was a dynamic process in which there was no place for reason; a process compared with which all that the little human brain could do in its endeavours to introduce order into the world was pitiful and contemptible.

This fateful power, manifesting itself in the forcible convulsions of history, was symbolised in myth. Myth, said Sorel, gives shape to that which works ineffably and inexhaustibly in the living present; everything which is and becomes—faith, society, law, and the ideal—is sanctioned by myth alone. We must acknowledge the predominance of myth, to which henceforward must be assigned the commanding position which for centuries has been usurped by reason.

At about the same date, and in the same sense, Friedrich Nietzsche demanded the affirmation of the heroic, and the rejection of cautious and calculating reason.

With the teaching of Sorel and Nietzsche begins a new outlook, that of those who no longer strive for the realisation of ideals of progress, no longer expect an ever-expanding realm of reason, but are devotees of the mythology of the instincts, of the forces of the irrational that well up from the depths.

Benito Mussolini, the founder of fascism, has declared himself a pupil of Sorel and Nietzsche. His political and philosophical programme is, in many respects, a realisation of the teaching of these two thinkers, a practical fulfilment of their demands from the new time.

Again and again, Mussolini has told us that he is not concerned with the postulates of the enlightened reason, is not concerned with advance towards a future realm of universal peace. No, all that he cares about is heroic activity, the mythical, perfection of form (Gestalt). "What France did in the year 1789," he said on one occasion, "Italy is doing

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to-day; Italy is proclaiming a new message to the world."

This new message deliberately conflicts with the message of the Enlightenment. Fascist Rome wishes to make a clean sweep of all that Paris of the French Revolution brought into the world; namely enlightened thought, liberalism, democratic government. The fascists believe in irrational forces, in the creative will of the nation, and in the leadership of One who has not been elected but has been mythically appointed. This Leader, the Duce, the Führer, will give new form and new greatness to the nation.

The revolt against rationalism finds yet more vehement expression in the programme of New Germany. If the fascists have proclaimed the primacy of the will, the national socialists have proclaimed the primacy of the no less irrational concept of "blood." Just as, in the fascist State, form, structure, and organisation are determined, down to the smallest detail, by an irrational power, the will of the dictator —so, in the national socialist State, they are to grow out of the blood of the chosen race.

The *Völkische Beobachter*, the official organ of the National Socialist Party, once declared that nationalism was not an intellectualist construction, for its essential idea sprang from the domain of feeling; just as all that is great and creative is rooted in instinct, in sensation, in the blood. National socialism lays its main emphasis upon forces which cannot be weighed or measured, which are not subject to rational calculation or comprehension: the forces of the soul and of the blood.

Race, says Alfred Rosenberg, is not a rational cognition but an affective acknowledgment. Neither logic nor philosophy is of importance here. According to Rosenberg the warranty of instinct deserves far more confidence than any intellectual demonstration.

According to Rosenberg, once more, an inner voice demands "that the myth of blood and the myth of soul, race, blood, and honour, shall solely and uncompromisingly pervade the whole of life, sustain it, and determine it." For hundreds of thousands of minds, myth has become the "new awakening of the cell-forming spiritual centre."

The same writer quotes Goethe, who said: "Only what is fruitful, is true!" In conformity with this notion, for the national socialists the criterion of veracity is not logical truth or falsity, but the question of fruitfulness. For them the only thing that is fruitful is that which grows out of race,

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blood, and soil; whereas, for them, speculative reason, estranged from life, remains perpetually barren.

If this be so, then dispassionateness, justice, lack of prejudice, and all the other qualities upon which rationalist thought prides itself, become valueless. Rosenberg expressly declares that whatever wishes to manifest itself as force must "repudiate dispassionateness."

This implies that the national socialist faith, like the fascist faith, depends, not upon reason, but upon grace; it repudiates the rationalism of conviction and works, repudiates any objective valuation by absolute standards.

"*Gloria sanguinis*"—that is the new ideal which the national socialists proclaim as against the hitherto prevailing rationalist ideals of the unity of the human race and a world-embracing humanity.

Thus we see that to-day there is being delivered a fierce attack upon that realm of reason in which our parents felt themselves so secure; and it seems as if all which has for the last century or more been regarded as the supreme achievement of mankind must be swept on to the scrap-heap.

Does this mean the "Untergang des Abendlandes," the Decline of the West? Is it the end of a whole epoch in civilisation? Does the revolt of irrationalism signify that Europe must lay down its arms before something new, strange, and hostile, which will establish itself upon the ruins of our shattered culture?

Or are we merely watching one of those momentary retreats, one of those temporary disturbances, with which progress has to reckon now and again? Is all this talk about force, myth, race, and blood, no more than empty verbiage, a last attempt of the obscurantists to delay for a few years the final triumph of reason?

In my view, that way of stating the alternative is based upon unsound premises, namely upon the assumption that the irrationalism which has raised its head so suddenly and has gained so many adherents, is something fundamentally alien to our civilisation.

We who have grown up in the days when faith in rationalism was dominant, are apt to forget how notable a part irrationalism has played during the last two thousand years in the establishment of our spiritual culture. Would this western world of ours, which now seems to us in danger of decay, ever have come into existence without the co-operation of powerful irrational forces?

Let us consider, for a moment, what an immense factor

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Christianity has been in the development of our civilisation. But what was Christianity, especially in its beginnings, other than a most highly emphasised form of irrationalism, in flat contradiction to the rational philosophy of classical days ?

Whereas pagan sceptics, in their search for intellectualist cognitions, had at length come to ask themselves in despair whether there really was such a thing as truth, there now appeared persons who by hundreds, thousands, and myriads, proclaimed their faith in a revelation which entirely transcended the grasp of reason. Revealed truth could not be proved ; had nothing in common with rationalist deductions and cognitions ; it must simply be believed. And lo, there were vast numbers of the faithful ready and eager to be torn to pieces in the circus by lions rather than deny their faith in an utterly irrational religious doctrine !

A fierce hostility to reason, fiercer than any to be found in our own days, found expression in the utterances of the Fathers of the Church. Tertullian, for instance, writes : " Christ, the Son of God, is dead. I believe it because it is absurd ! After having been buried, he rose again from the dead. It is certain, because it is impossible ! "

This " credo quia absurdum " remained, for long ages, distinctive of Christianity. When, in the days of the schoolmen, the Catholic Church had diverged a little into rationalist paths, there occurred a new and violent eruption of irrationalism in the form of the Reformation.

Luther insisted that reason, " the arch-whore," must be driven out of the faith. Calvin, another of the greatest among the reformers, preached a doctrine which flatly conflicted with reason ; the doctrine of divine predestination, according to which God Almighty had, before the creation of the world, irrevocably determined which human beings were to be damned and which saved.

Christian mysticism, which continued to live a life of its own in and beside the Churches, rejected on principle any attempt to attain higher knowledge by means of reason, the mystics declaring such attempts to be futile. The illumination sought by the mystics was only attainable in a condition wherein the spirit had divested itself of all cognitive ideas ; " in blindness and non-cognition," to quote one of the German mystics, " without form and sound and without the power of reason."

Roman Catholicism itself, although it had adopted from scholasticism many of the tenets of the Aristotelian rationalist

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philosophy, and was therefore regarded as unduly intellectualised by the champions of the Reformation, has persisted, down to our own days, in emphatically maintaining the supremacy of the irrational. Throughout the era of the Enlightenment, the popes continued to declare that human reason was subordinate to the higher and logically incomprehensible cognitions of revelation. As late as the year 1864, Pius IX denounced as a damnable heresy the belief that reason was the only arbiter between true and false and that through the instrumentality of reason all truths could be disclosed.

The Vatican Council of the year 1870 was a mighty demonstration in favour of the principle of irrationalism. Eight hundred bishops, patriarchs, and abbots, from every quarter of Christendom, assembled under the dome of St Peter's to thunder their solemn "Anathema sit" against the rationalism of the age.

It was because of its irrationalist foundations that Christianity was so fiercely attacked by the champions of the Enlightenment. To the French Encyclopædists of the eighteenth century, religion was the last bulwark of irrationalism. Their belief was that, as soon as Christianity had been overthrown, the reign of reason would become firmly and definitely established.

But the failure of the campaign conducted by the Enlightenment against religion shows plainly enough that irrationalism is not something exclusively associated with this or that religious doctrine, being, rather, a basic factor of human consciousness and of human knowledge in general.

For we find, not merely that Christianity has been able to maintain itself against all its enemies, and even against cruel persecution, not merely that it has not perished as Flaubert prophesied it would. We find something more than this; that, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, irrationalism has intruded itself into the sciences, and has of late gained an increasingly strong hold in the scientific camp.

Our whole conception of life itself has undergone a fundamental change. Few, nowadays, are inclined any longer to regard biological processes as the outcome of a rationally comprehensible mechanism, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that materialism in the sense of a Büchner or a Haeckel is as dead as a door-nail. Modern biology has come to recognise that there exists in nature an

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enigmatic formative impulse (Gestalttrieb), one which defies rational analysis. Hans Driesch divided the fertilised ovum of a sea-urchin into four parts, and found that each of these parts developed into a perfect though small sea-urchin. Each of the quarters, in some manner incomprehensible on any purely mechanistic theory, was able to develop into a fully formed adult.

The farther biology advances, the more impossible do biologists find it to reduce to a rational formula the life even of the minutest plants. Müller-Freienfels, therefore, is right in saying that the " Newton of the blade of grass " has not yet appeared, and never will appear.

Similar phenomena manifest themselves in all branches of modern research. Whereas in former days scientists believed that there must have occurred a rationally comprehensible and calculable continuous evolution of nature, lower and simpler species progressing to become higher, more complex, and more purposive ones, we know to-day that in the life history of species there occur unpredictable leaps and catastrophes (mutations) which confound our reason. Without apparent cause, the progressive development of certain species is suddenly arrested, as if Nature had changed her mind; and, on the other hand, we note a blossoming of specific types which for ages Nature would seem to have overlooked.

But the irrational is also coming into its own in the exact sciences, in astronomy, physics, and chemistry. There, likewise, where the mechanistic and rationalist outlook on the world seemed most firmly established, reason has of late been dethroned.

The most illustrious scientific investigators of our day utter watchwords that are welcome to the rebels against reason. In their observatories, laboratories, and studies, amid the most delicate instruments to weigh and to measure and among the most complicated mathematical formulæ, faith in the ultimate and complete reducibility of all processes to the terms of rationally conceivable " natural laws " has been shattered. Even the fundamental law of causality is no longer regarded as immune, so that we do not go too far in speaking of the existence of a " causality crisis " in modern physics.

No less noted a philosopher and physicist than the Austrian Ernst Mach (1838–1896) expressed his doubts as to the applicability of reason in the domain of natural science. When we think we have succeeded in understanding a

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process, he said, what has happened is that we have referred unfamiliar incomprehensibilities to familiar incomprehensibilities.

The number of these incomprehensibilities is continually increasing. To the student of modern astrophysics the bodies in stellar space are no longer a system of stars moving as if by clockwork, in paths that are perfectly calculable, and that remain unchangeable for all eternity. On the contrary, as we know to-day, the universe is undergoing continuous, and to us incomprehensible, change. It expands and contracts, undergoes, so to say, a diastole and a systole, or breathes in and out, without our being able to say in accordance with what laws it does so, or for what reasons. Consequently Sir James Jeans, the British physicist and astronomer, contends that the cosmos to-day seems to us more like a great thought than a great mechanism. We are once more compelled to believe in a spirit which holds sway over the realm of all being; to believe in the existence of a sublime but incomprehensible power beyond the measurable and the calculable.

But if reason fails us when we contemplate the stellar universe, the domain of the infinitely large, it fails us no less in the domain of the infinitely small, in the region of entities tinier than can be discerned by the most powerful microscope. In this world of molecules and atoms, reason's methods of weighing and measuring and formulating natural laws are, in many respects, no longer applicable.

Henri Poincaré (1854–1892), the French analytical mathematician, considered that if human beings had had eyes equipped with the power of the microscope, the mathematical laws of nature would never have been discovered. These laws, he said, could not endure too close, too precise, a scrutiny; they were valid only so long as their use was confined to a superficial testing of the material under observation.

Of late scientists have come to the conclusion that what we have been accustomed to term the laws of nature are in reality nothing more than outcomes of the calculus of probability. But this calculus of probability, with its statistical averages, applies only to very large numbers of instances, to almost innumerable repetitions of one and the same process. In the domain of the infinitely little, on the other hand, in the world of atoms and electrons, these great numbers are no longer to be found. Here, consequently, no valid laws can be formulated; here there prevails the

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power which we term chance, a microcosmic destiny which mocks at reasonable calculation.

Schrödinger, the Nobel prizeman, recently declared that, in the light of our latest knowledge about the structure of atoms, it has become questionable whether any laws at all can be formulated regarding individual molecular processes, or whether our powers of cognition are not here faced by insuperable barriers.

At the same time, Planck's theory of quanta has shattered one of the chief foundations of the earlier scientific and rationalist picture of the world; namely the assumption that all natural processes proceed continuously, without leaps. Planck has come to the conclusion that this notion does not apply to the world of the atoms, where there are demonstrable discontinuities. He says that whereas the ancients believed that Nature makes no leaps, we have to ask ourselves to-day whether Nature moves in any other way than by leaps.

Philosophy was earlier and more conspicuously affected by the invasion of irrationalism than was the domain of natural science. The publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) put an end to faith in the omnipotence of reason. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, a friend of both Goethe and Kant, was perhaps the precursor of entirely new outlooks in his insistence upon the importance of the impulses and the instincts, which certainly did not fit into the rationalist pigeon-holes of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Then came, one after another, the philosophical systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, in which it was made plain that reason is only a special mode, a partial function, of thought; and that, side by side with "ratio," other factors must be invoked to secure a satisfactory picture of the universe and an adequate understanding of what happens in us and around us. The mythical sense, the human vital impulses, the will—these factors that were ignored or thrust out of sight by the champions of the Enlightenment—now secured renewed recognition and were given a standing-place in philosophy. From this point of view the Romanticist movement signified nothing else than a vigorous attempt to rehabilitate the irrational.

The imaginative writers and the philosophers of the Romanticist movement devoted their eloquence, profundity and irony to an assault upon the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which they described as a "monstrous and barbarous violation of nature, cutting as it does organic life in twain

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with the shears of the concept." In contradistinction to the champions of the Enlightenment, the Romantics extolled darkness, night, as the creative mother of all that is genuinely alive.

In our own days, anti-rationalist philosophy has been incorporated once more, and pre-eminently, in the figure of Henri Bergson. For him and his school, it is not rational cognition which is the mainspring of human existence, but the "*élan vital*," the vital impetus, which strives towards configuration; and (they hold) man's most valuable cognitions arise, not from reason, but from intuition, from an immediate knowledge which is not associated with or subject to any sort of logical consideration.

Vitalism, intuitionism, dynamism—such modern philosophical doctrines posit an irrational vital factor far above rational cognition. The vital impetus, and not rational cognition, is, according to these schools, the truly important matter, to which all others are subordinated. From such an outlook proceeds the dictum of Ricarda Huch, who declares that reason is a faculty which does but "monkey God," being merely able to imitate what has already been created, or to pick to pieces what is already given in cognition.

Ludwig Klages pushes this repudiation of the intellectualists to an extreme, bluntly declaring that reason is the adversary of the soul. "What is reason?" asks Klages. He answers his own question as follows: "It is nothing, the absolute, the detached; whereas what we are concerned with is precisely the insoluble element of the generative earth. Reason has imposed on the world the burden of the cross upon which life, the soul, has been crucified."

This extensive change of direction in philosophy has been accompanied by a kindred revolution in psychology. Modern psychologists are unanimous in denying that human activities are primarily determined by reason.

Freud and Jung have shown what an enormous part irrational influences play in our mental life, and that powerful forces well up from the depths of the unconscious to influence our resolves and our actions. Ancient racial memories, symbols, and archetypes, decide the movements of our psyche; and rarely indeed can the rational reflections of the conscious mind hold in leash the straining forces of our impulsive world. Thus psychoanalysis has disclosed the way in which there is ever at work upon the determination of the thoughts and actions of human beings a power hostile to reason; and a power which, if not exclusively determinative,

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is at least co-determinative with reason in producing the decisions of our life.

We find, therefore, to-day, that the exact sciences, and philosophy and psychology as well, have been compelled to abandon the assumption that all the phenomena of the world and of human thought are explicable in the terms of reason. Everywhere we discern phenomena which are not amenable to rationalist explanation, and which compel us to recognise the irrational. The deeper we probe, the plainer this becomes.

Returning, now, to the programmes of the modern political irrationalists, we must sedulously abstain from the short and easy way of decrying the promulgators of these new theories as nothing more than reactionaries and obscurantists. What we are faced with, here, is something more than an ephemeral reversion, a political reaction. Whatever attitude any of us as an individual may assume towards these doctrines and systems, we have to admit that fundamentally they harmonise with a trend characteristic of our whole mental situation to-day. Those who proclaim the reign of myth, force, instinct, in politics and sociology, have good ground for pointing out that in every domain of mental life to-day irrationalism is disputing the right of reason to precedence.

Herein we see once more how the political ideals of an epoch are always, in one way or another, reflections of the philosophical and scientific convictions of the time. Just as, in the age of the Enlightenment, the philosophical rationalism of the French Revolution came to the front, so, now, is the scientific irrationalism of to-day represented by the anti-rational political and sociological doctrines of fascism and national socialism.

The question that consequently arises is whether the ideological spokesmen of the political revolt against reason are right in maintaining that rationalist civilisation has been moving along the wrong road and is foredoomed to destruction.

Of course those who voice the catchwords of the day maintain that reason has been slain once and for all, and that we are witnessing the dawn of a new realm of myth, instinct, and creative force. The student of history, however, will be on his guard against the totalitarian claim of the irrationalists. For, if the history of civilisation has shown us that the world has never been wholly guided by reason, it has also shown us that there has not hitherto existed any true civilisation without a strong tincture of rationalist elements. Had Christianity persisted in its primitive unconditional

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rejection of reason, as manifested in the grotesque penitential lives of the early Christian Stylites and in Tertullian's "credo quia absurdum," it would speedily have atrophied to become nothing more than one petty sect among many. In the writings of Augustine, already, Christian doctrine had begun to adopt many elements of the classical rationalist philosophy, and therewith dawned the Christian civilisation of the West. From century to century, in the sequel, there was an increasing tendency to supplement "revealed truth" by rationalist cognition, and to buttress faith by reason. At length, in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas, the outstanding scholastic philosopher and theologian, attempted to fuse the two worlds of rationalism and irrationalism into a unity, into a "philosophia perennis."

Down to the present day, the system of Aquinas, the "Thomist" doctrine, has remained the foundation of Catholic philosophy, and its traces can be followed in all the domains of Catholic creative civilisation. We may even say that it is of the essence of Catholicism that, in accordance with Thomist teaching, reason is nowise to be disdained, but is to be combined with revelation into a great system of cognition leading us upward towards God.

Nor could Protestantism, despite its beginnings out of Luther's revolt against "reason the arch-whore" and Calvin's utterly irrational doctrine of predestination, long withstand the impulse towards rationalism. Indeed, the permeation of Protestantism with rationalist elements was speedy and thorough. Modern biblical criticism and research have been the outcome of Protestant theology, and have often led to the verge of a complete repudiation of all that is irrational.

Furthermore we have to ask ourselves whether the irrationalist trends in modern science really signify a complete abdication of reason? They signify nothing of the sort! Those who promulgate the new irrationalism are not visionary prophets, drunken mystics, muddle-headed saints and obscure-minded poets, but scientists, philosophers, investigators—that is to say, at bottom, sober rationalists. What they teach is, not the renunciation of rational insight, but merely a restriction of the domain within which the dicta of reason appear to them fully valid. It has become plain that the laws of reason do not run everywhere, and that beyond certain bounds other methods of cognition than the rationalist must be applied. But within its own limits reason, science, continues to work in accordance with

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rationalist laws and formulas, and to achieve one triumph after another.

It is only those who have been obsessed by the political catchwords of the day that advocate the reign of an all-conquering unreason. A century and a half ago, during the French Revolution, the prevailing catchword was to the effect that the reign of absolute reason had begun, and that every vestige of the irrational must be cleared out of the world. In like manner, to-day, the catchwords based upon a partial understanding of the utterances of responsible investigators are the expression of crude exaggeration, leading to the confrontation of blunt alternatives, where, in reality, we must be concerned with the interaction of both factors, reason and unreason.

History, however, has never yet justified the crude alternatives of political slogans. What survives the heat and burden of the day to gain genuine historical validity is invariably one of those compromises which ardent believers and phrase-slaves so vehemently spew out of their mouths!

My general conclusion is, then, that the revolt against reason now in progress will ultimately lead to a synthesis between rationalism and irrationalism, to a middle principle of practical application. The revolt will have taught us not, as heretofore, to expect everything from reason. We shall have accustomed ourselves to give due weight to the vast reality of the irrational alike in nature and in human thought and action—to give the irrational its standing-ground in our otherwise logically fashioned system of the world. From the frank recognition of the irrational as an irreducible datum, we shall gain in the long run this much, that reason, far from being sentenced to death, will have been extricated from our present-day confusions.

VIENNA. RENÉ FÜLÖP-MILLER.

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BY WHAT AUTHORITY?

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It has become a trite remark in our day that civilisation itself may now be in danger. The French Revolutionary dogma of the infinite perfectibility of man, eloquently proclaimed by Condorcet, and enthusiastically diffused in England by the ponderous Godwin and the ethereal Shelley, allied to the belief in progress which was the legacy of nineteenth-century science, is seen to-day to be far less self-evident than would have been admitted possible by our optimistic grandfathers. One more war, says Mr Baldwin, and our precious civilisation may easily topple over like a house of cards. A new glacial age of the human spirit, opines Dean Inge, is one of the possibilities that we may well have to reckon with.

We may concede the fact that another world-war would destroy our civilisation, or at least transform it beyond all recognition, converting London either into a ruin or into a Moscow. But what is not always so clearly perceived is that not war, but something more deep-seated, is the cause of the hopeless upsetting of equilibrium in the contemporary world; and that is the absence of universally recognised authority. When in religion, in art, in politics, in social habits, the main landmarks are clear and unchallenged, the peoples march on, deviating comparatively little to left or right. It is when these things are in doubt, when there is no acknowledged pillar of fire by night or of cloud by day, that they roam hither and thither, eagerly searching for a path, until the eagerness eventually becomes a furious debate or a hopeless scepticism. For civilisation, after all, is only the name which we give to that equilibrium which is attained when men are generally satisfied that the right road has been found, and when all the activities of the human spirit con-

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verge harmoniously upon it. Historical parallels are notoriously untrustworthy, and very far from providing anything in the nature of scientific proof; for the old Greek spoke only the truth when he told us that you cannot step twice into the same stream. All the same, historical parallels judiciously employed may prove illuminating and useful. For history, though it may not repeat, does certainly resemble itself. Certain causes do tend to produce the same results under generally similar conditions. It may therefore repay us to look into the causes of the one other big catastrophe befalling a mighty civilisation, of which we have fairly abundant and reliable information; that is the classical civilisation of Greece and Rome.

The ruin of classical civilisation was due to two causes—inward decay, and a political accident. As a result, there came about the destruction of all legitimate authority, and the substitution for it of a despotism resting upon no clear or well-defined principle of government. The Roman Empire, under Diocletian and his immediate successors, tried to reconcile two conflicting principles of authority—the monarchical principle of the Eastern despotisms, and the republican principle of the Western city-states. The reconciliation (of which the Emperor was the symbol) remained, however, always defective; for it never succeeded in defining the constitutional principle from which the supreme authority of republican monarchy ought to spring. That principle was not heredity, as in the East; neither was it election, as in the West. Still, so long as the Senate retained its prestige and semblance of power it was recognised as the source of imperial authority. Septimus Severus destroyed that source; and in so doing really destroyed the basis of ancient civilisation. Of the three conflicting principles, that of divine right met with the greatest success; for the Eastern Roman Empire was built upon it; and that Empire survived well on into the fifteenth century, even re-civilising Europe through the Renaissance. The East had been prepared by history for despotism, while the West had not.

We Western Europeans who emerged in 1918 from the war were, in fact, in a situation which possessed striking analogies to that of Ancient Rome in the hour of its crisis. It is not realised, perhaps, as clearly as it ought to be, that in March 1917 one of the two principles upon which rested the whole social order of Europe—the monarchical principle—received a first and terrible blow through the Russian Revolution; and that it received a second blow, this one

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decisive and mortal, in November 1918, when the Empires of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns were overthrown. That was an event of overwhelming importance; the culmination of tendencies which had been at work for upwards of two hundred years. In consequence of it, Europe found itself faced with the grave danger of being altogether without any settled principle of political authority. The subsequent overthrow of the monarchy in Turkey, Greece, and Spain, and its virtual supersession in Italy, of course intensified the crisis by extending the area subject to anarchy.

The Christian Empire which emerged from the deluge which had overwhelmed the ancient world had discovered a solution of the central political problem which, if the religious ideas then dominant be accepted, was well-nigh perfect. It had given a sacred character to all governments, republican or monarchic, aristocratic, oligarchic, or democratic, which were legitimate; that is to say, which derived their origin from a legal act of unimpeachable validity, or which had become legitimate through the passage of time. But once the underlying ideas had begun to lose their authority, this conception of government became no longer tenable. The Thirty Years' War was the first real school of scepticism in Europe. Out of its ruins publicists like Grotius endeavoured to build a public law of universal validity which should owe nothing to divine sanctions. To the old religious conceptions, the eighteenth century opposed a philanthropic and rationalistic view of human society. Authority was now considered to be a purely human thing, having its source in the will of the people rendering obedience to it. True sovereignty lay in the people. Law, in order to be just, ought to express the people's will, and that alone. The theory is a seductive one; and it did seduce most of the best minds of an enlightened age, tired of the feebleness, the sloth, the routine, and the conservatism of the old *régime*. The French Revolutionists attempted to put the new political theory into practice. But difficulties at once began to manifest themselves. What is meant by the "People"? How can their will be known? By what organs can the will of the people express itself? One need only follow the constitutional history of France during the few brief years of the revolutionary period to realise how difficult of application is the principle of the sovereignty of the people. At last it became nothing more than a formality for legitimising a military dictatorship based on force, and exercising an authority far more absolute than that of the old monarchies.

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The European Congresses which met periodically between 1814 and 1822 endeavoured to establish permanently durable conditions. While the Congress of Vienna decided to reconstruct Europe upon the principle of legitimacy, the majority of great States were of opinion that it had unfortunately become necessary to strengthen that principle by conceding representative institutions. Among the leading countries of the West, Austria alone remained faithful to the doctrine of absolutism pure and undefiled. In the majority of other States a compromise was effected: the monarch remained nominally supreme as sovereign, while representative institutions functioned with more or less of real power in the background. How weak, in fact, was any such theory of democracy as would pass muster to-day becomes obvious when the writings of such typical political thinkers of the revolutionary period as Rousseau and Burke are carefully examined. Rousseau based his State upon what he termed a "general will" for the attainment of general good. But he rejected specifically the mere will of all; pleading instead for a general will, general in the sense that it is for the general good; a good which may not be realised consciously by all, but may be expressed by a single legislator who grasps its demands. In a word, "general" refers to the object pursued, and not to the number of citizens pursuing it. Here, beyond peradventure, is a theory of democracy with which not even a Mussolini need have any quarrel. For your modern autocrat does not claim to be exercising rule by divine right: what he claims is that he understands the real wishes of his people far better than they do themselves.

Burke was more truly democratic than Rousseau in that he perceived clearly that the general will can only be elicited by the active thought of a free representative organ or organs. In practice, however, he was content with an English Parliament which at best meant a virtual representation by Whig magnates acting as self-appointed trustees for the community. He never saw, what afterwards came to be the central doctrine of true democrats like Mill and T. H. Green, that the real value of a representative system of government is measured, not by the efficiency of the ruling body which it produces, but by the scope which it gives to the thought and will of each voter, and the extent to which it makes the whole community organic, by interesting each and every member in its life. Burke forgot that what matters in government is not so much the product, as the producer. The life and energy of the community is itself the end of the

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community. It was because he failed to grasp that fact that the great Whig writer was quite content, seemingly, with an electorate numbering some 400,000, at a time when the population of England had reached 8,000,000.

Almost inevitably the compromise effected between a still lively theory of the divine right of kingship, and a nascent and weakly theory of the divine right of the people at large, broke down. In France the legitimate dynasty only just succeeded in keeping the Chamber in the subordinate position assigned to it by the Charter. The struggle between Crown and Parliament, between divine right and popular sovereignty, between the old aristocracy and the awakened bourgeoisie, was continual, terrible, and implacable. Then came the July Revolution of 1830; resulting in the overthrow of the legitimate dynasty, and in the triumph of the principle of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless the people, even after this somewhat spectacular triumph, did not dare to use their victory to the full. Once again a compromise was arrived at, from which the "Citizen-King" emerged. Here was a throne surrounded by republican institutions, and floating on a sea of egalitarian oratory. Still the "people," as in Burke's England, meant only about 200,000 electors; a tiny minority of the adult population of France. It was between 1830 and 1848, by way of reaction against this absurd contradiction, that the doctrine of universal suffrage became the expression, almost mystical, of the sovereignty of the people. The Peoples' Charter in England, and the democratic propaganda in the South German States in the years immediately anterior to 1848, afford clear evidence of the progress which this dogma had made in the West. In the United States, of course, it was already a fundamental part of the sacrosanct Constitution.

The French Revolution of 1848 succeeded for the moment in vesting political power in the whole people, expressing their will by a plebiscite. But this democratic triumph proved short lived. The first National Assembly in France to be elected by the new suffrage was composed, in part, of the "old gang"; and as to the rest, of a great majority of time-serving republicans, and a small minority of sincere ones. Its action was confused and uncertain, and disorder soon pervaded the whole country. Lack of governance, as always, produced a violent reaction in favour of strong central authority; for, as in Tudor England, royal tyranny coupled with ordered efficiency was regarded as a welcome substitute for Parliamentary ineptitude and anarchy. In France the

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Second Empire was the result. Precisely the same drama was enacted in Germany; where the discredited Frankfort Parliament gave place to kings basing their authority partly on election, partly on divine right.

So emphatic and resounding was the defeat sustained in 1848 by the principle of popular sovereignty, that democratic doctrines and parties were discouraged for some three generations as a result. The victorious principle, however (that of divine right), was almost as greatly weakened by the method of its own triumph. In that fact lies the tragedy of 1848; and there also we shall find the key to the whole subsequent history of Europe down to 1914. Governed by a nephew of the great Napoleon, the upstart who had spent his best energies during twenty hectic years in the overthrowing one after another of a whole series of divinely appointed kings, France could no longer with any decency be a party to the Holy Alliance. The King of Sardinia (well started on his revolutionary road towards the crown of a united Italy), was fatally compromised through his having been the first among crowned heads, in 1848, to set at defiance the Vienna settlement of 1815. The Parliament of Frankfort had created a bitterness between Prussia and Austria, of which the astute Bismarck was prepared to take full advantage. Soon came the Crimean War, in its turn creating suspicion and dislike between Habsburgs and Romanoffs. That perfect harmony between the great autocratic states, which was the very foundation of the Holy Alliance, and indeed of the public law of Europe, was thus for ever broken; and with it was shattered the main strength of monarchical power. With Russia in alliance with republican France, and England standing aloof, it soon became apparent that the monarchical principle depended entirely upon the hegemony of Germany in Europe; while equally apparent was it becoming that such hegemony could only be maintained so long as Germany was able to display an overwhelming predominance of military force. Sooner or later the day was bound to arrive when Germany would be called upon to give proof of the possession of such power, or else relinquish the claim which tacitly she was making.

The day arrived in July 1914. Germany and Austria attacked Russia with the immense armies which conscription and industrial progress had enabled them to organise. The Russian Revolution, by its example, as well as by the void which it created on the flank of the Central Powers, provoked, in turn, the Austrian, Hungarian, and German

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Revolutions. The fall of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, following so shortly upon that of the Romanoffs, was the final collapse of the monarchical principle—the only principle of political authority, be it noted, acknowledged and understood throughout the greater part of Europe. A few monarchs survived; but they were symbols, not kings.

What, then, of the opposing principle, that of popular sovereignty? Was it capable of filling the void created by the disappearance of its rival? In 1914 three governments only rested exclusively upon the sovereignty of the people, viz. those of Switzerland, France, and the United States. Switzerland is too small, and her position altogether too anomalous, for very much to be learnt from her example. The United States had shown that democratic institutions could govern even an immense continent: but America is not Europe. France, in truth, was a great European State governed by a democracy; but it was only by a tremendous and terrible effort that she had succeeded in maintaining the Republic, and by sacrificing some other precious things to that end. Indeed, for the French people, the Republic was only an improvisation of despair, behind which lurked the brutal dictatorship of force, and the slimy influence of corruption. What, then, of the converts to democracy? We know that in Russia the Republic lasted from March 1917 to November of the same year—exactly eight months. In November 1917 the sovereign people were dispossessed by the Communist Party; or, to be more strictly accurate, by the oligarchy which dominated that Party. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is simply a return to naked and unabashed absolutism. In Hungary the Republic fell, after a few uneasy months, under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat; which, in turn, succumbed to a military dictatorship of the old style. Italy became a Fascist Dictatorship in 1922; and between that date and 1933, Poland, Turkey, Austria, and Germany, all of them repudiated democracy both in theory and practice, and sought to set up novel forms of government, the only common recognisable principle in them all being dictatorship.

Reference has already been made to the fact that there is no essential incompatibility between Rousseau's theory of democracy and the theory of government, call it what we will, now fashionable in Italy, Austria, and Germany; but no reconciliation is possible between the Nazi or Fascist creeds and democracy as taught and practised in England in the

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past fifty years. For by democracy we have understood a progressive realisation of three things—Security, Equality, and Freedom. Security meant safeguarding the humblest individual not only against the lawlessness and violence of other individuals, but also against the tyranny and lawlessness of the State itself. The rule of law has seemed to us, ever since the days when the great Coke confronted Bacon, to be the only bedrock upon which a civilised political community can be built. Freedom meant the gradual elimination of every sort of discrimination, whether of race, sex, religion, or social status. Freedom meant an ever-increasing latitude of self-expression for the individual, as against both tradition and the State. How completely every one of these ideals is abandoned to-day in all the countries subject to a dictatorship it would be superfluous to point out.

Some day, no doubt, if they endure, a political theory will be evolved to explain and justify these novel political systems. In the meantime it is fair to argue that Fascism, or Nazism, or whatsoever the dictatorship may please to call itself, is purely an opportunist invention, the product of critical emergencies in national and international affairs. Until a theory is found, capable of covering all the facts, and satisfying to the outside and impartial human judgement, they must inevitably rest upon force and upon that alone; and force must always mean unrest.

Such, then, appears to be the grave danger which at present menaces Western civilisation. Except for France, Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, continental Europe does not see clearly how it can or ought to be governed. It no longer believes in one principle universally accepted; and in this uncertainty it is easily seduced by political quacks and revolutionary catchwords. The last war destroyed much; but far and away the most important piece of destruction wrought by it was the destruction of the principle of authority. If Europe generally, in and immediately after 1918, had only possessed governments of sufficient strength and stability, the work of reconstruction would have been comparatively swift and easy; for science has now so added to our capacity to create material wealth, that even the gigantic waste of the war years could soon have been made good. But ruined by war, plunged in profound economic distress, strung to the point of hysteria by the prolonged strain of the four awful years, surrounded by every sort of difficulty—political, economic, social, military, and diplomatic—and with governments fumbling with tasks far

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beyond their abilities, uncertain of their own mandate, and consequently unable to govern decisively, the greater part of Europe could only fall into a prolonged period of anarchy. The principle of authority is the foundation of all civilisation; and when it is undermined, or even weakened, the whole fabric quickly tumbles to the ground.

We are, in this matter, far worse off than were the inhabitants of Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries. Then, it is true, the great Empire, which had seemed to all men to be as immovably fixed as the seven hills upon which stood its capital city, had been disrupted, and its far-flung provinces become cockpits in which rival hordes of barbarians fought for mastery; but religious belief did set a limit to intellectual and moral anarchy, and indirectly to political anarchy as well. Amid the welter of conflicting loyalties, it was possible for Augustine to pen his *City of God*, and to find it, not in heaven, but on earth. Every individual had then at least a few ideas and principles which remained unshaken in his spirit, when nations and empires waxed and waned. And those bedrock ideas and principles were strong enough to become the steel frame which gave to the Middle Ages, despite their manifold diversities, their dominant characteristic of unity. Christendom, between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries, was a unity in a sense in which Europe has certainly not been since 1914. For the truth of the matter is, that we to-day have no fixed and immutable principles at all, with regard to the State, to economics, to æsthetics, or to morals. Anarchy is more deeply seated at present than it has ever been since Rome won its victory over Carthage.

It has now become a commonplace with political writers that we live in an age of transition. Unfortunately, we have heard that said so often that we have come to attach but little meaning to the phrase. There is, however, in the statement a profound truth, and one which throws a flood of light upon our international troubles in particular. Ours is a transition period, in the sense that the great chapter in European civilisation which opened with the Renaissance and the Reformation, appears to be drawing to a close.

The progress of history appears to be made up of alternate periods of violent agitation, in the course of which everything, no matter how sacred, is thrown into the melting-pot, and periods of more or less stability, during which the chief values are taken for granted. Fortunately, the periods of turmoil and violent change are generally of brief duration,

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while the periods of relative stability are to be measured by centuries.

It is a characteristic never absent from the transition periods, that questions are asked with regard to the deepest things of life; and because the questions are so vital, the disagreement about them inevitably leads to friction and bloodshed. Compromise is easy with regard to the surface problems of existence; but for what they hold to be the truth about the big central things, men are always prepared to kill others, and to die themselves, rather than surrender their convictions. That is precisely why the Reformation was followed by the hideous hundred years known as the period of the Religious Wars. In the Middle Ages there had been essential harmony, just because people agreed about all the main problems of life. Rich and poor, learned and simple, Scot and Italian, Englishman and German, all accepted without proof the same human values. There was but one type of "good life," taught by the church, and endorsed by the State; and though people might fail to live it, they all agreed that it ought to be lived. Where the men of those days disagreed, it was mainly about trifles. And, be it remembered, there was always the universal belief in the divine function of the Pope to declare *ex cathedra* which side was in the right. The Renaissance and Reformation did two things: First, they abolished the Papacy as a universally recognised tribunal. And secondly, they induced men to ask fundamental questions; for the scientific mind had been born. Now it is pretty obvious that once people begin to plumb the depths, they will begin seriously to disagree; and that is just what Western Europe did in the sixteenth century. And because one-half of Europe would no longer turn to the Pope for guidance, and no alternative tribunal had been devised, there remained but one possible arbiter—the sword.

But out of the anarchy of the sixteenth century there emerged a new civilisation, with new values which, at least so far as the greater part of Europe was concerned, were of universal validity. In politics this new consensus took the form of the Sovereign National State, first proclaimed by Macchiavelli to be above all law, and omnicompetent to the full extent of its physical power. Side by side with that, there went such a unanimity as to literary and artistic standards, that it was possible, despite the great strides made by the spirit of nationality, to speak of a *European* culture. Titian might be an Italian; but there was a ready

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response to his art in Germany. Cervantes might be a Spaniard; but Don Quixote was as much at home in England as was Tom Jones. Beethoven might be a German; but his music was as much appreciated in Paris and Florence, in Amsterdam and Madrid, as it was in Vienna. That is to say, we all, as Europeans, acknowledged the supremacy of the same masters, in literature, in music, and in painting; nor was there either any serious disagreement with regard to the fundamental questions of moral conduct. And because there existed this essential agreement, covering so much of life, wars tended to be a species of rough sport, rousing but little national passion, and leaving behind them hardly any bitterness at all.

Ever since 1919 we have been addressing ourselves to the problem of international anarchy, and striving with might and main to devise machinery for its control in the interests of peace. Not to do so would be suicidal folly. Our attempt, however, would probably meet with greater success if we realised that political anarchy to-day is only a part of general anarchy. The truth is, that we are passing again through a period comparable to the sixteenth century, a period in which there is a general and drastic overhauling of all the old accepted standards. No longer are the former masters acknowledged without question to be supreme. Beethoven and Mozart are deemed by many to be too old-fashioned to have any message for us. The "new music" has little, if anything, in common with the harmonies which delighted us all until recently. So is it also in the domain of art. It was the present writer's fortune to live an entire winter in a club, on the walls of which were hung several specimens of the very latest in pictures. There was one in particular which gave occasion for endless debate; and at the end of six months the club was divided into three factions; one maintaining that the artist had intended to depict the face of a young woman, the second declaring that it was supposed to be the head of a sheep, and the third contending that indubitably it was neither sheep nor woman but obviously a tooth-brush! The votaries of each opinion clung obstinately to their view; and as there was no arbiter of authority to settle the question once and for all, a permanent division took place. Fortunately, the atmosphere of the club was so friendly that no blows were struck, though black looks were often exchanged.

If such examples as the foregoing be multiplied, and spread, not only over Europe, but over a whole world brought close together by the scientific inventions of the past half

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century, it is easy to see that the nations have plenty to quarrel about, even if there existed no economic rivalries. The chief thing lacking is an external authority to settle our points of difference; and such an authority is not likely to appear until we have built again a new civilisation of fairly general validity. In the meantime the inevitable is happening: where authority is absent, force flows in to take its place. Only a negligible fraction of intelligent people are so obsessed with the dream of non-resistance as to believe that force can be dispensed with altogether in the world of to-day. On that point fervid and idealistic internationalists like Mr H. G. Wells are at one with Mr Yeates-Brown and the whole school of fire-eating nationalists. But there is all the difference in the world between using force to aid an already existing moral right, and using force as a substitute for moral right. Here in a nutshell we have the whole matter in issue between the true believers in might, and the true believers in right. The old doctrine of force, which has received recently so ghastly a re-enthronement in many so-called civilised countries, is that might is self-justified, and because self-justified can call into being rights which did not previously exist. To that view the new post-War internationalism, the political philosophy which we associate with the names of Wilson, Bryce, Smuts, Nansen, Briand, Robert Cecil, Masaryk, and the millions of men and women in many lands who agree with them, is irreconcilably opposed; for it insists that no amount of force can ever turn a wrong into a right, or create a valid title to anything where no title already existed. It is this latter doctrine that has prevailed in the domestic life of every civilised state. Only among barbarians may a man acquire a title to his neighbour's flocks, or house, or wife, in virtue of superior bodily strength or cunning. Which of two claimants to a thing is the stronger physically or mentally is an irrelevant consideration when both stand before a judge: verdict goes to the one that has right on his side. But once the verdict has been pronounced, force may have to be employed to carry it into effect.

Unless we are to sink back internationally into the condition of anarchy from which we fondly hoped we had permanently emerged in 1918, we must be prepared to apply this only known method of law to inter-state disputes as well. Recourse to force, in the absence of a verdict given by an impartial tribunal, is of the very essence of barbarism.

BIRMINGHAM. W. WATKIN DAVIES.

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THE SCIENTIFIC ATMOSPHERE AND THE CREEDS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

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DURING the last 100 years, and for the most part during the lifetime of the older members of the present generation, a complete revolution has taken place in the thought of Western Europe. It is greater in extent than the revolution which occurred during the sixteenth century and which accompanied the reformation of religion and the renaissance of learning. The earlier revolution, since it challenged the hitherto undisputed authority of the Catholic Church, produced fiery outbursts of fanaticism and religious wars which deluged Europe with blood. The revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has come slowly and silently, and may be compared to the growing dawn of a summer day. It has produced what may be justly termed the "Holy Catholic Church of Science." Wherever Western education has spread, the forms of scientific thought have established their sway, and the scientific writers in Pekin, Tokio, Calcutta, Colombo, Angora, Moscow, Buenos Ayres and London use the same type of argument and have the same outlook on life. The ancient argument in favour of the Christian creeds that they embodied "*quod ubique semper et ab omnibus creditur*" is certainly valid for the presuppositions of science. But because religious tradition is taught to the young during the most impressionable years of life, it produces an almost ineradicable effect on the mind, and so elderly people continue to observe forms of worship which imply beliefs about the Universe which, if put to the worshippers bluntly, would not receive their assent. Since, however, the younger genera-

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tion came above the horizon this state of affairs has changed. Scientific ideas have penetrated even into elementary teaching, and boys and girls of any degree of intelligence are struck with the glaring contrast between the conception of the world contained in their traditions and that implied in their scientific text-books. The consequence is that a large majority of them, when they escape from their parents, without formally renouncing the Christian creed give up the practices of religious worship altogether.

The most strongly engrained parts of early Christian teaching are the ethical ideals, reinforced as they still are in many cases by the example of parents and teachers. So we find to-day men who profess a purely materialistic philosophy, but who nevertheless uphold and practise evangelical standards of ethics. This, however, is an unstable state of affairs, and slowly and certainly the influence of scientific teaching will be pushed farther and farther back towards the beginning of intelligent life, and the ethical ideals will undergo a corresponding change. Many think that signs of this change are already becoming evident in the young people of to-day.

It becomes, therefore, a matter of urgency to inquire whether there are elements in the Christian faith which are of permanent significance, which are, so to speak, expressions of *reality;* and if so, whether these elements can be separated from the temporary accretions which have adhered to them, because these accretions will render the adhesion of the younger people to the Church more and more difficult, and forty years hence the Church, if it still exists, will necessarily be constituted of these same people who are now young.

If we, then, contrast the conceptions of the Universe embodied in the ancient scriptures with those entertained by scientific men to-day, we seem to be contemplating two totally different worlds. For the early Christian, the driving force in the Universe was the active living God, Who was concerned for the welfare of His own people, but Whose feelings towards the rest of mankind were those of wrath and vengeance. Natural phenomena, such as terrific thunderstorms, floods and droughts, were due to the direct interference of this God with the natural flow of events in Nature, and were expressions of His displeasure with the world's inhabitants. The whole existing framework of Nature would shortly be destroyed by fire from heaven: God's people would be saved, but the rest of mankind would be doomed to punishment in eternal fire.

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The scientific view is that, whether God as an Intelligence exists or not, the events in Nature take place according to regular laws which are not influenced by Divine anger or approval. In order to escape destruction by natural forces it is necessary, not to pray to God for relief, but to discover the laws governing these forces and thus learn to control or avoid their outbursts. The study of the past history of the world gives no support to the view that it is nearing its destruction. The ultimate extinction of life on the globe seems likely to be caused by cold, not fire, as the heat of the sun slowly diminishes and dies down, but that contingency is hundreds of millions of years off.

Of course it will be answered that few, if any, Christians now hold the crude beliefs of the primitive Church, but they were vigorously upheld and taught less than 100 years ago. Not only are they deeply embedded in the traditions contained in Catholic dogma, but they are so plainly and unequivocally expressed in the ancient scriptures that Protestants whose faith is based on the Divine inspiration of the Bible are as much bound to these beliefs as Catholics. The prowess of the early Church in making conversions is generally praised; but it is too often forgotten that one of the strongest weapons in the armoury of the early Christians was the proclamation of the impending destruction of the world by fire from heaven. Even Paul says, "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord we persuade men"; and his advice on the subject of marriage shows that whilst he regarded marriage as lawful he did not think it worth while, since the time remaining was so short. But the same doctrine can be found in the teaching of the Founder Himself. When He says, "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come," and again, "Verily I say unto you; there be some standing here who shall not taste of death till they have seen the Kingdom of God coming in power," it is obvious that He held the same beliefs as His follower Paul.

It seems fairly clear, also, that it was these beliefs, and not the ethical teachings of the Church, which drew on it the pagan persecutions which, as John Morley once remarked, were a trifle compared with the persecutions which Christians inflicted on one another. The Romans, whatever their faults, were an enlightened people; they claimed that they conciliated the nations brought under their sway by the benefits which Roman rule conferred on them. The Romans were the last people in the world to object to a sect which

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taught the duty of abstaining from murder, stealing, slander and adultery, and which enjoined the social virtues of care for the sick and almsgiving. But when this same sect taught the immediate approach of the destruction of the whole world, including the Roman State, by fire from heaven, then they were not unjustly alarmed. In those days a belief in sympathetic magic was deeply engrained in all Mediterranean peoples, and when the promised delivery tarried, the Christians were strongly suspected of having started sympathetic fires in order to expedite the explosion of Divine justice.

It is a matter of history that the Christians were accused of having set fire to Rome. Tacitus attributes the fire to Nero, and suggests that Christians were blamed for it in order that they might serve as Nero's scapegoats, but this story seems unlikely, and when we consider the hatred of Tacitus for Nero and his party, it seems probable that it originated as a scandal picked up by Tacitus from Nero's enemies and invented after his death.

There is, moreover, one book in the New Testament which affords strong indirect evidence that the charges brought against the Christians were just. In the mysterious book of Revelation we are given a picture of the destruction by fire of "the great whore." The "whore," we are informed, is "the great city which sitteth on seven hills and ruleth over the kings of the earth." It may be said that the picture of the destruction is a figurative one: but this is certainly not the case; it is a life-like description of the Rome of the emperors, with its luxury, and especially with its great import trade; and when the book of Revelation was written there must have been an ardent hope in the minds of Christians generally that this burning of Rome would take place, a hope which a valiant few attempted to convert into a reality.

We have sketched the outlook of the early Church on life in order to bring out its sharp contrast with modern views, and it must be remembered that this outlook in its main outlines persisted until the beginning of the nineteenth century. True, the date of the final destruction was postponed from time to time; but every unusual outburst of natural forces was regarded as a herald of the end. The latest writers in the New Testament attempted to account for this postponement by their doctrine that "a thousand years is with the Lord as one day." As is well known, the same metaphorical interpretation was applied by modern

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Christians to explain away the creation of the world in six days recorded in Genesis, though, as a matter of fact, the present writer was taught the literal truth of the six days' creation a little over fifty years ago.

It cannot be denied that it was the rise of the sciences of geology and biology, both of which are less than 100 years old, which finally exploded the old view of the Universe, and it is from the point of view of a modern biologist that we wish to examine the essentials of Christianity. Considering that all our modern life is ultimately founded on Christian ideals, and that recognition of these ideals has been continually growing in spite of the loss of faith in Christian tradition, it seems *a priori* probable that this tradition must contain a core of reality, since otherwise it would not be so functionally active and so beneficent as it has proved itself to be.

We might not unfairly summarise the Christian philosophy as follows. The Power behind the Universe, which governs the lives of men, is an intelligent Power Who is deeply interested in human conduct. He has ordained laws for conduct which the great majority of mankind are unable to live up to. This failure is termed "sin," and the Almighty Power is in a state of permanent indignation with sin. The soul of man is immortal, but in consequence of sin the fate of the human race in the next world is an evil one. God has in the past revealed the correct rules of conduct only to one nation, the Jews, and they failed to profit by the revelation; but He sent His Son, the Founder of Christianity, into the world both to declare His will and by a cruel death, as representative of humanity, to pay the penalty due to sin, so that all who follow the Founder will secure happiness in the next life.

Now in this philosophy the two all-important articles are stated in the very beginning: these are the existence of God and the immortality of the soul of man. What reason has a scientific man to believe that the Power behind Nature is conscious and intelligent? Intelligence in living beings is deduced from the exhibition of order and plan in their work. It is beyond all question that the visible Universe is pervaded by order, and its structure cannot possibly be explained by chance. Sir James Jeans has said that it begins to look like the thought of a great mathematician. But there is another and still more cogent reason for assuming an intelligent Power behind the Universe. If we, the observers, forget for a moment that we are human like the rest of the race,

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and view our fellow-men solely as external objects, we can find no reason to believe that the sensations which pour into their brains can give them any correct idea of the external world at all. All knowledge travels through the nerves, and according to Professor Adrian, who is the foremost authority on the structure of nerves, the nervous current consists solely in the passage of a pulse of electric pressure. The size of this pulse in no way depends on the magnitude of the disturbance in the external world which called the nervous current into being; it is a function of the particular nerve-fibre which is actuated. Variation in the intensity of the external impulse governs only the *number* of impulses which pass through the nerve in unit time. Life is made beautiful for us by our enjoyment of the great variety of colour in Nature; but colour does not exist outside us at all—it is a quality of our sensations; and the same thing is true of sound and smell. We seem to be shut off from any real knowledge of the outer world by a shell of flesh, in which are embedded the terminations of our sensory nerves. If these conclusions are taken seriously, they seem to put an end to the possibility of our obtaining any valid knowledge of the external world at all.

But, as Planck, the author of the *Quantum Theory*, justly says—

> "The fact that we can foresee and to a certain extent control the course of future phenomena would remain an insoluble mystery unless there were a certain correspondence between the structure of our minds and the structure of the Universe."

This dictum of Planck's virtually concedes the whole of the Theistic position. A "correspondence" between our minds and the Universe means that there is a power behind the Universe which is intelligent in the same sense that we are intelligent, only, of course, in vastly greater degree. In fact, the same view is succinctly expressed in the first chapter of Genesis: "In the image of God created He man."

The immortality of the soul, however, is a far more profound conclusion than the existence of an intelligent power behind Nature. It is a conclusion with which scientific thought in its narrower sense is totally unable to deal. Natural science concerns itself only with measurable quantities such as matter and energy, and the soul, if it exists, is *ex hypothesi* non-material. Biological science finds that life wherever it exists, from the humblest microbe up to man

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himself, is essentially the same kind of thing. Its outward manifestations consist of physical and chemical changes which take place in a certain kind of semi-fluid material of the kind that the physicist terms "*colloid*." This material is never homogenous; it is always a mixture of several kinds of organic substance in solution in water, which interact chemically with each other. When the colloid ceases to live it becomes an ordinary organic solution, which either remains stable or disintegrates into simpler materials according to circumstances. A considerable number of biologists regard all the changes which make up life as due to the mutual *positions* of the different substances found in the colloid solution—in a word, as due to its structure. This is the materialistic or mechanical view of life. According to this view, all life, and therefore all consciousness, is but the "aura," or flame, produced by these changes in living matter. It will be seen at once that such a view creates overwhelming philosophical difficulties; it is hard to see on this hypothesis that there can be knowledge at all. Matter can only be defined as something which impresses mind, and therefore, logically, mind is prior to matter. Huxley himself confessed that he was totally unable to conceive of matter apart from mind to picture it in. But, apart from philosophy altogether, the materialistic hypothesis seems inadequate to account for the observed facts of growth and development.

When an embryo develops into an adult with well-defined features, according to the materialistic hypothesis this should be due to the existence in the embryo of a manifold of parts with a distinct part for every adult peculiarity, and these parts should be in definite spatial relations to each other so as to account for the definite arrangement of adult organs. Development would then, in essence, be nothing but the separation from one another of these embryonic parts. This is the old eighteenth-century idea of "evolution" or "unfolding," which had nothing to do with the origin of species. But the work of Driesch and that of the other experimental embryologists who have followed in his steps have shown that this view is incorrect. When the parts of an embryo are disarranged and forced into abnormal relations to one another, the result is, not a monster, but a normal animal. Hence Driesch has postulated the existence of a non-material power, or "*entelechy*," which guides the physical and chemical forces to a definite end. Driesch's arguments evoked the most violent opposition, but they have never been seriously answered. The best

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proof of their soundness is that many of his critics have silently adopted his terms, such as "regulation," without confessing the source from which they drew them. The word "regulation" was introduced by Driesch to describe the mode of action of his entelechy. It would require more space than it is possible to give in this article to prove that an "entelechy" can be analysed into a series of memories; but such is the case, and the innermost constitution of any animal can be envisaged as a series of superposed memories, which, after all, is essentially the Freudian conception of the human mind. But does the "psyche" or "entelechy" survive the destruction of the material structure which it dominates? On this matter we can only plead blank ignorance, so far as the results of natural science go.

That the soul of man survives death is a very ancient belief—in fact, the oldest belief of which we have any evidence. It gave rise to the custom of burying with the dead the tools, weapons, and ornaments which they had used during life for eventual use by their possessors in the life after death. It used to be held that the survival of the soul was a superstition generated in Egypt about 5000 B.C. through the accident that when bodies were buried in the dry sand of the desert this produced a natural mummification and preserved the corpse from decay. But the skeletons of the oldest race of which we have any record, the Neanderthal or Mousterian race, who lived before the last phase of the glacial epoch and are at least 40,000 years old, were buried in the same manner as the Egyptian bodies, not in desert sand, but in the calcareous *débris* of the cave floors, and with them were also buried the implements which they had used during life for their further use in the life after death.

On what, it may be asked, was this old and persistent belief based? On the only foundation on which it could be based—viz., the occasional appearance of the dead as active intelligences to the living. It is beyond all question that the sudden emergence and rapid spread of Christianity were due to the fervent belief of the earliest disciples that they had seen and spoken to the Founder after His death. No serious historian has doubted the reality and power of this belief; the question which requires to be faced is whether this belief was based on misinterpretation and delusion, or whether it had a foundation in reality. The question whether ghosts are mere fancies or are expressions of the continued activity of departed spirits is not one which can be solved by scientific methods, if by "science" we mean the study of regularly

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recurring phenomena. But the scientific process of weighing and sifting evidence is applicable to occasional as well as to recurrent phenomena, and we can merely state that the severely critical distinguished Cambridge men who founded the Society for Psychical Research came to the conclusion that whereas most ghost-stories were due to mistake and delusion, there was a residuum which could not be explained away. When this conclusion was forced on F. H. Myers, the most illustrious member of the original society, he predicted that whereas when he wrote (*circa* 1900) few educated people really believed in the resurrection of Christ, in 100 years everyone would believe in it, for it would take its place amongst a series of similar phenomena recorded from all periods of human history.

If once, however, the survival of bodily death by the human spirit be admitted, then it alters the whole aspect of the Universe and renders it possible to believe that what can be called the core of the Christian faith may be true. Of what use, it may be justly asked, is the proof of the existence of a Divine Intelligence, if that Intelligence permits the other intelligences—which are, as it were, emanations of Itself—to suffer cruelty, disappointment and pain? But if this terrestrial existence be only the first phase in an endless career, then the sufferings here may be so related to future events as to enhance the ultimate joy of the synthesis when the future is added to the past. It seems to us, however, that we have no warrant on scientific grounds for declaring God to be good. The utmost that we can assert is that He may possibly turn out to be good, and that if this proves not to be the case, then God must be less worthy of admiration than the best of humanity, which *a priori* seems extremely unlikely to be true.

But the great Christian creeds embodied in the dogmas of the Catholic Church affirm a great deal more than the existence of God and the immortality of man. We are asked to believe that the Founder of Christianity was a Divine person with a supernatural power over Nature, in virtue of which He performed miracles, that He had a miraculous birth, and that His cruel death was a penalty due to God for the sin of the human race, who without this payment would have been lost.

When we come to examine the basis for these assertions the great difficulty which we encounter is that it is impossible to get a clear historical picture of what Jesus Christ was and what He taught. Whether as Catholics we fall back on

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traditional dogma, or as Protestants we take the words of the New Testament as supernaturally inspired, we find on examination that both the tradition and the written records have been tampered with by successive generations of Christians who regarded the edification of the multitude as of more importance than the discovery of historic truth.

If we confine ourselves to the Protestant position, it seems to us that the matter stands thus. The labours of scholars have dissected out from the Synoptic Gospels a core of parables and narratives which are unique amongst human records, and seem to be accurate reflections of a great and wonderful personality, and to be a revelation, if not of what God is, at least of what God ought to be. We may, in fact, say that we hope that *Reality*, which is another name for the Divine Spirit, shone through the man Jesus Christ. But the fourth gospel, which is regularly read in churches, seems to be largely made up of pious fiction. How can anyone imagine that the author of the story of the prodigal son could say to a Jewish crowd, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man ye have no life in you." If He did say such things and we had been there, should we not have been forced to agree with the crowd in rejecting Him?

This last point raises the question of the light in which the Founder regarded Himself. In Mark, the oldest gospel, His initial message is given as "Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand." Now Jesus was addressing a community every one of whom had been taught from childhood to look forward to the advent of that Kingdom, and therefore His words had an intelligible meaning for them. His early teachings consisted of advice as to the proper preparation for that advent. Towards the end of His career, however, He seems to have convinced Himself that He Himself had been chosen by God to be King of the coming Kingdom. It is constantly forgotten that the word "Christ" simply means king. He saw quite plainly that if He were to go to Jerusalem and proclaim Himself King, He would be put to death by the Romans, and yet "His face was steadfastly set to go to Jerusalem," one of the bravest acts recorded in history.

That He recognised His death as the inevitable outcome of His action is made certain by His institution of the sacrament of the Last Supper. He took the best possible way of commemorating an event by embodying it in a ritual. The old Jewish name for the divine King was Messiah, but the legends about Messiah did not represent Him as dying for His people. There was, however, another legend about the

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Suffering Servant of God, preserved for us in the inimitable fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, which did represent the Servant as bearing the sins of many. The servant is regarded by modern commentators as typifying the pious remnant of the nation who persisted in their allegiance to God when all the rest had been swept away, and were the seed from which the revivified future nation would spring. Jesus seems to have been the first to identify the Servant with the Messiah.

It has become clear, however, that the term "Messiah" was not only applied to the coming king who should restore the fallen kingdom of Judea in all its pristine splendour, but was also applied to each member of the Davidic line of pre-exilic kings. Each of these, when he had been anointed, became imbued with the "Spirit of the Most High," and constituted the channel of Divine grace to the people. If the people sinned and incurred God's wrath, he offered sacrifices and made atonement for them. Every power expected from the coming Messiah was merely a glorified edition of powers supposed to have been exercised by past Messiahs. Some of the psalms sung in our churches had probably no reference to a future Messiah at all, but were hymns of adoration to a newly-anointed Messiah.

The idea of a king of semi-divine character imbued with the grace of the patron deity was not confined to the Jews, but was shared by many other neighbouring peoples. The King of Assyria, for instance, was regarded as the human embodiment of the spring sun-god Marduk. In many cases the king after his decease was supposed to have been elevated to the heaven as a demi-god, but this view was excluded from the Jewish religion by its rigid monotheism. The legends about Osiris in the Egyptian religion will at once occur to one. Indeed, we might go further and say that all the gods of the primitive peoples of the ancient world were originally the glorified souls of earthly heroes. Their special duty was to see that the rules on which tribal morality is based were carried out, and to-day the native in Africa fears the judgment of the dead far more than that of the living. When Christianity spread beyond the Jewish borders to the pagan peoples of Asia Minor, the glorious news that the Founder had survived death and appeared to His disciples at once elevated Him to the rank of demi-god, and from this root sprang the doctrine of the divinity of Christ embodied in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.

It is therefore obvious that when we penetrate to the historical events underlying the gospel records, we become

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enmeshed in a nexus of primitive ideas which have little or any meaning for the enlightened man of to-day, and which constitute for the young an intolerable stumbling-block in the teaching of the Church. What, for instance, is the meaning of the word "sin"? Paul throws considerable light on it when he equates it with the word "flesh." That human nature, with its qualities of reason and self-control, however it may have come into being, is built on a platform of animal nature common to man and the other mammals is at once obvious to the student of comparative psychology. Sins are mainly passions which have full vent in the lower animals. If God is the creator of all life, then He is directly responsible for this animal foundation of human nature, and it is a gross libel on Him to represent Him as being in a state of wrath with us for possessing it. Paul, as we all know, endeavoured to get out of the difficulty by blaming the "fallen nature" on the mythical ancestor of mankind, Adam, but that argument will convince no one to-day. It may be conceded that the object of human life is to learn to control this lower nature, and that individual men and women succeed in this enterprise to very different degrees, but this is no ground for praising God's justice when He is supposed to condemn the less successful to eternal fire. The old idea of atonement has likewise become untenable. How can the fount of Eternal Justice pass over the sin of one man and remit its punishment, which is only the consequence of the sin, because another man has suffered a cruel death?

Finally, the idea of the last judgment grew out of the increasing feeling of the Jews that, except by Divine intervention, the Jewish State would never be restored. In spite of the successes of the Macabees, the Jews found themselves surrounded by powerful menacing military States, and they saw quite clearly that the only chance of their realising their fondest hopes was a divine intervention of unparalleled magnitude, and the expectation of this intervention was the germ of the idea of the last judgment.

If, then, we must dismiss the ideas of sin, atonement and a final judgment as conceptions belonging to a world view which has long passed away, what, it may be asked, remains of Christianity?

In what sense is Jesus Christ our leader and teacher? The answer is, just in so far as experience has proved the teachings of the Founder to give a correct idea of the structure and laws of *Reality*. It is Reality with which we have ultimately to deal, and the teaching of Christ is held to

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be divine just because it *works*. Even this statement requires qualification. On His human side the Founder was a Jew of 2000 years ago, and He was brought up in the traditions of His people. From these traditions He absorbed His terrible eschatology of eternal fire, but He modified it so as to make the fate of the victims depend, not on their non-observance of the written law, but solely on their want of charity to their neighbours. He regarded His own people as the special favourites of the Almighty—that is, of the Maker of the Universe—and He was doubtful as to how far He should exercise His healing power on any outsider. Finally, since He expected the final judgment within the lifetime of the existing generation, His rules of ethics were conceived for a transition stage of society. When He bade His followers carry neither scrip nor purse, it was obvious that He was not contemplating the welfare of future generations. In the time that the pastoral epistles were written it had become obvious that the world was going on for several generations; and the rigid rules of Jesus had to be relaxed, and the idle members of the community were told that if they would not work neither should they eat.

The modern Christian is confronted with dreadful biological problems connected with population and race to the solution of which the words of Jesus afford no help whatever; nevertheless, as generation succeeds to generation, the certainty grows that His precepts afford the only cement which will hold society together. But we must avoid the error of thinking that the light of Reality shines only on the members of our own faith. As Paul truly said, God has not left Himself without a witness amongst any people. The great defect of Christianity is its tribalism, which it has taken over from its parent, the Jewish faith. In Buddhism there is a far more universalist attitude than in Christianity: there is no election of a chosen race, the faith is truly for all people, and the legend of Amidha-Buddha, who refused to enter Nirvana and enjoy everlasting rest until the very devils themselves had begun to walk in the path of peace, is nobler than anything which we find in Christianity.

Finally, the most glorious conception of the Kingdom of God so far enunciated is that expressed by the so-called atheist Cambridge philosopher MacTaggart: "It may be that there is nothing in the Universe but love and lovers, and God is the love which unites them."

E. W. MACBRIDE.

ALTON, HANTS.

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WOMEN UNDER FASCISM.

E. SYLVIA PANKHURST.

Fascism and the emancipation of women are inherently opposed.

Fascism is the rule of force. It is so, not merely in practice, but essentially and in theory. For this reason it is the more inflexible, and there is no hope of its changing in this respect.

The women's movement could only develop as the rule of reason, justice and humanity replaced the rule of might, whether of muscular strength, or of the big battalions of military force, and material wealth; for woman must ever be the lesser in muscular strength, despite her great powers of endurance. She has never, and will never take to the battlefield. The cares of maternity, and the fact that in Europe property has been bequeathed in the male line, have mainly excluded her from material wealth.

Education, law, ethics, democracy, had to develop before woman began to come into her own. Indeed, it is an important fact that the women's movement for political enfranchisement, for education, and the right to engage in the professions, and for emancipation from a position of subjection in marriage, rose with and largely kept pace with the general movement for the liberation of the democracy. Mary Wollstonecraft raised her cry for women's emancipation in the hour when Europe was debating the ideals of the French Revolution, of which, though an Englishwoman, she was a true daughter. In her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* she couples the demand for their political enfranchisement with that of the enfranchisement of the common people.

The flag having been raised by Mary Wollstonecraft, and some other isolated pioneers, the women's movement first

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took practical form in the shape of committees organised to do sustained work for it in the height of the Gladstonian Reform movement in 1865–66. Progressing in one direction or another, breaking down, one by one, legal, educational, political and social barriers during the advance of the general reform current, the women's movement languished during the period of general political stagnation towards the latter end of the nineteenth century. It again took life and power with the rise of the Reform movement which, towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, brought a revival of Liberalism and the birth of the Labour Party. The final breaking down of the sex barrier against the Parliamentary enfranchisement of women was achieved alongside the complete enfranchisement of men on an adult suffrage basis. The irresistible right of the democracy to self-government was thus established towards the close of the Great War, which could not be fought without the willing participation of virtually the whole democracy.

To such a victory Fascism is utterly and openly opposed. It denies all democratic right. It sweeps away all the conceptions and ideals of the French Revolution and of the Radical and Democratic movements in this country and throughout Europe, and bases itself absolutely upon the rule, by compulsion over the democracy, of a super-imposed dictatorship. At every stage it relies on authority from above, maintained by force; and this not merely in relation to material things, but in those of the mind and the spirit. In industry, in politics, in religion and in ethics it insists that there shall be one Party, one opinion, which all must perforce obey. This, I must again emphasise, is not an accident arising from the imperfect nature of human beings, not an expedient, frankly or covertly devised to tide the Government over a difficult period, but a theory guiding the whole conception and practice of the Fascist State.

Reposing upon force, and taking as its ideal the dictator supported by his fighting men, it is but to be expected that Fascism opposes any participation in government by the mother half of the race. It places woman in a subordinate position under the authority of the fighting male. With the nauseous repetition characteristic of it, it has continued to proclaim its view that the part of women under Fascism is to produce fighting men, and to be the entertainment and servant of the tired warrior.

Mussolini, in his conversations with Emil Ludwig, states bluntly :—

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"Women must obey. My opinion of the rôle of women in the State is opposed to feminism. If I were to give women the vote people would laugh at me; in a State like ours they ought not to count. Do you know how the Anglo-Saxons will end? In the matriarchate!"

He added that only one of his ancestors interested him, a Mussolini of Venice, who killed his wife because she had been unfaithful to him. He stabbed her twice in the breast and absconded. "That is what the men of the Romagna from whom I am descended are like!" [1]

The official *Biography of Mussolini*, by Margherita Sarfatti, which is used as a text-book for the children in the elementary schools, declares that Mussolini considers it the mission of woman to be beautiful and pleasing. "If she does not know she is pleasing she is nervous and unhappy."

In the Fascist Party, which, like everything else in the Fascist State, is controlled by a dictatorship from above, not elected but self-assumed, women cannot participate. Their membership is not permitted. There are, it is true, the Women's Fascist Groups. Indeed, in May, 1931, the *Foglio d'Ordini* of the National Fascist Party called for more energy in the founding of "Fasci Femminili." This, however, was mainly a challenge to the Catholic Church, for Fascism was at that moment engaged in its struggle to minimise the influence of Catholic action, and, as everyone knows, the charitable work of the Church has been one of the great means by which it has maintained its hold upon the women who receive and on the women who administer its alms. The Fascist Party now ordered that in all localities where a men's Fascist group of ten or more members existed, a women's group must be brought into being. Italian women of "irreproachable character and Fascist aims," who had attained the age of twenty-two years, were alone to be eligible for membership. It must, however, be emphasised that the activities of the "Fasci Femminili" are strictly limited, and directly subject to the authority of the men's groups, the woman secretary taking her orders, not from the members of her own group, but from the officials of the men's organisations; in Fascism, authority, be it remembered, is always from above. The women's groups are strictly prohibited from concerning themselves with politics; they are confined to philanthropic and propaganda activities approved by the Party, and especially the relief of distress

[1] Emil Ludwig's "Conversations with Mussolini."

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amongst dependents of Fascists who lost their lives in the struggle for power. The official instructions observe :—

> " This is the most effective means of propaganda and of penetration. The duty of the groups will be to relieve persons in need, who apply daily at the Fascist offices, and also to pay visits to the sick and necessitous in their homes. . . . This giving of moral and material help is a duty purely feminine, a duty which could not well be entrusted to any other organisation."

As everyone knows, British women of the nineteenth century had a stiff battle to secure the right to attend our Universities, but in Italy the Universities had never been closed to women. In the Middle Ages women held professorships there, and some of them became famous in history. Since Fascism came to power, a law has been passed that no woman may teach a male person over eleven years of age any subject which affects the formation of character, and as Fascism takes a very comprehensive view of how character and political opinion may be formed, this has a widely debarring effect. It precludes women from becoming professors in ordinary, and class teachers in the Universities and higher schools of Italy, and relegates them to certain defined subjects. Moreover, the rule that all teachers and professors must hold the Fascist card excludes an even larger proportion of women than of men, because the " Fasci Femminili " are more rigorously exclusive than the men's groups.

In 1934, according to figures published in the Fascist paper, *Corriere della Sera*, on March 1 the Fascist Party numbered 1,538,736, made up of 920,156 Fascist men, 175,780 Fascist women, 53,010 members of University groups, 52,568 Fascist Youth Groups, and 336,322 Fascist Combatant Youth Groups. As the population of Italy numbers upwards of 43 millions, the Party which nominally dominates the country therefore forms a very small proportion of the people.

When, soon after Fascism came to power, a woman was appointed as director of the great Scala Theatre in Milan, having abundantly proved her capacity for the post, the Fascist Press denounced the appointment as " an insult to lovers of the drama and to the great masters of Italian Art." " Is our revolution so poor in *men* that a woman should be appointed to the premier theatre of Italy ? "

Subordinated, even despised as a weaker vessel useless for warfare, which is the basis of its ideal, woman has, never

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theless, an all-important value for Fascism as the vehicle for producing the fighting male. Cash prizes are given by the Communes for the sixth, seventh and eighth children, and for twins. By the law of June 6, 1929, bachelors and spinsters were relegated to second place for State and other employment; preference must be given to the married over the single, and to fathers and mothers of families over childless people, as part of the general policy of securing large families and increased population. Even this was not enough, and compulsion for all State employees to marry came as a logical sequel.

The increase of population is accompanied by many difficulties, especially by insufficient accommodation in the schools, 1,000 children being excluded from the elementary schools of Milan alone for this reason. Preference in school places is given to the children of Fascists, to orphans of men who fought in the Fascist Revolution and the Great War, and to the children of the disabled in these contests; also, in accordance with the general Fascist view, to boys before girls!

Few people outside Italy are aware of the astounding degradation in legal and social status suffered by Italian womanhood under Fascism.

The penal code of 1929, compiled after the Lateran Treaty and the Concordat, and the regulations elaborating the code, which have been issued by Church and State, place women in a position of extreme legal inferiority towards men in every relationship affected by the law, and worsens their position at every turn.

The minimum age for marriage,[1] hitherto in Italy fifteen for girls and eighteen for lads, has been reduced to fourteen and sixteen respectively, a deplorably retrograde step, which is the more grievous on account of the legally defenceless position of the little girls thus prematurely hastened into matrimony.

In this country it was once the law that a man might beat his wife with a stick no thicker than his thumb; to-day he has here no legal right to strike his wife at all; she is entitled to proceed against him for any act of violence. The new Italian Penal Code punishes only what is regarded as the abuse of physical correction and discipline by the head

[1] The respective ages in France, Belgium and Roumania are fifteen and eighteen, Denmark sixteen and twenty, Germany sixteen and twenty-one, Sweden seventeen and twenty-one, Switzerland eighteen and twenty.

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of the family towards his wife and children, adopted children and other persons under his paternal authority. Only if the physical correction given by him be so excessive as to cause the risk to a woman or child of mental or bodily illness is he held to be in fault, and he will then receive no more than six months' imprisonment, instead of five years as in the former Code. If the corporal punishment result in the death of the victim, the penalty is only eight years, instead of being regarded as murder under aggravated circumstances as in the former Code. It is clear that the Italian of to-day may beat his family as much as he please, provided no bones be broken, and even that may probably be excused; the victims will scarcely dare to complain!

If a wife, perhaps one of those child-wives of fourteen years of age, menaced by a beating, flee from her husband's domicile, the police are authorised to track her down and return her, and she is liable for her offence to a year's imprisonment or a fine of from 1,000 to 10,000 lire. The husband is under no such penalties; he is free to go where he will.

Article 150 of the former Code, which admitted the voluntary abandonment of the home as one of the motives for a legal separation, has, in fact, been annulled. In this country, the Jackson Case of 1891, in which the Court decided that a husband was not justified in kidnapping and imprisoning in his house a wife who refused to live with him, marked a great advance in the status of British married women.

To-day, in Italy, adultery by a wife is punishable by imprisonment for two years, the highest punishment for this offence given by any European country; indeed, few States deal with it as a penal matter. The husband, on the other hand, incurs no penalty unless he keep a mistress, and the fact be a matter of public notoriety, which no Fascist Court would ever admit against a Fascist!

The law, in fact, does not seriously contemplate punishing any husband for adultery; indeed, by the accommodation of the Church, arrangements are actually made to lend the odour of sanctity to concubinage. The Roman Catholic Church theoretically regards marriage as indissoluble and prohibits divorce, except in the case of important personages who obtain it by special dispensation of the Church, a costly business! Nevertheless, since the Concordat with Fascism the Church in Italy may, and actually does, authorise religious marriage, carrying no civil rights, between persons

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one or other of whom is already married to someone else.[1] This extraordinary procedure is authorised and explained by the Government circulars, and the instructions of the Church to its officers. The religious marriage, without civil consequences, giving the wife and children no legal claims to inheritance or maintenance, formerly existed, not legally, but as an abuse. Several Acts of the Italian Parliament sought to destroy it. It has now been established on a legal basis! Here is another recrudescence of mediæval barbarism! Rich men may now again have their concubines in Italy; women, deceived as to their true position by the religious ceremony, constrained by the economic burden of motherhood, and by the social stigma attaching to the unwedded wife, may be maintained as a convenience, without rights, their children reared as social inferiors, having no claim to education or a start in life as their father's offspring; at his death compelled to make way for the lawful heirs.

The marriage celebrated in Church must be registered with the civil authorities within five days; otherwise it has no validity in law. The civil official who neglects to register it is liable to a penalty, not so the priest—if the husband advise the priest after the ceremony that he does not wish it registered, is he not the head of his house, and is not Fascism the man-made State *in excelsis?* Alas, that there should even be women, so dead to all solidarity with womanhood, as to assent to these provisions!

Murder "for motives of honour," if the murderer be a man, is treated with great indulgence. Under pre-Fascist Italian law, the murder of a spouse, a daughter, or a sister was punishable by from three to seven years' imprisonment, if the murder took place on the discovery of the victim in the very act of illegitimate carnal intercourse. The new Fascist law has extended this leniency to any case in which the victim has, at any time, had such intercourse—a sort of paterfamilias licence of the man, not only over his wife, but over his daughter and sister! In one Italian Province, the President of the Tribunal is a man who, when a Counsellor of the Court of Appeal, murdered his wife and got off scot-free. There are officers in the Italian Army who have killed their wives, and have been re-established in their former rank.

[1] Instructions of the Sacred Congregation, Article 18, *vide La Femme et Dieu*, by Giorgio Quartara, the notable Italian lawyer and author of several important books, Paris, *Sans Pareil*, 1930, p. 209.

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In this country there is much discussion as to whether abortion should not cease to be a punishable offence, as is the case in Russia, but no one here advocates reduced penalties for abortion produced without the consent of the woman concerned! The new Italian Penal Code reduces by two-thirds the previous penalty for abortion, *with or without the woman's consent*, if the object be to "protect her honour." Here again we find the assumption that women are not independent beings, with right over their own persons, but the property of their husbands and family clan. Article 18 is conceived in the same spirit; it reduces to a mere two to five years' imprisonment the abandonment of a child which results in death, provided the aim be to protect the "honour" of the person guilty or *that of a near relative!* Once such notions of honour are admitted as valid before the Court there is little difficulty in securing impunity for disposing of an unwanted illegitimate child!

The code is the product of that barbarous and smutty morality which demands: let my own women be preserved inviolate for my purposes, and let me be free to work my will unhindered on any others I may find defenceless!

Dr Marie Stopes, and our other birth control enthusiasts, should observe that by Article 553, the Code punishes birth control propaganda by imprisonment up to one year, or a fine of 10,000 lire, and if the propaganda be made for profit by both fine and imprisonment for the same offence. For Fascism it is a *sine quâ non* that families must be large, in order that the nation may be abundantly supplied with soldiers.

Whilst women are savagely punished for any lapse from chastity, rape is treated with the utmost leniency. Virtually all protection of little girls against seduction has been swept away; consent by a girl-child, however young, is valid legal excuse for sexual intercourse and its results; only if the girl be under sixteen years, and the seducer a married man, and it can further be proved that he concealed from his victim that he was married and seduced her under promise of marriage, does the law recognise that he has committed an offence. In that case he may be punished by from three months to two years' imprisonment, but even yet he may find a loophole for escape; if he can make the Court believe that the girl was already morally corrupted before he seduced her, he goes scot-free. In this country no such excuse is recognised. To women who, in this country, are working to raise the age of consent to twenty-one years, these facts are a sad revelation.

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Abduction is treated in this country with great severity. Few crimes occasion greater sorrow, and when cases of it occur, great public concern is manifested. The penalty here for abducting a girl under thirteen years of age may be penal servitude for life, even if there be no carnal knowledge. An attempt at abduction may entail fourteen years' hard labour if the victim be under twenty-one years, and the attempt be made with violence. Under the old Italian Code, abduction was punishable by seven years' imprisonment, and a woman was held to be a minor until twenty-one years of age. The new Code has reduced the age to fourteen years, and the maximum penalty to only two years, or three years if the victim be under fourteen years. If the object of the abduction be marriage, the penalty is still further reduced. These facts should be brought to the notice of such English women as are inclined to regard Fascism as a means of setting the National house in order, and whose masculine friends have joined the British Fascists.

Article 520 of the new Code deals with policemen or other functionaries guilty of sexual relations with women prisoners in their custody. This is a highly important matter at the present time in Italy, since women prisoners and internees are now often held solely under male wardership. Where the woman had been taken by violence, the old Code punished such men by from eight to ten years' imprisonment; the new Code reduces the minimum punishment to three years. Where violence could not be proved, the old Code fixed the penalty at from three to ten years' imprisonment; the new Code imposes only from one to five years.

Certain provisions in the Code are ostensibly designed to check prostitution, but Decree No. 1848, dated November 6, 1926, officially authorises prostitution, and renders impossible any attack on the brothels. The President of the Provincial Commission for Direct Taxation in Milan announced, through the columns of Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia*, that taxes of a million lire had been obtained from the sale of a brothel, in addition to the normal taxation upon the regular business of this house. This fact is well worth the attention of our English Society for Social and Moral Hygiene, and of all who reverence the great pioneer work of Josephine Butler.

The amnesty of prisoners, by which Fascism celebrated the Tenth Anniversary of its ascent to power, was boomed throughout the Press of the world as a great act of generosity on the part of Mussolini and his colleagues towards their political opponents. As a matter of fact, it liberated more

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than 20,000 ordinary prisoners and only a few politicals. The practical results of the new Code and the amnesty are demonstrated by a case reported on January 27, 1933, in *Lavoro*, which, like all the other Italian newspapers, is officially controlled. A builder's labourer of Genoa maltreated a little girl of three years, the child of his mistress. He beat her continually, forced her to eat soap, put needles in her food, rubbed pepper on the tenderest parts of the body, threw petrol over her and threatened to burn her alive. Under the new Code, the Court could inflict on this sadistic brute only four years and eight months' penal servitude. By the vaunted amnesty, the sentence was reduced to one year and eight months.

When a Code thus contemptuous of women and children is framed by the leaders of Church and State, one need not wonder that the licentious conduct of the Fascist squads strikes terror to the heart of women, that the amours of the Fascist "Ras" have become a by-word, and complaint is heard that the lights of the cinema are extinguished in order that armed bullies, under cover of darkness, may seize the women they desire.

Under the National Socialist Government of Hitler, which is but another name for the same type of force-sustained Dictatorship as that controlling Italy, woman bears similar shackles, and the imposing of them has been even more sensational and more loudly proclaimed. According to the dictum of Hitler, she must return to the three "K's," Kirche, Kinder and Kueche, to which the last century opponents of women's enfranchisement desired to confine her. According to Goebbels, "whilst man masters Life, woman masters the pots and pans!" The German *Financial Times*, January, 1934, observed: "The self-supporting woman injures man, not only by being his competitor, but also by depriving him of his pride of being the family's breadwinner."

The German woman had achieved her political emancipation, not greatly by her own efforts, but under the influence of the great suffrage movement in this country, and the general bursting of bonds which accompanied the overthrow of the Kaiserdom at the close of the war.

The Nazi advent to power meant the immediate exclusion of women from their new won seats in the Reichstag, the provincial Parliaments, and all local legislative bodies, to which they had been elected in considerable numbers after

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they won the rights of citizenship in the Revolution of 1918. Women had been members of all the political parties, except the Nazis, which, from the first the Party of the warrior male, refused to admit them. Therefore, when all Parties except the Nazis were forbidden, and their elected members driven from office, no elected woman remained.

All the women's organisations were dissolved, including the German branches of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, which flourishes here and of which the late Jane Addams of the United States was then still International President, the Catholic Women's Peace Society, the Association of War Widows and Children, and many more. Their officials have either fled abroad or have been flung into concentration camps. The arrest of Frau Zihetmeier, of the Catholic League of Peace, a high-school teacher, is characteristic. The women's patriotic societies, like the Women's Steel Helmet League and the Queen Elizabeth Society, have been forcibly absorbed into the women's Nazi organisations, which are themselves autocratically ruled by the men's Nazi Party.

A determined move was at once made to exclude women from all employment by public bodies, Government departments, local councils, hospitals, and as far as possible even schools. All women under thirty-five years were made ineligible for Government employment, and over that age were debarred if married to husbands in employment, or to men of non-Aryan stock. The law of June 30, 1933, provided that married women were to be dismissed from all employment if their superiors considered them sufficiently provided for, and unmarried women were also to be dismissed if it were held that they could be supported by parents, brothers, or even sisters. Without waiting to pass any law, the Nazi Government had already removed thousands of women from public offices, which they had occupied with great dignity and competence during the Republic.

Among the earliest dismissed were Dr Gertrud Baeumer, Inspector of Girls' Schools in Prussia, Emmi Becker, Inspector of Girls' High Schools in Hamburg, Susanne Engelman, director of one of the largest girls' schools in Berlin, Professor Wunderlich, head of the Berlin Pedagogical Institute, Dr Menter, Chief Librarian at the University Library at Cologne, and Professor Vaerting from the University of Jena. Frau Trapp, from the Women's Section of the Ministry of Labour, Frau Albrecht from the Trade School section of the Ministry

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of Education, Frau Heinemann, of the Girls' High School Department, and Frau Ermler, from the Kindergartens, were among the many obliged to leave. The Home Office dismissals included Anna Meyer, from the Health Department, Frau Hirschfeld, from the Pensions Ministry, and Hilde Oppenheimer, from the department dealing with economic questions.

Among the women eliminated are the very people who, since the Revolution of 1918, have actually created Government Departments dealing with infants' welfare and the education of girls and women. Kaethe Kollwitz was excluded from the Academy of Arts, Ricarda Huch, from the Prussian Academy of Poets. Anna Seghers, who had won the Kleist prize, was forced to leave Germany. Emmi Neother, Helene Ziegert, Elizabeth Blochmann, Anna Deynahl, Marianne Kunze, Gerda Simons, Bertha Kiesa, and Melitta Gerhardt, and many more, were deprived of their professorships. There is no question here either of race or political view; women are excluded on the clear basis of womanhood and that alone. Many famous actresses like Elizabeth Bergner, Fritzy Massary, Elizabeth Lennartz and Grete Mosheim, can no longer appear in Germany, either because of Jewish race or political opinion, but many hundreds of medical women have been obliged to renounce the practice of their profession simply because of their sex.

For twenty-five years, German women had possessed the right of admission to the Universities, and to the practice of professions. To-day, only 10 per cent. of the women students who pass the Baccalaureat (equivalent to matriculation) are permitted to enter the University. The immensity of this injustice can be gathered from the fact that out of 10,500 women who passed this examination in 1930, only 1,000 were permitted to study at the University. More than this, to all save 10 per cent. of those who are allowed to enter the University, the right of practising the professions they study for is absolutely refused, and even to this small proportion the right is not guaranteed! Whatever may be the number who qualify, only seventy-five women a year are allowed to enter the medical profession. The official doctor's organ has announced: "The woman doctor is a hermaphrodite who offends the natural and healthy instinct of the people."

Scientific studies are rigorously reserved to men. In the words of an official communication in the *Koelnische Zeitung*, January, 1934: "Women must recognise that scientific work is specifically masculine. . . . Woman must never think in

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a theoretical manner; her brain ought not to occupy itself with abstract things." Strange sayings these in an age which has produced Marie Curie and Maria Montessori!

As teachers, women may only fill subordinate posts. The organ of the Prussian teachers observed: "The men teachers' aversion to women superiors is in keeping with the healthy instinct of man."

Jewish women, of course, have been ruthlessly driven from all professions.

Women previously employed in responsible and skilled public and professional work have been drafted into the compulsory labour corps for work on the land. Civilisation has for many generations made steady progress in the elimination of women from heavy agricultural labour. Under Nazi rule, Germany compels some of her most intellectually gifted women to such work, under conditions approximating to slavery! Everywhere the effort has been to drive women from skilled to unskilled labour, in domestic service, on the land, and in factory war work, particularly in the making of poison gases and explosives, where they are employed at dangerous and debilitating processes in dark rooms lit only by red or blue light.

The wage of women in industry is ordinarily 60 per cent. below that paid to men, but masses of men taken on to replace women under the phrase "double income," have been obliged to accept the woman's wage. At a Wuppertal textile factory, the entire female staff was turned adrift for men paid at the women's rates. Women so dismissed are denied unemployment pay. In the cigar industry at Hamburg, women were threatened with the concentration camp if they did not leave voluntarily. In hospitals and other institutions, all the women cooks have been replaced by men.

Another means of removing women from their employment is the State marriage loan up to 1,000 marks (about £50) to brides who have been in employment at least six out of the previous twelve months, on condition of their undertaking not to go to work unless their husband's wage fall below 125 marks (£6 5*s*. 0*d*.) per month and until the loan be repaid. The marriage loan is made, not in cash, but in coupons for the purchase of furniture and household equipment, and must be paid back in not less than eight years. After March, 1934, the conditions were changed, and the women had to pledge themselves not to take work unless the loan had been repaid, and their husbands were obtaining the unemployment dole, the last a condition difficult to satisfy,

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because make-shift seasonal land work and work camps are used to evade the payment of unemployment insurance. Thus, for a loan of 1,000 marks, the wife probably loses an income of some 900 marks a year.

Unemployed women are drafted to camps, where they wash, mend and clean, and must undertake to do all work in house, stable, garden and field, and attend lectures in Nazi philosophy after their labour of ten to twelve hours a day is finished. Receiving no wages, with bad food, crowded together in sheds and barns, sleeping on straw, they live under an iron discipline, and are liable to severe punishment. If one of them be dismissed, the fact is stated on her certificate, and is a bar to obtaining other work. If thereafter her parents dare to receive her, the father loses his right to unemployment benefit should he fall out of work! Large numbers of women from factories, offices, schools, Universities and Government departments, have been thus drafted, in city clothes and high-heeled shoes, working in the muddy fields for ten to twelve hours daily, often obliged to sleep with the men labourers. Many young girls have returned to their homes pregnant after this sad experience. At first only single women were sent to the camps, but afterwards also the married, their children being sent to orphanages.

Note Hitler's declaration that the children of Germany must be trained whilst very young to be what Germany desires; if the parents are "still old-fashioned people, who cannot move with the times, . . . we shall take the children away from them!"

Some of the unemployed are sent to unpaid domestic work. In Wuppertal, where unemployment was great among women, owing to large-scale dismissal from the textile factory, they were paraded through the streets with brushes, pans and ladles, and placards: "1,000 girls seek work"; but there was difficulty in placing them, though the Council offered 45 to 60 marks to employers taking a domestic pupil without wages for six months.

For girls between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one there is compulsory labour, which is equivalent to men's military service. Some are congregated in concentration camps for both domestic and military aid work; others are drafted to compulsory domestic work.

It must be emphasised that though the employment of German women in the labour market had changed, the number of women industrial workers actually increased by 9·1 per cent. during the first nine months of Nazi rule.

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Dr Ley, in *Voelkischer Beobachter*, observed: "It is quite erroneous to think that women in industrial work have their health impaired . . . we get both healthier and fresher women, since they have again entered a life of employment."

Though driven from public work, women are not spared either the insult, or the violence, the Nazis visit upon opponents. Five terrible examples are typical of many more.

I have before me the photograph showing serious contusions from the beating given by the Nazis to the Socialist, Maria Jankowsky, aged forty-six years, well known and widely respected for her municipal and social work in Koepenick. This act of marked brutality received the approval of Alexander Bogs, head of the Scandinavian section of the Nazi Press Department, who said: "If ever a Communist or a Socialist deserved such a hiding it was Maria Jankowsky."[1] In the small hours of March 21, 1933, she was taken from her dwelling by fourteen armed men to the temporary Nazi premises in the Dorotheenstrasse, where there were six other men, making twenty in all. They showed her the Republican flag, and invited her to call it a foul name. When the brave woman still refused she was stripped naked, laid on a table, and while one man held her head, four others belaboured her with canes and sticks. After receiving at least a hundred strokes, she rolled bleeding from the table, but was dragged to her feet with a violent blow in the face. Only when she at last agreed to recant her Socialism, and report regularly to the Brown House, was she taken to St Antonius Hospital, in Karlshorst, where she told all that had happened. Her death from her injuries was subsequently reported.[2]

[2]Betti Suess, having been seen in the company of a Jew, had her head shaved, and was dragged round the streets and cafés with a placard round her neck bearing the words: "I have offered myself to a Jew." From this terrible experience she became mentally affected, and had to be sent to a home at Erlangen.

[3]Madame Schwalbach was arrested after returning from abroad, where she had been to visit her husband who had escaped from Germany. She has been more than a year in prison. Her mother was also arrested and interned in a concentration camp at Morigen.

[3]Francisca Kessel, an ex-Communist Member of the

[1] Reported in *The Times*.
[2] Condensed from *The Times* Report.
[3] Bulletin of Women's World Committee Against War and Fascism. Vol. XXXIV, No. 2.

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Reichstag, was condemned to three years' imprisonment and found hanging in her cell in the prison at Mainz. She was said to have committed suicide, but her friends believe she was murdered.

Gladstone's axiom: "Self Government is better than good Government," is an incontrovertible truth, and is only another way of expressing the fact that good government cannot exist apart from self government. The reaction which sweeps away the rights of self government already won is necessarily of so forceful and extreme a character that it displays the evils arising from the denial of self government in their worst form. So it is that women under the modern dictatorships of Italy and Germany suffer under a deeper subjection than that from which they extricated themselves during a century of painful effort.

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[Note.—The information given here regarding the laws and regulations affecting women under the German dictatorship has been taken either from the German Official Press or from *The Times*. For Italy, the same sources have been used, and, more especially, the exhaustive work on the new Italian Penal Code of the well-known Milan lawyer, Giorgio Quartara. Information as to the effect of Fascist and Nazi laws and regulations has been obtained directly from residents and investigators in, and refugees from the two countries, from the refugee Press, from *The Times* and other British newspapers, and from the bulletins issued by the Women's World Committee Against War and Fascism, which together supply a mass of mutually corroborative evidence. Evidence of conditions under Italian imprisonment and internment has been obtained from the same sources, also personally from F. F. Nitti (nephew of the Italian ex-Premier of that name), who escaped from the penal island of Lipari, as well as from the writings of his companions, Professor Carlo Rosselli and Dr Lusso. Miss L. Gustava Heyman, the well-known German feminist, now a refugee in Switzerland, Dr Vaerting, who was relieved of her professorial chair in Germany, Mrs Ellen Horup, of Denmark, a notable international worker at Geneva, are amongst the many who have kindly kept me informed.]

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DICTATORSHIPS AND FAILURE.

E. G. LEE.

I.

In the chapter on the Human Soul in the *Adventures of Ideas*, Dr Whitehead suggests that "the intellectual strife of an age is mainly concerned with . . . questions of secondary generality which conceal a general agreement upon first principles almost too obvious to need expression." [1] One of the first principles of the modern age is Freedom; "with subsequent lame qualifications" it is "the presupposition of political theorists now." [2]

The latter suggestion, even with "lame qualifications," seems very rash to-day; yet obviously it is true. Intrinsically at least, if not extrinsically, every modern State is concerned with freedom: this is just as true of dictatorships as of democracies.

Mr Walter Lippman has pointed out that men will accept any form of government that will "make secure again the peace of human privacy." [3] What men desire first of all is security to live their private lives; without this, freedom can have no real semblance, for it is in privacy that men discover the elementary human values which offer them the greatest fulfilment. There is little security for the personal life in a State which is constantly threatened with political and economic upheavals. Under the ill-organised, faulty-working democracies, or semi-paralysed autocracies, which preceded the dictatorships, men were not certain of this essential freedom of the private life. They therefore received with thankfulness the strong government which appeared to be able to give them the security they desired. Dictatorships in this sense conferred freedom.

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 14.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
[3] *The Method of Freedom*, p. 23.

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Connected with this security for the private life is a condition peculiar in intensity to the modern world. In all its multiform, closely-interlocked complexities freedom, to be real, must be organised. "Every one of the myriad activities of man is therefore always falling out of adjustment with those to which it has to be related and needs a corrective mechanism to bring it back again." [1] This is plainly true of the economic life; but it is just as true of the wider social life which embraces the economic. Individual wills and purposes are so closely intertwined in the modern community that it is almost impossible for the individual to will anything socially without bringing into existence "unwilled accompaniments of our willing, unpurposed effects of our purposes." [2]

Such is unemployment, such are industrial and political crises, diplomatic misunderstandings, threats of war and war itself; such are all the seeming inconsequent events which often bring to nought the well-intentioned efforts of good people: no one deliberately wills these things, hardly anyone wishes them to happen, yet they occur, not as an act of God, but as the "unwilled accompaniments of our willing."

As communal life increases in complexity and intensifies in character, so will these unconsciously created happenings tend to occur. It is impossible to live in closer social dependence without the tendency towards closer social liability.

To control this very real factor in modern life communities are being driven more and more towards organisation. The process consists in giving up a lesser liberty in order to gain a greater. The constant stream of laws and regulations affecting almost every aspect of communal life is evidence of this. The tendency towards collective control in every modern State is perhaps evidence more emphatic. Almost against their wishes nations are being forced into "New Deals," "Marketing Boards," "Plannings" of every description.

Dictatorial forms of government can claim to be more effective instruments for this organisation than democracies. If they make this claim, then it is made upon the basis of the first principle of freedom.

They might claim also that they are conferring the reality of freedom in another direction. Through the concentration

[1] *Recovery* (Arthur Salter), p. 41.
[2] *Community* (R. M. Maciver), p. 415.

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of power in the hands of a few determined men, with knowledge of what they want to achieve, national effort has become more effective in the international field of politics. The dictator might claim that his nation is no longer hemmed in, frustrated, suffering from a neurosis of fear and humiliation, it is accepting new positions of strength and power. This results in national exhilaration. In addition to a new personal freedom there is a new racial freedom. The modern dictator might claim that under his control there is a wider real freedom than that which existed under the democracy or autocracy which preceded him. He might sneer at the liberty of democracies, but only from the basis of freedom within a dictatorship.

Some such arguments as these could be advanced upon the first principle of freedom in favour of dictatorships.

They all rest, of course, upon the organisation of the State for success in its major operations. Dictatorships cannot fail; they must always be successful. To confess failure would be to confess that the dictatorial form of government was not fulfilling its purpose, and that would imply the necessity for a return to democracy. It is precisely upon the capacity for failure in relation to freedom that dictatorships must be judged. For freedom consists not only in the possibilities of success, but in the possibilities of failure also. To what extent can a dictatorship absorb these? When the possibility of failure has been eliminated, then the possibility of freedom has been eliminated as well.

II.

It is one of the polite fictions of a democratic State that each of its political parties—to its followers—is always right. No political party dare confess its shortcomings; it may never dare, in public, to tell the truth about itself, and that truth, in private, is often very different from the party as it appears in public. This, of course, is well known to the educated party man, and he necessarily accepts most of its implications.

He accepts, too, the fact that probably no party can completely represent his views on political life. Broadly speaking, one particular party may more or less represent his general tendency, but it is highly improbable that one of them can give final precision to his political ideals. On the whole, in democratic States, political parties are the result of general compromises guided by certain well-defined

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tendencies. The certainty of their correctness on specified points is fictional.

Political propaganda, moreover, is never accepted by the educated citizen as the full truth. If sources of information are not open to him, or if he has not the time to examine them, more or less consciously he weighs propaganda against propaganda and arrives at some approximation to the truth. He knows perfectly well that if he wishes to form an unbiassed opinion he must get behind the propaganda. Thus, correctitude of full statement is never taken for granted in party utterances; their nature is understood within the conditions which govern their promulgation.

But behind these fictions and the fictions of party catchwords at elections, and, sometimes, the fictions of the supposed issues, there is a deep faith. It goes behind party and is the reality behind the grand façade of party conflict—it is a belief in the collective wisdom of mankind. Sooner or later, the democrat believes, error will be adjusted by the conflict of error with truth, half-truth with half-truth, partial error with partial error—"the pale, pathetic peoples still plod on through hoodwinkings to light." The method is clumsy; it is clearly open to criticism, perhaps derision, yet—the democrat would urge—it is a method of arriving at truth.

Now the polite fiction in a democracy is turned into an absolute truth in a dictatorship. The party in power is always and necessarily right; to doubt it in any effective way is an offence against the State. The faith of a dictatorship is in the power which controls the State; it is not a faith in something greater and wider than that power, because it is always identified with the State; it is a belief in the triumphant dominance of one set of ideas. Whether this represents adequately "national unity" is a matter of opinion; certain it is that it represents the fixation of certain national ideas. To assume variety in those ideas to the extent of opposition resulting in conflict is, of course, to assume a democratic structure. A dictatorship must necessarily be the triumph of one particular party and one particular political interpretation. The assumed "national unity" is only attained when the whole nation thinks as the party. What is fictional in a democracy is first principle in a dictatorship.

Likewise, propaganda under an authoritarian rule is never presented as a party point of view or understood as such; it is an article of belief which all well-disposed citizens will

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accept. Even if the educated citizen is sceptical about its value, it is probable that he does not possess the resources to test it; neither can he adopt the rough-and-ready method of contrasting propaganda with propaganda. In this instance the partial truth of a democracy is turned into the necessary truth of a dictatorship.

It is clear, therefore, that if both a dictatorship and a democracy be founded upon the first principle of freedom, and if both forms of government are eager to defend and realise it, the difference in method is so fundamental that it is highly doubtful whether the difference is only of "secondary generality."

In the faith of democracy there is scope for the absorption of failure. Invariable success is neither demanded nor given. The party in power is there on trial, and never is it assumed that its policies are unquestioningly successful. They are mostly a mixture of success and failure; and whenever achievement is accomplished it always bears about it the marks of battle, the effort of points hardly won. The achievement enters into the organic life of the nation, purged of any artificial complacency, or any pseudo-touch of gigantic effort. In nine cases out of ten it is bought of compromise: it represents intellectual achievement tempered, controlled, perhaps slightly baffled, by the elements of life. It is reduced to the intangible quality of a nation's moving life; it enters into tradition; it becomes in its incompleteness a part of a larger whole which it helps to sustain. Invariably it bears upon it the mark of creativeness in apprehension of difficulty, the guidance of minds which have capitulated at certain points, and yet have fashioned something abiding out of the malleable reality of human wills and instincts. All this represents the constant absorption of failure, with the continued apprehension of failure. What is created never carries "the glittering substance of success"; it belongs to life too closely to be wholly and totally that.

And because of this tempered success, the success is more real. Real creativeness always suggests the knowledge of failure and the transitoriness of success. The perfect touch of the master, the supreme effort of genius beyond the normal limitations of mind, always bear within themselves the poignancy of what might have been. Without this poignancy the achievement would not be masterly; it would only be vulgar and complacent, giving no information beyond itself. The most perfect piece of legislation, the most masterly control and manipulation of diplomatic situations, bear

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within themselves the touch of the haphazard turned to lasting account by a mind that was playing grandly and magnificently with the material before it, with the soul poised to accept failure.

Within a democracy this pliancy of failure is allowed for. When it occurs on an important scale the living substance is there to receive it, to recover, to try anew with a different set of men under different circumstances. The polite fiction recovers a reality of method which in turn covers the inner faith. Error is allowed for, accounted for, and expected; and in what remains, although indeed it may hold a quantity of error, yet it is sooner or later sifted, purified by collective wisdom. In a democratic life the individual is protected, not by anything outside himself, but by the reality of his individuality in understood conflict and co-operation with other minds.

III.

In this difference of method, masking a difference of faith, there is, obviously, a difference of culture. The democratic culture, being based upon collective wisdom, seeks to protect the individual from error by giving him the right to commit it. It believes that in the long run, if the individual is allowed access—ideally—to all the sources of knowledge and allowed to criticise from those sources, that error will gradually be corrected. "Doubt grows at the root of truth," and truth is made certain, vivified and kept alive by these new shoots. Democracy, in its faith, perseveres in those hesitating, hardly-won compromises of value which sooner or later go to make up its culture. It sacrifices the ideal persistently to the real. It will never, in its political life, oppose black by white, because in its very composition it is difficult to find such opposing contrasts: its normal colours are greys and shades of grey. Its purposes are ever dominated by the notion of "Wait and see," believing that all is not clear yet, but will become clear as the moments bring their immediate problems and decisions of action. It pursues its way through mistake and experiment. Through its faith it believes that the dawning of truth comes sooner or later. In short, a democracy believes in an equality of culture.

A dictatorship cannot possibly accept such an equality. It exists, just as a democracy exists, to protect the individual from error; but its method is more direct and conclusive. The individual must be protected, not by the slow conflict of error with truth, but by the imposition of the dictator's

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will. The criterion of truth is the wisdom of the dominant authority. Under these circumstances the individual can only be defended by the crushing of individuality. His freedom must consist in conformity, and not in non-conformity; he must discover himself in his similarity with other people, not in his dissimilarity. He can never be allowed to test himself against unfettered knowledge; only that kind of knowledge which has been filtered by the controlling few. A dictatorship, therefore, must always be opposed to an equality of culture. Through the operation of the censorship, the stifling of ideas, the narrowing of the area of conflict, the concentration of power in the hands of the elect, it is in effective control of the expressions of individuality. Instead of allowing experiment, it imposes it; instead of creating opportunities for mistakes, it confines the radius of action to its own immediate circle where mistakes can be immediately rectified and controlled. A dictatorial culture cannot pretend to have any aims and ambitions which may be described as democratic; it must attempt to appear as the very antithesis of democracy; it must attempt to give freedom by crushing one of freedom's prerogatives, the right to make mistakes. No member of a dictatorial State can be allowed to make mistakes about the first principles of his government; he must obediently follow it: necessarily, therefore, such a government must make pretentions to quasi-infallibility, or a kind of permanent success.

It may be claimed, of course, that this suppression of individuality is part of the process wherein a lesser liberty is sacrificed for a greater, the greater in this case being obtained by control from the centre and a deeper consciousness of racial freedom. Through the channels of authority flows the collective stream of national effort, and those who are a part of that stream are conscious of proud achievement. But the control and the racial freedom are directed by authority. In what shall they consist? In the prevailing ideas of authority. How shall they be expressed? In the forms selected and controlled by authority. Any divergence from this is either futile or impossible; the mass accepts always the decisions of the dominant few, and it has very little opportunity either of knowledge or desire to do otherwise.

Thus, in the effort of the dictatorship to rescue the individual from error, an effort extended over every possible expression of political liberty, two classes are inevitably created in the State: those who know and those who do not.

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There is a small privileged band of men and women gathered around the person of the supreme authority; they have the information upon which judgments can be based. They exercise their power through the position of the supreme dictator; they live in the world of reality, for they only are cognisant of all the streams and movements controlling the destiny of the State. To this privileged class the rest of the men and women in the State, the vast masses, are either beloved children or the despised mob; probably, according to time, temper or mood, a mixture of both—just because the masses are not adult enough to sustain error. Being children, the actualities of adult life do not apply; therefore devices of persuasion may be used, devices known for what they are—instruments of persuasion rather than revealers of truth. Under a dictatorship, in spite of pretensions to the contrary, there can be no real equality. It accepts and assumes what are sometimes called "realities": it uses "realities"; it has no intention to change them. In this division of classes, based neither upon wealth nor knowledge, but upon the control of the sources of knowledge, carried out with the supreme intention of serving the individual, the individual is robbed of his supreme right, that of access to the truth. He is no longer essentially free in himself, because the power has been taken from him to discover himself. Mass emotion, planned to move in a certain direction, may, for the moment, be vastly stimulating; to those nations who have suffered in the past from futility and humiliation it may seem to be the very dawning of freedom; but the source of the stimulation should not be ignored. It is derived from the stark recognition of the fact that there shall be those who know and those who do not; from a fundamental inequality of knowledge and culture within the State; from the profoundest, most "realistic," class distinction that man has ever been able to invent, based neither upon hereditary power nor capitalist control, but upon the readiness of the masses, in dim pursuit of their freedom, to offer up to the dominant authority the birth-right of their being.

This is the distinctive feature of all dictatorships. It is just as true of Soviet Russia as of any other. Divisions in human life are created in the pursuit of freedom that are a very denial of the ideal. There is no organisation of freedom; only an organisation of men. There is no room for failure; only for success. There are no cathartic failures demanding new expense of the spirit to build anew; there is only the

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immediate, superficial triumph of the present. There is no fumbling attainment of purpose that will live for ever in the organisation of men, because it has been wrought out of the long process of trial and error; only the dominant march of the present, with its apparent, clear-cut appearance of immediate attainment. In short, dictatorships build in time, they are measured by the clock, and they must be judged by something beyond the clock.

IV.

For dictatorships make the fundamental mistake of equating freedom with the span of life: man is free here and nowhere else; he is free for the allotted period, and beyond that there is no illumination, no continuation of reality that gives the semblance of truth to the spasmodic searchings of the soul after its own fulfilment. The dictatorship takes refuge in a grand illusion; it paints the future in the colours of the present: the future is never a strange bourne into which no one can march with the petty present; it is a projection of the triumph of the moment. A thousand years hence shall be as to-day, only to-day a little more compelling, with schemes working better, and the members of the State a little "freer" and "happier." The illusion is always seen through the eyes of the dictator's pet "revolutionary" scheme. According to the little theory and practice of the moment, so shall it be. The corporate State shall be working with more flair and smoothness; the race soul shall be more thoroughly triumphant; Marxianism shall be a little more Marx, with socialised industry working smoother and with greater efficiency: and because all these things shall be according to the theory, all men shall be happier. Each spasm of the moment is man's talisman of happiness in the future. And the past? That, too, is turned into a grand illusion—a grand fake to support the present. It is never the cold, immortal presentation of what has been; never the humble contemplation of reality seen through the eyes of the present: no, the past also is the projection of the present's emotional needs in terms of false colours, fascinating theories, flamboyant pageantries, decking out the achievements of the immediate. Authority cannot be humble or self-effacing either to the past or the future: it can never know how to limit itself within those realities, how to condemn and stand awed in the light of what shall be and has been; it cannot realise, dare not realise, without the loss of

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its own dynamic flair, that the life of nations and communities is not as the life of man; that the life of man is doomed to wither, that the life of nations and communities persists, and ever persists, through changing forms. It does not recognise, and cannot recognise, that beyond this persistent life there is a necessary grandeur lifted above the exigencies of time. Bound to his own time, cut off from any abiding reality, the dictator is bound to discover his own ego in a constant assertion of itself. In other words—and perhaps with a slightly different intention, but with the same inner revolt—the modern dictatorship is forced to assert "Evil, be thou my good." Justice is no longer done though the heavens fall; it is done that the State may continue. The individual is no longer sacred in his individuality; he is sacred in so far, and only in so far, as the little necessity of the moment triumphs through him. All these endeavours are summed up in one word—ruthless—the word that conveys the illusion of the real. Wisdom is careful, and slow, and hesitating in building up her judgments; justice is slow and careful in examining evidence: but not so wisdom and justice where it is necessary to be ruthless in action. The power must strike, and strike at once: there is no time for the contemplation of certain courses of action; the shadowy world of reality allows no contemplation. Thus, on occasion, every semblance of ordinary justice is thrown to the wind: trials must be hastened; political offenders must be brought to trial at once; everything quickened up to prevent any possibility of escape. This is ruthlessness in action, the illusion of reality and achievement.

It is illusion because it is so thoroughly self-stultifying. In attempting to serve the individual the authority has forgotten the preciousness of individuality. The authority is thinking of the mass and forgetting the springs of action within the mass. It has taken away collective wisdom, the only truth against which the individual can measure himself, and substituted for it merely the will of authority. The dictatorial power is forced to worship itself; and forced with increasing degrees of intensity to interpret everything in terms of its own ego. There is nothing higher than itself to which it can appeal, because it controls every possible expression of anything higher. Inevitably, the dictator, sooner or later, is forced back upon himself, and thus he becomes the "lonely man," with legends about his loneliness. He is the Titan bearing up his country's welfare: all things are dependent upon his magnetic personality; men live in

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fear and trembling about what will happen when he disappears. It is the latter fact which reveals the shallowness of such greatness. The Titan is doomed to annihilation; and if, after all, he is really indispensable, what becomes of his work? How can it live in the future? This is the final Nemesis of the "great man" theory; if he is really "great," if he is really indispensable, then all his work will come to nought because he will not be there to carry it through. It is the final criticism, too, of a dictatorial culture. No matter how efficient it may be—how immediate in its success, how triumphant in controlling the destinies of a nation—it is built in time and must fall in time. There is no carry on; no source of strength which shall lift its efforts beyond the immediate into the future.

V.

The really great man, the man who passes through his person the unuttered desires of the age, is never the indispensable. He who is indispensable has never accomplished his mission, for when he dies his work must follow him. He has built in terms of egoism, shallow greatness, imagined necessity, instead of terms of wisdom. He is measuring himself by the clock. He has not learnt how to rest on other wills than his own; he has never subordinated himself to the faith of collective wisdom. He is so doubtful of wisdom, so fearful of its non-appearance, that he struts in apparent loneliness in its place. When the indispensable goes, it is left for others to recreate out of his ruins. The really great are never missed at their passing; their work continues, because it has been related to realities outside the personal ego. Ruthless, over-centralised authority, clear-cut, immediate action, efficacy of single will and single control, are bound to fail in necessary persistence, because they must miss those half-tones, those suspended judgments, those dependences upon the judgments of others, those creations within and out of failure which form the real living basis of continuous social activity.

SHREWSBURY.

E. G. LEE.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.

ALFRED E. GARVIE, D.D., DTh.

I.

There is a conflict *à l'outrance* going on between Christian Universalism and Pagan Nationalism. In Christ the differences which have divided men are transcended and abolished when they cannot be transformed. As there is one God and Father of all, one Lord and Saviour of all, one Spirit for all—so there is one human race. Even where Christian beliefs and standards are not expressly renounced, and the Christian profession is still made, the exaltation of the State, the repudiation of internationalism, the commendation of war which are now current in Italy and Germany, are pagan. such an exclusive and arrogant nationalism corresponds not to monotheism, but to polytheism and a pantheism tolerant of polytheism.

This pagan nationalism in the totalitarian State virtually repudiates Christian ethics, or indeed anything which could be regarded as rational ethics, in internal government and international relations. It is concerned about *health* and *wealth* (the biological and economic functions of the State), less about *social happiness* (the utilitarian function), and only about individual morality in a very slight degree (the ethical function). From the Christian standpoint, however, the State can properly function only as an ethical community legally enforcing a wide range of moral obligations.

In insisting in opposition to this tendency in applying Christian ethics to the policy of the State, we must, however, recognise that general moral principles must in their particular applications take account of the actual situation. What may be wrong in individual conduct, such as taking

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the law into one's own hands by avenging a wrong, may be right in State policy in punishing the criminal. Again, a nation may in self-defence resist aggression from another nation, as one faction in a nation would not be justified in doing against another. Moral principles are absolute; but their applications must be relative to all the relevant conditions.

While, as in the administration of the criminal law, the State exercises control over individual conduct, restraining personal vengeance, administering punishment on crime, and thus using force to maintain law, that State is best governed which so commands the loyalty of its subjects generally that they will not feel its laws as limiting their liberty, and it will not need to use force except as a last resort against the comparatively few law-breakers. Subjects will be more law-abiding if they are also citizens—that is, have some personal share in choosing those who govern them. Not only should government *of* the people be *for* the people, for the ends mentioned in a previous paragraph, but it will be best *of* and *for* as it is *by* the people, for the ethical function of the State is but fulfilled as it rests on *self-government*, as the personality of each citizen is developed in his relation to the State. Democracy is in many lands under a cloud, and does not bask in the sunshine of general approval as it once did. It must be confessed that it has failed to fulfil its promise, and has shown faults which its ardent advocates did not expect. That disappointment, however, is not a sufficient reason for ending it, but an urgent summons to mend it, not only by discovering more efficient organs for its exercise, but also by inspiring it with a less partisan and more impartial purpose.

Given a moralised democracy, does the Christian ethics appear altogether impracticable? Even if the Christian citizen recognises that his citizenship is in heaven, that he belongs to a Kingdom not of the world, that not only his own personal character cannot be perfected in this world of time and space, and that he awaits his inheritance with the saints in the eternal light, but that also the consummation of the Kingdom of God too lies above and beyond the course of human history, nevertheless is his ethics *interim*, and should he in his conduct allow himself to be so dominated by the apocalyptic hope as was the primitive church, as to be only a pilgrim through time to eternity with no aim or hope of getting the will of God done on earth as it is in heaven? Admitting all the limitations that our incarnate sensuous condition implies, and all the hindrances which are added

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thereto by human folly and wretchedness, I hold that Christians are not only justified, but obliged to make the world as much better as they possibly can by applying the principles of Christian ethics, not at the *minimum*, but the *maximum* practicable. The defect of Lutheranism, which has, I believe, injuriously affected the public morality of Germany, is the separation of the realm of grace from the social and the natural order—to me an intolerable ethical dualism. An extreme *optimism* would not be justified, but a temperate *meliorism* seems to me possible to the Christian who dares to believe with the apostle that grace may abound exceedingly where sin has abounded.

In these to me relevant considerations as leading up to my subject, because necessary to make even feasible the following proposals, I have tried to take account of the four valuable articles at the beginning of the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October, 1935 (pp. 1–56).

II.

While the Christian believer cannot abandon his hope that the Kingdoms of this world will become the Kingdom of our God and His Christ, and, looking back on man's chequered career in history, may expect that man's extremity will prove God's opportunity, yet there is reason for the question with which the sixth article in the same number of this Journal deals: "Will our Civilisation Survive?" For it seems to be engaged in a slow and sure process of committing suicide, economically, politically and internationally, as all these spheres are closely interrelated. In this crisis, to change the metaphor, there are efforts to avert ruin and secure recovery. The League of Nations is trying to put an end to war, to find ways of settling quarrels (judicial, arbitral or conciliatory), to get the nations to work together for common ends, and thus substitute friendship for prejudice, suspicion and enmity. As it succeeds in doing this, will it prove a good physician for a very sick world? What is now being generally recognised as one of the most serious hindrances to this work of world-reconciliation is the economic distress, which, terrible as it is, governments are aggravating, despite their confessions and professions, by their practice of *economic nationalism*, the promotion of national self-interest in this sphere regardless of the injustice and injury it inflicts on others.

This economic nationalism is as stupid as it is cruel, for

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selfishness in the long run and on the big scale defeats itself. It is a law of social progress that individuation and socialisation proceed *pari passu*, that a man finds his fullest self as he enters into widest social relations. A nation will carry its own burden of responsibility for its own population best as it learns to bear the burden of other nations in a collective responsibility. The recognition by Sir Samuel Hoare that there is an economic reason for Italy's policy towards Abyssinia was the more welcome as it was surprising from a member of a Government which has raised to life again a policy of Protection, which Lord Beaconsfield described as *not only dead but damned*. I must here try to show how *damned* it is as a prevention of peace and a provocation of war.

Among the causes of war we must still recognise national hatreds due to bitter memories of the past, individual ambitions, national pride, the desire for the rectification of unjustly drawn frontiers, the grievances of minorities; but these we must be content only to mention. The most general and permanent, however, is this economic distress. The primary necessities of every nation which is making any advance are adequate food for its growing population, raw materials for its developing industry, open markets for its expanding commerce, and homes for its surplus population beyond its own borders without loss of nationality. Even the last has an economic motive, if also wider relations. Germany and Italy are suffering economic distress for all these reasons. Both may be blamed for encouraging an unnecessary growth of population, but, apart from this propaganda for motherhood as a woman's highest service to the nation, the two nations had not reached the stage of a stationary population. There is abundant food in the world (wheat was being burned in Canada, and coffee thrown into the sea in Brazil to prevent a glut in the world markets); but the other causes of economic distress mentioned above hold back the means for purchase of all the food needed; hence scarcity of certain important articles, high prices and a lowered standard of living.

The development of modern industry has been increasingly away from national self-sufficiency (*autarchy*) in regard to raw materials. Cotton, rubber, oil, to mention only three of the most important, must by most countries be imported. If a nation gives a preference to its own manufacturers in securing the raw materials, it imposes a handicap on its fellow-competitors in world markets. If a higher value in its

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currency puts another at a disadvantage, the handicap i increased. The economic development of a country may b at the stage at which it cannot command adequate foreig currency to purchase the raw material which it needs an which may be available. The lack of raw material may s limit its capacity for production that it has not the goods t sell so that it can buy. The economic distress is increase if it finds markets abroad closed to it, so that it canno export, even what it is able to produce. It must buy raw materials to sell finished goods, and must sell finished good to buy raw materials; if the prices of raw materials ar raised against it, and if markets for sale of its goods are close to it, or these can be sold only at unprofitable prices, it involved in a vicious circle; it cannot buy without selling and it cannot sell without buying. Thus Sir Samuel Hoare allusion was inadequate: to close markets for goods is economically as injurious as to make the purchase of raw materials difficult.

We must go beyond his immediate reference to consid more generally this question of international trade an economic nationalism, for which temporary expediency ma be pleaded, but no permanent justification can be offered. is the fear of war and the consequent cutting off of the nece sary supplies of food and raw materials which is one of th primary motives for this economic nationalism (autarchy just as an assurance of enduring peace would give th opportunity to each nation to develop the agriculture an industry for which it was most fitted by its climate, quali of its soil, mineral resources, the aptitudes and necessities its people, and enable it on this solid basis to rest its foreig trade as an exchange of goods alike mutually profitable t buyer and seller. To use a concrete illustration, this countr is not specially adapted for the cultivation of wheat or bee root in competition with other countries; and yet th economic nationalism leads to an artificial stimulation of th cultivation by reducing imports from other lands, which, th impoverished, are less able than they once were to recei our exports. While undoubtedly it is desirable that w should make our agriculture as efficient as possible, and s as large a proportion of our population on the land as nation physical well-being demands, we cannot reduce our ag cultural imports and yet expect to maintain our industr exports; for legitimate trade must be mutually benefici buying and selling. The danger which lurks in unregulate Free Trade is that the keen competition of the increasi

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number of industrialised nations may and does provoke jealousy and enmity, and so promotes war. The ideal of a planned economy would be that each country produced all for its own needs which it was best fitted to produce, imported all that it could not itself produce as advantageously as could other lands, and confined its exports, visible and invisible (goods and services), to the lands which needed them in proportion to its imports as payment for them. For many decades Great Britain has been expending a large proportion of surplus wealth, not on home developments, but on foreign investments. Its exports overseas were not proportionate to its imports; but it was loaning the money to pay for its own goods and to industrialise the nations which have now become its competitors. Refusing imports from these lands as it is now doing, it is making it impossible for these debtor nations to pay it as the creditor nation the interest and dividends due to it. Again, in restricting imports by various fiscal devices, it is protecting some favoured industries, but is inflicting injury upon other activities of the community, as, for instance, shipping, insurance, banking, raising the prices against the consumers, and in some instances encouraging slackness in methods of production. If aggressive internationalism causes the danger of trade wars between nations, economic nationalism has internal defects as well as external dangers.

III.

What is certain is that *laissez-faire* is no remedy for our present economic distresses whether at home or abroad. What is imperative is a planned economy within each nation and between the nations. A first step would be to raise the standard of living in each nation so that it could consume more of its own products and be able to import more for its own consumption; thus would more international trade be promoted without necessary injury to home business. To secure this it would be necessary that much of the purchasing power which results from the production of wealth should go to the consumers, the nation as a whole, and less to the producers, a relatively small class. More consumable goods would be purchased than capital goods, and the supply would be brought into closer correspondence with the effective demand. That enough wealth should be preserved as capital goods to produce the consumable goods needed would, of course, be essential to avoid scarcity, and yet eliminate waste. To-day we have both unused capital and unused

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labour—a double waste. With some such planned national economy a planned international economy would not appear so Utopian as it now does.

For what is being done now is that each nation in seeking to ward off economic injury from itself is inflicting economic injury on other nations; and in the long run it does not escape injury itself. There is a boomerang movement in trade. We injure Holland or Denmark in restricting agricultural imports, and thus injure ourselves in restricting our industrial exports; it may be not altogether directly, but through more circuitous trade channels. In *economic nationalism* a nation is carrying its own trade burden in such a way as not to bear the trade burdens of others, but rather so as to increase theirs and its own. The policy of Cain, "Am I my brother's keeper?", is even economically less profitable than the law of Christ, "Bear ye one another's burdens."

The economic, no less than the political and international, crisis is a *krisis*, a divine judgment through the moral order of God's world in spheres in which it seemed to be assumed that there was some other sovereignty than the divine. "Be not deceived, God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." Self-interest has been the dominant motive, and competition the prevalent method of industry and commerce; and where there is selfishness there is strife. How many speakers on world affairs have confessed that what the world needs is a new heart? Service as the motive and co-operation as the method of industry and commerce can alone ensure a universal and permanent world peace. Surely this is the divine intention, which man's folly and wickedness have been thwarting. God provides abundantly for man's needs, and desires that His bounty should be shared by all. Sentiment, however, must be guided by science to become practically effective. If "more harm is wrought by want of thought than even want of heart," to avoid the harm there must be more venturesome thought than the leaders of the nations have yet displayed, although an occasional utterance like that of Sir Samuel Hoare encourages a hope which still is faint.

IV.

Without denying collective responsibility for the betterment of the world, we may urge that on Great Britain, more than any other nation, lies the individual responsibility to lead in the movement to remove the present distress. It may

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be without any deliberate intention to become a great Empire, it has, like Autolycus, been picking up disregarded articles and has become the greatest Empire which the world has ever seen. "If I had a mind to be honest," says Autolycus, "I see Fortune would not suffer me; she drops booties in my mouth." On her territories the sun never sets; her flag floats on every breeze; there is a pigeon English along the shores of the Pacific. As a people we are not quite so hypocritical as most nations believe us to be when we disclaim imperialist ambitions. But an Empire that can command so many raw materials for the world's industry, and so many open markets for its commerce, is not only the envy but even the enemy of mankind, if it should practise, not merely nationalism, but imperialism in economic policy. The mischief to mankind that Mr Joseph Chamberlain, applying the business ethics of Birmingham to a great Empire, has wrought is simply incalculable. Germany saw that a closed economic system for the British Empire meant "no place in the sun" for other nations, sought to build a big fleet, and pushed on a colonial policy. It is a pity that the daughter nations have so thoroughly learned a bad lesson from the motherland. They cannot be compelled to change their protectionist policy, although Canada has just offered a welcome promise. But as regards the colonies still governed from Whitehall, an experiment might be made to make our imperial economics an assurance of good and not a menace of evil to other peoples.

Germany was deprived of her colonies, and is demanding a return of them; Italy is not satisfied with the inferior share of the loot of the last war that has fallen to her. The transfer of mandates, even if it were possible without the revision of the Peace Treaties, seems no easy remedy, for three conditions must be insisted on: (1) The restrictions on sovereignty which the conditions of the mandates involve, and which even the vigilance of the League of Nations can only incompletely enforce, would irritate the new recipients when they saw so many territories held without any such limitations. (2) The consent of the inhabitants must be obtained; and such consent is by no means to be reckoned on. (3) The interests of the inhabitants must be the first consideration; is there any assurance that either Italy or Germany as now governed could be trusted to fulfil such a demand? Without altogether ruling out this possibility, the most adequate solution would be that even if the empires could not be induced to extend (using the word for any nation

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which rules dependencies not self-governing) the principle of the mandate to all colonies, yet the British Empire at least should give a lead in extending to other nations any economic advantage it now enjoys. An alternative suggestion that the League itself should hold the mandates, the League being what it now is, only becoming what it may be hoped to be, seems to me quite impracticable. To be frank, I should not like to see Africans or Asiatics ruled in Fascist or Nazi fashion. Consideration for other races as well as our own must be maintained if the world crisis is to end in recovery, and not ruin. This, I am sure, is the path to be trod—novel as it is, dangerous as it may appear.

V.

Our last paragraph can simply indicate the legitimacy of a nation's desire for new homes for surplus population beyond its own borders without any loss of nationality. It is to be hoped that the restrictions on immigration which are being imposed in the States, Australia and Canada may be relaxed, and so an outlet from Europe may again be open. But that does not go to the root of the matter. An intensified nationalism is desirous—and not unreasonably, if the sense of nationality be rational—of retaining as many of its nationals as possible. Germany does not want Germans, or Italy Italians, to become British, or even 100 per cent. American; it wants to keep them what by birth and breeding they are. The German churches throughout the world are being helped and encouraged to be the means of preserving, not Lutheranism alone, but (to coin an English equivalent) *Germandom* in all the world. I regularly receive the Year Book which deals with this *Diaspora*. Over against this reasonable desire we must place as reasonable a desire that immigrants to those lands beyond the seas, if not in the first generation, yet in the second, should become loyal citizens of the country that has given them a home and a livelihood. Just as Germany itself is in an illegitimate way showing its resentment of the alien element, the Jews, but is not allowing them so far as they are willing to be assimilated, so should she recognise that the perpetuation of a German element, emphasising its aloofness, may be legitimately regarded as undesirable by other nations. It has been found that, as in Poland and Russia, Germans do easily assimilate, and it is only by such stimulation through the churches and wider propaganda that they preserve their Germandom.

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Is there a synthesis of these antitheses? As one of purely Scottish parentage born in Poland, then under Russian rule, this problem has a personal interest for me. As a family we jealously guarded our Scottish characteristics and British nationality, and were, I think, justified, as the culture and civilisation, morals and religion of Poland were less advanced than those of our motherland; and the arbitrary rule of Russia was one to be dreaded, and not desired. But in cases in which no such plea can be advanced, it would seem to me desirable to accept change of citizenship. There seems to be no room in the British Empire for a separate German colony; and it would be a disaster if so bad a neighbour as Germany has proved in the past, and still seems likely to prove, were to introduce danger of aggression in any part of the world now free from it.

Setting aside all prejudice, it seems to me that this aggressive, arrogant nationalism presents an insuperable obstacle to the solution of the problem from the standpoint of Christian universalism without creating dangers beyond the seas. It is no compromise with principle, but only a recognition of the whole situation which must guide the application of any principle, to assert that, if Italy and Germany claim justice from the community of nations for legitimate demands, they must in turn abandon the methods of violence in asserting them. To simplify the discussion I am omitting Japan from consideration now.

One other danger in restoring or providing colonies for Germany or Italy must be mentioned. No doubt both countries would welcome the opportunity of increasing their military resources by the enlistment of colonial peoples. How France has used her opportunity is well known. It is an indelible blot on her escutcheon that she added insult to injury by sending colonial forces to the occupied territory of Germany, and required the provision of "tolerated houses" to gratify their lust—an outrage Germany cannot forget. It is a mistake and a wrong, of which we as a nation should repent, that we also brought troops from India to fight on European soil. If colonies were held under a League of Nations mandate, such recruitment except for police purposes would be forbidden. Could the victors impose such a limitation on vanquished Germany, or Britain and France on their ally Italy, while in lands not under mandate themselves refusing it?

LONDON.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

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THE PLEASURE OF NEWNESS.

BARON VON OPPELL.

If and as long as we possess any vitality and it finds an outlet in some degree of mental energy, whatever direction this may take, we seem to have in us a desire, perhaps not consciously felt, for something new. This desire lies at the root of all movement, all effort: the constant urge to get out of the present state, whatever it may be, into a new one, making men strive towards an aim. It might even be regarded imaginatively as the hidden spring to progressive evolution—the groping of life itself in all its untold and various ramifications for something new.

I am not here, however, concerned with a speculative attempt to trace all human striving and possibly even the very evolution of life to this unconscious desire for newness. I am concerned to suggest a few initial reflections on newness in itself. Where alone can we really find it and why—be it real or merely its semblance—does it give us pleasure? For there can be no doubt that it is a pleasure quite apart from any personal advantage we may be hoping for.

It is this general craving for novelty, at its lowest level, to which newspapers owe most of their readers, and to which the startling headlines of those with the widest circulation appeal: our pleasure in anything "happening," marvellous by preference, but anyway "happening," be it a record flight across the Atlantic or swim over the Channel, a tidal wave or an earthquake or even merely abnormal heat or cold in any part of the earth, however remote from our own; the charm that simple gossip has for many people, say, about their neighbours which, even when not increased by the satisfaction of hearing of their ill-doings or misfortunes, yet remains a pleasure; our interest in a story, in any change, in news of any kind, however little it may affect us, simply for the sake of news and change.

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At a higher level the desire for newness may lead men of action to risk their lives in exploring the unknown parts of this earth, and active thinkers to search for new phenomena in Nature, or more generally to the pleasure many of us, who are not able ourselves to pursue such aims, experience in the record of travels and in following the researches of science. At last this want can rise till it may become an incentive to seeing for ourselves some new wonder in our everyday surroundings, in the familiar countryside.

Whether we turn to the headlines of the evening paper, to the discoveries of science or look with our own eyes at the ever new mystery of Nature,[1] as she is before us all, the hunger for newness has, I think, a common origin, namely, that we ourselves come into the world as something new.

If we take a purely materialistic or mechanical view of life and consider individual man to be but the result of a convergence of physical elements, of a—may be accidental—crossing of their several causal streams, even then there yet would spring into each such particular conflux something not to be found in any of the elements which, streaming together, have brought it about, nor in all of them in other combinations. There would arise a particular new relation between them, what Harald Höffding calls a new totality. Moreover, no one has yet been able to account for the human mind as simply the result of a physical process. We are bound to allow it, I think, to be another aspect of that, which materially regarded, constitutes the human brain. In this aspect mind points to something that cannot, like the physical elements that compose our body, be claimed to have existed in previous other forms, but would seem to arise into existence from some different and unknown source, ever afresh in each human being. The arising of a thing into existence, its origin, would add something original and unique to that new totality which, even materially regarded, is born with each of us.

We cannot therefore wonder that man should want something that corresponds to his own originality, even if this desire may lose its strength with the loss of real newness which the aims of human life are apt to bring, or degenerate into an ever unsatisfied craving for its semblance.

Conceding, then, that each of us is born as an original being, let us now ask if there is any corresponding newness to

[1] I employ the capital letter for Nature when I mean by this term to designate the entire sensuous world we understand or know. Cf. "Beauty as a Human Want," HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1934, p. 97.

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be found in this world of ours; and if there is, where shall we look for it?

We only know an ego or subject and a non-ego or object of experience, or rather both only in relation to each other, as reciprocally determined one by the other. All that is not Self, including events, I shall here call *things*; by which I mean not things as they may be in themselves, but as they are for all of us, as beings possessed of structurally the same senses and the same powers of perception—things as they are to our common view which, quantitatively elaborated and fixed, becomes in the end the viewpoint of science. As Self I designate our *individual* outlook on these things which, without any need to alter or distort them, as we do in illusions, yet shows them to each of us in a particular colour or light. This must add something essential to what they appear to all of us in common, if I am right in claiming that we each come into existence as original individuals and thus with a unique outlook.

Now where shall we find real newness: in *things* or in *ourselves*; in things as they are for all of us or in things as they may be for each one of us alone? If my premises be accepted, one might be inclined to look for it in oneself. Nevertheless it must be admitted, that as a matter of fact nearly all of us search for it only in *things*. Nor is it surprising that we should begin by doing so.

The Universe is limitless, and even in that part of it which is or may be one day accessible to our observation there are and always will be many things, that, old as they may be, no one has ever seen yet, and are thus new in a way to all men. Moreover it might be argued that even the humblest form of life is, like ourselves, the result of a particular crossing of causal chains, a new individual totality. And I fully accept Bergson's view that time itself—perhaps even among inanimate things—is ever bringing forth something new.

But we do not know things, be they living or not, otherwise than in relation to each other; we only know *differences* among things, called their qualities. We know only their surfaces. What originality they may possess in themselves viewed from within we do *not* know. Thus even science can only look into corners and *discover* things, or rather relations between them that have hitherto escaped us. It cannot tell us, nor is it concerned with the origin of anything.

No more is there any use for originality or newness in

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practical life; it would be, on the contrary, an obstacle to success. The great statesman or general or successful man of business does not trouble to see things individually or differently from what they are to others. He is dealing with things as they *are*, that is, as they are to our common view. All he needs is to see them a little more exactly in their bearing on his purpose and above all a *little sooner* than others do.

But however slight our success in practical life may be, we all, at times, strive after something, be it only for ends that change with the day. If I am right, it is the desire for novelty, the hope that the goal, when reached, will bring us a *new* satisfaction, different from anything we have yet experienced, which lies at the root of all effort. Yet, even if our aim were high and difficult and completely achieved at last, we rarely find that success brings us what we hoped of it. And certainly it will never give us the pleasure of newness. For, as Cressid says—perhaps a little too cynically—of man's love for woman—certainly truly of most of our aims:—

> "Things won are done,
> Joy's soul lies in the doing."

It is to the "doing"—not to the goal when reached—to the act of striving itself that we must look for our joy. It should be a joy, if we say yes to life, for it means life, and life itself is ever new. As we strive we are unconsciously doing our part towards this newness, the newness that time is ever bringing forth.

But it is not our share, in common with all living things, as unconscious actors in the creative progress of life, which is the object of the present inquiry. We are here concerned only with the *pleasure* of newness, that is, with a newness we can *consciously* experience.

Such newness we never find in things as they are to our general view. Nor do we find it in striving for them, nor when our aim is reached. This can change only the *standpoint* from which we regard the world, but not our *outlook* on it.

It is only when we see things uniquely, as I am claiming that as original beings we should be able to do, that we can find, every day and wherever we may be, real newness before us. Thus alone can we attain what Hume calls the enjoyment of our own mind, the pleasure of thinking our *own individual* thoughts. And it is well observed by Schopenhauer that what distinguishes men is not the seeing things that no one has ever seen before, but thinking about things

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which everybody can see what no one has ever thought before.

And think originally we all could do. It does not matter if our thoughts will not bear critical investigation. In what is really our *own* there will always be something—however imperfect and crudely conceived—that is *new* and contains the possible germ of an original train of thought.

Further, above all—whether we be thinkers or not—it is *simply seeing* the world with our own eyes which *alone* can give us a pleasure that is open to everyone; a pleasure that can never pall, for its essential character is *newness*: the pleasure of beauty. For beauty can only arise by seeing things in harmony with your *individual* self, and therefore just a little differently from what any other can see them; thereby creating something quite new, since each one of us himself is a unique and original being. So it is that there are as many and always new beauties to be found in this world of ours, as there are individuals who can see beauty. And yet there is only one criterion of beauty: the harmonious adaptation of whatever the object be in our common view to what is unique and new in each percipient.

This would seem to me to show further, as I have argued in previous articles, that the theory of beauty as nothing else than adequate expression or capability of expression is both superficial and false. Though you might express things as they are to our common view never so adequately, you would at best produce something that might be called "clever" and that every equally "clever artist" could imitate on other subjects, but never beauty, which defies imitation, for it arises new into existence with each human being who is capable of seeing it.

Thus, it will be agreed, all real works of art are *always new*. They may serve as examples of what beauty should be, but they can no more be copied, than one original being can become the replica of another. And indeed we see all those who would be artists instinctively striving to be new and original; for originality, as Kant well says, is the hallmark of genius. But most of them search, just as we ourselves do in ordinary life, for their newness in *things*. Or, again—to illustrate here only from literary art what applies equally to *every* form of art—they at best seek for *false* originality, by trampling on sentiments, principles or prejudices, religious, moral or conventional—a method which rarely fails to produce some effect of novelty. But people get used to being shocked. Such works in time lose their

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novelty and become out of fashion. To violate principles or prejudices does not mean that the things to which they apply are seen more originally than those need do who entertain them.

More generally artists who can find no true originality in themselves will turn immediately for their newness to things, search for it in unusual situations: bridges that collapse or ships that go down involving various types of persons with startling suddenness in the same fate, which in the end, be we types or individuals, awaits us all. Or they will choose unfamiliar aspects of life, often particularly sordid ones (which therefore perhaps have not been so frequently treated of). At last they will be content with the simple narration of events, as striking as they can make them with the aid of that easy imagination which enables us to string facts together unhampered by any serious regard for their inward connection. But they all see these novelties, whatever form they take and however unlovely, just as everybody else sees them. Therefore once their first effect is worn off, such "artistic" productions lose even their semblance of newness and become as "old" and obsolete as the headlines of last week's paper.

Great art is not concerned with new things. The three great tragedians of antiquity treated of practically the same subject, and the story was by no means a new one. Yet they each left us something different and new, and new it will still be when to-day's "newest" play is as if it had never been.

Shakespeare did not try for the effect of novelty by trampling on prejudices, nor did he trouble to search for unknown stories or unusual situations. He took his facts from history or legend, just as he found them ready-made—sometimes even down to details, as from Plutarch in his Roman plays; or he took them from Nature, not in her remote aspects, but, as she is there before us all, for everyone to see. And yet he gave us something new, and which will ever remain new—namely, the world that Shakespeare saw.

Now we who are not great artists equally possess, I am claiming, or at any rate might possess, an original outlook. And yet, even if we are above being satisfied with any sensational gossip or story, we persist in searching for the pleasure of newness in *things*. And this is, no doubt, because it is so much easier to see the world as it is for all of us in common than with our own eyes. We are apt to lose our original outlook as life goes on. There is, as I have tried to show, no use for it in any of the ordinary aims of life. And

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we are bound to pursue some practical aim, most of us by the necessity to provide for our livelihood, and all of us more or less by our very nature. I am far from deploring that it should be so. For there can be no doubt that striving for something is needful in order to maintain and strengthen that same energy which, with rare exceptions, we might lose altogether if we did not employ it for practical aims, and which we want, perhaps even in a higher degree, in order to see things originally. But where the trouble comes in is that it demands a great effort to exchange the view-point we need in ordinary life for that very different one, which might show us the same things quite apart and free from their use—simply as they are to yourself or would be if you saw them for the first time. We easily lose this view-point in the course of life, and we might have to recall some vivid impression in early youth or what we may have seen in the simplest things that meant the whole world to our childhood, to find it again.

Something corresponding to inertia in the physical world determines to a great extent our mental states. It may be for our good that it should be so, since the capability of making effort such as is needed to change our state of mind is strengthened by habit, that is, again by inertia. Only the task becomes more difficult when it means not merely changing from one state of mind to another on the same plane (as both our work and recreations generally are), but turning inward, as it were, from the periphery of our mind to that deeper level where alone we may find whatever is unique and original in ourselves.

Thus it comes about that we generally continue in our moments of leisure to look on all things only as we know them for use, which means as they are to our common view. But when we do this without pursuing any aim, thereby unconsciously doing our part towards the newness that life itself is ever revealing, it means nothing else than seeing the world second-hand. Such an outlook robs human existence of all its wonder, for it will necessarily extend to our thoughts and beliefs. Thus, even their God most people do not know as alone such knowledge is possible, that is, immediately in ourselves, but only as they have been informed about Him by others, as they know Him by hearsay.

Everything is clear and comprehensible in this second-hand world, and there is to be found in it, and beyond it, no mystery and no newness. Such is human existence, I am afraid, for many of us always, and for all of us at many times.

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But to those who neither know nor want a different world, Schopenhauer's cheerless reflections on the lot of humanity in general apply only too well. Hardly is man relieved, he says, from the toil and anxiety of striving for the means to live, when already the spectre of boredom is hovering over him like a bird of prey, ready to swoop down on any human life that is secure from care.

Thus, in order to escape from the sameness we find both around us and in ourselves, we search, whenever we have the means, for novelty in everything that is implied by that magic word "change," which for many people is but another name for all recreation and pleasure. But, however great the variety we may be able to bring into our life, sooner or later we will find that "le plus que cela change, le plus ça reste la même chose." The more we crowd our lives with different pleasures and pastimes, the more accentuated becomes the sameness of our outlook on all these things. And at last that minimum of newness is reached, which is characteristic of most people once youth is passed. We observe it in nearly all forms of human intercourse and, most easily, in that which claims for itself the name of "society."

And yet there is wonder and newness everywhere around us for everyone to see. We need only look at things, as I have said before, with our own eyes. We may not see, it is true, a whole new world as Shakespeare did, nor need we be able to express our vision in any form of art; yet we each can see something that no one else has ever seen before or will ever be able to see, in exactly the same way, again. Then and then only we shall have the pleasure of newness. And not only ourselves, for in some way, by the very fact of seeing it, we bring newness to others.

These few reflections lead me to conclude: there lies a strange, one might call it a self-creating newness in life itself. Thus we ourselves, as all living things, are ever new. This stream of newness gives to all animals, who live in an ever-changing present, the joy of life. Although this joy must lose its original *completeness* in beings who *think*, and for whom therefore the present moment has ceased to be all, yet its spirit survives in the feeling that makes us go on.

If we are not satisfied with the unconscious newness which is ours by the grace of living, but would realise it in ourselves by consciously seeing it around us, we must begin by recognising that we shall never find it in things simply as they are to the general view needed to maintain our life. Nor shall we find it in any *variety* of such things, but only in looking

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with our own individual eyes and thinking our own individual thoughts on the things that are before us every day.

So, whoever of us would have the pleasure of newness, that is, the pleasure of thought and the pleasure of beauty, must create it for himself by that unique and ever new outlook which is our common birthright as human beings.

VON OPPELL.

Schloss Wilsdruff Bei Dresden.

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IS MARCION'S GOSPEL ONE OF THE SYNOPTICS?[1]

PAUL-LOUIS COUCHOUD.

I.

It is well known that Marcion's gospel was used up to the fifth century, in Marcionite churches which had seceded from the Mother Church during the second century. It was not called "the Gospel according to Marcion," but quite simply "the Gospel," and was the only gospel accepted by the Marcionites. It was attributed, not to Marcion, but to Jesus himself, or to Paul, of whom Marcion professed himself the disciple and successor.

This gospel is now lost. But during five centuries it was frequently, largely and scrupulously quoted by orthodox writers, particularly by Tertullian, who follows it, verse by verse, in order to refute its author in the *Adversus Marcionem* (iv.); by Adamantios, who in his anti-Marcionite *Dialogues* introduces two Marcionites, each of whom advocates his own gospel, and thirdly, by Epiphanius, who once possessed a copy of this heretical gospel, and quoted the passages where it differed from that of Luke. By collecting these quotations and allusions, it is possible to reconstruct Marcion's gospel in its entirety, sometimes textually, sometimes only approximately, but with a fair degree of accuracy.

The latest reconstruction is that of Harnack,[2] but in spite of its great merit it is not perfect. The impartiality of the editor has been influenced by the convictions of the author. Harnack, in opposition to Zahn, wanted to prove that Marcion's gospel had been derived solely from that of Luke

[1] Thesis delivered before the Sixth International Congress on the History of Religions, at Brussels, September, 1935. Translated for the Hibbert Journal by Joan Ferro.

[2] Marcion: *Beilage IV.*, 2nd edition. Leipzig, 1924.

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with no borrowing from any of the other three orthodox evangelists, Matthew, Mark or John. He was thus compelled to omit certain passages which tended to disprove his theory. Here are three examples :—

(1) Two quotations, independent of each other, from Adamantios (*Dial.*, II., 15) and Isidore of Pelusium (*Ep.*, I., 371), and also allusions from Irenæus (*Hær.*, I., 27, 2), and Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.*, 14, 4), show us that Marcion's gospel recorded one of Jesus' sayings in these words : "Think you I am come to fulfil the Law of the Prophets ? I am come not to fulfil but to destroy." Now there is nothing analogous to this in Luke's gospel, but in that of Matthew (v. 17) we find the exact reverse : "Think not I am come to destroy the Law or the Prophets. I am come not to destroy, but to fulfil." Harnack does not pay due attention to this authenticated fragment of Marcion's gospel.

(2) According to Chrysostom (*in Phil.* vii., cf. ii. 6-8) the followers of Marcion maintained that "Jesus took the likeness of a slave (as Paul said in Philippians ii. 7) when *girt with a linen cloth he washed the feet of his disciples*." Now the account of the Washing of Feet is only found in John, not in Luke. Harnack, in spite of Chrysostom's testimony, leaves it out of Marcion's gospel.

(3) A text of Origen (*Hom. in Luc.* XXV.) leads us to infer that Marcion's gospel contained the story of the two sons of Zebedee asking Jesus to let them sit one on his right hand and the other on his left in his glory. This incident is not recorded by Luke, only by Mark and Matthew. Harnack does not include it in his reconstruction of Marcion's gospel.

Certain it is that Marcion's gospel consistently corresponds to that of Luke, and only very inconsistently with those of the other three evangelists, in those cases where each gives an individual account. Marcion and Luke are closely connected ; Marcion makes contact with the others only in rare cases. Nevertheless, Zahn was right in refusing to dismiss these latter instances, however exceptional they might be. From them he drew the conclusion that Marcion had employed all four canonical gospels. Harnack showed that it is difficult to accept this conclusion, because if Marcion had in truth employed the Four Gospels that we now possess his work would have a far closer resemblance to a compilation from several gospels—a diatessaron. Harnack endeavoured to simplify the whole question by reconstructing Marcion from Luke alone, a theory which, though very alluring at first sight, comes into conflict with such

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facts as those just quoted. The problem must be reconsidered from the beginning.

II.

The chief problem raised by Marcion's gospel is not that of its reconstruction but that of determining the significance of its close affinity with Luke's. Which served as a basis for the other?

Is Marcion's gospel (as Tertullian in the third, and Epiphanius in the fifth century both affirm), drawn from that of Luke, with certain omissions and variations due to Marcion's heretical beliefs? Alternatively, is Luke's merely an edition of Marcion's corrected and amplified in accordance with the orthodoxy of the Roman Church, as Christian Baur [1] thought in 1847?

It was not possible to give a positive answer to this question when it was broached in the middle of the nineteenth century, owing to the scant progress made in solving the problem of the synoptics. The arbitrary conclusions reached by Hilgenfeld and Volkmar [2] led Baur to revise his opinions. An early essay of W. Sanday [3] added nothing conclusive to the discussion, because he treated the subjeet too broadly.

In order to reach an incontrovertible conclusion, one must obviously begin by comparing those parts of the gospel common to both Luke and Marcion with the sections peculiar to each. It is almost invariably the sections peculiar to Luke which come under discussion, as those peculiar to Marcion consist solely (with the exception of the two incidents already quoted) of occasional isolated words.

This has in itself a certain striking significance. When an author wishes to re-model a text so as to conform to a given doctrine it is not often that he can accomplish his task with nothing but a pair of scissors to help him. It is much easier for him to use the glue-pot and stick additions into the text which he is at perfect liberty to compose for his own purpose. But this is a mere assumption.

Let us begin with the two incidents peculiar to Marcion, that is, those which are not found in Luke. Are they consistent with the main part of the gospel?

The arrogant and much-resented request of the sons of Zebedee (the account of which shows these two apostles in a

[1] *Kritische Untersuchungen*, pp. 305, 424.
[2] *Das Evangelium Marcions*, 1850.
[3] *The Gospels in the Second Century*, 1876, pp. 222–230.

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somewhat unfavourable light), has an exact parallel in an incident common to both Luke (ix. 52–55) and Marcion, where Zebedee's sons ask Jesus for permission to bring down fire from Heaven on the inhospitable Samaritan village, and receive from Jesus a severe rebuke. These two rebukes to James and John are both written in the same style and spirit. It is, therefore, very unlikely that Marcion made an addition.

The washing of feet is not found in Luke, but, curiously enough, the text common to Marcion and Luke contains an allusion to it. Actually, Jesus says (Luke xxii. 26–27 D.): "He that is chief let him be as he that doth serve, for whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat or he that serveth? . . . But I am amongst you *as he that serveth*." From this it would appear that Luke has omitted the episode but retained the moral. There is, therefore, no evidence even here of any addition by Marcion.

Let us now consider some of the sections peculiar to Luke. Let us see if they are equally consistent with the main part of the gospel.

By far the largest, and the one which best lends itself to examination, is the whole romantic and delightful beginning of Luke's gospel.

Marcion begins with these impressive words :—

> "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, during the government of Pontius Pilate, Jesus Christ, Son of God, descended from Heaven, and appeared at Capernaum, a town of Galilee."

In Luke the names Tiberius and Pilate are followed by those of the three tetrarchs, Herod, Philip, and Lysanias, and the high priest Annas (iii. 1) while the fifteenth year of Tiberius' reign marks the beginning not of Jesus' ministry, but of John the Baptist's. Above all, the first appearance of Jesus in public, which took place at Nazareth, not at Capernaum, is preceded by a long, elaborate history of the miraculous births of both John and Jesus, and Jesus' boyhood, baptism, and temptations (i–iv. 15).

This fine narrative, the painters' paradise, is in a distinctive style, pseudo-Biblical, brim-full of allusions and quotations from the Scriptures, interspersed with verses from the Psalms, which are themselves treasures of Biblical poetry. This style, with its somewhat artificial charm, is not found again in the main part of the gospel, save in a few short isolated passages which are precisely those also absent

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from Marcion's rendering. Moreover, the characters are not shown in the same light here as in the other part of the gospel. John the Baptist is treated almost as Jesus' equal —as a great prophet, sent from God, filled with the Holy Ghost, the mediator of salvation; his halo almost merges with that of Jesus, whereas in the main part of the gospel, Jesus himself praises John, only to add that "he that is least in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than he" (vii. 28) —a very different attitude. Mary is honoured as the Virgin who conceived by an act of God, and as the Mother who kept in her heart the secret of the birth and boyhood of Jesus, whereas elsewhere in the gospel, Jesus himself says that his mother and brethren are all those who hear the Word of God (vii. 21)—there, again, the attitude is entirely different. Jesus himself is represented as the national Messiah of the Jews who "shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever (i. 33), whereas in the main part of the gospel, he is the Christ of Paul's teaching, who suffers and dies in order to save mankind—a further difference in the representation.

It is hard indeed not to feel the contrast between the first chapter of Luke and the rest of the gospel. It is, therefore, more likely that this lengthy narrative peculiar to Luke has not been omitted by Marcion, but is an addition made by Luke himself.

According to Marcion, Jesus began his ministry at Capernaum; according to Luke, at Nazareth; but, by a curious oversight, Luke, who had thitherto made no mention of Capernaum, describes how Jesus imagines the men of Nazareth saying to Him "Whatsoever we have heard done in Capernaum, do also here in thy country" (iv. 23). Now, up till then, nothing had happened in Capernaum. This negligence on the part of Luke clearly indicates that the order, Capernaum before Nazareth, as found in Marcion, is the original one.

Let us turn to other examples :—

Marcion records two incidents which, appearing at first sight to be analogous, are, in reality, fundamentally different. In the first a lawyer asks Jesus what must be done to obtain life, and Jesus tells him to obey the Law. By "life" however, is meant "life on earth," longevity, which is promised by Jewish law, and the Law does not lie. In the second, a man asks what must he do to obtain *eternal life*. He says he has kept all the commandments of the Law. This time it is not terrestrial, but celestial life which is meant. The young man must do more, he must give up his riches, a much

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harder thing to do. In Luke both questions refer to *eternal life* (x. 25 ; xviii. 18), and the two replies of Jesus, one about the Law, and the other about the riches, cannot be reconciled. In my opinion, it is more probable that Marcion's version is the original.

Here is yet another divergence. Marcion records Jesus as saying : " It is easier for heaven and earth to pass than one tittle of *my words* to fail," while Luke gives " . . . than one tittle *of the Law* to fail " (xvi. 17). Marcion's version is supported by a common passage : " Heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away " (xxi. 33). The first quotation from Luke would appear to be a hasty correction, introducing the Law quite irrelevantly.

The same criticism must be made of the following variation. Marcion gives " Who is my mother, who are my brethren, if not those who hear *my words* and do them ? " Luke has " . . . who hear the Word of God and do it " (viii. 21). There again, the phrase " my words " fits better into the context, and is more probably the original text, whereas the phrase " the Word of God " seems to be a correction made like the other, through the influence of the Old Testament.

One finds in Marcion : " Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall I confess *before God ;* but he that denieth me before men shall be denied *before God,*" whereas in Luke " . . . him shall the *Son of Man* confess before the *angels of God* . . . shall be denied before the *angels of God* " (xii. 8). In Marcion, " there is joy in the *presence of God* over one sinner who repenteth," and in Luke : " There is joy in the *presence of the angels of God* . . . " (xv. 10). One cannot but feel that Luke's rendering is a correction due to a theological scruple.

In a passage on Martyrdom, Marcion writes : " Ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake, but in your patience possess ye your souls," but Luke gives : " . . . for my name's sake, but there shall not be an hair of your head perish. In your patience, etc. . . . " (xxi. 17).

The sentence about the hair must surely have been an addition, introduced in the nature of a promise to reassure faint-hearted martyrs ; more especially since a similar allusion to hair is made again, in order to mitigate another fear-inspiring text. Marcion has the rendering " Fear him which, after he hath killed you, hath power to cast into hell ; yea, I say unto you, fear him," while Luke adds a sentence peculiar to his gospel, " . . . even the very hairs of your

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head are all numbered; fear not, therefore . . . " (xii. 67). In both cases, the words peculiar to Luke are really inconsistent with the context.

Marcion also writes: "This generation (or, this people) is evil; they seek a sign, but there shall no sign be given it." Luke has: ". . . but there shall no sign be given, but the sign of Jonas the prophet" (xi. 29). And he infers in two verses peculiar to his gospel, that the sign of Jonas is that of the general resurrection. Here indeed are clear indications of the original text being revised.

I could give other instances but they would take too long to enumerate. I have reached the conclusion that a methodical and thorough comparison of the gospels of Marcion and Luke would show that the former is the original, and the latter a corrected and considerably amplified version of the former.

This conclusion does not in any way contradict the latest researches on Luke's gospel. Streeter [1] and later Taylor [2] both conclude solely from their study of canonical texts and with no thought at all of Marcion, that behind Luke's Gospel there must have been some source other than Mark, and one more comprehensive than the source usually known as "Q." They call it "Proto-Luke." In their opinion Luke drew from both Proto-Luke and Mark. Those passages taken directly from Mark are clearly secondary, as though they had been fitted into the main story. On the other hand, those which come from Proto-Luke seem to have furnished the original design.

I am not trying to prove that Marcion's gospel agrees in every respect with the reconstruction of Proto-Luke that Streeter and Taylor have attempted to make. But it is noteworthy that many of the passages in Luke which they consider to be second-hand, that is, taken direct, and often word by word from Mark, are precisely those omitted from Marcion for no reason, doctrinal or otherwise, that can be discovered. For instance, take the account of the Purification of the Temple as recorded by Luke. According to Taylor (p. 95), this account is only a servile abstract of Mark's (out of twenty-five words, twenty-two of Luke's occur in Mark). Epiphanius (42 sc. 53) rightly commented on the absence of this particular passage from Marcion's gospel. Luke would therefore appear to have amplified Marcion by inserting this passage from Mark.

[1] *The Four Gospels*, 1924; Chapter VIII.
[2] *Behind the Third Gospel*, 1926.

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The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen is treated in the same way. This parable is peculiar to Mark, who makes of it a vehicle to express his own particular belief in Jesus as the well-beloved Son, Heir of God his Father, probably as an answer to a parable of Hermas.[1] It has leapt straight from the pages of Mark into those of Luke, but does not appear in Marcion's, although it is in accordance with Paul's teaching, and Marcion would have had more reason to include it in his gospel than to leave it out.

The priority of Marcion to Luke does not therefore disturb the exegesis. Whenever the Oxford commentators say "St Luke had Proto-Luke for his principal, and St Mark for his supplementary source," the reply is simply this: "As his principal source St Luke used Marcion's gospel, and St Mark's as his supplementary one." In other words, an authenticated text is substituted for a hypothetical one. I do not say that this can be done without a considerable readjustment, but at least the framework, so laboriously built up, retains its usefulness.

It is hardly surprising that an orthodox evangelist should have undertaken the task of re-editing, correcting and completing Marcion's gospel. The anonymous author of the Gospel which we call Luke's, alludes to his predecessors, who were fairly numerous (πολλοί) and he sets himself the task of determining how much can be safely believed (περὶ ἀσφάλειαν). Marcion's gospel was not attributed to Marcion, its origins are veiled in mystery. It comprised a restrained, majestic account of sublime, truly divine utterances. Why should it have been lost? The essential was first to delete every saying which could provide a weapon for heterodox writers, second, to imbue it with a wholesome religious atmosphere, and third, to supplement it with whatever was required by sound religious principles, as well as with the best passages from the other gospels. The skill of this author lies in the subtle way in which he blends two different doctrines into one whole, and at the same time impresses his own personality even on passages copied almost verbatim.

Luke's gospel should be considered as the Catholic edition of Marcion's. I have endeavoured to show elsewhere[2] that a Catholic edition of Paul's Epistles has been substituted in like manner for the Marcionite version, and that the Acts of the Apostles may possibly be the Catholic version of

[1] See the HIBBERT JOURNAL: *Quels livres Marc a-t-il lus?* April 1932.

[2] *Premiers écrits du Christianisme.* Paris: Rieder, 1930.

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book, the *Acts of the Apostle* (Paul) originating from, or inspired by, some text of Marcion. By an act of high religious policy, the Roman Church succeeded in assuring the future of Christianity by setting aside every indication of the uncompromising author Marcion, and by retaining, in annexing it for her own use, that author's New Testament.

III.

To make a comparison of Marcion's gospel with that of Matthew, Mark, and John would require a lengthy statement, which I cannot undertake here. I shall only try to show how, by including Marcion's among the gospels known as the Synoptics, the need for the evangelical source which has been postulated by all critics in the last half century, under the letter "Q," is thus abolished.

This letter stands, as is well known, for the evangelical writing common both to Matthew and Luke, but which is not found in Mark. It has been presumed that it derived from a book now lost a collection of "Logia" which must have been the source used by Luke and Matthew to supplement Mark. But with regard to the precise nature of this book, whether Matthew or Luke kept the more closely to it, and whether Mark himself knew and used it, on these questions critics have not been able to agree.

As soon as one takes Marcion's gospel into proper consideration, one realises that the book of "Logia" is a figment of the imagination, which never really existed. Its contents must instead be attributed partly to Marcion and partly to Matthew. The passages common to Matthew and Luke are not homogeneous; they are divided into two groups, each with widely divergent philological characteristics.

The first group, containing the majority of passages, comprises texts, which, in Matthew as in Luke, are derived from Marcion's gospel, Luke, as was his wont, transcribing them almost word for word, making only a few small alterations on points of doctrine. Matthew, in the literal sense of the word, rethought them from the Jewish standpoint, giving them the wording of Hebrew poetry. These passages, therefore, have two characteristics: (1) They occur in Marcion's gospels; and (2) they are handed down to us in two versions clearly differing from each other.

The second group comprises those passages not found in Marcion. Of these Matthew is the chief author. He composed them with great care, making them scan, and, without

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forcing, giving them that Hebraic symmetry so dear to him. Luke borrowed them from him, and, as usual, transcribed them almost literally. They have, therefore, these characteristics: (1) They are not found in Marcion; (2) they possess a very marked Hebraic turn of expression; and (3) they have come down to us in two versions so similar that they appear to be but one.

For brevity's sake, I will only quote two examples from each group.

For the first, the choice is so large as to be embarrassing. If one glances down the two columns in which Harnack reconstructed "Q," one following Luke and the other Matthew, one finds that in the majority of instances, the text, whilst substantially the same, introduces constant and unmistakable variations in the editing.

Let us take, almost at random, one sentence in the Parable of the Talents. Luke gives the following :—

ἐφοβούμην γὰρ σε ὅτι ἄνθρωπος αὐστηρὸς εἶ
αἴρεις ἃ οὐκ ἔθηκας
καὶ θερίζεις ὃ οὐκ ἔσπειρας

(xix. 21).

We know from Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.*, iv. 37) that Marcion's gospel gave the same rendering ("... *Austerum, tollentem quod non posuerit, et metentem quod non severit*"). Here is Matthew's version :—

ἔγνων σε ὅτι σληρὸς εἶ ἄνθρωπος
θερίζων ὅπου οὐκ ἔσπειρας
καὶ συγάγων ὅθεν οὐ διεσκόπισας

(xxv. 24).

The uncommon and picturesque αὐστηρός, "acrid" or "harsh," is replaced by the more ordinary term σκληρός, hard. And the proverbial expression, already used by Solon [1]: "*thou takest up that thou layedst not down*" is replaced by the Hebraic "*gathering where thou hast not strawed*," which is a mere redundancy of "*reaping where thou hast not sown.*" Compared with the Greek as given by Luke, which is that of Marcion, Matthew's version is unquestionably derivative.

Another instance occurs in the indictment of the Pharisees. Luke gives :—

τὸ ἔξωθεν τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τοῦ πίνακος καθαρίζετε
τὸ δὲ ἔσωθεν ὑμῶν γέμει ἁρπαγῆς καὶ πονηρίας

(xi. 39).

[1] *Diogenes Laertes X.*, 29.

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This is also Marcion's version as recorded by Tertullian (iv. 27) (*exteriora calicis lavatis, interiora autem vestra non emundastis*). Matthew gives :—

καθαρίζετε τὸ ἔξωθεν τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ τῆς παροψίδος,
ἔσωθεν δὲ γέμουσιν ἐξ ἁρπαγῆς καὶ ἀκρασίας

(xxiii. 25).

By placing this verb in the plural (γέμουσιν) it is the cup and platter, and not the heart, which are full of extortion and excess, wording obviously more forced. The original is Luke's and Marcion's.

There are many instances of well-authenticated texts in Marcion, in the rendering of which Luke and Matthew differ notably, and in these cases Matthew's version is clearly dependent.

Here, on the other hand, are two examples of the second group.

From Matthew, let us take this couplet of an unmistakably Jewish lyricism :—

O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets,
And stonest them which are sent unto thee,
How often would I have gathered thy children together,
Even as a hen gathereth her chickens, under her wings,
And you would not !

Behold, your house is left unto you desolate,
For I say unto you, Ye shall not see me henceforth,
Till you shall say :
Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.

(xxiii. 37–39).

We know from Epiphanius that this passage does not occur in Marcion. There is here a sequence of fifty-six Greek words, which are transcribed by Luke (xiii. 34–35) in exactly the same order, but with these alterations :—

A present-infinitive replaced by an aorist infinitive ; two little words omitted, one added. These are the kinds of variations shown by two manuscripts of the same author, the slight changes which are inevitable in every traditional text recorded by hand, since absolutely literal versions have only come into being since the invention of printing. We are therefore dealing with the same text, re-transcribed. Moreover, it is possible to see that in this case it is Luke who is derivative, for in Matthew this passage fits well into its context, whereas it is but clumsily introduced in Luke's version.

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Again, let us consider two verses from Matthew, written in fine Hebraic style :—

> The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation
> And shall condemn it :
> Because they repented at the teaching of Jonas ;
> And, behold, a greater than Jonas is here.
>
> The Queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation.
> And shall condemn it
> For she came from the uttermost parts of the earth
> To hear the wisdom of Solomon
> And, behold, a greater than Solomon is here. (xii. 41–43.)

Epiphanius (42 sc. 25) tells us that this passage did not occur in Marcion. It is, however, found in Luke (xi. 31–32) with the two strophes in reverse order. If we bear in mind that the passage which in Luke (xi. 24–26) immediately *precedes* this one, is the one which in Matthew follows immediately *after* it, and which at the same time is not found in Marcion at all, we have here one hundred and thirteen Greek words reproduced verbatim. Here again, the context proves that Matthew's version is the original and Luke's transcribed from it.

In Matthew (iii. 7–10) (" O generation of vipers . . . ") we find a sequence of sixty-three Greek words, and in xi. 21–23 (. . . . " Woe unto thee Chorazin . . . ") one of forty nine, both of which are most faithfully reproduced in Luke. Moreover, neither of these passages occurs in Marcion, and there are clear indications that both originated in Matthew.

In conclusion, I would say that it is impossible to find in the source " Q " that homogeneity which would justify a belief in its existence, and that the originality to which it lays claim ought to be divided in unequal proportions between Marcion and Matthew.

The problem of the Synoptics will not be resolved as long as only three gospels are numbered among the Synoptics, Mark, Matthew and Luke. There must be four : Mark, Matthew, Luke and Marcion.

As a result, the date of the composition of the Synoptic Gospels must be placed roughly between A.D. 135 and 145. Marcion went to Rome in A.D. 138, but probably his gospel preceded him there.[1] He died in A.D. 144, as Barnikol[2]

[1] Jerome tells us (Epis. 133, 4) that Marcion had sent one of the women of his church to Rome before him.

[2] E. Barnikol : *Die Entstehung der Kirche im zweiten Jahrhundert und die Zeit. Marcions*, Kiel, 1933.

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proved in opposition to Harnack's theory. It is easier to understand the last of the Synoptic Gospels, Luke's, being written after Marcion's death, than during his lifetime, that is, about 145.

The date A.D. 135 to 145 agrees better with two indications drawn from the Gospels themselves: (1) The literal fulfilment of Daniel's prophecy: ("*The abomination of desolation* (*i.e.* a heathen altar) *standing in the Holy Place*") to which both Mark (xiii. 14) and Matthew (xxiv. 15) allude, only occurred (after Antiochus Epiphanius' times) during the reign of Hadrian in 135 A.D., when the altar and statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, as well as those of the Emperor, were erected on the site of the Temple, and when the name Jerusalem was changed to that of Ælia Capitolina. (2) The Parable of the Vineyard as recorded by Mark (xii. 1–11) is apparently intended to correct the analogous parable of Hermas (Sim. V.)[1] which cannot be dated earlier than 120 A.D.

PAUL-LOUIS COUCHOUD.

PARIS.

[1] See the article, previously quoted, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, April, 1932.

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ACCURACY IN THE GOSPEL RECORDS.

THE RIGHT REVEREND R. O. HALL.
Bishop of Hong Kong.

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ESSAY.

THE purpose of this essay is to suggest that in "L" and "Q"[1] may be found the most accurate records of Our Lord's actual words: and that if this is so all four historical Gospels have the same relationship, not to any written sources of which we have evidence, but to Our Lord's actual life and teaching. They are all four legitimate interpretations of Our Lord's life to those for whom each Gospel was written.

Certain conclusions follow from this position which have a practical bearing on Our Lord's teaching and life as it affects our common life to-day.

2. THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE WRITER.

I write as a working parson, not as a student: as a member of the jury, not as a learned counsel for the defence. I write also as a missionary whose daily work it is to help others into an understanding of Jesus Christ and His way of life. I have tried to master the following:—

(1) Dr Streeter's *Four Gospels* (and some occasional papers of his on similar subjects). (2) A. Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus*. (3) Hoskyns and Davey's *The Riddle of the New Testament*. (4) Dr Manson's *Teaching of Jesus*, and various other books, among which I must mention (A) various lives of Jesus, all of which have convinced me that St Mark's Gospel is a bad starting point. (B) The reconstruction of "L" and "Q" made by Dr Taylor, published by S.P.C.K., which I have used *devotionally* for some years.

[1] An interesting theory as to "L" and "Q" will be found in the previous article on Marcion's Gospel, pp. 271–6.—EDITOR.

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The evidence presented by these books is as follows :— (1) That St Matthew and St Luke in their historical form contain large sections of St Mark. (2) That St Matthew and St Luke use a further common source (" Q "). (3) That St Matthew and St Luke have also independent sources of their own (M) and (L).

My suggestion is that *this evidence proves a time priority for St Mark ; but does not prove for St Mark an " accuracy " or " content " priority.*

Reading the *Quest of the Historical Jesus* and the *Riddle of the New Testament* gave me an uncomfortable feeling that the significance of St Luke's special source was unduly ignored as inconvenient material, not really assimilated by the writers (*e.g.* in *The Riddle of the New Testament* St Luke's parable of the fig tree is quoted, but the last episode of the parable beginning " Lord, let it alone this year also till I shall dig it and dung it about " is omitted, p. 174).

In Dr Manson's book I find a still more strange phenomenon. He begins by establishing the priority of Mark, but is forced by facts to give a position of at least equal importance to " L," and almost always prefers St Luke's version of " Q " to St Matthew's. Dr Manson's book ceases to be a house divided against itself if the story of the road to Emmaus is taken as the clue to St Mark's Gospel, rather than Peter's confession, *i.e.* if St Mark's Gospel is a sermon on the text " Ought not Christ to have suffered," rather than a cinematograph record of a mysterious Son of Man, divided into two reels by Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi.

3. The Thus-far-and-no-further of Form- and Textual-Criticism.

Dr Streeter, in his paper to the Modern Churchmen's Conference of 1933, has shown the limitations of form-criticism as only technical evidence. Jesus was a poet, not a poetaster. But there is more poetry in the parable of the Good Samaritan than in the parallelism

> "Love your enemies
> Do good to them that hate you."

As technical evidence the latter is more important. As essential evidence of the living Jesus and His power over the lives of men the Good Samaritan is more important. More important still is the cry of the pain-wracked body, " Father, forgive them ; for they know not what they do."

If form-criticism has a thus-far-and-no-further, so has

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textual evidence. If we had an actual copy of St Mark's notes of Peter's preaching which could be proved to have been written down in A.D. 40 it might still be possible that St Luke, interrogating living ear-witnesses twenty years later, has recorded more accurately the actual words of Jesus Himself. For example, all the three references to love and forgiveness which I have mentioned above would be for different reasons easily remembered and accurately recorded by simple lovers and friends. Whereas St Peter, the impetuous, arguing continually to prove that the Messiah was bound to suffer, is more likely to have concentrated on this point than to have given a simple, guileless narrative of his beloved Lord.

4. Two Modern Parallels.

The exact significance of my contentions as to the content and accuracy priority of "L" and "Q" will be made clearer by the following illustrations :—

(A) I have some personal knowledge of two pupils of a great master of theology. When they left college they were candidates for the same Kirk. "Peter" proved acceptable to the congregation, and till his retirement as an old man lived a Vicar of Wakefield life in the same parish. "John" became eventually a great teacher himself, developing the teaching he had received into a masterly Christian philosophy.

Suppose the old master of their youth to have a sister and a housekeeper and a circle of devoted friends who had listened to his stories and sermons for many years. "Luke" appears a theological exchange student from America with journalistic flare and *Manchester Guardian* standards. He visits the old sister of the now dead master, who calls the faithful circle of her friends. They talk. They remind and correct one another. He sits quietly making notes.

"Luke's" notes are likely to have a more photographic accuracy than "Peter's" eager sermons to his flock. "Peter" is bound to adopt his master's teaching to meet their needs and to answer their questions.

(B) The second illustration shows what types of sayings and teachings are remembered. I happen to have heard only two references to the sermons or words of a preacher who had been preaching for some years in one place. I must quote what I was told at some length to prove my point.

"He told us about a visitor in Northumberland dropping down from a Roman Wall to an inn for the

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night. His attention was arrested by a new grave. On it lay a large cross of white hawthorn. Knowing the prejudice of the country folk against hawthorn, he drew the inn keeper on to talk. 'Yes, that'll be Job Thamson's grave. We called him Job for he never had no luck. They say it was the wayward lass he had bringing hawthorn into the house that did it. The lass herself came to no good, and Job lost his wife and four fine lads. I guess it was parson laid that dross. There are no relations left and parson was his only friend. Thamson never left his farm except for market and parson's early Communion service. He would say he found meaning in the broken Bread and the Blood shed."

My informant then looked at me and said, "I remember that so clearly because the vicar said the Cross is the real conclusion of the book of Job and you can only understand the Cross in the Bread breaking."

This is an example of a vivid recollection of a parable.

The second example is of a "saying that stuck."

Another informant said, "he wrote to me once '*after all you cannot resign from life.*'"

"L" and "Q" are composed of similar memories, parables and "sayings that stuck." My suggestion is that in such *records accuracy is much more likely than in the preaching of the most devoted curate-disciple.* Nestorius, we are told, was not a Nestorian. Karl Marx is reported to have thanked God that he was not a Marxist. St Peter's personal enthusiasm for his Master makes him the first "Christian," but not necessarily the best basis for a biography of his Master.

5. A Tetroptic View.

Here is a possible road from the Synoptic problem to a "Tetroptic View." If a name must be given to this suggestion, it is "content" criticism. Plainly this does not contradict or ignore textual-criticism and "form"-criticism. It uses them as foundations. But by using them in this thus-far-and-no-further way a start is made in construction. The start is not made with Mark but with "L" and "Q." If Mark is made the basis the persistent spiritual claim of the fourth Gospel cannot be heard. But if "L" and "Q" are made the basis then all four Gospels have similar relations to Our Lord's own life and teaching.

It is important to notice that I do not say similar relations to "L" and "Q." That would be to limit evidence

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to technical evidence and allow the success of textual criticism to inhibit further advance. The technical evidence proves that Jesus lived and taught as He is described in "L" and "Q," in Mk and in M. Followers and *recorders of such a Jesus* can be easily understood to have written out His life as we now have it in our four Gospels. But the *content-relationship* between them is likely to be more significant for understanding Jesus Himself than the textual relationship.

I would tentatively describe the relationship as follows (in each case I am describing the historic Gospel as we now have it in our Canon) :—

St Matthew is the deposit of the religious Jewish Christians (the multitude of priests who believed ?) who loved their Master's teaching and codified it in their own way, and searched the scriptures for proof of His Messiahship.

St Mark is the deposit of St Peter's vivid experience, particularly of his own early misunderstanding of Jesus' way (Get thee behind me Satan, and the Denial). For this reason he emphasises how Jesus insisted that because He was the Messiah He must suffer.

St Luke explains for Gentiles carefully and artistically (dramatically) the power and charm and teaching of this fulfilment of the pure religion of the Jews.

St John writes out with more apparent personal devotion and partly in philosophical terms what is the heart of the Christian faith in Jesus of Nazareth, the divine Son of God.

6. St Mark : "The Gospel of the Suffering Messiah."

The suggestion about St Mark's Gospel must be defended. I shall base that defence on Dr Manson's book, because it is his masterly analysis of Jesus' teaching that suggested this explanation (which is not his own explanation) to me. Shortly, my view is that Dr Manson is right in making St Peter's confession the turning point in St Mark's Gospel, but wrong in also suggesting that this was also the great turning point in Jesus' own life. The other words, the confession *and the rebuke that went with it*, are more important to St Peter than they were to his Master.

Here is Dr Manson's most convincing table. He regards the frequent use of the phrase "Son of Man" as significant. But the phrase "Son of Man" is nearly always associated with the necessity of suffering. My suggestion is that it is the necessity of a suffering Messiah that is significant, rather

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than the mysterious phrase "Son of Man." The phrase cannot have been so significant to the disciples as the fact that the Messiah was crucified. Here is Dr Manson's table :—

We can now set out the remaining passages according to the source in which they are found and the audience to which they are addressed. We begin with Mark.

BEFORE ST PETER'S CONFESSION.

Mk ii. 10 (P) : The Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins.

ii. 28 (P) : The Son of Man is Lord of the Sabbath.

AFTER ST PETER'S CONFESSION.

viii. 31 (D) : The Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected.

viii. 38 (D + G) : The Son of Man coming in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.

ix. 9 (D) : The Son of Man rises from the dead.

ix. 12 (D) : The Son of Man suffers many things and is set at nought.

ix. 31 (D) : The Son of Man is betrayed, killed and rises again.

x. 33 (D) : The Son of Man is betrayed, suffers, is killed, and rises again.

x. 45 (D) : The Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many.

xiii. 26 (D) : They shall see the Son of Man coming on clouds with great power and glory (Dan. vii. 13f.).

xiv. 21 (D) : The Son of Man departs (this life) as it is written concerning him.

xiv. 21 (D) : Woe to the man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed.

xiv. 41 (D) : The Son of Man is betrayed into the hands of sinners.

xiv. 62 (P) : Ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the Almighty and coming with the clouds of heaven (Ps. cx. 1 ; Dan. vii. 13).

And here is another table from Dr Manson's book which shows how St Mark's association of the Son of Man with the Passion is almost unique.

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II. Sayings referring to the Passion:

Mark.	Q.	M.	L.
viii. 31			
ix. 9			
ix. 12			
ix. 31			
x. 33			
x. 45			
xiv. 21			
xiv. 41			xxii. 48
			xxii. 69
			(xxiv. 7)

If to this list is added the story of the Road to Emmaus and especially xxiv. 26, "Ought not the Christ to have suffered," "L" at once appears historically more natural. It is in the experience of the risen Lord that they understand the necessity of a suffering Messiah. The record as it is in "L" really explains St Peter's denial better than St Mark's Gospel. The logical conclusion of this evidence is surely that it is "L" which presents the accurate photographic record whereas Mark is much influenced by the personal impression made on St Peter by his own failure to understand that Jesus must suffer and his consequent betrayal of the beloved Master. He consequently stresses the frequency of Jesus' anticipation of suffering.

7. "L" and "Q" more accurate than "Mk"?

At the conclusion of Dr Manson's second chapter the position of St Mark's Gospel is thus stated. "Mk . . . is the most important. . . . It is St Mark's portrait before which we must stand. We may fill in the details of the sketch from our other sources; but if we desire to keep the picture true to life, we must keep the outline which Mark presents" (p. 44).

This statement "Mk is the most important" is based on the assumption that St Mark's Gospel is the most accurate record. But the accuracy of St. Mark's Gospel is not proved either by its priority in date or by its close association with St Peter. My suggestion is that St Mark's Gospel is rather an account of the impression St Peter's own share in Jesus' life made upon St Peter himself. St Mark therefore is in the same

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category as the Fourth Gospel; the impression Jesus made on a particular disciple, with a special relation to himself, and a special responsibility after Jesus' death for explaining to men with his own Jewish background what he had learnt from that experience.

It is significant that Dr Manson's careful examination of texts always brings him down on the side of "L" in the case of any difference in the Gospels. Still more significant is his treatment of the word "apostle" on p. 242. His preference for St Paul as against St Peter is most emphatic. And yet this Gospel of St Mark comes through St Peter's mind. It is difficult to see how St Peter can be at once so right and so wrong.

This reference to the controversy between St Peter and St Paul indeed suggests that St Luke was more than a disinterested diarist. He came with St Paul to Palestine eager to collect all the information he could about what Jesus did and said in order to refute the Judaizers. The travellers' first host is Philip. Philip's story is woven into the Acts. He meets an Ethiopian eunuch and preaches in Samaria. He is left at Cæsarea till the story picks him up again in the same city giving hospitality to St Paul and his party. It is perhaps not too much to guess that Philip told St Luke the story of the Good Samaritan. St Luke may indeed have gone behind the earliest writings to the still earlier memories of the faithful. (It is interesting, too, to note that the story of St Peter and Cornelius is a *Cæsarea* story.)

One more footnote is required. The authors of *The Riddle of the New Testament* disparage St Luke as an accurate account because "We should have no conception of what St Paul really taught if we had to depend for our information upon Acts alone" (p. 279). That is true, but the connection between "Luke-Acts" and St Paul's writings is much closer if St Paul's "poetry," rather than his doctrine, is considered. The inspiration of 1 Corinthians xiii. is not the Markan but the Lukan Jesus. There is also a remarkable closeness between St Peter's early speeches in Acts and St Mark's Gospel as I have suggested it should be understood, *i.e.* as interpreted by the road to Emmaus (*e.g.* Acts iv. 27: "Thy holy servant Jesus").

8. "Love and Obedience."

There is one consequence of great importance if the accuracy priority of "L" and "Q" is accepted. In "L"

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the summary of the law is put in the mouth of the young lawyer. In Matthew and Mk it is Jesus who gives the summary, but in Mk the young lawyer repeats what Jesus says in a rather meaningless way. Matthew, following his custom, would abbreviate the more lengthy Mark, and in doing so misses out this repetition by the lawyer which may be a record of an earlier tradition preserved by "L."

"Thou shalt love God and thy neighbour as thyself" are not then, if we accept "L," Jesus' commandment, *but the best till Jesus*. Jesus came to fulfil this best with something more. We find that something more in St John. "This is my commandment that ye love one another *as I have loved you*" and "Greater love hath no man than this that he lay down his life for his friends."

Here, then, is removed any danger of sentimentality from following "L."

The clue to Our Lord's life is not St Peter's confession but Our Lord's own calling "This is My beloved Son." As a Son He must do His Father's will though it lead Him through Gethsemane to death.

The answer of man to the love of God is not love but obedience. Jesus the friend and lover, the gentle-stern teacher of "L" and "Q," commands obedience from men. There is a quality, surely, about this obedience which is the quality of Jesus' own life.

9. Parson and Scholar.

To the parson also who is dealing always with sin and not with texts, the fact that Jesus lived as "L" and "Q" describe him brings more conviction of God than the phrase "Son of Man" which seems so important to Mk. There is more mystery in St Luke's story of the Passion than in the enigma of a phrase.

Here is Dr Manson's basis (p. 43, foot) :—

> "In 'Q' Jesus is the Prophet; in 'M' the Rabbi, however unorthodox; in 'L' he is one who fulfils the prophesy in Isaiah lxi. 1f. and lviii. 6: 'The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has annointed me to bring good news to the poor, he has sent me to proclaim liberty to the captives, and restoration of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those that are oppressed, to proclaim the year of the favour of the Lord.' In 'M' he is all this and something more—something which is hidden in the enigmatic title 'Son of Man.' 'Q,' 'M'

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and 'L' emphasise different aspects of Our Lord's life and teaching to such a degree that we might almost call 'Q' a Gospel for the votaries of ethical religion pure and simple, 'M' a Gospel for ecclesiastics, and 'L' a Gospel for evangelists and missioners."

Does "the something which lies hidden in the enigmatic title 'Son of Man'" really account for our knowing anything at all about Jesus Our Lord to-day?—so well as for example the *experience* behind the saying "To-day thou shalt be with me in paradise"?

Dare I suggest that Dr Manson explore the possibility that the phrase "Son of Man" goes back to the Jordan and Wilderness experience. "Thou art my beloved Son." "If Son, then what must I do?" The Chinese language could have a phrase "The Son-Man" (*i.e.* The Son of God who is also man or the man whose experience is that he is called by God "His beloved Son"). Is it possible that such a combination was possible also in Aramaic? Jesus shows a greater readiness to rip the heart out of Old Testament experience than to adopt its phrases—however enigmatic.

In all these things the practical parson as the juryman claims a point of view. We learn the unimportance of phrases. We know in the North that a gracious and glad acceptance of an invitation lies behind "I don't mind if I do." We know that experience is more than its definition. To us the enigmatic title "Son of Man" is less important than the cry "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do."

But we know that a love like that is the only explanation of there being any Gospels at all to study.

So we ask the scholars to go back behind the texts, the phrases, the forms of the Gospel to the amazing parables of love in word and action in "L" and "Q." The PERSON described in "L" and "Q" makes all the rest, including St John, intelligible. This PERSON demands an obedience and a discipline of terrific sternness.

Jesus does not tell us we *must* love God. He *is* God loving us. To such a love our answer is a glad obedience and a stern discipleship of love and duty.

THE BISHOP'S HOUSE,
HONG KONG.

RONALD, HONG KONG.

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THE LIBERAL-MODERNIST VIEW OF JESUS.

C. J. CADOUX, D.D.

SHREWD thrusts have been made at the liberal interpretatio of the Gospels in recent decades, ever since Schweitze launched his well-known theory on the critical world; an it remains to be seen whether that interpretation has been s sorely smitten that it cannot rise again, or whether it wi emerge, marked indeed, but in essentials unchanged, like a anvil that has broken many hammers. Two trenchan attacks on it—from very different angles—have appeare recently in this Journal: I refer to Rev. R. A. Edward criticism, in the issue for July, 1935, of "The 'Peasant Theory of Jesus," and to Mr M. Chaning-Pearce's article i the following number on "The Ethics of a Kingdom not o this World." It is only fair to both these authors to say th their contributions are so skilful and incisive that th modernist who reads them feels stirred to get his teeth wit out delay, not indeed into the writers, but into the arg ments they advance.

Mr Edwards' thesis is that the modern theory whic regards Jesus simply as a pious Galilæan villager with enthusiasm for humanity is so hard to reconcile with th early Christian beliefs about his Person, that it is far le credible than the full orthodoxy of the Creeds. Mr Chanin Pearce is concerned, not so much with the vindication historical facts about Jesus, as with the completely oth worldly character of his ethic. He urges that the Christi ethic of purity, meekness, etc., is wholly relative to a dependent upon the thorough-going eschatology of the ea Church, and forfeits all its value if that eschatology be fou incredible. Whether it is incredible or not he does explicitly say; but if it were, the Christian ethic would ha

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to give place to the self-assertive ethic of a humanistic "fertility-faith."

Though not easily reconcilable with one another, both articles agree in laying stress on the super-human and super-mundane activities ascribed to Jesus, and both are very relevant to the liberal interpretation.

Mr Edwards nowhere says explicitly that what he is attacking is the liberal-modernist view as such; and we may avail ourselves of his silence in this respect to observe that the "peasant"-theory, as he envisages it, includes several features which a liberal modernist would do well to repudiate, but which he might not be able to deny that some of his school have admitted. Thus, we can accept no responsibility for those who dismiss the ransom-saying (Mk. x. 45) as ungenuine, who deny that Jesus thought of himself as Messiah, who are satisfied to describe him as a "normal" Galilæan peasant "and no more," who think lightly of the importance of his Person as central to the movement he founded, and who can make nothing of the resurrection-appearances beyond dismissing them as imaginary, and nothing of the Incarnation beyond stating that it was not a fact. Of such a negative position Mr Edwards' arguments constitute a devastating refutation.

Mr Edwards has, however, too easily convinced himself that his apologia for the Christology of the creeds is a mere "walk-over." Those who have felt constrained by critical considerations to modify some of the credal formulations about the Person of Jesus have a little more to say for themselves than he seems to imagine.

They will, to begin with, repudiate with emphasis his affirmation of a

> "tendency among modern scholars who favour some form of the peasant theory to date the books . . . so as to allow time for the development of the Christian legend. In effect what is done is to assume the peasant theory true, then to use it to destroy the value of the documents, and then apparently to claim that the documents so arranged prove the theory."

It would doubtless be hard to show that no critic had ever allowed his Christology to affect his opinion regarding the dates of the Gospels: but the suggestion, if aimed at liberal criticism in general, is grotesquely inaccurate and unfair. The discussions leading up to the most widely-accepted conclusions concerning the dates of the Gospels

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have for the most part been carried on without regard to anyone's preference for the "peasant-" or any other theory they have centred round objective facts like the assertion of Irenæus that Mark wrote his gospel after the deaths of Peter and Paul, the obvious dependence of both Matthew and Luke on Mark, the glaring incongruities between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, and so on. To plead, as some do, that a penchant for the peasant theory or some other minimising theory of the Person of Christ is at the bottom of the controversy about the Fourth Gospel betrays either an extraordinary ignorance of the facts or an unworthy disbelief in the honesty of those from whom one happens to differ.

It is similarly gratuitous to urge that

> "the peasant theory assumes . . . that the documents . . . are not what they profess to be, but were either actually written long after the date they appear to bear or were carefully edited by later hands."

But no scholar whose opinion is worth considering "assumes" anything of the kind: he accepts the main conclusions of a criticism which, as I have observed, is based on a careful study of objective historical data. And what do the Gospels "profess to be," and what dates do they "appear to bear"? Those at all familiar with recent New-Testament criticism may well feel at a loss to attach any meaning to the charge.

But besides vindicating themselves against the suspicion of dishonesty in dating the documents, liberal modernists will plead that historical criticism has established certain facts which show that a very considerable development did take place, between 30 and 100 A.D., in the ascription of Divine honours to Jesus. Mr Edwards seems, for instance, to take it for granted that the doubts thrown on the stories of the Virgin Birth and of the birth at Bethlehem are quite baseless, although—with no space to argue the points here—one may fairly claim that those doubts are in many ways justified. Nor ought it to be made a reproach against any theory that it embodies the obviously true facts that Jesus did lead the more or less normal life of a Galilæan villager for thirty years, that he was concerned about the position of the Jews in the Roman world, that he did preach the Fatherhood of God and enjoin brotherly love on men, and that he did come into conflict with the priests and Pharisees by denouncing their formalism and exclusiveness. Criticism has, moreover, been perfectly right in drawing attention to the psychologic

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conditions (faith, etc.) of Jesus' miracles of healing, and to the similarity between them and the achievements of modern psychiatry. Mr Edwards is disposed to think that we greatly overestimate the credulity of the first-century Christians, and bases his view on the solidity of the contents of Paul's Epistles. But whatever we ought to infer from the character of Paul's Epistles, the credulity of the first-century Christians as regards narratives about Jesus admits of no doubt whatever. What does Mr Edwards make of the fact that the two earliest of our Gospel documents, Q and L, contain no allusion to any "nature-miracle," that Mark has made two crowd-feedings out of one, that "Matthew" several times over gratuitously doubles the recipient of a work of healing, that in order to exhibit a close fulfilment of prophecy he represents Jesus as riding on two asses at once, that, whereas it is certain from the Synoptics that Jesus never divulged his Messiahship to the disciples before Cæsarea-Philippi and to the public before his trial, the Fourth Gospel represents him as talking openly to all and sundry about it from his baptism onwards? What does he make of the impossibility of weaving together a consistent account of the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus, without contradicting one or other of the authorities at every step? Does this condition of things reveal freedom from credulity, or protection against it through the presence of people in a position to correct erroneous statements? Does it not, in fact, prove the very thing which Mr Edwards finds it so easy to deny, viz. that during the first century Christian beliefs about Jesus underwent very extensive growth? Mr Edwards argues as if the Docetists, who—though sure about Christ's divinity—doubted the reality of his humanity, were an *early* sect: actually we find no trace of them before about 90 A.D. And he completely ignores the obscure but significant history of the Ebionites, who, treasuring traditions about Jesus on his native soil of Palestine, gave to his human limitations a larger place than did the Gentile churches, who knew him only at third or fourth hand.

Enough perhaps has now been said to show that the absence from the New Testament of any record of crucial controversy within the early Church about the Person of Christ, remarkable as it is, does not by any means prove that the full version of the historic creeds ("Very God of Very God," etc.) was proclaimed by the Church from the very beginning of her history. By dating back the full Christology of Paul and John virtually to the lifetime of Jesus himself,

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and—what is more—tacitly assuming that all Christians possessed as rich an experience of Christ and as exalted a Christology as Paul and John possessed, Mr Edwards is able to make the gulf between the peasant-theory and the beliefs of the early Church yawn so wide that the reader is compelled by his description to rule out the former as inconceivable. But our author is as mistaken in ascribing a uniform Christology to all as he is in dating the formation of it so early. As the Rev. Campbell N. Moody has shown in his valuable book, *The Mind of the Early Converts* (Hodder, 1920), it is probable that the doctrinal views of the average convert in the first and second centuries fell far short of what we find in the Epistles of the New Testament. All sorts of imperfections and limitations entered in ; and to reconstruct the story of the Church by tacitly assuming that virtually all Christians thought and felt about Jesus much as Charles Wesley did is to build a largely imaginary picture.

A further point—it seems never to occur to Mr Edwards to allow for the fact that different minds need different words and even thoughts, in contemplating the same spiritual realities. Bearing in mind " the sad incompetence of human speech," we moderns must be prepared to do a certain amount of elastic " translating " of the ancient utterances, unless we are to commit grave misjudgments regarding them. Thus Mr Edwards refers several times to the doctrine of redemption and remission of sins through the Saviour's death as integral to the Christian message from the start. But what if this doctrine be simply the appropriate ancient eastern way of saying that, by dwelling reverently on the heroic moral grandeur of Jesus' death, and seeing in it a manifestation of God's attitude to sin, man may be led to that genuine repentance through which alone he can experience reconciliation with God ? What if the assertion that " the Word became flesh " be simply an alternative way of saying that Jesus was " the first-born among many brothers " ? Here are statements fully consonant with liberal modernism—and there are others similar to be put beside them. Jesus was " more immediately aware of his fellowship with God " than others, and his life " more completely reflected God's will than has the life of any other man." His mind was " the very greatest that has yet appeared." God was " more completely 'incarnate' in him than in other men." Let these affirmations, instead of being set aside, be generously taken at their full value, and their implications followed up ; let allowance be made for the difference between the

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language and thought-forms of the first century and those of the twentieth; let the inscrutable mystery of God's nature and ways be kept in mind—as well also as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the creed-making process in the Chalcedonian denial that Jesus was a human person; and then perhaps men may be less eager to insist on the "great gulf fixed," and to protest that modernism makes of Christianity "the blankest of blank illusions." I am, as I have said, far from holding a brief for the "peasant"-theory of Jesus as Mr Edwards envisages it; and I am far from supposing that modern criticism is able to remove all mystery and obscurity from the story of early Christianity: but I deprecate attempts to discredit honest thought by an inaccurate over-simplification of the data, by the exaggeration of differences, and by an over-rigid and narrow interpretation of terms.

But do we perchance escape the clutches of Mr Edwards only to fall on to the horns of Mr Chaning-Pearce's dilemma? Have we vindicated the rights of historical criticism against excessive dependence on tradition, only to find that the real Jesus was so concerned about the other world that his ethics make no allowance for the human values and interests of this? That conclusion certainly seems to follow from the sharp antithesis which Mr Chaning-Pearce draws out. Must we accept it?

Now let us grant at the outset that belief in eternal life is integral to any thoroughly defensible version of Christianity, ancient or modern. This does not necessarily mean that a man cannot be a useful Christian unless he feels sure that his differentiated, self-conscious, individual life will continue to exist throughout an absolutely unending future. Many nowadays would admit that we know far less about the life beyond the grave than our grandparents thought they knew, and that the nature of eternal life may be in many ways different from what the space-time conditions of life in the flesh make familiar to us. Be that as it may, it is true that Christianity includes belief in the existence of an eternal world, from which the death of the body does not shut us out, and in which the deeds done in the body have their effect for good or ill.

It is also true that Jesus and his followers believed in personal immortality, that he spoke of the Kingdom of God as imminent and supernatural, that—when opposition frustrated his work—he projected on to the future his confidence in ultimate success as a personal return of himself in glory

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within the lifetime of his own generation, and that the early Christians lived in a glowing expectation (which only gradually waned) of seeing him reappear to set up his heavenly Kingdom. History has shown that this early Christian hope was a delusion; and Gospel-criticism makes it hard to deny that Jesus himself was in error at least so far as the *form* of his triumph was concerned. As regards its *substance* (viz. his faith in personal survival, triumphant power, and historical vindication), his faith was thoroughly sound and fully justified. Our problem now is to ascertain whether such other-worldliness as he did exhibit really does bring his ethics into irreconcilable conflict with the interests and values of earthly life.

Into the grounds for believing in a life after death we cannot fully enter here. Man's instinctive longing for survival after bodily death is a testimony not to be despised; and so, too, are the experiences opened up by psychical research. Moreover, although the existence of such a life cannot be logically demonstrated, neither can it be disproved; and when a man who acknowledges no explicit belief in it sacrifices his bodily life at a time of crisis for the sake of his friends or in the service of truth, he is bearing unconscious testimony to the existence of an eternal world of moral values, with which he is deeply concerned, death or no death. Such a faith, capable of nerving one to such self-sacrifice, is a thing which any man, even the veriest humanist among us, might well be proud to hold. Yet who would feel that by holding it he was turning his back on the duties and interests of this present life?

Full participation, therefore, in the affairs of this life is by no means inconsistent with such trust in a future life as may nerve any man, when duty calls, to die willingly. But more than this—it is by no means inconsistent with that view of the future which Jesus himself held. Mr Chaning-Pearce admits, indeed, in a general way that Jesus himself may have been misrepresented by his reporters, and in a rather obscure paragraph grants that he may have been right about the Kingdom not of this world, except in his anticipation that it would come in space and time. But if we will look at the historical reality a little more closely, we shall see that he has gravely over-stated the other-worldliness of the real Jesus, and with it the incongruity between his ethics and all this-world values. In the title of his article, and some eight times in the course of it, he quotes or alludes to the words of John xviii. 36: "My kingdom is not of this world," as if they

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formed the keynote of Jesus' teaching. But these words have exclusively Johannine attestation, which is quite insufficient to establish them as his *ipsissima verba*. They represent rather the view of an other-worldly Christian writer at the end of the first century. Jesus' own view is more truly reflected in "the Lord's Prayer": "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done—as in heaven, *so on earth*." People are in far too great a hurry to assume, at Schweitzer's suggestion, that Jesus' mind was dominated by the conviction that human history would, by Divine intervention, come to an abrupt end almost at any moment. The records do not warrant such an assumption. Whatever the nature and imminence of the coming Kingdom may have been in Jesus' mind, they did not prevent him from seriously pleading with his fellow-countrymen to pursue a pacific and conciliatory policy towards Rome with a view to establishing harmony and peace in the world.[1] The great change to which he looked forward is never concretely or prosaically described; nor is its imminence more precisely emphasised than by the vague intimation that it would occur before the existing generation had died out. Nearly all the miraculous particulars introduced into the allusions to it are consequent upon the realisation of his coming martyrdom and ensuing triumph, and are not integral to the picture of the Kingdom as such. In any case, it is (I hold) an error to picture Jesus' ethic as having reference *throughout* to an immediately impending cataclysm.

For example, "Take no thought for the morrow." Now, to start with, this is a mistranslation, unhappily perpetuated for many by an uncritical adherence to the Authorized Version—for Jesus did not say, and did not mean, "Take no thought": he said "Do not worry"—a very different thing. But waiving that, *why* should the disciple not worry about the morrow? Mr Chaning-Pearce thinks the answer is obvious: "Why should he when he will not see it?" But the reason which Jesus explicitly gives is something quite different: God knows your needs, and you can trust Him to supply them.

Or take the so-called non-resistance teaching. Mr Chaning-Pearce understands it to be a mere negative *laissez-faire*, contributing nothing to the removal of tyranny

[1] Perhaps I may here refer to my article in *The Congregational Quarterly* for January, 1936, entitled "The Politics of Jesus," in which the opinion expressed in the text is argued in detail, and to my comments on Schweitzer's position in *The Expository Times* for June, 1935, pp. 406–410.

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and other wrongs, whereas it is in reality a positive policy of overcoming evil with good. But in any case, what is the ground for it? Mr Chaning-Pearce again suggests that eschatological *motif* as clear ("Why should he [resist evil] when that evil is about to end?"); but again the reason Jesus gives is something else: God is merciful to both good and bad men, and you as His children have to be like Him.

The teaching of Jesus regarding sex is similarly misunderstood. It is true that Paul thought celibacy on the whole the preferable state for Christians, in view of the imminence of the Parousia, and that Jesus apparently approved of it for individuals with special duties under conditions of crisis; but it is arbitrary to ascribe to him a general depreciation of marriage. His evident reverence for the status of fatherhood, his fondness for little children, his description of the married couple (not only the *happily* married couple—as the context shows) as "that which God has joined together," and his consequent strong disapproval of divorce, all point in the other direction. And his words about the lilies of the field show that he was not devoid of a keen appreciation of physical beauty.

It is therefore historically erroneous to represent him as having no eye for the values of this life, as enjoining a passive and negative attitude to its conflicts, as frowning on all natural human instincts (because he remarked that out of the heart of man evil purposes proceed), and to describe him as a "dim preacher of death," who demands of his followers total suicide.

But what are we to say of that humanistic "fertility-faith," whose ethic of self-assertiveness presents such a complete contrast to the Christian ideal? Mr Chaning-Pearce describes its guiding principle for us as follows:—

> "For fertility-faith, of however exalted a nature, 'meekness,' 'charity' and guilelessness become not virtues but vices.
>
> "A psychology which sees no further than the natural psyche, which leaves God and the reborn spirit out of the picture, is utterly right in recommending the fulfilment of every sane desire and condemning the repression of desire. As human animals we are wise to take all that we want. But if we are to get what we want we must fight for it. Thus desire breeds strife. The sequence is inescapable. For secular humanism for fertility-faith, fulfilment of desire is a good, repression

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of desire an evil; to fulfil desire man must fight, strive, resist, assert himself. It is the wisdom and ethic of such humanism, and if that humanism is the last word, that is the last word of human wisdom, and the Christian ethic which contradicts it point by point is a septic folly and a crime against life."

It is only just to observe that Mr Chaning-Pearce nowhere in his article commits himself to the view that the fertility-faith-ethic is the right one. His concern is rather to enforce the dependence of the Christian ethic on the Christian eschatology and to emphasise the contrast between it and the non-eschatological ethic of humanism. But who is there that does not see that this latter, as he describes it, is simply the old selfish ethic of the jungle, which man's conscience and common-sense, let alone his other-worldliness, have long ago rejected as a snare and a delusion? It is ruled out right away by the bare demand for business efficiency: unless man is prepared at times to bridle his desires, "to shun delights and live laborious days," how can he ever achieve any difficult and worth-while enterprise? It is ruled out still more definitely if any regard is to be had to the rights of others. Curiously enough, Mr Chaning-Pearce does not see any necessary incompatibility between "fertility-faith"—ethic on the one hand, and on the other nobility, kindness, tolerance, gentleness to the weak, justice, gentlemanly honour, and willingness to sacrifice one's individual good for the good of humanity. But how these values are to be conserved when men are acting on the principle of taking all they want, and if need be fighting for it, he does not explain. The combination is, of course, quite impossible. If any humanistic ethic is to manifest these amiable qualities, it will do so in the exact measure that its principle of satisfying desire is subordinated to the Christian ethic of self-control and love for one's neighbour, and not otherwise. If not so subordinated, it will obviously make kindness, justice, tolerance, honour, etc., for ever impossible, and will produce just those tyrannies and social wrongs which humanists are so anxious we should oppose. Mr Chaning-Pearce specifies the sex-instinct as a typical example of those natural desires the denial of which (under, for instance, Christian scruples) is, from humanism's purely psychological point of view, fraught with disease and misery. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that deliberate and conscious self-control (which is perfectly compatible with healthy sublimation) is a very

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different thing from that subconscious "repression" which psychologists teach us is dangerous. But that apart, is it not obvious that "to take all that we want" in the matter of sex-desire, and to fight for it if we cannot otherwise get it, would lead straightway to self-disgust, misery, injustice, disease, and ruin? Doubtless sex is a difficult subject, and the discussion of its problems demands more space than can here be afforded; but what has just been written is in any case well within the truth, and suffices to show the total impracticability of any ethic of sexual self-indulgence not strictly controlled by a regard for the specifically Christian values.

The fact of the matter is that, once the humanist betrays an appreciation of kindness, tolerance, justice, and self-sacrifice for the good of humanity, he gives away his whole case against Christianity. His appreciation of them is proof that it is not only man's other-worldliness, but the simple utterance of his moral nature, which assures him that these values have a claim on him. It is not only other-worldliness, but common-sense and simple moral experience, which tell us —as the Christian ethic also tells us—that there are times when self has to be denied and its strong inclinations masterfully, perhaps agonisingly, curbed, and that during life we shall therefore from time to time "have tribulation." If the ethic of Jesus be accurately and not one-sidedly studied, it will be found to provide an intelligible basis for that risk of self-renunciation with which life faces us, without in any way denying a place to the interests and values of life in the flesh. That ethic, and that alone, has "promise of the life which now is, and of that which is to come."

I submit therefore that, in so far as present-day criticism of the liberal-modernist view of Jesus is represented by the two articles under discussion, that view has been by no means fatally damaged. Holding no brief for the "peasant" theory in the form in which Mr Edwards attacks it, I contend that the findings of liberal criticism regarding the conditions and limitations, within which the work of God in the human life of Jesus was done, cannot be swept aside in the manner in which Mr Edwards desires to sweep them aside. Nor, on the other hand, can I agree with Mr Chaning-Pearce in the total cleavage he makes between the other-worldly ethics of the Gospels and the interests and values of life in this world. The answer to both writers lies, it seems to me, in a more exact appreciation (on liberal-modernist lines) of the historical and moral facts enshrined in the Gospel-story.

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True, scholars are just now tumbling over one another in their eagerness to tell us that the early Church grew—not by admiring the beautiful moral character of Jesus, accepting his doctrine of God's Fatherhood, obeying his ethical teaching, and following his example—but by proclaiming him as the Incarnate God, who had come down from heaven to die for man's salvation, had risen from the dead and ascended to heavenly glory, and would speedily come again to judge the world and to open the Kingdom to all believers. Now this antithesis is, in part at least, a false antithesis, because it ignores the fact (alluded to above) that different minds need different terms and thought-forms in order to express the same spiritual reality (in this case, the new experience of God's presence and power which Jesus mediated). In so far as it is not a false antithesis, it is largely inaccurate in point of fact, overlooking the great stress which the early Christians did lay on the ethical aspects of the Gospel-story. And in so far as it is neither a false antithesis nor an inaccuracy, it records the weaker and less wholesome side of early Christian thought, the less ethical and more speculative (sometimes even mythological) tendencies in the Church, which became later the cause of so much perversion and failure.

The true holiness of Jesus is not manifested primarily by the Virgin Birth, by marvellous fulfilments of prophecy, by nature-miracles, by Johannine utterances, or by early Christian doctrinal constructions: it is manifested primarily in the moral and religious quality of his life on earth. His achieved goodness within the human sphere is absolutely fundamental to the whole process: even the important Christ-mysticism of Paul and others is not prior to that. It is in that that the numinous quality of his life, *i.e.* his true holiness, really inheres. The power of this numinous quality is increased, not impaired, by a thoroughly frank recognition of the human and historical conditions within which he worked. And it is here, too, that the answer to the ethical theories of humanism, in so far as these really differ from those of Jesus, is to be found. When all reasonable allowance has been made for the extent to which he shared the intellectual limitations of his age, it remains true that, the more fully and exactly his essential character and teaching become known, the more brightly do they reveal his insight into reality, his sane appreciation of ultimate values, and his consequent title to guide as the Divine Saviour the wayward impulses of men.

OXFORD.

C. J. CADOUX.

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SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

THE recent Coverdale commemoration was celebrated by a display of some Biblical treasures from the rich stores of the Rylands Library, and an introductory sketch of *The Transmission of the Bible*, with twenty-two facsimiles of manuscripts and early texts, has been issued by the Manchester University Press, at the amazingly cheap price of eighteen pence. Mr Guppy, the librarian, has supplied bibliographical notes, in addition to his essay. This forms a permanent artistic contribution to the subject, for which educated readers cannot fail to be once more grateful to him. It is a glorified catalogue, with an appeal far beyond its local origin and object.

The general study of the Old Testament, for educational or cultural ends, is advocated by Professor S. H. Hooke in the *Church Quarterly Review* (July, p. 189 f), on the ground that scientific study now enables us to place the Old Testament in its relation to ancient civilisation, instead of merely viewing it as a prelude to Christianity. This, he remarks, was first proposed by free spirits among the eighteenth-century deists, and the last twenty-five years of research have set the literature of the Hebrews within its contemporary situation with a flood of fresh light. It is time to study the Old Testament as more than a "praeparatio evangelica"; this collection of documents is as educative as Greek and Latin literature for mental appreciation of the ancient world, particularly as revealing the contribution of the Hebrew genius to civilisation. Martin Thilo's *Alttestamentliche Bibelkunde* (Steinkopf, Stuttgart), is not an introduction on critical lines, though it is written in the light of criticism, but an unassuming, useful account of each book's contents, accompanied with some special notes on topics like chronology, for example. There are maps and plans and a few illustrations. What the volume does is to present in readable and attractive form matter which is generally scattered through Aids to the Bible.

In the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (p. 90 f) Dr R. E. Wolfe's essay on "The Editing of the Book of the Twelve" analyses the various strata in the canonical text by distinguishing the original scrolls from editorial comments and interpolations.

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task is one of extreme delicacy, as the writer admits; he gives only a hypothetical reconstruction of the editorial work, but urges that these later strata are not to be regarded as inferior in influence, since "the New Testament writers, taken as a whole, were influenced more by the secondary writers than by the great primary prophetic writings in which these additions were appended"; also, as the majority of these materials come from the period between Zechariah and Antiochus Epiphanes, they help to light up the obscure centuries after the Return. Thirteen strata are detected, from a Judaistic edition of Hosea down to scribal schools. One of them is an "anti-neighbour" editor of militaristic nationalistic temper, with a special antipathy to Tyre. His traces are to be found also in Isaiah 13–24 and even in Jeremiah and Ezekiel. On the last-named prophet, Canon J. Battersby-Harford has published *Studies in the Book of Ezekiel* (Cambridge: University Press, 7*s.* 6*d.*), which deal with recent criticism and develop a new position. Two strata are distinguished, one of oracles in and for Palestine, the other prophecies of a Babylonian framework. Are these two elements compatible? Canon Battersby-Harford does not agree with Kittel that they are, and prefers to work along the lines of Herntrich, attributing the Babylonian, exilic touches, including the latter chapters, to a second author. A provocative, learned contribution to the intricate investigation of the prophecy, of which it has been said that if the problems are hard, the solutions lately proposed are harder still. Mr Shalom Spiegel, undaunted by the rough edges of recent discussion, has written an essay "Towards Certainty in Ezekiel" (*Journal of Biblical Literature*, September, p. 145 f), which recognises with admiration the spirit of Dr Torrey's method, but declines to accept a pseudo-Ezekiel about 230 B.C. Evidence tends in favour of a sixth-century date. It is even urged that "we have too easily dismissed the statement of the rabbis that the arrangement of chapters in the book of Ezekiel is often due to symmetrical rather than historical considerations."

Dr C. C. Torrey's theory of the Aramaic originals of the gospels still engages interest. In the *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1935, pp. 20–34), Professor Enno Littmann praises the translation as "the best scientific English version of the gospels which we possess," but demurs to the assertion that the four gospels as a whole can be thus explained. Only Mark, he thinks, is likely to be a translation. A number of special translations by Dr Torrey are also challenged. Thus, in the light of Oriental long-drawn-out salutations, such as are meant in 2 Kings, iv. 29, Dr Littmann points out that it is an error to suppose that Jesus could not have said "Salute no man by the way," as if that meant discourtesy. The article is valuable for its use not only of Aramaic learning, but of Oriental usages and experiences. Professor T. W. Manson (*Expository Times*, October, pp. 7–11) takes a similar line in discussing "The Problem of Aramaic Sources in the Gospels." He restates the theory, which has been lightly discarded of late, that the Matthean Logia, mentioned by

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Papias, correspond to Q, which was originally an Aramaic document, and does not agree that any other Aramaic source is provable, *i.e.* a written source. While Dr Littmann confessedly writes as a philologist, Professor Manson has the advantage of knowing New Testament criticism thoroughly; his brief article supplements the data of the German scholar, while at the same time it is more authoritative on the literary side.—Miss B. K. Rattey's seven chapters in *The Growth and Structure of the Gospels* (Oxford: University Press) give a clear, unpretentious account of the genesis and the environment of the four documents. It is a capital manual for the teaching of the subject in high schools, written with a critical perception of the problems and an unforced emphasis on the fact that after all, and before all, the gospels are religious books. On special features, we have to chronicle Mr M. Kiddle's study of the Lucan Passion narrative (*Journal of Theological Studies*, July, p. 267 f) in which he finds Luke taking a less tragic view of the career of Jesus than his predecessors, owing to the success of the Gentile mission; the latter led him to regard even the tragic side of the life of Jesus as fore-ordained, and to view the Cross as important on account of the gift of the Spirit. Hence "the death of Jesus is much less *religious* and far more *political* in significance," less momentous, "an unfortunate blunder," though "less unfortunate in that it was the pre-determined means whereby Jesus entered into His glory." As "only an amorphous mass of material remains" in the passion-story, once the Marcan verses are removed, "this seems to be the most weighty argument against the theory that Luke possessed an independent source, and it has not yet been refuted." But if sources are suspect, it is not by Dr A. T. Cadoux, for in his elaborate treatise on *The Sources of the Second Gospel* (London: James Clarke, 6*s.*) he distinguishes no fewer than three, one being a gospel-book for Peter's mission, another, about ten years later (*c.* 50 A.D.), for Paul's gentile mission, and finally one for mission work among Jews of the Dispersion during the war-period (*c.* 67 A.D.). Five London lectures on *Gospel Criticism and Christology* (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 4*s.* 6*d.*) by Professor M. Dibelius are a persuasive, positive presentation of the Formgeschichte method, in which it is significant that he declines to believe "that the polemical discourses of Jesus with his opponents recorded in the Gospels are imaginary scenes read back into the life of Jesus from the later controversies of the Church" (p. 30). This problem of the gospel-sources also enters into the scope covered by Mr H. J. Bardsley in the first volume of his ingenious *Reconstructions of Early Christian Documents* (S.P.C.K., London). His primary interest lies in the traditions and literature of the so-called "apocryphal" genus, believing that they are neither masses of absurd legend nor unrelated to the New Testament documents. Thus there would seem to be proof that the "Preaching of Peter" was known to the author of the Johannine Apocalypse (p. 193 f). Much attention is paid to the "depravation of Mark" (p. 93 f), a Gospel which Mr Bardsley thinks highly prejudiced, badly arranged and interpolated.

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its canonical form. The Fourth Gospel (p. 400 f) is "the work of a blundering editor," perhaps Gaius of Pergamum, a man who "had no adequate conception of the importance of truth in the writing of a Gospel"; he used "papers which preserved the oral teaching" of the aged, purblind, apostle John, papers that were in serious disorder when they reached him and were casually put together. The source Q was based on the Logia of Matthew, which had been written for Jerusalem converts, and in 1 Corinth. xv. 3 f, the apostle Paul is supposed to be drawing upon a manual which may have been composed by Mark. Such are some of the suggestions thrown out in this decidedly stirring examination of the Church's primitive literature.

E. B. Allo has published an elaborate, most generous edition of *Saint Paul: Première Epître aux Corinthiens* (Paris: Gabalda, 100 francs), which he dates early in the apostle's stay at Ephesus. The exegesis is traditional, but learned. On almost every topic, except that of textual criticism, the editor provides ample material, either in the notes or in a series of excursuses; the eleventh of these covers the primitive traditions of the eucharist, and the fifteenth discusses glossolalia. The epistle is thus interpreted as a reflection of the primitive Christian mission, which directly or indirectly it illustrates. Professor R. H. Strachan's edition of *Second Corinthians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 8*s.* 6*d.*) is more compact, though he also provides some special notes, *e.g.* on "the new covenant" and "the pre-existence of Christ." Commenting on the English text, he has written a living, scholarly interpretation of this intensely personal document, combining criticism with literary and religious insight; indeed, the pages of his introduction dealing with the epistle as "a human document" (pp. xxix.–xxxviii.) are a frank and sympathetic appreciation of the epistle such as one rarely meets in a commentary. The usual critical analysis of the epistle is presented. In the *Expository Times* (November), Mr R. V. G. Tasker upholds "The Unity of Second Corinthians."—The more general theology of the apostle is treated by Professor Goguel in the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses* (p. 335 f), where he analyses the cosmological element in Paul's soteriology. Man's salvation is part of a cosmic tragedy which is being overruled by God in the interest of His glory. How far this connection of the saving purpose with the world's future is due to the influence of Jewish apocalyptic, and what importance the apostle attached to it, are among the questions raised in this illuminating sketch. Paul's engrossing interest, it is argued, was religious, however, not speculative. Professor Goguel is at any rate sure of one point, viz. that when Paul said, "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," he meant all men would be raised—a universal resurrection (p. 352 f). The use of the Greek term for "wisdom" in the Pauline epistles, on which Allo has an exhaustive note (pp. 112–115), is treated by Joseph de Finance in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* (October, pp. 385–417); he exhibits its application to Hellenistic rhetoric and religion, as well as the higher content of the word for the apostle, who never fell back upon a "mysticisme anti-

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intellectualiste." In his thought, "wisdom" of the Spirit operates for the mature development of the individual Christian, who lives consciously under the redeeming purpose of God, and also directs his behaviour; to contemplate the mystery of Christ brings mental joy and practical guidance. Mr Irwin Edman's five lectures on *The Mind of Paul* (New York: Henry Holt, $1.75) are a pleasant plea for what he modestly calls "critical interpretation." He has been reading some recent books, especially by Loisy, Montefiore and Deissmann, and offers an analysis of salient strands in the apostle's personality and message. It is argued that the apostle was "at heart a mystic." This gives coherence to his various interests and acquirements. He "transformed the Cross into a mystical reality," in terms of the current mystery-cults, so that "the gospel of Jesus became at the hands of Paul a mystery, and in becoming so became at once intelligible too, and appealing to whole hordes that could not otherwise remotely have welcomed it or made head or tail of it." This exposition of the apostle's mind is stated easily, for popular readers. The author makes no pretensions to "originality of scholarship or to theological enthusiasms or commitments," but he feels the significance of Paul for Christianity, and endeavours to account for it. Another popular book is *Paul's Secret of Power* (Abingdon Press, $1), by Professor R. H. Walker, which seeks more positively to bring out the abiding realities of the gospel as the apostle conceived it in terms of his own day. Like Mr Edman, the author is impressed by the fact of Paul counting for so much in Christianity, and he does not believe that this is a purely historical significance.

The textual criticism of the epistles has been enriched by Professor H. A. Sanders' *A Third-Century Papyrus Codex of the Epistles of Paul* (University of Michigan Press), which the editor places in the second half of the century and declines to view as a revision. This priceless fragment of the Chester Beatty find is collated, but it is to be hoped that the learned editor will add a study of its relations to the other later manuscripts. *The Greek Manuscripts of the New Testament at Jerusalem* (Paris: Libraire Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner), by Professor W. H. P. Hatch, is a book for which the Greeks had a word—καλός. Not only is the critical letterpress fine, but it contains facsimiles, beautifully reproduced, of pages from fifty-five minuscule manuscripts in the library of the local Greek Patriarch, most of them being on parchment. For palæography as well as for critical study of the text these form a fascinating brochure. It is distressing to discover that vandalism prevailed even in treating such sacred pages. One manuscript "has been much mutilated by the cutting out of pictures of ornamental headings at the beginning of the gospels"!—In reply to an article in the *Harvard Theological Review* (pp. 61–67), Dr Streeter (*ibid.*, p. 231 f) adds data to confirm his view that the Koridethi type of text represents that used by Bishop Eusebius for Matthew as he prepared at Cæsarea the "Demonstratio Evangelica." It is interesting to find that, from a different angle of interest, two scholars

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Berlin and in Athens have simultaneously addressed themselves to the task of vindicating Eusebius against criticisms of his honesty and religious character. Professor D. S. Balanos, in the *Theologische Quartalschrift* (pp. 309–322) confines himself to the policy of Eusebius during the Arian controversy. In opposition to those who in modern books upon the literature and history of early Christianity blame the bishop for vacillating at least, the Greek scholar advances evidence to show that his true faith in Christ, as indicated by the early "Demonstratio Evangelica," remained constant, despite the carping censures soon levelled by Jerome and Photius. If he sometimes took a politic line, in practical affairs, it was because he dreaded the effect of church controversies upon the prospects of Christianity, now patronised by the Emperor; but historically there is not the slightest reason to believe that he yielded to Arianism, or that he was insincere. Herr H. G. Opitz, in a telling paper on "Euseb von Cæsarea als Theologe" (*Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1935, pp. 1–19), is equally emphatic, but more incisive. He brings out the bishop's controlling belief that Christianity is a religion of truth and intelligence, even as it is God's revelation. "To stamp him as an Arian simply betrays the fact that one is still caught within the extremely clever polemic of Athanasius." What made him favour Constantine and eschew violent controversy was his profound conviction that God's will for the Church was now opening up a vocation within the Empire. But he was no courtier-bishop, and if, like Lucian and Asterius, he did interfere on behalf of Arius now and then, he never was an Arian in theology. Where he and Athanasius differed was really at this point, that Eusebius always dwelt on the cosmic significance of the Eternal Logos for the world, whereas Athanasius was absorbed in the immortality brought by the Logos to corrupted human nature. Paradoxically, it was Athanasius who opposed the view that the Church, as a state within State, was the appointed guardian of the divine mystery; Eusebius looked in that direction. Hence the tension between the two champions.

The close connection between personality and theology in the historical sequence, since Eusebius, emerges with remarkable frequency in recent work upon this subject. Under the title of *Makers of Christianity* (New York: Henry Holt, $2), Professor J. T. McNeill, of Chicago University, has published what is the second volume of the series. The first, by Professor S. J. Case, appeared last year, ranging from Christ to Charlemagne. The second extends from Alfred the Great to Schleiermacher, covering the careers of thirty-one figures, who are judged to have contributed notably to the application or the interpretation of the Christian faith. Only two are women, Elizabeth of Thuringia and Catherine of Siena, who are placed along with Lambert the Stammerer and Francis of Assisi among the "Brothers and Sisters of the Poor." As the author admits, any selection of this kind is liable to criticism, but Professor McNeill will not disappoint most readers by the way in which he has picked and chosen his team, and the difficult task of being brief without becoming

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scrappy has been admirably accomplished. It is particularly pleasant to find that men like Norbert of Xanten, Scotus Erigena and Leibniz have not been overlooked. The estimates are balanced, and the interest of the reader is well sustained. Also the author occasionally pauses to prod moderns with a pointed observation, as when he writes that "when we imagine we are thinkers, it may be salutary to re-examine, in the questions of Aquinas, the way in which some of the world's choicest thinking has been done," or *à propos* of the Holbein picture of Erasmus "The scholar sits in reflection, and the eyes are looking far away, as if over the heads of combatants into a problematic but inviting future. As we study the picture the thought comes that Erasmus is still looking over our heads." The issue of an Italian translation (Firenze: La Nuova Italia) of Dr F. C. Church's *The Italian Reformers, 1534–1536*, has occasioned an important study of their originality by Alfredo Caselei in *Religio* (Rome, September, pp. 424–448). Dr W. W. Sweet's *Men of Zeal* (Abingdon Press, New York, $2) describes biographically the difficulties and achievements of early Methodist leaders after the American Revolution.

On Cranmer, whose "superb gift for framing the language of public prayer," Professor McNeill judges, "is scarcely surpassed by any of the known or unknown authors of mediæval liturgies, and probably not approached by any modern," M. G. Constant passes judgement in the first part of his study of "Le changement doctrinal dans l'Église anglicane sous Édouard VI" (*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, July, pp. 541–565), not as a liturgist, but as a theologian, who is pronounced to have been swayed by various Continental winds of doctrine during the course of his efforts to determine Anglicanism. Another reading of the period is offered by Mr R. D. Richardson in a penetrating paper on "The Doctrinal Characteristics of the Church of England" (*Modern Churchman*, October, p. 301 f). He shows how Cranmer cannot be bracketed entirely with Calvin or with Luther, and how significant it is that the Articles were linked to the Prayer Book. "To understand the meaning of Anglicanism one must know and live the deep religious life that obedience to the Prayer Book fosters." Cranmer's work marks the significance of worship for theology.—On a later Continental figure, who is not included among the "Makers of Christianity," but whose personality and influence were outstanding, two recent books have been written. Stephan Hirzel's *Der Graf und die Brüder* (Leopold Klotz, Gotha) is the most literary and reliable sketch of Count Zinzendorf which has yet appeared. The author draws an outline of the Count's personality and propaganda on behalf of the Moravian mission, which will make it clear to modern readers why and how this remarkable man moved out of Pietism and at the same time never succeeded in founding a movement with the range of Methodism. As an example of biography which stirs the imagination without becoming fanciful, this book must be reckoned a masterpiece in the sphere of religious literature. The ideas of the Count form the subject of W. Bettermann's *Theologie*

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und Sprach bei Zinzendorf (Leopold Klotz, Gotha), in which his anti-rationalism, his simple theology of the Cross, and his belief in the Bible, are linked to the mysticism of his temperament. The writer considers that the Count's vague liking for mysticism belongs to his earlier period rather than to his later years. We have here a careful, suggestive analysis, which forms an independent supplement to Hirzel's volume. Unfortunately, Zinzendorf does not come into R. H. Grutzmacher's useful *Textbuch zur systematischen Theologie des 17 bis 20 Jahrhunderts*, a third edition of which has just been edited by Kurt Frör (Deichert, Leipzig). It provides extracts, as objectively selected as possible, from characteristic books, beginning with the early Lutheran theology of 1580–1720 and Pietism. Account is taken of recent scholars like Troeltsch and Karl Holl, and room is made even for philosophers like Kant, Hegel, Lessing and Herder. Such a survey or source-book will help students to become acquainted with the words as well as with the characteristic ideas of prominent men within the period, and form a basis for critical appreciation of their respective contributions.

The publication of a second edition of Brunner's *Natur und Gnade* (Mohr, Tübingen) has led to an acute survey, by M. Edmond Grin, of the problem discussed by Barth and Brunner in their controversy (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, pp. 282–294). He is disposed to side with Brunner on the main issue, that no doctrine of the Fall must ignore some sensitiveness still towards God in human nature. The formula of Thomas Aquinas only needs to be completed; it is not heretical, if we say not simply "gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit," but "gratia non tollit naturam, sed totaliter reparat et perficit," and Brunner's interpretation of Christianity is therefore more adequate than Barth's. In the same journal Maurice Neeser discusses the connection between philosophy and theology in the dialectic scheme of Barth (pp. 243–254), doubting if the latter's dualism is just either to philosophy or to theology. M. Arnold Reymond (p. 255 f) contributes an exceptionally important article by way of answering a friendly query from M. Etienne Gilson, "How can one be a Protestant without being a Barthian, and how can one have any philosophy if one is a Barthian?" The crucial flaw found by Reymond in the implicit philosophy of the Barthian scheme is the failure to present a deep view of truth. Brunner is pronounced rather more satisfactory on this point than Barth. The obscurity of the latter is held to go back to a constant oscillation between an intuitive pragmatism and a logical transcendentalism; his notion of the Divine nature, though it is called "God," reminds M. Reymond of "l'*Un* plotinien, insondable et indetermine," with the additional drawback that, unlike Plotinus, he will not allow that it can be known even indirectly and in its effects, outside a specific range of revelation. M. Reymond writes as a philosopher.

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REVIEWS.

A Coptic Gnostic Treatise. Translated from the Coptic, with Commentary, by Charlotte A. Baynes, O.B.E., F.R.A.I.—Cambridge: University Press, 1933.—Pp. xxv., Text 229.—30*s.* net.

SINCE our knowledge of the Gnosticism which was rife in the first centuries of the Christian era has to be derived mainly from what is said about it by the Christian Fathers who wrote against it, any fragments of Gnostic literature which have survived or which can be recovered from the sands of Egypt are peculiarly precious. In this finely produced volume Mrs Baynes gives us the Coptic text of a Gnostic treatise—or what remains of it—included in a collection of papyri acquired by James Bruce in Egypt in 1769, accompanied by a translation into English and a commentary. To students of Gnosticism the work had already been known in a German translation included in Dr Carl Schmidt's *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften*, Vol. I., published thirty years ago. But it is more accessible to English readers in Mrs Baynes's new version, and she has been able to profit by the researches in this field which have been pursued since Dr Schmidt's translation appeared. There is some doubt how the leaves of the papyrus should be arranged, and Mrs Baynes has made one notable change from Dr Schmidt's order. The pages which Dr Schmidt puts at the end, as chapters 21 and 22, Mrs Baynes makes the first of the remaining sections of the treatise, I. to X., according to her reckoning, of the papyrus sheets.

It can hardly be said that we get a more favourable idea of Gnosticism, as presented in this original work, than we do from the accounts of the Christian Fathers. While the document, of course, has interest as bearing on the ideas current in the Greco-Roman world, as a piece of religious literature it is the dreariest abracadabra. The human mind is exhibited in a condition of extreme debilitation. No doubt, it would be unfair to judge Gnosticism as a whole by the works preserved in Coptic. These, as Monsieur E. de Faye indicates in his book *Gnosticisme et Gnostiques*, seem to represent Gnosticism in a later popularly degraded form. What Gnosticism was on its higher levels we can see by such documents as the "Hymn of the Soul" (translated by my brother in the Cambridge *Texts and Studies*) or in Ptolemy's "Letter to Flora." The myth of the fall and restora-

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tion of Achamoth, as given by Irenæus in his account of the Valentinian school of Gnosticism, may have had, we can see, a genuine poetic appeal, translating as it did the human craving for deliverance from the limitations and defilements of life in the body into a dramatic story in which the feelings which man knows within himself are seen operating on a magnified scale in the genesis of the universe. Mrs Baynes believes that the circle from which our treatise proceeded was an offshoot of the school of Valentinus. She finds in it the same story told of the fall and restoration of Achamoth, Wisdom, called here "the Universal Womb," or "the Mother of the Whole." But in order to trace this story she has to do a great deal of reading between the lines. Otherwise, it would scarcely be possible to trace any series of events at all in the cloudy phantasmagoria of tediously repeated mysterious-sounding names. Mrs Baynes herself says: "One of the difficulties of interpreting this text arises from the fact that while in broad outline there is historical sequence, this is often disregarded where incidents and details are concerned, and the narrative sometimes dodges about, giving particulars of one space and another, or one personage and another, regardless of the temporal relationship of such particulars to the whole" (p. 107). Out of vague phrases Mrs Baynes with notable perseverance extracts allusions to concrete events which an ordinary reader would never suspect. For example, in a passage which describes how "the Man" of the upper sphere came down into the lower world, we are told "He came to the borders of the Mother of the Universe and set himself up upon the All-containing Æon. And the Universe was moved in the presence of the Lord of the whole Earth, and the Æon was troubled and remained still, as seeing him whom it knew not" (p. 170). Mrs Baynes conjectures that the phrase "set himself up upon the Æon" indicates the Crucifixion. Such a mode of guessing may get a good deal out of the text which is not there. In the same passage, Mrs Baynes seems without reason to make it "them of the world" who love and praise the Man, and not the Powers of the Pleroma, to which the relative would naturally refer. Her argument, that a "tongue of flesh" is spoken of, is wide of the mark. The document does not (according to her own translation) say that those who praised the Man did so with a tongue of flesh, but that their hymns were such as could not be uttered by a tongue of flesh.

As a contribution to human thought or religious apprehension such literature is as worthless as the productions of a lunatic. Yet it may have a value, just the value which the productions of a lunatic may have, as psychological material, illustrating the pathology of the mind; and we know to-day that the study of an organism's pathology may further the knowledge of its normal working. The terms and the ideas with which the writer operates have a history in the preceding thought of Greeks or Orientals, and it may often be possible to trace these connections. Mrs Baynes modestly abstains from any extensive inquiry in this direction, and regards it as her task simply to give the meaning of this particular document. The

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only connections she treats with any fulness are those with what we know of other Gnostic writings, especially, as has just been intimated with those of the Valentinian school. She herself has perhaps not yet given much study to the Greek and Hellenistic literature which supplied many of the ideas to Gnosticism. In regard to the use of *ham-maqōm* or ὁ τόπος as a mode of designating God (p. 10) the reference which she gives to the Greek and Latin translations of Exodus xxiv. 10 would hardly by itself prove that Jews regularly spoke of God in this way, and the language of the Kabbala, to which she also refers, belongs to the Middle Ages. It should have been noted that the usage by which God is spoken of as "the Place" is common in the earliest Rabbinic literature, and is proved as far back as Philo. There is some ground for thinking that it was borrowed from Zoroastrianism (W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischer Zeitalter*, ed. 3, 1926, p. 519, note 3). It is an indication of slight acquaintance with the early Greek philosophy that where a fragment of Parmenides is cited, the reference given is to the old edition of Mullach, and not to the now standard edition of the fragments of Pre-Socratic philosophy by Diels, of which a fifth edition by W. Kranz is now appearing. What is meant by "the theory of absolute evolution, first advanced by the early Greek philosophers" (p. 76), I do not know. The *seminales rationes* were not something new in "the later Scholastic philosophy": the term is a literal translation of σπερματικοὶ λόγοι, which was a stock phrase of the early Stoics.

But if Mrs Baynes has left it to others to follow up the connections between the ideas in this treatise and the ideas current in the Greek and Oriental world, she has evidently studied very closely the other Gnostic literature, and it is the extensive references to this literature which will make her edition most valuable to future students.

When indeed she calls the Gnosis of Simon Magus pre-Christian (p. 14), as if she were giving a generally agreed fact, that is misleading. If she means the form of Gnosis attributed to Simon Magus by Christian writers, it is highly questionable whether that is pre-Christian. A statement too, on p. 95, might seem to mean something which Mrs Baynes certainly does not mean—"The Gnostic belief in the unity and inter-relation of all things involved a restorative process for the entire cosmos." A reader would hardly be unintelligent if he took this to mean that, according to the Gnostic systems, every being in the cosmos would sooner or later attain salvation, as Origen did, as a matter of fact, hope. Mrs Baynes makes it plain elsewhere that the Gnostics believed a good part of mankind to be destined to ultimate destruction, and by the sentence quoted she no doubt means only that the redemptive process, in the Gnostic view, extended to beings in the upper spheres as well as to human beings. That, of course, is true.

That Mrs Baynes's rendering of the Coptic is trustworthy we may be confident from the fact which she mentions in the Preface—that she had advice throughout from Mr W. E. Crum and that he read

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most of the translation before it was published. She has done a genuine service to students of ancient religion by making the document thus available to them. Where she appears to me weak is in her conjectural explanations of Greek words: here her knowledge of Greek is evidently inadequate. It is true, no doubt, that the Coptic translators often present Greek words in distorted forms, but conjectures about their meaning must take some account of probabilities. How much in the air Mrs Baynes's guesses are can be seen in regard to the name Sētheus given to a great creative Power. Mrs Baynes conjectures that the name indicates *movement* as the essential factor in creation. The sole ground for this guess is that there is a Greek word (σείειν) beginning with a *sigma*, which means "to shake." There is, indeed, another Greek word meaning "to sift in a sieve" (not, as Mrs Baynes says, "to shake"), and beginning *sēth-* (σήθειν), but whether σήθειν has any etymological connection with σείειν is doubtful: L. & S. gives quite another derivation for it. Her explanation of the name Aphredon as equivalent to ἄρρητος, "unuttered," "unutterable," because there is a Greek root ΦΡΑΔ from which the word ἄφραστος comes, is equally wild. Coptic writers might distort Greek words, but they will scarcely have hunted out their roots in the manner of a modern philologist and then constructed words out of them. They are not likely to have used archaic Greek words which belonged to a peculiar poetical vocabulary, such as ἠδέ for "and," which Mrs Baynes would substitute for ἤδη "now," though Dr Schmidt had taken it, surely rightly, as that common word. Nor, again, are they likely to have used Greek words in a sense which had belonged to them in Homer, when they had come in current Greek to have another meaning—ἀγών, for instance, in the sense of "assembling place" when contemporary Greeks would understand nothing by it but "contest" "struggle." If Solmistos can be explained as compounded of σόλος (a rare Homeric word for a lump of iron) and μέγιστος, anything is possible. Mrs Baynes is probably right in taking ἐρημος ("desert"), which occurs twice, to be the Coptic scribe's mis-writing of ἠρεμος ("tranquil") since this latter word is found repeatedly elsewhere in the document. Yet it is not, I think, impossible that ἐρημος is right. In a fragment of Numenius, whose Neoplatonism has an affinity with Gnosticism, we are told that in the Transcendent Good there is an "inexpressible Divine solitude (ἐρημία)," while the word ἤρεμον is also used of it in the same sentence. (W. Scott, "Hermetica," II., p. 83.)

It is, perhaps, if it were taken as a psychological document, that a study of the treatise would yield results of the greatest interest. What Aristotle said of the mysteries, that their object was not to teach anything, but to produce a certain kind of feeling, is probably true of this kind of literature. We can imaginatively understand how when a conventicle in third-century Egypt listened to the reading of this series of mysterious-sounding phrases, this adumbration of dim, vast, transcendent forms, it would act as a kind of charm to produce a strange numinous feeling. Perhaps an analysis

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would show that in detail the means by which this feeling was produced illustrated certain modes of reaction to suggestion characteristic of the human mind generally. The series of negative adjectives, for instance—incomprehensible, insubstantial, invisible, unknowable, without body, without bounds—point to that character which Rudolf Otto has indicated as belonging to the object of numinous awe, the *mysterium tremendum*. Or again, the multiplication of similar Forms, the ennead of æons, the many Deeps, the many Fathers or Fatherhoods, the many Spaces, and so on, may have had a definite psychological effect in deepening the mystery, not one shadowy form only, but one behind the other, going into vague immensity. And then the use of numbers would contribute to the effect—four Gates and four Monads, one to each Gate, and further to each gate six Supporters, twenty-four myriad Powers, nine Enneads, ten Decads, twelve Dodecads, five Pentads and a Guardian who has three aspects (p. 58). As the numbers were solemnly read in the conventicle, we can conceive the worshipper having a sense of mystic knowledge which hardly anything could create so well as definite numbers, assigned to these dimly apprehended Forms. It might be exceedingly interesting if a competent alienist could study the document in detail and note how far the images and ideas here found dominating the mind correspond with the characteristics which the mind is apt to show when its natural tendencies become exaggerated or unchecked in insanity.

EDWYN BEVAN.

REIGATE.

Thomas More. By R. W. Chambers, M.A., D.Lit., F.B.A., Quain Professor of English in the University of London.—London: Jonathan Cape, 1935.—Pp. 416.—12*s.* 6*d.* net.

IT would be difficult to over-praise the learning that has gone to the making of this book, truly a labour of love and of hero-worship. We feel as we read it that Dr Chambers has lived in spirit, as he has lived in research with his subject, and that he is giving us an Apology, in the Platonic sense, at once for More and for himself. It is the work of one who has soaked himself in his theme, and whether we have More's own words or those of his friends and earlier biographers, or whether Dr Chambers is taking up the tale, we get the impression that More's story is telling itself; and for what better could an Apologist wish? Particularly do we feel this in the earlier part of the book, with More at home with his family or engaged in his eager quest to gain and spread enlightenment with his fellow-humanists, the More whom even those who find most to disparage in his policy or achievement have not ceased to admire. But to whatever camp the reader belongs, whether he feels, as Dr Chambers seems at times to do, that the history of what is worth while in England begins with the early Christian Missionaries and ends with the disappointed hopes of the Renaissance, or whether he would begin with the Norman

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Conquest and draw a deep breath of renewed life with the Reformation, he must admit that, with regard to More himself, Dr Chambers clears away many mistakes and misunderstandings. "What good is it," asks the Platonic Socrates, "that all the world should agree with me if I do not agree with myself?" and Dr Chambers demonstrates More's consistency in what he wrote and what he did and what he was prepared to suffer. Like Burke, as Dr Chambers quotes in a most apt comparison, "he had taken his ideas of liberty very low; in order that they should stick to him, and that he should stick to them, to the end of his life." As he justly claims, "More's strictly Utopian attitude comes out at his trial. He is entitled to plead conscience, he asserts, *just because* he has given no occasion of tumult or sedition." . . . "It is just because More kept his freedom of conscience within the narrow limits which he had defined twenty years before in *Utopia* that we can regard him as a consistent martyr for his ideal of freedom." There may still be some who would regard More as quixotic in his martyrdom, and think that after all there was not so very much to choose between allegiance to a disreputable King and a disreputable Pope. More's wife was an excellent exponent of this school of thought, and no less so the boy who could boast descent from her; who, as Dr Chambers tells us, declared that "she was the only one of the crowd who had any sense." Yet Dr Chambers shows clearly how his martyrdom was consistent with his life, and, being consistent, inevitable.

It may well be that in much that he has written Dr Chambers has said the last word on More. In part, the candid critic and friend —and the present reviewer may claim to speak in the unpleasant capacity of both—may suggest that he has only said the latest. Trevelyan writes in his *History of England*, "Erasmus feared Protestantism, and More persecuted it, dreading toleration anywhere nearer to Europe than Utopia." Dr Chambers shows what More's "persecution" amounted to, and he claims that "it is precisely More's tolerance that makes him, on true Utopian principles, intolerant of the Reformers," and again he convinces us of More's consistency. Still, the larger question remains, what are we to understand by toleration? Dr Chambers makes comparisons, or emphasizes comparisons already made, between More and Socrates; and these comparisons, in respect of discipline, and particularly of self-discipline, are just. But we cannot help thinking that More would have approved of the condemnation of Socrates, above all because he would not stop talking; and close as is the kinship between *Utopia* and what might be termed the lower plane of the *Republic*, there is all the difference in the world between the darkened Churches of *Utopia* and the Platonic Socrates of the seventh book of the *Republic*, who would turn the eye of his soul to the light, and allow it no rest till it had found the fullest illumination that the human soul can reach. It is the difference that makes Utopia interesting and the *Republic* inspiring. It is in a sense the difference between the spirit of the Reformation and that of much that it swept away. It was no

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part of Dr Chambers's task to make himself an Apologist for the Reformation, and, indeed, it was rather the accidents than the properties of the Reformation that brought More's world tumbling about his head. Yet if we go to such an Apologist, if we read, for instance, the few wise pages on the Reformation in the third chapter of Edward Caird's great work on *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, we may think that even "tumult and sedition" may be avoided at too great a cost.

Dr Chambers impresses us with his exposition of More's wise and noble conception of statesmanship, his ideal of European comity, and he deplores the frustration of what might seem so bright a prospect in the early years of Henry's reign. Faith and learning, goodwill and progress never had so fair a chance. Instead, we have the destruction of the Abbeys, the genial currents frozen of arts and crafts and letters, while "Henry and Wolsey threw their weight about in the wars and diplomacy of Europe." We may see the picture as Dr Chambers sees it, and yet think that we have no case for putting history in the dock. For history has never moved by a process of enlightened eclecticism. There is, as Aristotle would tell us, too much ὕλη in human nature and in the nature of things. Dr Chambers quotes from Professor A. F. Pollard's *Henry VIII.*:—

"Political movements are often as restless as the tides of the ocean; they carry to fortune, and they bear to ruin, the just and the unjust with heedless impartiality. . . . Fisher and More seeking to stem the secularization of the Church, are like those who would save men's lives from the avalanche by preaching to the mountain on the text of the sixth commandment. . . . That is the secret of Henry's success."

Dr Chambers goes on to show what cold comfort his "success" brought Henry and England, and how little "ruin" describes the end of a man who had achieved all he held most holy, and whose martyrdom was the crown of that achievement. *Quis inter doctos iudicabit?* Perhaps the unlearned may decide the dispute by saying that they are both right; but Dr Chambers speaks as a moralist, Professor Pollard as a historian.

In his *Epilogue* Dr Chambers quotes several tributes to More and his influence. Some of these show how good a press More has had of late years, but they have not the weight of Dr Chambers's own tribute. For instance, Mr Chesterton's, "he is not quite so important as he will be in a hundred years' time," and its endorsement by Father Henry Browne may raise a smile from those who do not give it the uncritical acceptance of fellow-devotees; and when Dr Chambers tells us that Mussolini is also of the company of devotees, we can only say that he is not giving us much reason to think so. What, then, is to be our estimate of More? We should not presume to give one, but perhaps we may say that, if we did, it would not be quite what Dr Chambers would wish us to give. The present reviewer, whose candour may have outrun his discernment, must confess that he feels that he is not quite at home with human nature when he reads Tudor history, whether in Dr Chambers or in his colleague's, Professor J. E.

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Neale's, equally admirable *Queen Elizabeth*. He finds strange gusts of passion and cruelty of lives lived too feverishly to be quite normal, as in the Florence of *Romola* or the Athens of the closing years of the fifth century, B.C. Perhaps the mind still needed, or needed again, that "freeing of a direction" of which Bacon speaks in the *Novum Organum*. It is not till we come to the miracle of Shakespeare that we are at home with human nature at its fullest and at rest. It would, of course, be absurd to speak of this pathological discomfort in relation to More, truly a great and a wise and a good man; but we may think that his consistency and completeness left something outside, that, while he agreed with himself, there were some things that he did not ask himself or answer, that humanism must of its nature fall short of humanity, and that for those of us for whom he cannot be a cult, he must still "abide our question." However this may be, the candid critic and friend may unite in congratulating Dr Chambers on a work of unfailing interest, though he feels that he convinces most when he is partner with More in his story, rather than when he is acting as Chorus to it.

LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

A History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. By A. Wolf, Professor of Logic and Scientific Method in the University of London, with the co-operation of Dr F. Dannemann and A. Armitage.—London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935.—Pp. xxvii., 692.—25*s*. net.

IT is a remarkable fact that though it is a current commonplace that science has transformed the modern world, and is bound to have yet greater influence in the future, the steps by which it has attained this position are still for the most part ignored. History, in the common acceptance of the term, still denotes political history, and the sides of history most closely connected with the growth of science—technology, industry, the spread of communications, the applications of medicine—are still treated, if treated at all, in short subsidiary chapters or relegated to specialist works. The "historian," or the history teacher, is not expected to know anything about them, and as a rule lives up to the expectation. A change must come in this matter if men are ever to arrive at a just conception of the laws of their collective being, and the process of the change will probably be a long, as it is certainly a difficult, one. There are two main obstacles in the way. The first is the tradition that political history (including, of course, the history of wars and monarchs) is history *par excellence*. This tradition is not now openly much defended. It is dying as a belief, but its exequies are tedious. The greater obstacle lies in the provision of the true substitute for this traditional view, not only in understanding the truth, but in arranging for its practical and popular presentation. The matter of history—conceive it how we

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will—is so immeasurable. Quite easily one may spend a lifetime not only in studying the details of a single war, but even of a single human being. And in the given problem we are called upon to present, or at least to allude to, the whole.

Such thoughts must crowd into the mind in reading this new volume of Professor Wolf's "History of Science Library." It records the growth of science and technology in only two centuries—the sixteenth and seventeenth—and yet the seven hundred pages are full of new facts elicited by observation and experiment, and every one of them is of interest. It was, of course, a time of exceptional excitement and enthusiasm for the spread of knowledge, but no doubt, if we extended the period downwards, there would be found no diminution, but again a vast increase of the material to be recorded. It is right that it should be put on record, and the public is under a heavy debt of gratitude to Professor Wolf for the industry and thoroughness he has put into the task. There is certainly nothing like it in English—an ordered encyclopædia of information on the early stages in the building of all the sciences—Astronomy, Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, Metereology and Geology, Biology, Medicine, Psychology and the Social Sciences. It is welcome and encouraging to note that Professor Wolf has had the co-operation of the veteran Dr Dannemann, whose previous works on similar lines in Germany are well known and a model to other labourers in the field.

Nothing like a detailed account of the book can be attempted, but it would be wrong to omit a word of special praise for the abundant, well-executed and appropriate illustrations. They fit in well with the general care which has been taken to make the record reliable and permanent. But, for the general reader, two remarks are called for, one by way of warning, the other of summary. One feels, in spite of its excellence—partly, perhaps, owing to this very excellence—that the work will not achieve that most desirable object mentioned at starting, of permeating the historical consciousness of the intelligent public. One does not get much idea of the forest where the trees are so close and thick, and when one is threading the way with interest among them. It would have been possible, one thinks, to give the general reader a little more guidance, to thin out here and there, summarise a little more, and, in one respect at least, to improve the arrangement. That one respect is the treatment of mathematics. It is something to be grateful for, that mathematics are included at all; but, being included, they should take a more leading place. Side by side with the new experimental method, the revival and development of ancient mathematics was the leading intellectual feature of the time. The most significant and interesting fact, at least about the earlier and more purely physical part of the story, is that accurate measuring and counting accompanied and made possible the building up of the permanent structure of scientific thought.

The other general remark relates to this permanence. One is accustomed in these days, even in scientific circles, to hear of the

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impermanence of scientific results. One is intended sometimes to get the idea that science is constantly being remade and that none of its results are final. In face of this, it is a useful exercise in reading such a book to ask one's self whether the thing discovered is not still recognised as true. The answer will undoubtedly be that in nine cases out of ten what these early scientists finally agreed on, *i.e.* within the period described, is still accepted. The constant impression is, not that their results are now discarded, but that they are commonplaces of thought or nature. We feel them to be commonplaces, but do not in most cases know to whom we owe the commonplace.

F. S. MARVIN.

WELWYN GARDEN CITY.

Science in the Making. By Gerald Heard.—London : Faber & Faber, 1935.—Pp. 266.—7*s.* 6*d.* net.

MR GERALD HEARD has made an excellent little book out of his series of broadcast talks on the "Science Front." It is not too slight—nearly three hundred pages—and is a good example of what might be done regularly to keep the larger public in touch with the growth of thought. If, however, it is to be repeated, say every year or two years, it might be suggested that a rather less colloquial style would better suit the printed word. One reader at least prefers the more deliberate, even if rather longer, sentence, and doesn't want to be poked in the ribs when he is reading. "This isn't uplift," "that's not a conventional phrase," are examples, out of many, very natural and passable, phrases in talking, but irritating, if a book is meant to have any permanence.

This one should, as it covers a very wide range of scientific topics and deals with a period of exceptional interest in discovery. One can only pick out a few. First, of course, is put the bombardment of boron by alpha particles to produce a new radio-active element, the positron. This Mr Heard compares ingeniously with the other "super-discovery" of man which marked his transition from the animal to the human stage, viz. fire. If we are really in possession of the secret of the transmutation of elements, it will be as momentous a stage in the advance of mankind. The crucial experiment appears to have been tried in the spring of 1934 in a Paris laboratory. The vaulting of the heavens by cosmic radiation, the universal pulsation of the earth coming to a climax in earthquakes, the penetration of extreme depths in the ocean and extreme heights in the air, with the results—all come in for record in this two years' bulletin.

Mr Heard is equally thrilling on the biological side. The bi-focal fishes; the cat-fish as the premonitor of earthquakes; the various evidence of the prevalence of mind in the lower animals; the extra-ordinary effects of special training in the case of one out of two identical twins; the idea that man is an earlier and less specialised type in the evolutionary series rather than a later; all these are

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specimens of subjects treated with attractive and concrete detail in the latter portion. Then there is a very good medical section, with special treatment of the conquest of pain.

It is well to conclude in a philosophical journal with some praise of the force of mind. This is, indeed, the underlying main thread of Mr Heard's discourse. It is the mind of man that has triumphed; the brain of the Saurians was about an ounce to the ton. "There is no subject which is not fascinating if we can see how it is linked up with ourselves, and the triumph of science has been to show that there is nothing with which we are not linked in some strange relationship."

F. S. MARVIN.

WELWYN GARDEN CITY.

Creative Society: a Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism. By John Macmurray.—London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1935.—Pp. 192.—5*s.* net.

THE theory with which Professor Macmurray starts is that in man the continuity of nature is broken by the emergence of a new capacity—consciousness. The awareness of animals is limited to the immediate present: they are conscious *in* the world, but not *of* the world. But man, by the power of reason, has knowledge of life as a whole, and is, therefore, aware also of death. With knowledge of death comes fear of death, and fear of death isolates man both from the world, which becomes a continual threat to his existence, and from his fellow-men, by breaking bonds of kinship and friendship, and forcing the individual into the isolation of his own existence. Yet reason, which thus involves a double sense of isolation, at the same time reveals to man his intimate dependence upon nature and upon his fellows. The first characteristic desire of human personality is to overcome this fear of death without losing consciousness of death; for failure to overcome the fear would paralyse human life, whilst to lose consciousness of death would be to lose all human consciousness. Religion is this necessary effort to deal with the fear of death. And so its task is twofold; the reintegration of the individual with his fellows, and the reintegration of man with Nature in full consciousness of death. In this sense, "all religion is the expression of community," and is the first and completest expression of reason.

There are, however, two kinds of false religion. There is an other-worldly idealism, divorcing body from mind, and expressing only a community of the future. And there is the natural concomitant of idealism—materialism, a blind struggle with matter. "All idealism," the writer maintains, "is a concealed materialism, and the real motive to action which it sustains is the hunger for power." This, in fact, is the general contrast between Catholicism and Protestantism, where they have become pseudo-religions. "Catholicism tends to a falsification which turns it into a religion of

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power seeking temporal control, while Protestantism, when it is falsified, tends to become 'purely' spiritual, and to withdraw from responsibility for material life."

The error of Communism is to identify Christianity with idealism, and so itself evolves by antithesis into materialism. The true synthesis of Communism and Christianity is, then, a true Christianity; that is, a genuine expression of the universal community of mankind. That such a synthesis is possible, the author attempts to prove by revealing the common ground between them already. He expounds the teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of Heaven so as "to exhibit the main theoretical conceptions of Communism—the unity of theory and practice, the dialectical nature of social development, the importance of class conflict, and the fundamental part played by economics in the social process—as structural ideas in the religion of Jesus." He also traces a dialectic in history, wherein Christianity seized the Greek conception of human society as a family and the Roman conception of society as the universal reign of law and administration, and synthesised them into the conception of society as a universal family. "It is Christianity that commits Europe, and through Europe the world, to a continuous process of dialectical development which can only reach its goal through the social unification of mankind." And so Fascism, an attempt to perpetuate one of its intermediate stages, is doomed to fail.

In short, the twin activities of man are work and love, and both involve social action. The defect of Communism is its ignoring that aspect of life grounded on the love-impulses, and the failure to see that all progress towards a truly human community depends upon the subordination to those of the hunger-impulses. And, finally, it fails in these latter days because it continues to think of an obsolete dialectic, based upon Marx's analysis of a world in which Socialism did not exist, whereas the synthesis of that dialectic is now past history, and the problem is no longer creation but extension. And the modern dialectic, it is suggested, is between nationalism and universal interdependence. This can be solved only by Christianity; but a Christianity purged both of other-worldliness and of power motives, and issuing in a clear programme of action.

Professor Macmurray is very chary of using the words "transcendence" and "immanence," and I have half a suspicion that he would repudiate them altogether as a false antithesis. He does admit that "if we believe in God we live as if the fortunes of the world did not depend on us; we live as if the world could be trusted to work out its own destiny and to use us, even through our mistakes and our failures, for its own good purposes." This attitude, he believes, Communists have and many Christians have not. Yet the problem remains: can there be Christianity without some awareness of transcendence in a more definite sense than mere awareness that the community (however extended) transcends the individual? And will Professor Macmurray not end up with humanism rather than with Christianity?

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Two years ago the same author published a little treatise on *The Philosophy of Communism*. Therein he stated more explicitly his attack on idealism and his faith in Communism. He restated Communism as not ultimately a matter of economics, but of the inherently social nature of human personality. "Individualism and Communism are opposites and irreconcilable. Individuality and community are correlatives." The humanism stated therein essentially recurs in this book, and the unconscious conclusion seems to be that Communism and Christianity can be synthesised only if Christianity becomes this kind of humanism. This provocative book is, therefore, a challenge to Christian theology, for to a dialectic philosopher this very antithesis between Communism and Christianity is ground for optimism. "The separation of Communism and Christianity into conscious antagonism means that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." If it is not the challenge of humanism, then it is certainly the challenge of Quakerism. A creative society, uninhibited by fear; of such is the Kingdom of Heaven. And the only form in which Christianity could conceivably survive would be a universal Society of Friends.

DAVID THOMSON.

SIDNEY SUSSEX COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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THE
HIBBERT JOURNAL

NIETZSCHE AND THE PRESENT CRISIS OF CIVILISATION.[1]

PROFESSOR HENRI LICHTENBERGER.

MANY errors are now current in regard to Nietzsche. One of them consists in mixing him up with latter-day politics and claiming him as a prophet for one or the other social or political parties of the hour.

It can be easily shown that Nietzsche can neither be claimed as a defender of the State, nor of the Nation, nor, least of all, of Pangermanism.

First, and on no account, he can be claimed as a devotee of the State.

Nietzsche, who thinks it the highest function of humanity to give birth to genius, to superman, to a human élite, Nietzsche, for whom a people is nothing but a round-about-way which nature takes in order to produce a few great men, cannot but be hostile to an ideology, that commands the

[1] From a lecture delivered by Professor Henri Lichtenberger of the Sorbonne, before audiences at Bâle, Zurich and Budapest, and published in *La Revue de Hongrie*, October 1935. Translated for the HIBBERT JOURNAL by Oscar Levy, Editor of the English translation of Nietzsche's works (Allen and Unwin).

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subordination of the individuum to the collectivity. He is thus the outspoken antipode of Hegel, who had praised the State as the "representative of God on earth" and "the absolute end in itself," and who demonstrated that individuals only exist by and for the State. In Nietzsche's eyes the State is the New Idol whom he denounces in a famous chapter of Zarathustra. The State, he says, here, is the "coldest of all monsters," with it everything is false, and in spite of this it says "on earth there is nothing greater than myself, it is I who is the ruling finger of God". The State attracts to itself a crowd of superfluous people, whom it promptly devours. But alas! by its lies it also seduces fine souls and noble hearts, hearts that wish to discharge themselves: it takes men into its service, it makes use of their greatness, of their virtues, of their heroism, of their wisdom. It is thus that the nefarious power of the State increases, a power where "the slow suicide of all is called life", and where a group of agitated monkeys are ever "disputing ferociously for wealth and power". For a free spirit there is no other remedy than to try and escape from these malodorous Saturnalia. "There, where the State ceaseth—pray look thither, my brethren! Do ye not see the rainbow and the bridges of the superman?" Nietzsche detests the State because it aims at a conquest of political and economic power, and makes no effort to create a superior type of humanity, because it does not place at the head of hierarchy the creator of new values, but a sovereign who owes his position to his birth or an elected chief, who pretends to represent the collectivity.

Next as to the nation.

Nietzsche detests above all the State when it becomes "national." The devotees of the State, as is well known, not only try to subordinate the individual to the collectivity, they are aiming, besides this, at the greatness and the triumph of one nation, confounding the religion of the State with that of the country. Just on this point Nietzsche has raised a celebrated protest and one that has scandalised many. Sharply and decidedly he opposes to nationalism of a State a new cosmopolitanism, which he thinks an absolute necessity for our near future. Modern Europe, he says, must try and face the task of union, which, in their days, the cities of Greece failed to accomplish in time. The United States of Europe are a psychological, historical, economical necessity —which is bound to come through the falling to pieces of nations and through the formation of a mixed class of people

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the product of the cross-breeding of nationalities. Napoleon's dream of an United Europe, destined to govern the world, must of necessity be realised sooner or later. Against this tendency of union, there arises a very noisy and disturbing reaction of nationalism which, Nietzsche thinks, is as impotent as it is artificial. Nationalism, by its nature, has been forced upon the masses, but only in the interest of certain dynasties or certain social groups. It is the philosopher's duty, once he has recognised this fact, frankly to confess himself a "good European" and to work with all his might for the fusion of peoples and civilisations. The realisation of this super-national ideal, of this European super-race, which is on its way everywhere and which is only hidden from our sight through the differences of languages, can, according to Nietzsche, not be so very far off.

Nietzsche, under these circumstances, combats this nationalistic counter-current with that trenchancy which is characteristic of his nature. Categorically he declines to share the hatreds which divide the civilised world. The armed peace, which reigned in Europe during his time, inspires him with decided repugnance. Nothing more odious, he says, than this permanent state of suspicion and hatred, in which modern nations live; nothing worse than this ignominious hypocrisy, which consists in loudly repudiating for oneself any appetite of conquest, any desire of oppression while, on the other hand, regularly suspecting the neighbour of these black intentions. This is, he declares,

> "an inhumanity worse than war, for it is a provocation, an excitement to war, inasmuch as it presupposes the neighbours' immorality and arouses hostile dispositions and acts."

We shall succeed in having lasting peace neither through a clever balance of power nor through a progressive reduction of armaments. Only the most powerful of nations would be able one day to confer peace upon the world:

> "Perhaps there will come a time when a nation, that has carried to the highest degree its organisation and military intelligence, and which has acquired the habit of sacrificing itself heavily to its Army and Navy, one day out of its own free will say: 'We will break our sword,' and then destroy all its military institutions from top to bottom. Peace can only come through the pacification of minds and hearts, it can and will only be

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born on that day, when all human societies have this one thought : ' better perish than hate and fear, and better twice perish than make one self hated and feared '." ...

Words perhaps from Utopia, but certainly wonderfully prophetic which Europe, to its misfortune, did not think worthy of attention when they were uttered, and which, also probably to its misfortune, it will not listen to any better to-day. And the more Nietzsche approaches the end of his career, the more violent become his diatribes against the "Horned cattle Nationalism" (Hornviehnationalismus), which he abhors and detests. In sentences ever more violent he stigmatises the chauvinism of the "patriot," the nationalistic itch, which has separated Europe into a number of nations, facing each other behind walls, and erecting barricades higher and higher, whose entrance is defended by quarantines ever longer and stiffer.

But most vehement of all is Nietzsche's aversion against the specific German kind of the Nationalistic disease: to wit, Pangermanism.

Certainly, Nietzsche was no more an anti-patriot than he was an anarchist. One must not take him at his words, when he glorifies himself as being a man "without a country." Nietzsche, on the contrary, loved his country profoundly: no lengthy proof of this fact is needed here. He who quotes his famous invectives against Germany, in order to demonstrate his lack of patriotism, simply proves that he does not understand the manner in which, according to Nietzsche, love of country should be practised. The truth is that Nietzsche, just because he was a German, opposed with double bitterness the German kind of universal nationalism, which he condemns everywhere. Immediately after the war of 1870, at a time when the nationalistic fervour of his countrymen increased and flared up in an outbreak of enthusiasm, he took his decision : he does not desire at all a triumph of Germany, but wishes for a renaissance of Hellenism, for the advent of a "tragic" civilisation, which would be neither Greek nor German, but human and European. And if he begins by assuming that it is in Germany where this will take place, and that the German genius by its very nature must expand into the European genius, he later on renounces all hope in that direction.

The providential mission of Germany very soon becomes problematic in his eyes. Deep in his heart he may preserve the hope that his country will one day play a glorious part

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in the development of humanity. But more and more he feels the abyss, immense, painful, unbearable, which exists at present between the ideal Germanism—which in its last essence unites itself with the genius of humanity—and the German genius of his time, which Nietzsche hates and despises and against which he from now onwards breaks out with ever more growing exasperation. He fulminates against a sort of politics that "renders the German soul sterile by exciting its vanity, against those miniature politics that have to fall back upon mortal hatreds and have to perpetuate in Europe the system of small nations." He turns out this provoking aphorism :

> "Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles. The silliest watchword that has ever been given out. And why Germany, I pray you, if she does not wish, does not represent something higher in value than that any other power, up to now, represents ? By itself, this is nothing else than one big country, one big stupidity, more in the world."

One cannot go much further in the repudiation of any solidarity with Pangermanism and, speaking generally, with any national exclusiveness. Later on Nietzsche has only repeated the same ideas in a more violent and fanatical form, by delivering those famous invectives, which are quoted everywhere and with which he has enamelled his latest writings : *The Genealogy of Morals*, *The Twilight of the Idols* and *The Antichrist*.

And in the same manner as he censures the nationalism of Pangermanists, he condemns their Antisemitism. Not that he had for Jewish people a boundless admiration. According to him the Jews were the first propagandists of the great revolt of the slaves against the strong and the mighty. He knows their flaws and shortcomings, and he is ready to admit that the Stock Exchange Jew is among the most disagreeable types of the modern world. But he also pays due tribute to their great qualities : he sees in them the oldest, strongest and most unimpaired human race ; he notes with admiration that they, placed under the worst conditions of existence, have kept themselves alive owing to a prodigious tenacity ; he recognises that they have a practical mind, an aptitude for rational science, and even the gift for the "great style" in morals ; he thinks that on account of their intellectual superiority they could have become the masters of Germany and Europe, if they had

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earnestly desired that hegemony; he holds that they are better than any other people vaccinated against the "rabies nationalis." So much so that on the whole, and in spite of their blemishes and imperfections, he esteems very highly the race that has given to humanity its noblest saint (Christ), its most admirable sage (Spinoza) and the sublimest of books (The Bible). Under these circumstances he combats with ever-growing violence that antisemitism, whose immense force in Germany he clearly recognises, and which is to be found even amongst people who out of opportunism do not think it advisable to profess it in public. He thinks Anti-semites "step-motherly treated by Nature"; they cannot forgive the Jews for having both money and intellect; he denounces them as blunderers who are not made more respectable by the fact that they lie on principle.

Nietzsche above all desires a superior race, which would be the result of cross-breedings, in which all European peoples should take part. As amongst the most precious elements of this future combination, he points, besides the German, to the Russian who will confer his youthful ardour and barbarian energy, and likewise to the Jews, who will contribute their wit, their subtlety, their intelligence. A cross between the Jew and the Prussian Squire, Nietzsche thinks, should give an especially favourable result.

But let there be no mistake about it: the biological aspect of the race problem is not the one which interests Nietzsche most. Questions of hygiene and eugenics have certainly their importance for him, but he does not trouble about them for very long. The value of a being does not entirely depend upon his pedigree. The importance of education is in his eyes much more decisive and throughout his life he studied it with minute care. Yet the real selective principle is for him not of pedagogic but of metaphysical kind. What, in his opinion, really draws the line between superior or inferior human beings, is neither the purity of blood, nor education with its moral and physical training, but the capability to support the idea of the Death of God and the Eternal Recurrence. The decadent can only reject with horror that nihilistic vision of a Becoming void of meaning and rolling on without aim and end eternally: this idea leads him fatally first to theoretical and then to practical suicide. On the contrary, the strong and able man who feels within himself a creative power and has confidence in the human will, able to organise the Universe, can accept without despair the idea of an universal evolution without

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aim and purpose. And thus the advent of Nihilism in Europe is in Nietzsche's eyes, the decisive and salutary aim, that will lead to the appearance of the Superman. By scattering the delusion, which religion and philosophy have created around reality, Nihilism acts as an agent of selection, and this with exceptional energy. It is the touchstone by which the strong and the weak will recognise themselves. It will break the latter and it will help them to disappear, and this will be a benefit for the Universe as well as for themselves. But it will stimulate the vital spirit of others ; it will animate them with a new enthusiasm for the conquest of power and the indefinite development of humanity.

Under these circumstances the problems of race, politics, economics have in Nietzsche's eyes not nearly that importance, which they have with the majority of our contemporaries. Nietzsche subordinates them entirely to the philosophical problem. The power, to which Will aspires, and which is the aim of the Superman, is not, if we go to the bottom of Nietzsche's thoughts, a possession which we can touch with our fingers and see with our eyes ! It does not mean the domination of a Master over his subjects, or of a Chief over his troops ; and still less is it the power that confers the possession of gold. It does not aim at establishing vast Empires nor at the accumulation of ever-increasing wealth, nor at the acquisition of a higher standard of living. Power, under its highest aspects, is something purely immaterial. "Thoughts that come on dove's feet set the world in motion," teaches Zarathustra. The mighty "par excellence," therefore, is not the soldier, the man of action, the "Master of the Universe." He is the contemplator, the philosopher, whose thought has enough power of expansion to fascinate the souls and to impress the hearts of mankind. He is the Seer who lays down the law of fundamental values ; he is the Initiator who suggests to future generations experiences that will ennoble humanity : he is the religious genius, who with authority dictates to men the principles that will direct their actions. The Nietzschean Superman is in the same category as those embodiments of Divine Inspiration, who like Christ, Mahomed and Buddha have gained power and ascendency over souls. And thus the war which interests Nietzsche is not the one that takes place in battle-fields, wasting wealth, lives and treasures of art in its blind fury, as well as the happiness of man. That war may be a fatality ; but it is above all a barbarity, whose horror, with his soul so easily moved by pity, Nietzsche has perceived

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more than any other man. The war, on the other hand, which really arouses his fervour, is that war which takes place in the depth of the soul between the great principles capable of governing life and which finally decides in which direction universal evolution shall proceed. The material war, the war with powder and shot, has for its object the hegemony of one people and one race; the spiritual war determines what, in the widest meaning of the word, is called the religious future of humanity. He, who falls into rapture over the triumph of a country, of a people, of a party has no right to invoke Nietzsche's name.

Under such conditions is it possible to see in Nietzsche, as one has frequently done of late, a prophet of National-socialism?

At first sight one can easily detect analogies between Nietzsche's doctrine and the principles of national-socialism. First they have a number of enemies in common: for instance, Marxism, the communism of the anarchist, parliamentary government, English eudemonism, America and its religion of efficiency and technical progress and, furthermore, capitalism and the worship of wealth. Both sides censure the weakness and flabbiness of modern civilisation: they strive for the appearance of a new "barbarian"; they prefer culture of the will and of the body to an exclusive development of the intelligence; they preach "hardness," they rehabilitate the virtues of the soldier and the warrior; they proclaim a new Sparta; they recommend for the youths a strong obligatory and military training; they ask for a creation by selection of a new chosen race of "Masters of the Earth," they underline the necessity of authority, they desire the advent of a "chief" who has a will and who can command. One could without much trouble detect even more similarities between the two creeds. Under these conditions one easily understands that many national-socialists, in the eager outlook for a spiritual pedigree, have thought it proper to claim Nietzsche as one of their ancestors in the realm of the spirit. For it is a fact that Nietzsche has the privilege to fascinate even those who are separated from him by profound divergencies.

So much may be conceded: but now, I believe it is indispensable to draw attention to the fundamental dissimilarities which, in spite of all, separate Nietzsche from national-socialism. Nietzsche is neither national nor socialist. He is the opponent of all the principles that aim at the self-sufficiency of European countries; he is the partisan of an

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United Europe, of an œcumenical organisation of the planet; he does not believe in purity of races; he is hostile to anti-semitism. His doctrine is profoundly aristocratic: he repudiates fiercely the idea that the master exists for the benefit of the herd and that his power depends upon the approval of the masses: never the idea would have come into the head of Zarathustra to ask the people for a plebiscite. Never would Nietzsche have admitted that education should have for its end a spiritual conformity between the members of a collective group. On the contrary, he is a profound individualist and he proclaims as leading principle: "Become who thou art"! ("Werde, der Du bist"). Nietzsche forbids all propaganda, he does not desire that his ideal should be an ideal for all, nor even for many: he recommends, on the contrary, to his disciples, not to follow but to abandon him. His Dionysian attitude, furthermore, tends to a trans-valuation of all the spiritual values of humanity, to an establishment of a new table of values and to a destruction of the old tables: it does not aim at all at a new State founded upon the unanimous consent of all the citizens. The fundamental postulates of Nietzsche's philosophy—the death of God, the Superman, the Eternal Recurrence, have nothing in common with the categorical imperatives that govern the Third Reich.

My firm conviction is that these divergencies cannot be considered as negligible. It is, therefore, impossible for us to see in Nietzsche the harbinger of that great anti-liberal movement which develops itself in modern Europe and which has triumphed in so many countries. At the zenith of Imperial Germany's power he announced the inner flaw of the Second Reich, and proclaimed the downfall of European order and modern civilisation. The years that have followed have given to this prophecy a tragic and all too evident confirmation. But it does not follow from this that the Third Realm is the realisation of that new order which he foresaw: the appearance of the "lachende Löwen" (laughing lions) whose roaring amaze the higher man and announce to Zarathustra that the hour of the "Great Midday" has struck. On the contrary, I am convinced that Nietzsche is as out of tune with the world of to-day, as he was with the world of yesterday. He has not come down to the market-place, and he has not donned any modern shirt, be it black, brown or blue. He remains a solitary, afar from human agitation and entirely above the combat of nationalities and the hatreds of parties. I am prone to believe that his true

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disciples are less the adepts of a new faith, who now salute him as their master without comprehending perhaps the deeper sense of his message and life, than some lonely beings, some inquirers, some "Gottsucher" who will climb up to the cave of Zarathustra in order to find there, far away from the maddening crowd, a purer and more bracing air, a help against the black serpent of Disgust, a remedy against the temptation of despair, that haunts to-day, as well as yesterday, so many solitary and disappointed souls.

HENRI LICHTENBERGER.

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EUROPE'S NEED FOR A NEW POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR R. B. MOWAT.

In the January number of this Review, René Fülop-Miller pointed out the astonishing contrast between the peoples of the late nineteenth century who believed in Reason, and the prevailing mentality of the present age which seems deliberately hostile to Reason.[1] The "revolt against Reason" is a real thing. And yet it may be that this represents not so much a determination to do without the light of reason, but rather bewilderment at the collapse of an old system, and an instinctive groping for a new one.

The fifteen years since the inauguration of the Peace in 1919 have been a terrible disappointment to all the peoples of Europe. Nearly all the hopes with which people consoled themselves for the agonies and sacrifices of the War have been frustrated; that justice would displace violence; that the world would be safe for the weaker nations; that the blessing of orderly freedom would be extended everywhere; that there would be work and leisure and a reasonable livelihood for all men; and especially that there would be a long period of stability—an absence of political alarms, anxieties, tensions.

A retrospect of these fifteen years since the Peace was made shows that all this disappointment is fundamentally due to the fact that the peoples and most of the statesmen of 1919 misjudged the period that was to come, and that they have been misjudging it for fifteen years. They insisted on regarding as a period of settlement what was bound to be really a period of transition. The peoples, expecting—indeed promised—stability for the years after 1919, and finding only

[1] R. Fülop-Miller, "The Revolt Against Reason," HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1936, p. 181.

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movement and change, have been disappointed and perplexed; and so their feelings of hope and security have turned into bewilderment and despair.

That people wholly misread, and are still wholly misreading, the post-War period, by expecting stability in it, may be inferred from a contrast of the political condition of Europe down to 1914, and its condition as the War and the Peace Treaties made it.

Europe before 1914 was politically a trim, tidy, settled place. It had a political system which, in spite of serious internal strains, functioned on the whole with remarkably little friction. This system depended upon the preponderance of six Great Powers which balanced each other and at the same time formed a sort of European directorate. These Great Powers—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia—in spite of certain historic ambitions or regrets, were fairly well satisfied with the existing territorial system of Europe; the frontiers were not ideally the best, but they had been found in practice to suit the states quite well. The Russians no longer expected to have Constantinople; and even the French, though no French Government dared openly say so, were in practice reconciled to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. The Concert of the Great Powers, though ill-organised and unwieldy, did exist and actively functioned in times of crises. The smaller states had all long ago given up any territorial ambitions and only desired to be able to live their own lives in peace and quiet. Thus Europe, with six Great Powers, fairly well satisfied with the existing distribution of territory, and recognising a common interest and responsibility for the general peace; and with all the other states unambitious and quiescent, might be considered politically a very stable continent. And there was an additional element of security and stability in the fact that the states, great and small, of the pre-1914 period had a well-understood system of economic relations. They were nearly all of them protectionist, but on what would now be called a low-tariff basis. They did not object in principle to trading with each other, to importing as well as to exporting. There were no prohibitions and import-quotas. Trade was relatively free. This saved an immense amount of irritation, political as well as economic. Such was the pre-1914 European system, simple, intelligible, stable. That it ended in the terrific collision and clash of the World War does not alter this fact. It only proves how difficult a thing it is to preserve peace in a world of sovereign states.

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Yet the pre-1914 system at any rate preserved peace for nearly forty-five years; indeed, there was no *general* European War for a hundred years (1815–1914).

Contrast with all this the political condition of Europe after 1918. In the first place it is to be noticed that there are now, since 1918, no longer six European Great Powers. The Habsburg Monarchy (or Austro-Hungarian Empire) does not exist; and Russia, at any rate until she joined the League of Nations in 1934, did not count as a Great Power or act as one; she was practically outside Europe. The disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire alone destroyed the internal equilibrium of Europe, and made especially the political situation in Central Europe frightfully unstable.

In the second place, not only were there no longer six Great Powers, but those that were left did not regard themselves as a kind of directory or Concert of Europe. The old Concert known to the nineteenth century and the first thirteen years of the twentieth was shattered by the War which, from the point of view of general history, was a civil war within the European system. After 1918 the European Concert was never revived. Although attempts have been made to restore it, Europe has had to do without it.

Thirdly, there are six new states—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. None of these is a Great Power, none can supply the place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, although two of them, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are large, strong states. At any rate, the emergence of six new states has introduced a new factor into European politics and has powerfully affected the internal equilibrium of Europe.

Fourthly, and lastly, the emergence of new states, and the increase of two others (Roumania and Yugoslavia) at the expense of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, has added about 14,000 miles of frontier inside Europe. This increase of frontier has coincided with an astonishing growth of economic nationalism, protectionism and aversion for imports. The consequent impoverishment of most if not all states, and the patent losses which the states' economic policies inflict on each other, create strains and tensions, politically in the highest degree dangerous.

With the post-War Europe so completely altered from what pre-War Europe was—having no longer six Great Powers, no Concert of the Powers, having six new states, and fourteen thousand miles of new frontier—it was too

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much for people to expect that the first fifteen or twenty years of the "New Europe" could be a period of stability. Yet they did so expect, and as the contrary has happened they have been grievously disappointed, puzzled and indeed bewildered.

Yet the cause of the universal and pathetic bewilderment lies deeper than all this. Europe is living in a period when an old faith is disintegrating and a new faith (perhaps more than one new faith) is being born. In this respect the present age may be compared with the first century A.D., when the old faith of paganism was dying and the new Christian religion was taking form and slowly winning men's minds. In that ancient world the period of transition, the dying of one faith, the birth of a new one, was an age of uncertainty, bewilderment and—for many people—of despair, though for others, for those who saw clearly and could discern and embrace a new faith, it was an age of hope.

The present age, too, is an age of transition, and is accompanied for those who cannot see clearly, with similar bewilderment or despair, although the faith which is dying and the other which is being born or growing, are not religious.

The faith that is passing away is the comfortable creed that democracy was, so to speak, of the nature of things, was the natural and best government for all civilised people, and that progress was inevitably towards it. In this political faith nearly everybody in Europe was brought up during the nineteenth century. Even in the non-democratic states, Germany and Russia, probably most people, including those who actively opposed democracy, believed that some time—which they hoped would be distant—democracy would triumph in their own countries. Facts corroborated this general view of the inevitableness of democracy. One state after another adopted it; and even those which still resisted made concessions which seemed to prove that complete democracy was only a question of time. Germany had a representative parliament based on universal male suffrage; Russia after 1906 had a Duma. Political progress—always in the direction of more complete democracy—in the states of the United States of America and in the British colonies and dominions only strengthened the universally received view until the progress of democracy came to be regarded with something of the same certainty as the rising of the sun.

It was this creed, this faith, which made the world rational to the European peoples of the nineteenth century and of

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the years before the War. The nineteenth century peoples had a philosophy which satisfactorily explained the world. They based themselves (even if they did not realise this) on Locke and Burke and Voltaire and Rousseau. These thinkers of the great eighteenth century, of the "Age of Reason," had proved that democracy was the only reasonable form of government for civilised men; and almost without exception the philosophers, scholars, teachers, writers, accepted their views as valid. The political views of Locke, Burke, Voltaire, Rousseau, entered into the tissue of all European people's mind and thought; and every political movement—the rise of the French Republic, the institution of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Union of Italy, the Union of Germany, and the wars of the century were explained as stages in the steady and secure evolution of universal democracy. This explains the comfortable outlook of the pre-1914 peoples; they not only had a political faith, but every fact of the political world confirmed and strengthened this faith. All facts and occurrences fell into place in this evolutionary scheme. The world to all observers was intelligible, rational.

Since 1919 the world, or at any rate Europe, has lost this rational principle, this basis of intelligibility. The inevitability of progress towards democracy can no longer be accepted. Democracy has been tried by some civilised states and given up. Some governments and many people are hostile to it. There has been a very marked decline in democracy in the last fifteen years. Italy has abandoned it. Russia has reversed the political process. Germany tried democracy and gave it up or lost it after twelve years' experiment. In France the democratic system, which once looked so solidly based, is seriously challenged and functions only with serious friction and much uncertainty. As crisis succeeds crisis in Europe, no one would dream of explaining the ferment of affairs as the working of the democratic spirit in a predestined march towards fulfilment. There is no rhythm in the march of events, no system of spontaneous order on the grand stage of European politics; and no one has any notion whither the world is tending unless it be towards chaos. The present political and economic aspect of Europe is itself chaotic—that is, people see no intelligible principle in it.

The old democratic faith having failed them, the Europeans need another, if the world is to become intelligible to them again; and indeed they are looking for one now. The

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new faith, however, if it is to be of abiding practical use, must correspond to facts. If it is a fiction of people's minds, it will not enable them to make an irrational world proceed rationally. It must take account of existing tendencies, and discern what political principle, if adopted, will provide a rational world and an orderly march of events—a principle which, in a word, will restore the idea of political and social progress in the minds of the puzzled and despairing Europeans.

It indeed seems true that a struggle is in progress between democracy and authoritarianism; and that people as a whole have lost their faith, not perhaps in the desirableness of democracy, but in the certainty of its triumph; and that European politics can no longer be explained as the process towards democracy. This is not to say that democracy is doomed, or that the secular progress towards it has been arrested for ever; but only that the democratic problem has been merged in a wider problem and for the time being has become subsidiary to that problem. When people realise that this is so, the world will again become rational to them; they will see an intelligible principle at work, and they can base their political faith upon it, for or against.

For, hitherto, people have been slow to observe or have failed to observe that a new movement is at work in the world, a new process going on, and a new faith, or rather two new and antithetic faiths, being formed. The new faiths may be described as Internationalism and Nationalism.

The national faith is a development (I would prefer to call it an aberration) of the national sentiment of the nineteenth century. This earlier national sentiment, at a time when subject peoples were struggling to free themselves, necessarily took the form of self-assertion. The race, nation, or people, for instance the Italians, in order to be united and free, had to assert, proclaim, insist upon *their* rights, *their* claims, *their* duty to themselves. But their assertion of their own nationalism did not imply any objection to other peoples' nationalism. On the contrary, nationalism, as explained, with practically universal acceptance, by Mazzini, was in its final analysis a gospel of the brotherhood of nations; once they were all free, there would be nothing to divide them against each other.

The new nationalism is something very different from this. It is combative and assertive, not against alien oppressors (for most of the nations are now free), but against neighbours. It is a gospel not of the brotherhood of nations but of the selfishness of nations. In its doctrine of sacred

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egoism, of the right to satisfy a "need" of expansion even at the expense of another nation, it is the cause of the existing chaos, and if widely adopted, it will make the chaos permanent.

The other movement which can be discerned in all this ferment is international; and internationalism, I suggest, is the new philosophy or faith which will make the world, or particularly European politics, intelligible; it may even gradually gain ascendency and put an end to the chaos, though nobody at present can be sure of this.

The internationalist faith or philosophy is not wholly antithetical to the prevalent neo-nationalism, but aims at purifying it and transcending it. For internationalism has two basic principles: one, that a nation's or state's form of government, internal politics or internal conditions of life, are matters only of domestic concern, entirely within that state's or nation's domestic jurisdiction. No external Power or organisation has any right to intervene in another state's domestic affairs—unless, of course, there is some existing treaty or other contract concerning these domestic affairs. A state, for instance, which by treaty or other act has entered into agreement with other states to abolish slavery within its own borders has, to this extent, acknowledged the concern of these states in its domestic affairs. In the absence, however, of any treaty-engagement to the contrary, a state's internal politics or policies are recognised by international law, and by the internationalist philosophy, to be exclusively its own concern. This does not mean that other states are not "interested" in their neighbours' internal politics, nor that they are debarred from offering advice or making protests; but they have no right of intervention.

The second basic principle of internationalism is that every state has an interest in the independence and integrity of every other. For if the right of any one state to independence and integrity is denied, the right of every other state is, in principle, equally invalidated. International law does not recognise higher and lower grades of states. All states are equal before the law; and the fact that they differ from each other in strength and civilisation only emphasises the imperativeness of universal justice, of impartiality in the treatment of all states by each other.

Regarded from the point of view of the internationalist (or, for that matter from the point of view of the neo-nationalist), the world ceases to be inexplicable; the superficially bewildering mass of events assumes rhythm; and

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the many movements which are taking place are seen to be aimed at something, though no one can confidently predict whether the aim will be permanently achieved or not.

The present chaos, the alarm, anxiety, war-neurosis, the recurrent crises, are all due to the clash of faiths, to the advance or retreat, the check and counter-check, of the neo-nationalist or internationalist movement. The Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted by some twenty-six states in 1919–20 (since increased to about sixty), was the public legal and almost universal affirmation of the international faith. Its principles are precisely the two already mentioned as being the basis of all internationalism, firstly that matters which by international law are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state are no concern of the rest (Covenant of the League of Nations, article 15, clause 8); and secondly, that every state had a vital interest in the independence and integrity of every other (Covenant, article 10).[1]

For a time it looked as if all the world was going to be international. Every government, every people, including those that were not members of the League (except Soviet Russia), expressed themselves in favour of these two principles. Neo-nationalism might sometimes in practice be the motive of state-action, but no government and no statesman openly asserted that this should be so. On the contrary, they affirmed their faith in the international movement and their determination to adhere to it, by a series of pacts culminating in the celebrated Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy, 1928. The Pact of Paris was universally subscribed. Before this happened, however, the international movement had been challenged by neo-nationalism. The first to do so publicly, confidently and forcibly, was Senior Mussolini when he bombarded Corfu in 1923 in order to impose his own solution of a dispute with Greece without submitting the question to the League. Numerous other instances, some successful, some unsuccessful, could be cited, in which governments adopted a national solution in preference to a League solution. The Sino-Japanese dispute concerning Manchuria is such an instance.

[1] *Covenant of the League of Nations, article* 15, *clause* 8: "If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."

Article 10: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."

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The "unilateral" rearmament of Germany (for which the other Powers are probably quite as responsible as Germany) is another. Every now and then the international movement has acquired strength and has gone forward. It did so when the Disarmament Conference met in 1932 and the World Economic Conference in 1933; but the impetus, which appeared powerful at the time, was soon exhausted. The forces of neo-nationalism, economic in one case, political in the other, gathered strength. The World Economic Conference broke up after a few weeks' activity, without accomplishing anything; the Disarmament Conference held together for three years, and displayed sporadic bursts of energy, but at last dispersed ineffectively. When it was first convened it was attended by a greater number of states than had ever assembled before, and it was supported by a more vocal and more widely organised public opinion than had ever previously been displayed; yet it ended in the *sauve qui peut* of an armaments race among all the great states which had attended it.

The Italo-Abyssinian dispute of 1935 exhibits with extraordinary neatness and clearness, the two faiths posed against each other and the balance hovering between them. The Italian Government was putting into action a faith with which many people agree, namely that its own needs, its national interest in expansion, in colonising, and in economic enterprise, combined with the need of Abyssinia for internal reform, justified Italy in intervening forcibly in Abyssinia. The other member-states in the League of Nations opposed this view and urged a League solution, on the ground that they all had an interest in the independence and integrity of any one of their members, however weak or inefficient; and that internal abuses of a member-state gave no right of intervention except such collective intervention as could be authorised by the terms of the Covenant.

I suggest, accordingly, that neither the present time nor indeed the whole period since 1919, is confused and perplexing, but on the contrary simple and rational. The period displays, with steady rhythm, the ebb and flow of two powerful tides of opinion, two new movements, two new faiths, neo-nationalism and internationalism. The European public has been bewildered and discouraged because it did not recognise this. The public has discerned that the old faith in the inevitableness of democratic progress is dying, but it has not seen that new faiths are being born, growing, and becoming active. The public in 1919 expected the

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coming years merely to complete the secular process of the previous Age, the process towards democracy; it misread the times, and finding, as the years passed, that it had misread them, the public was only perplexed and discouraged. It expected too much of the new age. It did not discern that the old issue between democracy and autocracy had been merged in a wider issue, between neo-nationalism and internationalism.

When this new, wider issue is definitely discerned and appreciated by the general public, people will see how events are shaping themselves, or being shaped; they will see to what end affairs are tending, and how human will-power and energy deflects them towards one side or another; and seeing all this, the public will make its choice. It may be that on reflection most people will adopt neo-nationalism, but it is not likely. Most reflective people seem to incline to the internationalist solution of the world's problems. It has on its side all the teaching of the Christian religion. It has the consensus of opinion of most philosophers, whether they belong to the Christian communion or not. It has the support, as the debates in the League Assembly of 1935 showed, of the majority of European statesmen. The plain man and woman, who have to pay with their personal suffering the price of all neo-nationalist adventures, will, if freely faced with the issue, almost certainly support internationalism. As more and more people consciously adopt the international faith and support the international solution, this movement will naturally grow in power. But it is too much to expect that progress shall be steady and unbroken. The other faith is strong, backed by passion, fortified by prejudice, supported by powerful "interests." All this is normal; it is the ordinary, rhythmic course of every Age of contending faiths. The people, however, who have deliberately adopted the international faith believe that they are in accord with immutable principles of righteousness and justice; and that these principles, commanding the allegiance of all men and women of good will, must ultimately triumph.

R. B. MOWAT.

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL.

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MAURICE BLONDEL'S *LA PENSÉE*.[1]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF "*L'ÉLAN SPIRITUEL*."

DON LUIGI STURZO.

It was probably with Bergson's *élan vital* in mind, that M. Louis Lavelle, the well-known philosophical critic of the *Temps*, called M. Blondel's *La Pensée* "a philosophy of *l'élan spirituel*." He thus established the differential factor of two philosophic systems which to-day, in France and elsewhere, attract all those thoughtful minds that, in their desire to escape from an oppressive positivism or a formal rationalism, seek in intuitional, volitionary and synthetical theories a repose of the mind and a refuge of the spirit.

For some forty years Maurice Blondel has been known in the world of studies and the controversies of the reviews as the philosopher of Action. *L'Action*, the thesis for his doctorate at the Sorbonne, which then seemed bold and was much attacked, till yesterday remained the best-known embodiment of his originality and his title to merit (or demerit) in his university career.

When this thesis appeared (and it soon created a sensation, separating into opposing camps, for and against, philosophers, exegetes, and even politicians and journalists), Blondel was wrongly classed, now among the immanentists, now among the pragmatists. In the heat of the religious struggles in France at the beginning of the present century, anti-modernists immediately set him side by side with Von Hügel, Tyrrell, La Berthonnière, Loisy.

The truth is that Maurice Blondel was never condemned. (Nor indeed was Von Hügel.) His theory of Action, both outside and inside the Catholic camp (and more outside than inside) was much debated and was held in consideration or

[1] Translated from the Italian by Barbara Barclay Carter.

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rejected according to the trends of the various philosophic currents of the last forty years. What was remarkable was that the theory of Action withstood the assaults of its adversaries—formalist rationalism, neo-thomist intellectualism, bergsonian intuitionism—and escaped the fate of still-born theories, which are soon buried in oblivion. It is extraordinary to think that Blondel himself, though writing various articles and pamphlets, for years and years confined himself to his professorial work at the University of Aix-en-Provence, without showing any particular interest in the clamour he had aroused, without preparing any other editions of *L'Action*, and leaving the theory he had launched to make its own way, almost in spite of him.

And now within a year (1934–35), two closely written volumes have been published by Félix Alcan (who publishes Bergson and all the more important novelties in philosophy and sociology), entitled *La Pensée*,[1] while two further volumes, *L'Etre* and *L'Agir*, are promised for the near future. For the France of culture and study this publication has been the most outstanding event since Bergson's *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* in 1932. In this work Blondel reveals himself in the maturity of his thought, showing a marvellous continuity from his first intuition onwards, and with an intellectual consistency and scientific scrupulousness that deserve the attention not only of philosophers but of every cultured person.

. . . . .

Blondel's theory is not a technique of thought, nor an abstraction removed from living reality, nor a theoretical speculation to delight the intellect; it is instead a quest, an experience, a deepening of the reality of thought. He leads us at the beginning by a long and difficult path, which runs from "the Genesis of Thought" to "its fulfilment," and he himself takes care to keep his feet always on solid ground, warning us of the snares and deviations of which we must beware. It will be well for us to take him as our guide, as Dante took Virgil, and with him to traverse the realms of nature up to the threshold of supernature, of which the philosopher can only divine the existence, but never discern the reality or essence.

And so we start. Our experience of the universe leads

[1] Maurice Blondel, *La Pensée:* I. La Genèse de la Pensée et les phases de son ascension spontanée (1934). II. Les responsabilités de la Pensée et la possibilité de son achèvement, (1935). Paris, Librarie Félix Alcan.

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us to say that "the world *is*, and it *is a thought*" (I., p. 7). But instead of being one and homogeneous, as Parmenides imagined, the world is neither a compact block in which everything is identical, nor, (a contradictory concept), is it a unity spreading to infinity. It is instead a datum and a thought under the aspects of multiplicity, variety and change. And it is a mistake to claim to explain it by the reduction of all differences to pure identity. Such a process, which seems at first sight rational, is intrinsically irrational, for only by differentiation does the real become intelligible. We perceive the world as diverse, or better, as heterogeneous, so that we may define it with Blondel as "an unceasing and organised passage of the homogeneous to the heterogeneous."

André Lalande, who presented the second volume of *La Pensée* to the Académie des Sciences Morales, in a restrained but sympathetic report noted, as the one point on which he himself dissented, that Blondel

> "expresses his horror of the theory of intelligibility by identity, which," [he says, he himself has] "defended for over thirty-five years, and which M. Meyerson has revived and imposed on the attention of philosophers by the rare breadth of his knowledge as well as by the vigour and lucidity of his mind" (Session of April 27, 1935).

This is one of the fundamental principles of Blondel's theory, and one which irradiates his whole system. The problem of intelligibility is inherent in every study of thought, but, according to Blondel, it "has none the less never been discussed nor explicitly resolved in a methodical and complete manner" (II., 384). The reduction of facts and of beings to identity can never be complete; hence scientists introduce into their systems an irrational element which is always to be found at the bottom of the varied and diversified Real. This explanation, says Blondel,

> "far from satisfying the mind—as so many of our contemporaries have seemed to believe—is a counterfeit of any explanation. For how can an identity illuminate the first of the terms set? How can it explain the second? What does it teach us about duality or multiplicity, about relation, about the origin, the behaviour, the finality of phenomena? . . ." (II., 385).

None the less, he admits that the search for the identical in the diverse and for unity in multiplicity springs from an

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imperious exigence of thought, and is a fiction useful to science, which, unable to adapt itself at the first go off to all the singularities of the real, has recourse to such a provisional "economic" schema. As little by little it comes to comprehend more and more individual data, it extends to them the reduction to identity, or else it seeks the formula of a single law of relativity as wide as possible in its applications. But this extension does not at all imply a true explanation, nor does it give us the intelligibility of the world and of thought.

It is sufficient to note the great and ever growing diversity of theories and tendencies even among the positive sciences, in order to rule out the possibility that they are about to discover an eternal axiom, a theorem on the march, of which the universe would be the clear and rigorous development. Mathematics, logic, physical sciences, are constrained to introduce unforeseen rules which would have appeared pure absurdities to our ancestors. Can we attribute a final stability to those sciences which to-day seem at their height without reserving an illimited place for future innovations?

Blondel holds that the purely *intellectual*, which is found in the cosmic order, will never be *intelligible* without the intervention of an *intelligent* agency, which will "give the final touch ('*un coup de pouce*'), to bind together what cannot be so in a completely rational manner" (II., 388). In other words, both that which presents itself to scientists as rational, in as much as reducible to homogeneity, and that which presents itself as irreducible (and which they therefore term irrational), will be intelligible in the solidarity of the universe with intelligent and conscious thought. Without the initiative of a personal intelligence, which can never be eliminated, not only the intelligibility but the existence of the cosmos would be at an end, for, as we have already noted, "the world is, and it is a thought."

. . . . .

What does Blondel mean by the words "Cosmic Thought"? To him, human thought, or "thinking thought," does not enter the world as a stranger. Even before man appeared on earth (and, I believe, other thinking beings inhabit other millions of worlds, having come to be, like man, at a given moment of the cosmic process), thought was born, and lives in the Cosmos as in its home. The universe is fundamentally thought. It might be termed *rationality*, in as much as any cosmic system implies laws and

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values of reason, but Blondel prefers to call it *thought*, since the word rationality is used to indicate an aspect of thought, thought as logical and discursive, while we must also take into account that which is spontaneous and intuitive.

Bergson would say that the intelligible is a kind of "thought thinking itself in the unconscious"; Blondel instead holds thought to be a compound of *noetic* and *pneumatic*, as he expresses it, that is, of rationality and intuition, logicity and initiative, universality and invention.

Blondel's originality does not consist in his manner of classifying the two aspects of thought, which, however they may be called, have always been discerned or defined. Pascal called intuition "*l'esprit de finesse*," and Bergson calls "*l'esprit de finesse*" intuition. One of Bergson's recent commentators, P. Gorce, goes so far as to say that Bergson's *intuition* may be called "intelligence *par excellence*," or "the intelligence of qualities and values," and Bergson himself has sent him a letter of approbation. What Blondel first glimpsed and then developed is the mode of the co-existence of the two forms of thought, or aspects of thought, and the infinite dynamism that ensues. These two aspects, which we shall call with him noetic and pneumatic, never merge or mingle. They are at once inseparable and opposed, and they create a continual movement, advancing towards an unknown goal.

The movement that springs from the conflict and contact of these two aspects of thought, corresponds to the intrinsic need of thought to actualise itself, organise itself, and make itself conscious. Blondel, therefore, by profound analysis, leads us on from one experience to another, step by step, in a continuous process, from the first genesis of *cosmic* thought, to what he calls *organic* thought, then to *psychic* thought, and then to *conscious* thought: man.

This process of thought may appear at first sight as a positive determinism, or an "*évolution créatrice*." Blondel presents it as an "*élan spirituel*," an "*option libératrice*." It would be waste of words to emphasise how Blondel's theory contains no trace of material determinism; in any case, contemporary thought has travelled far from the old materialism. Not for nothing has the drying breath of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson blown over that morass.

Bergson allows to the *évolution créatrice* a *vis a tergo*, an initial impulse. His commentators and interpreters are divided into two camps—the idealists, led by Le Roy, and the realists, who find in Jacques Chevalier their most dis-

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tinguished champion. For the first group, nothing is known of this initial impulse or whence it comes; those of the second are led to the conception of a Creator. Blondel, however, does not accept the idea of creative evolution; the two terms are ill-assorted. Can evolution be creative without ceasing to be evolution? Is not evolution instead itself created? For the idealist interpreters of Bergson, it is self-created; for the realists it is a creation caused by another power.[1] Bergson, moreover, admits a possible return to immediate and primitive data, and this is contradicted both by physics and by psychology. Neither the physical nor the historical world is reversible; to turn back demands always new states of thought and being; never in either conscious or unconscious life do we find the re-emergence of phases already outdistanced.

. . . . .

The acceptance of the principle of causal determinism has led to a denial of natural finalism as at variance with reality. Indeed, where there is a cause determined by blind, fixed forces, there can be no finalism, which implies free initiative and co-ordination to a further reality. If on the other hand we admit an initial impulse of thought, as exigency and as initiative, we have a finalism that is not external, but inherent in being itself.

A step further. If this exigency were wholly comprehended in the initial impulse, and its first actualisation fulfilled it wholly, the outcome would be final and static. Without an exigency of still further realisation the vigour of the impulse would come to an end; there could thus be no room for option or choice leading to further realisation, for reality would be complete in itself.

This truth has a central place in Blondel's system; he conceives this inward and continual exigency of concrete realisation of thought as implying a fundamental impossibility of reaching the complete synthesis of its two aspects, noetic and pneumatic; for the individual reality is never so complete as to comprehend the whole of the universal, and the universal is never so comprehensible as to find expression

[1] Bergson's letter to P. Gorce, to which we have already referred, is dated August 16, 1935. Bergson writes to his interpreter as follows: "Reste alors la question posée entre le réalisme et l'idéalisme. Il faut choisir entre ces deux 'isme.' Je n'hésite pas un seul instant: c'est au réalisme, et au réalisme le plus radical, que je rattache l'ensemble de mes idées."

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in a single order of moral, physical or logical realities. In every concrete reality there is always something wanting; and by this want it is incessantly impelled to fresh realisations.

The experience of emptiness is a counterpart to the experience of fullness; so is that of error to truth, that of guilt to good felt as a duty—such is deficiency to reality.

This exigency, whether conscious, as in man, or unconscious and instinctive as in lower beings and at certain stages in man himself, or merely physical, indicates a state of being that might be defined as the difference between the real and the ideal, or, as the Scholastics said, between existence and essence. That which exists never fully coincides with its essential nature taken as a simultaneous and perfect whole. Therefore the old philosophers insisted on the difference between essence and existence, and attributed to God alone the perfect compenetration and identity of the one with the other in the Divine Nature.

None the less, we must here emphasise an important point: to a "closed" philosophy as it exists the imperfection of the world must appear a kind of relative perfection, a final term in which all the possibilities of being are exhausted. Whereas for an "open" philosophy, that sets no limit to the completion of thought, incompletion is definitely a privation, which calls for a fresh impulse—"*l'élan spirituel*"—towards a still higher stage of attainment.

If this process exhausts itself in itself, as by an intrinsic dialectic, it leads to pantheistic idealism; if it exhausts itself through lack of further impulse, it ends in annihilation; and if it exhausts itself by a completion of being, it leads to anti-vital stasis.

. . . .

Here then is the justification of what Blondel calls the option of thought, an option at once spontaneous and liberating. When we speak of option we think of a conscious, voluntary act, or at least of an instinctive act, but we do not attribute it to the movements of plants or the combinations of chemicals. This is because we are used to attributing all thought to man alone. Just as conscious thought could not germinate nor develop without a suitable body, such as we possess, it could not exist without a physical and vital nature such as that which surrounds us and of which we are part, and which therefore conditions our thought as our bodies do. But the existence of conscious thought would be impossible

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if this physical, organic, animate world were not at the same time a thought realised in the course of the ages in an order and reality that demands and prepares the advent of human thought.

Were it not so, without thought what would material reality be but chaos, nothingness? How could it have developed without an intimate impulse towards the happy advent of thinking thought? And how would this have been possible without a series of unconscious and occult finalities? And how could these have been realised without a choice, or, as Blondel would say, without an option?

Option implies also error, deviation, retrogression, sclerosis, collapse . . . why should we not attribute such phases of incompletion to the sub-human world? Is not the incompleteness of all individualities, their tendency either to fulfil themselves or to collapse and end, a constant fact? Once we have excluded purely material determinism, and admitted the constant co-existence of thought under its two aspects, noetic and pneumatic with their constant dynamism towards ever further completion, we must also admit a spontaneous and liberating option in all the grades of thought.

The analysis of the experience of the appearance of conscious thought throws much light on the problem we are considering. Blondel takes the celebrated psychological case of Marie Heurtin. Blind, deaf and dumb, this girl when she was taken to the Larnay Hospice was afflicted with idiocy, inaccessible to any communication, and ravaged from time to time by violent frenzies and despairs. It was a nun who by her patient method was able to bring forth a soul from this pathological complex. A common sign was wanting—thus the idea of a sign, the invention of such a sign—if these two minds and two wills were to find contact. For Marie Heurtin the first sign was an ivory-handled knife, contact with which, desired and repeated by the poor idiot, aroused a tactile pleasure, which could also produce an obscure instinctive sensation. It was thus that communication between her and the nun began; and thus she eventually became capable of conscious thought.

Another case, which Blondel quotes from Louis Arnauld's book *Les Ames en Prison*, is that of Lydwine Lachance, who was also deaf, dumb and blind from birth, and who found the way to healing at the Montreal Institute. She had a special liking for milk. Attempts were therefore made to make her use some sign to indicate milk, but she could not understand. When the cup of milk was taken away from her

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she grew furious, till one day, all at once, she understood the sign that had been repeated so many times and reproduced it. . . . "Ariadne comes forth from the labyrinth where she had been lost in the inextricable tangle in a starless night" (I., 334).

These and similar cases show us how thought, in order to arrive at self-consciousness and to become communicative, must invent signs; thought itself is unthinkable without the signs that serve to communicate it.

"What is peculiar to the pathological cases that have taught us their lesson is thus the abrupt accession which reveals the deep hiatus to be overleaped by a prodigious effort. Almost brutally the difference is revealed between *conditions* and *cause*, between virtualities and actualisation, between organic or noetic development and spiritual genesis. If as a rule the leap is imperceptible, it is not less true that the marvel subsists of a change of plane, a transition from an immanent order to transcendence" (*idem*).

For Marie Heurtin or Lydwine Lachance the sign that they understood as such all in a moment, was not the cause of their understanding, but a conditioning for the transition from idiocy to capacity for communication with other human beings. A like sudden illumination comes to inventors in science or art; a moment, an intuition—a revelation has been made, a transition has been effected.

. . . . .

"Thinking thought" is thus a fresh transcendence in the process of thought. The idea of transcendence is usually set in opposition to that of immanence, since one seems to exclude the other. But in the process of thought the idea of transcendency cannot and should not be dissociated from that of immanence; that which actualises itself in reality is thought (hence, immanent), and in as much as it is thought, it also transcends the special nature of its realisations every time it succeeds in achieving a new and higher synthesis, to which it aspires as its term of completion.

The word transcendence, like the word metaphysics, was for more than a century practically banished from the current vocabulary of philosophers. The idea remained reserved for the theologians. Now the philosophers are re-adopting it, albeit with circumspection, in the conviction that no other term exists to indicate this particular achievement. It could

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not be called evolution, as though it held in germ all that will subsequently appear; it is a passage to a higher stage by an accession that only an *élan* can bring about. This *élan* is spiritual; it proceeds not from material causes nor from blind natural forces, but from an original creativity that fulfils itself when conditions and preparations are ripe for it.

This same *élan* by which thought has reached the stage of human consciousness, is not and cannot be wanting throughout the whole actualisation of human existence through the ages, which tends towards a term of perfection ever dimly seen and ever unattainable. The pages of the second volume in which Blondel treats of "the responsibilities of thought and the possibility of its fulfilment" are an extraordinarily profound analysis, and of ever-increasing interest. It is our torment and our joy, the reason of our life and the exigency of our nature, to feel perfection and not to be able to attain it, to strive to go beyond ourselves and not to be able to reach the complete appeasement of thought.

Blondel often uses this profound and limpid phrase, "appeasement of thought." It is the longed-for state—*hic manebimus optime*—in which all is consistency, simultaneity, perfection. And this is just what we cannot attain, or we should cease to be.

All this, summarily set forth in an article, may seem at first sight *a priori*, an ingenious construction into which to fit the various phases of thought; or else as a metaphysical interpretation of phenomenic reality. Louis Lavelle, in the *Temps* of September 1, 1935, writes as follows:

> "The originality of the work lies in this: that instead of seeking, as Descartes did, to seize thought in the lucid but tardy act of reflection, it would trace thought to its remotest and obscurest origin, showing how thought is already present in the universe before it acquires distinct self-consciousness in the thinking subject."

And having spoken of the two aspects of thought, noetic and pneumatic, existing in human nature itself, he adds aptly:

> "Nevertheless, one who knew only logical thought would end by the ruin of his personal consciousness; and one who knew only intuitive thought would so exalt it that it would escape all law. . . . The fact is that these two forms of thought express equally irreducible experiences of our deepest self: thus we see that our

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incessantly outstrips the other . . . in each one of us, they confront each other. It is impossible either to sever them or to reduce them to unity."

. . . . .

In making us feel at every step the unsatisfied need of completion and the continual quest of a term of rest, Blondel finds the central motive of the expansion of thought in social life and the exigencies that arise in the trend towards a "wholesome humanism." "Human society, it has been said, is at once the mother and daughter of thought" (II., 155). On the one hand thought in order to become conscious presupposes the social complex of collective life, and on the other, thought generates the social organism, which Blondel describes as "a kind of condensed and implicit thought."

If we consider the organising character of thought, we seem to find in society a stable framework, an organic fixity, an immutable logical rationality. But this order is made up by individuals whose co-existence is always mobile and dynamic, through the spontaneity of their thought and their freedom of choice. It is impossible to reduce these individualities to mere cogs in the social machinery (whether this be State or "reich"); it is impossible to leave them to their instability as though they were destined to find order in a perpetual creative revolution.

The dynamism of thought is not constricted by the formation of a social structure, nor is the latter left to the mercy of an unregulated movement; the one influences the other and *vice versâ*, in the various and perpetual phases of realisations and advances that Blondel calls "unfulfilled thought" and "possibility of fulfilment." Society too is nothing other than an incomplete thought in quest of its completion. It is thought because it is the consciousness of associated life; it is incomplete because it is dynamic; it is in quest of completion because it is in movement towards a term.

In a strictly political conception in which utilitarian and material factors predominate, every completion remains in the present; but the present flees before us, its makers, as it will flee before those, our heirs, for whom we believe we work and for whom we sacrifice ourselves. The mirage of a reality complete in this world, of justice and social bliss, is harmful to both the individual and to society, in as much as it paralyses both within a magic circle of unreality, reducing to this necessarily limited vision all the infinite possibilities

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of human experience. Thus yesterday Marxism reduced all the conquests of civilisation to the economic fact in which he placed the completion of human aspirations; and to-day Nazism reduces all morality and all right to the race principle. Social life, the field in which the passions stirred by great movements of peoples find expression, will never reach saturation point; it will never find in itself the appeasement of thought, which in its continual interweaving of experiences, trials and responsibilities, seeks a kind of spiritual evasion, of which it feels the need as a rest from wearisome struggle.

> "What want is supplied by thought in its free æsthetic unfolding? To what satisfactions does it then aspire and pretend to attain? Since till now it has never succeeded in uniting and possessing a universal order in a single unity, it fabricates the paradoxical marvel of a masterpiece that seems to enclose a perfect truth, a perfect beauty, within the contour of a poem or a statue. All that would subject such a work to the interdependence of natural subjections is eliminated, while the indispensable materiality of the means of expression is used only as a sign ever more simplified, translucent to the ideal intention. Thus, from our tragic universe, a little cosmos is mentally abstracted, which, like an oasis, offers to the dolorous pilgrims of life a resting place, or better, an image of paradise, something that seems to escape the law of unfulfilment, a timeless achievement which in time itself and in multiplicity, bears witness to a permanence of unity. For the perfect work is such that by a miracle of genius it seems to refuse retouches, dissolution, even analysis. So that in this epitome of thought, something absolute, final, a satiating and bliss-giving solution seem to have been obtained, without the necessity of descent from this serene region and from this contemplation in which all the powers of the soul are in harmony, to the agitations of earth" (II., 173-174).

Thus in a rapid and complete sketch, in a page at once philosophical and lyrical, Blondel sets the problem of æsthetic thought and the value of art. And in a subsequent paragraph he more closely determines its function:

> "Æsthetic thought thus truly merits the name of thought, which connects art with the whole of Nature, not so much to copy and reproduce it as to extract from it a rational meaning; and this name it deserves no less

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because indeed art teaches man of the obscure depths or the heights between which our destiny takes its course" (II., 176).

I should like to be able to quote the whole of the masterly summary in which, in twelve paragraphs, Blondel gives a synthesis of his ideas on art. Two will suffice :

"Art is a purification and an education of sensibility. By ideal experiences it relieves, teaches, immunises, without the risks, delays or responsibilities of real life . . . "

"Art expresses this essentially human characteristic of a liberty that dominates the whole of nature and which, inspired by man's most imperious exigencies, seeks to recreate the world in accordance with a law of order, harmony, beauty . . . " (II., 180–181).

None the less, our philosopher warns us not to blind ourselves to the limitations of art, not to make of it a religion, not to allow the advance of thought to stop short at it, as though asking of it that final synthesis which thought goes seeking without ever finding. Art summons us to a glimpse of the infinite, whether it be art at its origin, bound up with religious life, or art when it has evolved and become independent, for art, true art, is purification, revelation, ascent towards unexplored worlds.

. . . . .

One of the most characteristic aspects of Blondel's philosophy is the continual convergence towards the exigency of God, not as a theological preconception nor as a social postulate, but as an intimate experience of the nature of thought. "The philosophy of insufficiency," as he has called it in a provisional stage of his construction, transforms itself into "a philosophy of superabundance," as little by little the conquest of the ascending planes leads us towards the Thought of thoughts.

Thus Blondel sets the problem : if and in what sense thought, in its spontaneous ascension, can reach the idea of God and catch a glimpse of His infinite reality. According to him this idea does not present itself as the purely logical product of reason, nor as a mathematico-physical problem, as it might appear to Descartes. In this connection Pascal wrote :

"Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes ; il aurait bien voulu, dans toute sa philosophie, se pouvoir passer de

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Dieu ; mais n'a pu s'empêcher de lui faire donner une chiquenaude, pour mettre le monde en mouvement ; après cela il n'a plus que faire de Dieu."

For Blondel the whole problem of thought is, one might say, impregnated with the idea of God, not as something clear, logical and mathematical, but inward, insinuating, stimulating. It is at one moment a sense of emptiness that constrains us to a movement of transcendence ; at another it is a joy, the joy of possession of a truth that brings us near to Him ; at another it is a revelation, the revelation of a new horizon of reality, the ascent to a higher stage from which to survey the cosmos ; at another it is an inner darkness that makes us feel the throbbing life of the spirit, hungering for an absolute perfection.

The idea of the absolute accompanies us our whole life through ; it is the touchstone of all our ideas, it colours our outlook on a past that loses itself in the gulfs of an impenetrable origin, the future which presents itself to us as endless. Are there or have there ever been any true atheists ? Blondel says no, and in this he agrees with Père Boumaert the Jesuit, who maintains the thesis of *apparent* atheists who believe in God without knowing it, and live by such belief even while their words deny it. In the atheist there is no consistency between the life of thought and the life of the spirit, the idea of the absolute remains sterile, a logical support without inner vitality.

From this standpoint Blondel, while he neither rejects nor attenuates the proofs of the existence of God as they have been handed down from Scholasticism, attributes the maximum efficacy to their *ensemble*, in the inner vitality of thought. Therefore the idea of contingency, which is the basis of the proofs of the existence of God, must not be taken as space or time, limitation or number or other abstract ideas which make of contingency a logical concept external to our spirit ; but it must be considered as the intrinsic nature of our thought, so that the idea of the Absolute penetrates it as by an inner necessity. Thought, as such, could neither exist, nor develop, nor find completion without the idea of God.

Jean Rimaud in *Etudes* (Paris, August 20, 1935) notes aptly that often the traditional philosophers fall into a two-fold error. The first is that of minimising cosmic contingency by seeking to give the universe a final stability, so that it may serve as a " spring-board " from which to reach God

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"Now it seems that many are afraid of slipping and imagine that God will be the more certainly proved the greater their illegitimate reassurance as to the solidity of the spring-board" (p. 441).

The other mistake is that of compensating for the instability of the universe by giving to thought a stability to which it has no right, since it too is contingent.

"Forgetful of the bonds between man and the universe, they reason as if, in ascending to God, thought only strove, most disinterestedly, to render the world intelligible without having need to become intelligible to itself" (p. 442).

Blondel, in his penetrating analysis cannot but unite the dialectical effort to arrive at a God as principle of the material and spiritual world, as Descartes did, with the acknowledgement of a hidden God, whom the traditions of all peoples present as object of worship. But how are the two tendencies to be reconciled—the one

"towards the category of the ideal and of principles, towards the God who can be thought or understood only, it would seem, by not existing" (qui n'est pensé et compris, semble-t-il, qu'en n'étant pas), and the other "which draws the soul towards a reality enveloped in impenetrable mazes, where our reason loses itself?" (I., 194).

It is in this profound contrast, which comprehends all the conflicts between noetic and pneumatic thought, that Blondel finds the source of a supreme appeasement or completion of thought.

"The idea of God in us, however deficient it may be, and by the very fact that it is deficient, becomes a principle of freedom, an exigency of option, a source of responsibility, a confirmation of certitude, the condition of a destiny that does not allow human thought to enclose itself in a stabilised philosophy, isolated, self-contented and excluding all other spiritual disciplines" (I., 196).

With these words he alludes to the answer to a second problem: philosophically speaking, what relationship is possible between us and God? Blondel's central doctrine is that "our spiritual being is constituted by our intellectual option: *sumus quod cogitamus et facimus*" (II., 407). To

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become conscious of our thought and of our being leads us to realise

> " that there could be neither nature nor consciousness without this unperceived presence, without this action at once immanent and distinct that furnishes all thought in process of becoming with a point of leverage, with the possibility of a provisional unity, of a partial affirmation, of an aspiration without bounds " (II., 382).

To correspond to this divine presence or to resist it is not solely an act of will, but an *intellective option*, for thought is not deterministic, it is not solely logical, nor solely intuitive, but dynamic, and by its dynamism it informs our spiritual life and the inmost source of our consciousness. Hence Rimaud rightly notes : " to think, for him, is to be, to find oneself, to form oneself, to unify oneself, to complete oneself" (*Etudes*, 444). Another critic, Rabeau in the *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, notes in his essay on Blondel that " Thought exists only as its own mistress " (p. 203).

It is thought that forms our personality, with all its responsibilities of inner life and outward activity, in its journey through time and in its completion beyond time. Human personality with its consequent responsibilities is inconceivable without a thought mistress of itself, and at the same time without " that unperceived presence " and " that action at once immanent and distinct " that is God in us and in the universe, transcending us and the universe in His infinite reality.

LUIGI STURZO.

LONDON.

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"OUGHT WE TO FIGHT FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE NEXT WAR?"

C. D. BROAD.

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THE question before us is of the general form: "What ought such and such people (*e.g.* males of military age) to do under such and such circumstances (*e.g.* when their country is involved in a war)?" I shall first point out the general conditions which govern all attempts to answer such questions.

Any argument on the subject will have to use premises of two utterly different kinds, viz. *Purely Factual* and *Ethical*. An ethical proposition is one which involves the notion of good or bad, right or wrong, ought or ought not. A purely factual proposition is one which involves no such notions. That deliberate homicide is wrong is an ethical proposition, true or false. It is a purely factual proposition that, if a man is shot through the heart, he will almost certainly be dead very soon afterwards.

Now the purely factual premises are of two kinds, viz. (i) Statements of alleged particular facts about the past or the present. These may be called *Instantial Premises*. And (ii) statements of alleged general laws or tendencies. These may be called *Nomic Premises*. An example of the first kind is the proposition that Japan has spent such and such a proportion of her revenue on her navy for the past ten years. An example of the second is the proposition, true or false, that an increase of armaments tends to produce war. Now everyone admits that what a person ought or ought not to do at a given moment depends *either* on his present state and circumstances and his past history *or* on the probable consequences of the various alternative actions open to him at the time; and most people believe that it depends to some extent on *both*. In order to conjecture the probable

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consequences of various alternative actions which might be done in a given situation it is always necessary to use both kinds of factual premise. Therefore everyone would admit that factual premises of the instantial kind are needed, and the vast majority of people would admit that factual premises of the nomic kind are also needed, if we are to have any rational argument about such questions as we are asking.

But it is equally certain that ethical premises are also needed in any argument about an ethical question. Now ethical propositions are of two kinds, which I will call *Pure* and *Mixed*. It is always difficult to be sure that a given ethical proposition is pure, but it is easy to give examples of ethical propositions which are certainly mixed. Suppose I assert that a classical education is a good thing. I mean (*a*) that it is likely to produce in those subjected to it certain experiences and dispositions, which could be described in purely psychological and non-ethical terms; and (*b*) that such experiences and dispositions are good. The first of these two constituents of the original proposition is a purely factual statement of the nomic kind. The second is an ethical proposition. Whether it is *purely* ethical is another question. But, at any rate, the original proposition is certainly a mixed ethical one, and its ethical component is certainly a nearer approximation to a purely ethical one. When mixed ethical propositions are used as premises in ethical arguments they are always liable to lead to mistakes and misunderstandings. If we are to avoid these, it is essential that we should split up such propositions, so far as we can, into their purely ethical and their purely factual components. For two disputants who agree about one of the components may differ about the other; and, if they fail to recognise and distinguish the two, they are bound to be at cross-purposes and to produce crooked answers.

There is another important division of ethical propositions which cuts across the division into pure and mixed. Ethical propositions are of three kinds, which may be expressed respectively by sentences of the three forms:

> "You *ought* (or ought not) to do so-and-so in such and such circumstances"; "Such and such an action would be *right* (or wrong) in such and such circumstances"; and "Such and such an experience or state of affairs would be *good* (or bad)."

For the present purpose I shall group the first two together

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under the name of *Judgments of Obligation*. I shall call the third kind *Judgments of Value*. Now this brings us to a fundamental difference of opinion which it is essential to notice if we are to have any intelligent discussion on such questions as we have before us.

Some people hold that there is one and only one *ultimate obligation*, and that this involves an essential reference to *value*. According to them the one ultimate obligation is to secure the increase and to prevent the decrease of the present amount of good, and to secure the diminution and check the increase of the present amount of evil. All other obligations, such as the duty to keep one's promises or to obey the laws of one's country, are derivative from this one. They are obligations if and only if they are, in the actual circumstances, the most efficient way of fulfilling the one ultimate obligation to conserve and increase good and to check or diminish evil. Otherwise they are wrong. I shall call this the *Teleological Theory of Obligation*.

This theory can, of course, take many different forms. I shall not attempt to distinguish more than two of them, which I will call the *Universalistic Form* and the *Restricted Form*. According to the universalistic form of the theory a person has no special obligation to produce good and diminish evil in one person or community rather than in another. Suppose you have two alternative courses of action open to you. By one of them you will improve the condition of your own countrymen, and by the other you will improve the conditions in another country instead. Then it is your duty, on this view, to avoid the former action and to do the latter, provided that the improvement which you will effect in the foreign country is in the least degree greater than that which you would effect in your own country. According to the *restricted* form of the teleological theory your ultimate obligation still is to conserve and increase good and to check and diminish evil. But you have a stronger obligation to increase the good and diminish the evil in certain persons and communities, to which you stand in certain special relations, than you have towards other persons and communities to which you do not stand in these relations. On either form of the theory the one and only ultimate obligation is that of *Beneficence*. On the universalistic form of it there is only the general obligation to be as beneficent as you can in the circumstances in which you are placed. On the restricted form of it the appropriate strength and direction of the obligation of beneficence is in part determined by the

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special relations in which the agent stands to certain individuals, institutions, and communities.

Now many people would reject the teleological theory of obligation. They would hold that there are *many* ultimate obligations, and that they do not all involve an essential reference to value. They admit that I am under a general obligation to be beneficent to human beings as such; and they assert that I am also under more special and stringent obligations to be beneficent to my parents, my benefactors, my fellow-countrymen, and so on. But they say that there are many other obligations which are not reducible to beneficence at all, whether general or special. *E.g.* if a person asks me a question to which I know the answer, the mere fact that I am in this state and that he and I are in this situation gives him a claim on me to receive a *true* answer. On this view there is an obligation of truth-speaking which is not reducible to any obligation of beneficence and which may conflict with one's general or special obligations of beneficence. And there may be other obligations, *e.g.* an obligation to obey the laws of one's country, which may conflict with the obligation of truth-speaking and with the special and the general obligations of beneficence. I propose to call this theory the *Pluralistic Theory of Obligation.*

On the pluralistic theory a person who is called upon to act in one way or another, or to abstain from action, in a given situation may be subject to many different and conflicting claims or obligations of varying strength, arising out of various factors in his past history and various relations in which he stands to various persons, institutions, and communities. Whichever alternative he chooses he will fulfil some of these component obligations, and in doing so he will necessarily break others which conflict with the former. In such cases the right action is the one which makes the best compromise between the several conflicting claims, when due weight is given to their number and their relative urgency. But no general principles can be suggested for deciding what is the best compromise.

Now I cannot attempt here to decide between the universalistic form of the teleological theory, the restricted form of it, and the pluralistic theory. I will content myself with two remarks about them. (i) *Prima facie* the pluralistic theory is in accord with common-sense, and the universalistic form of the teleological theory is flagrantly at variance with common-sense. And, if we reject the universalistic form of the teleological theory, it seems doubtful whether we can

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consistently rest in the restricted form of it. It looks as if the restricted form were an unstable compromise between the pluralistic theory and the universalistic form of the teleological theory. (ii) However this may be, it is essential to be clear in one's own mind as to which theory one is going to assume before one can argue intelligently about the question at issue. Facts which might prove conclusively, on the universalistic form of the teleological theory, that a man ought not to fight for his country might lead to no such consequence if one held that a citizen is under a special obligation of beneficence to his own nation. And their force would be still further diminished if one held that a man is under a strong direct obligation to obey the laws of his country, good or bad, simply because he is a citizen of it.

It remains to say something about the other kind of ethical propositions, viz. Judgments of Value. Here again there is a profound difference of opinion on a fundamental question. Some people hold that there is one and only one kind of subject of which the adjectives "intrinsically good" and "intrinsically evil" can properly be predicated, viz. experiences. And they hold further that there is one and only one characteristic of experiences which makes them good or evil. I will call this the *Monistic Theory of Value*. It might conceivably take many different forms, according to what characteristic of experiences was held to be the one and only good-making or bad-making characteristic. But in practice, I think, nearly everyone who holds the monistic theory of value assumes that the one and only good-making or bad-making characteristic of experiences is their hedonic quality in its two opposed forms of pleasantness and unpleasantness. So, for the present purpose, we may identify the monistic theory of value with the *Hedonistic Theory of Value*.

On this theory, whenever we call a community or an institution or a person or a disposition or an action "good" or "bad," we are making a mixed ethical statement. Suppose, e.g. that we call a certain person "good." We mean simply and solely to assert the two following propositions. (a) That his nature is such that he tends in most circumstances to have, or to produce in others, experiences which are predominantly pleasant. And (b) that such experiences are, for that reason and to that extent, good.

Now many people would unhesitatingly reject the Hedonistic Theory of Value in whole or in part. Some would hold that persons can be good or evil in the same

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ultimate sense in which experiences can be. Some would go further, and would hold that this is true also of certain collective wholes, composed of intimately interrelated persons, *e.g.* nations. Again, even those who hold that nothing but experiences can be intrinsically good or evil may hold that there are other good-making and bad-making characteristics of experiences beside their pleasantness and their unpleasantness. Anyone who holds any of these views may be said to accept the *Pluralistic Theory of Value.*

Once again I shall not attempt to decide between the rival theories. I will content myself with the following remarks. (i) *Prima facie* the hedonistic theory is flagrantly at variance with common-sense. The common-sense view is *prima facie* that persons, at any rate, can be intrinsically good or evil as well as experiences, and that there are many characteristics beside pleasantness and unpleasantness which make experiences intrinsically good or bad. (ii) If a pluralistic theory of value is admitted, a person who accepts the teleological theory of obligation is faced at the second move with the same kind of problem as faces an adherent of the pluralistic theory of obligation at the first move. He will not, indeed, have to try to find the best compromise between a number of ultimate and conflicting obligations of various degrees of urgency. But he will have to aim at producing the best compromise between a number of ultimate kinds of value and disvalue. He may, *e.g.* have to weigh the nett value of a state of heroic self-sacrifice accompanied by misery and intellectual stupidity against that of a state of clear-sighted and cool selfishness accompanied by comfort. And no general principle can be offered for conducting the comparison. The only person who can avoid such difficulties is one who combines the universalistic form of the teleological theory of obligation with the hedonistic theory of value. And both the elements in this combination seem *prima facie* far too simple to be true. (iii) Whatever may be the truth about these rival theories of value, this at least is certain. It is essential to be clear in one's own mind as to which theory one is going to assume before one can argue intelligently about the question at issue. Facts which might prove conclusively, on the hedonistic theory of value, that a man ought not to fight for his country might lead to no such consequence if it were held that heroic self-sacrifice gives value to the persons who practise it just as pleasantness gives value to pleasant experiences. And their force might be still further diminished if it were held that a nation is a

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persistent collective entity of a peculiar kind, with a characteristic value or disvalue of its own which is determined by the actions and dispositions of its citizens.

This completes what I have to say about the general conditions which govern all rational discussion about such questions as we have before us. I will summarise them as follows. (i) The factual and the ethical premises must be clearly distinguished; any mixed ethical premises must be analysed into their purely factual and their purely ethical components; and the instantial and the nomic factual premises must be separately stated. (ii) The theory of obligation which is being assumed by any disputant must be explicitly stated. We must know whether he assumes the pluralistic theory or the teleological theory. And, if he assumes the latter, we must know whether he assumes the universalistic or the restricted form of it. (iii) The theory of value which is being assumed by any disputant must be explicitly stated. We must know whether he assumes the hedonistic theory or the pluralistic theory. And, if he assumes the latter, we must know whether he holds that only experiences can have intrinsic value or disvalue, or that only experiences and persons can have it, or that experiences and persons and societies can have it. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, there can be no rational *argument;* there can be only emotional hot-air emitted in argumentative form.

When these conditions have been fulfilled I do not believe that there is much room for argument on such questions except on the purely factual side. We may be able to alter a man's opinions about the probable consequences of fighting or refusing to fight when his country is involved in war, by showing him particular facts which he had overlooked, or by convincing him, from empirical evidence, of laws or tendencies which he had not suspected. But there are no arguments by which we can alter his opinions as to what circumstances do and what do not impose obligations on him, or as to the kinds of thing which can have intrinsic value or disvalue, or as to the characteristics which do and those which do not confer intrinsic value or disvalue on the things which possess them. If he is a pluralist about obligation, we cannot by argument alter his opinions about the relative urgency of the various conflicting obligations which he believes to be incumbent on him. If he is a pluralist about value, we cannot by argument alter his opinions as to the various degrees of goodness or badness conferred by the

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various characteristics which he believes to be good-making or bad-making. We can clear up confusions and indicate possible sources of prejudice; but, when we have done this, we have done all that argument can accomplish in such matters, and, if we still differ, we must agree to do so.

My next business is to try to restate the question in a perfectly clear and concrete form. I shall assume that the war in question is an important one, in the sense that there is real uncertainty as to whether England will win or lose it, and that the loss of it would certainly entail on England such disastrous consequences as accrued to the defeated nations after the war of 1914 to 1918. I shall assume that conscription is in force. And I shall assume that "we" means persons liable under the act to military service, and not exempted by the authorities because of special usefulness in some other form of war-work, such as munition-making. The question is whether such persons, in such circumstances, ought to obey this law or to refuse to obey it. Of course a very similar question would arise for those specially skilled persons, such as research-chemists, who would be exempted from military service in order to apply their special skill to other forms of war-work. Ought they to refuse both to fight and to exercise their abilities in arming those who are fighting?

Now I have no idea what is the right answer to this question, and, if I had, I should not be able to prove it to people who accepted different ethical principles and premises from those which I accept. I am not sure indeed that it is the kind of question to which there is an answer, even laid up in Heaven, as Plato might say. I shall therefore content myself with making a few remarks which are, I think, relevant to it.

(1) There are three and only three cases in which no difficulty can arise. (i) A person may be persuaded that the war in which his country is engaged is the least evil alternative open to it in the circumstances, and he may hold that he has a direct or derived obligation to obey the laws of his country. Such a person will presumably hold that he ought to fight if he is ordered to do so. (ii) A man may hold that there is a direct obligation not to take or help in taking human life, and that this is so urgent that it overrides all other obligations, direct or derivative, which conflict with it. Such a man will have no difficulty in deciding that he ought not to fight, no matter how good the cause may be and even if he admits that war is the only way to bring about a great

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good or avoid a great evil. (iii) A man may hold that there is a direct obligation to obey the laws of his country, and that this is so urgent that it overrides all other obligations which may conflict with it. Such a man will have no difficulty in deciding that he ought to fight, no matter how bad the cause may be and even if he thinks that war is an inefficient means of securing good or avoiding evil. Both these opinions seem to me absurd. I do not believe that there is any one obligation which is of such unique urgency that it overrides all other obligations, direct or indirect, that may conflict with it. Therefore the only case that seems to me to be of interest is that of a man who holds that war in general, or this war in particular, is wrong, and who does not hold that there is an overwhelming obligation either to refrain from taking human life or to obey the laws of his country.

(2) The following fact is very important, and is liable to be overlooked. If one believes that war in general, or a certain particular war, is wrong, this may be a conclusive reason for trying to prevent one's country getting into it and for trying to get one's country out of it if it has entered upon it. But, except on the universalistic form of the teleological theory of obligation, it is *not* a conclusive reason for refusing to fight for your country when, in spite of your efforts, it is engaged in war. There is nothing particularly paradoxical in this. If one is a member of an ordinary partnership or committee, it is often one's duty loyally to help in carrying out a policy which one believes to be wrong and which one has conscientiously opposed while it was still under discussion. No doubt, if the conflict is too extreme, it becomes one's duty to dissolve the partnership or to resign from the committee. But it is just at this point that the analogy breaks down. For you cannot really do anything analogous to resigning from your country. If you are to go on living in England at all during the war, you will be dependent for your food and for such protection as you enjoy on the army, the navy, and the air-force; *i.e.* on the fact that there is a majority of persons of military age whose consciences are less sensitive than yours or work in a different way. Plainly there is a *prima facie* obligation not to put yourself in this situation of one-sided dependence on what you must regard as the wrong actions of people who are less virtuous or less enlightened than yourself. This complication would be avoided if the conscription-law imposed the death-penalty for refusal to undertake military or other war-service. I am inclined to think that this ought to be done, and that

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really conscientious objectors to military service should welcome it.

(3) Refusal to fight in a war is one of those actions whose effects vary very greatly with the proportion and the distribution of those who practise them. If a *majority* of persons of military age in *both* belligerent countries simultaneously refused to fight, it would be an extremely good thing, since it would automatically bring the war to an end without either victory or defeat. If a considerable proportion of such persons in England refused to fight, whilst few if any in the enemy country did so, the result would be the defeat of England. Under the conditions of modern war a complete and early defeat might be better even for the defeated country than victory after prolonged fighting. But it is not worth discussing either of these alternatives, because it is as certain as anything of this kind can be that nothing like them will in fact be realised. The actual situation will certainly be that only a quite negligible proportion of those liable to military service, either in England or in any country with which England is likely to be at war, will refuse to fight. The intending refuser can safely assume that, if he refuses, he will be in a tiny minority, and that his action will make no appreciable difference to the duration or the outcome of the war.

Now there are two remarks to be made about this. (i) It is a mistake to suppose that, because refusal *would be* right if most people in both countries were going to refuse, therefore it *will be* right in the actual case where only very few people in either country will refuse. No legitimate inference can be made to what is right in the actual case from what would be right in the widely different hypothetical case. The rightness or wrongness of an action depends, *inter alia*, on the circumstances in which it is done; and one extremely relevant circumstance in the present case is the extent to which other people will perform similar actions.

(ii) Since the large-scale effects of refusing to fight are likely to be negligible, the individual who is debating whether he ought to refuse can confine his attention to the probable effects on himself and his circle of friends and relations when considering the utility or disutility of refusal. This is, no doubt, a great convenience for him. But he will have to reflect that he owes this convenience, as he will owe his food and protection, to the fact that he can count on most other people doing what he judges to be wrong and deciding to fight. Unless he holds the universalistic form of the teleo-

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logical theory of obligation and the hedonistic theory of value, he may suspect that it is not altogether fitting that his honour should be rooted in the fortunate dishonour of most of his contemporaries.

In conclusion I would make one remark to those who are convinced that they ought not to fight for their country in the next war or are not convinced that they ought to. They can avoid most of their difficulties by suicide; and, on the whole, this is the course which I should recommend to those of them who do not think that there is an overwhelming obligation not to take one's own life. Of course it is possible that we survive the deaths of our present bodies, and it is alleged that the position of the suicide in the next life is less eligible than that of the non-suicide. But there is no conclusive evidence for the first proposition, and no evidence at all that the position of the suicide is worse than that of the victim of any other form of violent death. The next life, if there be one, must be bad indeed if it is worse than this life will be in time of war. And the gas in your oven is no less deadly and far more merciful than that which you will encounter on the battle-field or in the streets of your own town if it should be bombed.

C. D. BROAD.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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WHAT THE SCIENTISTS FORGET.

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MacBRIDE.

G. W. BUTTERWORTH, LITT.D.

THE simple reader of Professor MacBride's article on "The Scientific Atmosphere and the Creeds of the Christian Church" in the January number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL may be forgiven, I hope, for wondering whether he has really been introduced into the pure atmosphere or into the fog. Many of us, whose lives are spent in teaching religion, are fully prepared to accept any proposition which is scientifically proved, and to amend our previous beliefs accordingly. And although there are in the Christian Church large numbers of people who cannot, and many who will not, reconsider their theology in the light of new knowledge, yet the Church, like Galileo's earth, really does move, and slowly the outlook even of the *simpliciores* (to borrow a term used in its Greek form by the great Alexandrians over 1700 years ago) is changing.

The process of change, however, owes little to scientific teachers. For change of this sort is a positive thing, the substitution of a new belief for an old one. The influence of scientists, in the schools and through the Press, has been mainly non-religious if not anti-religious. To them chiefly is due the present uncertainty of religious belief. The men who are slowly, and in the face of great difficulties, refashioning Christianity to serve the needs of the future are the rank and file of Christian ministers, who have to deal with the common man and not with the small minority of intellectual people. It must be admitted that the pace of change is not satisfactory. But the Christian minister is hampered by many things; particularly by the dullness of his hearers, who can comprehend a negative proposition more easily than a positive one. Children, for instance, can so quickly

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grasp their teacher's statement that the Bible is not true, that from that moment it begins to influence their outlook and conduct. They do not so readily comprehend the parson's positive efforts to show what kind of truth it is which the Bible contains. There is also the opposition of the aged to contend with, including many of those who sit in high places and rule the Church, but whose thoughts turn to the past rather than the future. Finally, there is the lack of material for reconstruction; it is not easy to know where to turn in order to find new hymns, psalms, prayers and doctrinal expressions to replace those which ought to be discarded. A religious Reformation demands a burst of inspiration, showing itself in a flood of poetic and prophetic literature. This cannot be produced to order, and alas! where we should have a flood we only discern a trickle.

Professor MacBride may say that his complaint is directed chiefly against the leaders of the Church, who from their secure positions outside the dust of the conflict ought to lead us forward more boldly than they do. But his argument concerns those who teach children "during the most impressionable years of life." As parental teaching on religious matters is most uncommon to-day, and school teaching, where it exists at all, is with comparatively few exceptions of a vague character, we may conclude that the teaching objected to is that given in our churches. In Professor MacBride's article the gist of it is as follows. Children are taught the existence of God and the immortality of man; and further, that

> "the Founder of Christianity was a Divine person with a supernatural power over Nature, in virtue of which He performed miracles, that He had a miraculous birth, and that His cruel death was a penalty due to God for the sin of the human race, who without this payment would have been lost."

In addition, they are taught that God is angry with sin, and that He intends to condemn those who are "less successful" in overcoming it to eternal fire. Again, they are taught the idea of a final judgment. These ideas of sin, atonement and judgment ought, according to Professor MacBride, to be dismissed as "conceptions belonging to a world view which has long passed away." But to this we will return later.

What is the evidence, we may ask, on which this account of current Christian teaching is based? Hearsay is not sufficient. Few men can remember what they were taught as

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children, especially if from the years of adolescence they have neglected the Christian fellowship and failed to develop the rudimentary lessons of childhood. They are likely, if questioned, to confuse Christian belief with antiquated or erroneous presentations of it, or with interpretations fashioned by its enemies without regard for truth or justice. The main sources of evidence are the members of the Christian ministry and the books from which they teach. In connection with the first I can only speak with some knowledge of the Church of England. I know no clergyman who would not consider the outline given above to be a caricature of the teaching imparted to our children to-day. And even if in the past our faith had ever been taught in quite the stark way in which it is there presented, which is doubtful, there was associated with it much other teaching which on a fair judgment would modify some of its harsher features.

In regard to books, let me take down from my library shelves, almost casually, a series of Lessons on the Life of our Lord Jesus Christ, composed by Hetty Lee and published by the National Society. I choose this because it is not a modernist work, nor even a modern one (for it is at least fifteen years old); it is orthodox, typical and representative. Out of fifty-two lessons, nineteen concern the Gospel narratives, human stories of the life and work of Jesus with no miraculous admixture; thirteen are lessons on the parables and other teachings of Jesus; fourteen are stories involving the miraculous, chiefly in healing; five are stories of the appearances of Jesus after the Resurrection; and three are special lessons on which the stories of Christmas Day, Easter and Whitsunday are told. In this list the miraculous element is clearly present, but does it give a fair description of the man whose image we try to impress upon the mind of children to say that he was a "Divine person with a supernatural power over Nature?" Would it not be more accurate to say that we describe him as a man of perfect goodness, who taught the law of love, and finally gave his life to prove his love for men? The few miracles which involve a "supernatural power over Nature" are being more and more omitted from Christian teaching of the young, or where included are taught with an emphasis on the moral lesson that can generally be drawn from them.

When children are older, that is, during the years of adolescence, it becomes necessary to answer their questions and give them the basis of a theology. It might be possible to find here and there a church where these children are

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taught the forbidding notion of God described by Professor MacBride. But it must be difficult to gain their acceptance of such a doctrine; for children are alert to-day, and hear in school and elsewhere quite enough to make them sceptical. I should say that for one church where the penal theory of the atonement, and the doctrine of hell-fire, are taught, there are at least a score where these doctrines are completely remodelled. The notion that Jesus, in his heroic and selfless life, has provided a reconciling point between God in his perfection and erring humanity seems to me in no way to conflict with reason. Eternal punishment in hell holds no place in the Christian creeds (with the exception of the hymn called the Athanasian Creed) and is a doctrine generally dropped nowadays; indeed, in its traditional presentation it owes more to classical antiquity than to the New Testament. The doctrine of the Virgin Birth is difficult to explain and defend and, although precise evidence is hard to obtain, I should surmise that it is being more and more passed over in teaching and preaching. What is certain is that no Anglican theologian of repute would base his teaching of the Incarnation on the Virgin Birth. This latter doctrine, when accepted, is accepted as being congruous with the facts we know of the character of Jesus and the theological inferences which may be drawn from them. It is doubtful how long the doctrine will remain within our theological structure if it does not support anything but is only a kind of ornamental addition. But the positive fact I would emphasise now is that modern Christian teaching, whether of children or adults, starts from a moral and not a miraculous basis. Moreover, the number of Christian teachers who can secure all they need without invoking the aid of miracle in the commonly accepted sense is increasing. It is therefore incorrect and unfair for Professor MacBride to use the expressions I have quoted, as if they really described what is being taught to children to-day.

What has been said hitherto is not so much what scientists forget as what they do not know. But when Professor MacBride goes on to say that the Church made its early conversions chiefly because it proclaimed the impending destruction of the world by fire he is, I think, forgetting many other features of early Christianity. That the Church as a whole did at first believe the end of the age to be imminent seems clear from many passages of the New Testament. But it is going far beyond the evidence to say that this belief was the main cause of the success of Christian preach-

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ing. The belief itself is practically non-existent, or if discernible has lost all its dynamic force, in Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus and other writers at the close of the second century. Indeed, even in the Apostolic Fathers, at the beginning of the second century, it can scarcely be found; while the Gospel of St John, almost certainly written by A.D. 100, appears deliberately to substitute (if we except the one obscure passage, v. 28) a spiritual return of Christ to the hearts of his followers for the apocalyptic return on the clouds of heaven. There are many questions which we should like to ask concerning the effect of apocalyptic beliefs on the minds of those who hold them. In every age, including the present, there are people whose main article of faith is that the end of the world is coming soon. Often they announce the precise date. The early Christians were not so foolish as that, for they had their Master's warning that God alone knew the time of the end. But just as to-day men can combine an ardent apocalyptic faith with a comfortable existence here and now, including property owning and life insurance, so we must not assume that Christians in the first century accepted this part of their belief with the prosaic literalness which a modern scientist might expect. When certain Thessalonians took the doctrine too seriously and ceased their daily work, St Paul was quick to see the danger of such an attitude and to reprove it. Is it likely, therefore, that when he wrote, "Knowing the terror of the Lord we persuade men," he really meant, as Professor MacBride suggests, that he wished to frighten the Greeks into belief, by announcing their imminent destruction? The fact is, that the doctrine of the end was used then, as now, to inculcate watchfulness, a preference of the eternal to the temporal, and a conviction that, however wickedness might seem for a time to flourish, God would vindicate righteousness at the last.

If the doctrine of an immediate and violent end had possessed the realism and vitality which Professor MacBride attributes to it, how can we account for the other elements of Christianity, both in the teaching of Jesus and in the conduct of his followers? Early Christianity was a creative movement, and fanatics do not create. The parables of Jesus, with their clear emphasis on the universal love of God; the Sermon on the Mount, with its teaching on human love and forgiveness; even the theological constructions of St Paul in Romans and Ephesians, how did these originate in minds filled with the hope of an imminent destruction of

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the world? Scientists forget that the first Christians, and their Master himself, were not logical machines, who had to wait for Planck's *Quantum Theory* before they could rationally believe in God, but men of flesh and blood, filled with diverse, almost contradictory, hopes, fears, passions and needs. At one moment, under stress of suffering, they could cry, Amen, come, Lord Jesus, and look for God's vengeance on the great whore drunk with the blood of the saints; at another they could, and did, reach out hands of sympathy and loving service to the weak and helpless, wherever they found them, making no distinction between Greek and barbarian, freeman and slave, enemy and friend, loving all because Christ loved them, and saying when they were maltreated, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." It is the height of irrationality to assert that Christianity made its way in the world by reason of its harsh, unlovely or miraculous features. It conquered because it was worthy to conquer, morally better than any religion that had been known hitherto, and intellectually giving a more satisfactory interpretation of life than Jewish religion or Græco-Roman philosophy could give. Any religion or philosophy which gains wide allegiance from men will exhibit undesirable features which may not be part of its essence. The test is, whether it has power, when the critical time comes, to drop these extraneous elements and rely on the vital truths which have been its real support all along.

Just as it is a mistake to suppose that Christianity arose on any other basis than its intrinsic merits, so it is a mistake to regard its persistence through the centuries as being due to any other cause. It is a superficial analysis which will read over a creed, or a theological statement, in a cold scientific spirit, and then conclude that every person who accepts the Christian religion does so on the ground of these statements. To do that is to put the cart before the horse. A famous epigram of Dr Inge's is that "religion is caught, not taught." The essence of Christianity consists in a conviction that God is living and loving, and that in Jesus he comes nearest to the world and to us. This belief leads the Christian to look for the image of God in every man, and to treat men, especially when they suffer or are in need, as if through them God were appealing for our help. For this attitude, which makes God a real and tangible presence around us, we have our Master's express warrant: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." Following upon this comes a

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feeling of humility, of sorrow for our sins (which we are conscious of, however lightly Professor MacBride may regard them), of courage and cheerfulness under suffering, and a conviction that in God's hands we are safe in life, in death and beyond. The Christian spirit is easily recognisable. And it is this spirit which, in Dr Inge's words, is "caught," passing from parent to child and teacher to pupil throughout the centuries. The doctrine of the Incarnation, in its creedal and theological statements, might appear to limit the contact of God with the world to a single person. But Christian legend is crowded with examples of Christ coming to men for help, under the form of a child or a beggar; and even of injunctions to reverence the life of animals and to discern the beauty of the flowers. It is this deep-seated faith in the universal presence of God and the ultimate goodness of things which really animates the Christian Church. Without it, however scientifically unobjectionable theology might be made, religion would not survive a generation. On this faith and on Jesus who first made it plain to men, our systematic theologies have been built. It is not they which support our religion, but our religion which supports them. Theology has its value for religion, as economics for commerce and biology for the phenomena of life, but it must not be taken too seriously. Theology is, in fact, the creation of our religious scientists. Like other scientific creations, it is a transient and fallible thing. What has kept Christianity alive is the fact that in a mysterious way it makes an appeal to the heart of humanity and answers some of our deepest needs, needs which no conceivable material or intellectual progress can ever remove; for without them we should not be human. What has led Christians astray is not their religion, but their false science; and this is the very thing which to-day is fast undergoing a process of purification, redundant elements being silently abandoned and others clarified and corrected. The process would be all the quicker if scientists would display a little imagination and sympathy, and refrain from confusing theology and religion. When you attack a man's theology as if it were his religion, he will of course hold on to it all the more tenaciously.

Professor MacBride indicates in his article the parts of the Christian creed which he considers might be retained, with certain reservations. He feels that the existence of God can be proved, and should therefore be admitted. But he adds that we have no warrant on scientific grounds for

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declaring God to be good. "The utmost that we can assert is that He may possibly turn out to be good." Of what value, I ask, could such a Deity be for religion? Then in regard to immortality, we are gravely told that since the Society for Psychical Research regards some ghost stories to be true, it is possible that the human soul survives death. Scientists forget that neither the Christian belief in God, nor our hope of immortality is dependent upon logical proof. We believe in God because we do not believe that something can come out of nothing, or that the creation can rise higher than its source. It is interesting to hear the physicists saying that they find evidence of spontaneity at the heart of the material world; but no amount of irregularity in the movements of electrons will ever bridge the gulf between quantity and quality, or matter and spirit. So in regard to immortality. Not ten thousand authenticated ghost stories would give the Christian what he wants. Even if they proved, as possibly they do, that the spirit of man survived physical death, how could they prove that the survival was permanent? Such evidence as we have, if we admit its reliability, appears to show that the disembodied spirit is feeble, unable to utter anything but platitudes, with no more, nay, not so much apprehension of God as it had when on earth. Man's faith in eternal life remains, and must remain, a hope and a dream of things that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart conceived of, based upon the conviction that love and truth are indestructible. Even though Christians cherish, and rightly, the few appearances of their Master to his disciples after death, their faith is based on broader evidence than this. The mystical apprehension of him who said, "Lo, I am with you alway," or "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them," this and nothing less than this is the witness to the believer that his Master is still living and active in the Universe. Prayer and worship, which on purely scientific grounds might be dismissed as irrational, are the means by which this faith is kept alive in the hearts of simple men, who after all form the great majority, and whose existence, were they forbidden to hold any belief that they had not first scientifically proved, would indeed be miserable.

Finally, is it not a dangerous doctrine to assert that the ideas of sin, atonement and judgment belong to a world view which has long passed away? That these ideas need new expression in different ages no intelligent Christian would deny. So far as atonement and judgment are concerned, the

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Fourth Gospel witnesses to an attempt, made, as I have said, by A.D. 100, to replace penal and apocalyptic theories by others more spiritual. "God so loved the world." "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." And in spite of much depressing conservatism, and many reactions in thought, there is distinctly observable in theology a forward movement through the centuries, old theories being constantly subjected to examination and restated, whenever they have offended the Christian consciousness. My contention is that at the present time this movement is proceeding with great momentum, not in the sense of carrying the leaders of religious thought much further forward (for they have already reached a point at which a rest might be made for a few centuries), but in the implanting of a new outlook in the minds of the multitude, preparing them to receive the new conclusions when once they are accepted and formulated, as they soon must be. But can any conceivable development abandon the ideas of sin, atonement and judgment? So long as we treat our fellow men as responsible beings, and hold it possible for them to sin against one another, how can we say that men are not responsible to God, or to the Power behind the Universe? Why should men feel shame and humiliation at having neglected a duty or hurt a child, or spoken a lie, if the only thing that has happened is that they are "less successful" than others in overcoming inherited passions? The boy who does his best in an examination and is "less successful" than the prize-winner does not feel humiliation. Perhaps he is not meant to take the scholarship; and other avenues of life, equally honourable, lie before him as alternatives. But in moral questions it is different. We do not, in fact, if our minds are healthy, excuse ourselves for wrong conduct. The ideal is a thing which should be attained, not by one only, but by all. It addresses us in imperative tones. And those who believe in God cannot help feeling at least the same shame before him as they feel before men. Undoubtedly Christians have let the sin idea fill too much of their consciousness. They have exaggerated human depravity, and looked for sin where there were none. But this is to do injustice to their own religion; for the teaching of Jesus centres in forgiveness and not in sin. On the appropriate methods of dealing with sin, whether God's methods towards us, or ours towards one another, we have doubtless still much to learn; but the sin remains, and will have to be dealt with, and some theories formed about it, whatever Professor MacBride may say.

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Religion is a very old accompaniment of human life, and ideas of sin and atonement (with judgment following as soon as men came to believe in immortality) have nearly always been an important part of it. The life and teaching of Jesus, though (with certain small but significant exceptions) it does not include much reference to these primitive ideas, was, after his tragic death, inevitably interpreted by his followers in terms of them. So it has come down to us. Are we to say that these ancient ideas, developed by man in his infancy, as he groped fearfully in the darkness, touching the mysterious forces that encompassed him in Nature, and listening to the promptings which welled up from the depths of his own consciousness, are just delusion, to be cast aside and forgotten by people like ourselves who have reached maturity? Is it not more likely that, for all their crudeness, they bear witness to that Reality which Professor MacBride desires us to reach. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the ordinary scientist's philosophy. Nor does it make matters any better to end up with the mythological speculation that the Universe contains nothing but "love and lovers." The world we have to live in, and for which human religions have always been framed, contains also "hate and haters." In the peaceful recesses of a university it may be possible to discount all this hatred, and to take refuge in the poet's magnificent faith—

> The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound—

but in the mean streets of great cities, amid scenes of sickness and unemployment, in the selfish interests of men and the angry clash of nations in war, there are other elements which force themselves on our attention and demand explanation and remedy. When we come to tackle these elements, we wonder whether our primitive forefathers were altogether wrong in their notions of sin and the need for atonement, or whether they were on the right track, but expressed themselves badly owing to their ignorance and inexperience.

Balham Hill, London. G. W. BUTTERWORTH.

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MARCION'S GOSPEL.

A REPLY.

ALFRED LOISY.

AFTER Harnack's *Marcion* one would have supposed that the problem of the Marcionite Gospel had been definitely solved in conformity with the opinion of the Church Fathers, beginning with Tertullian, to whom the book was known. According to them, the Gospel of Marcion was in substance the Gospel of Luke mutilated and touched up to bring it into harmony with the doctrine of the heresiarch. But now, behold, all that is to be changed.[1] Harnack, we are told, deliberately passed over certain texts which embarrassed his theory that Marcion was exclusively dependent on Luke; moreover, Marcion is not dependent on Luke, but Luke on Marcion, while Matthew depends on Marcion for those parts of his Gospel which he and Marcion have in common; finally that Luke himself depends on Matthew for the parts which he and Matthew have in common but are not to be found in Marcion. From all which the conclusion is that originally there were four Synoptic Gospels, Marcion, Matthew, Mark and Luke, edited and produced between the years 135 and 145 of our era. Let us see what reality can be assigned to these marvels.

I.

The truth is, that Harnack, whose learning no one regards as improvised, discusses, with his characteristic care and exactitude, the very texts which he is here accused of neglecting, but in doing so he pays attention to two facts of which Couchoud takes not the least account: (1) that the

[1] P. L. Couchoud, *Is Marcion's Gospel one of the Synoptics?* in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1936.

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Marcionites themselves continually modified the evangelical text established by Marcion—Tertullian bears witness that in his own time modification had already been practised; (2) that Marcion himself in his *Antitheses*, published by way of introduction to his *Evangelion* and *Apostolicon*, in order to justify his dualism in opposing the Jewish Scriptures to the Gospel, and to make good the exegetical method applied by him to the Gospel and the Epistles of Paul—that Marcion himself, in the course of his argument, picks out and discusses certain passages in the orthodox Gospels which cannot be proved to have appeared in the *Evangelion* before the time of Tertullian, but may very well have been inserted later.

For example: Marcion, in the *Antitheses*, corrects the text of Matthew v. 17, "think not I am come to destroy the law and the prophets: I am come not to destroy but to fulfil." According to Marcion the Christ must have said "think not that I am come to fulfil the law and the prophets; I am come not to fulfil but to destroy." Even before Harnack, Zahn perceived that Marcion was forced to make this remark by the argument of the *Antitheses*, and that later the Marcionites had introduced it into the text of the *Evangelion*. (Cf. Harnack, *Marcion*, 210, 233*, 290*.)

According to Chrysostom, Marcion is reported to have said that Jesus took upon him the likeness of a slave (Phil. ii. 7) when, girt with a linen cloth, he washed the feet of his disciples. This would prove, according to Couchoud, that the Washing of Feet which is recorded only in the Fourth Gospel (John xiii. 4–17) had a place in Marcion's *Evangelion*. In reality the passage in question is nothing more than the remark of a commentator. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the story ever figured in the text of the Marcionite Gospel.

There are still stronger reasons for rejecting, as part of the *Evangelion*, the story of Origen to the effect that Marcionites assigned to Paul and to Marcion the two seats to right and left of Christ in his Kingdom which the sons of Zebedee demanded for themselves. It neither follows that Marcion himself suggested this gloss in the *Antitheses*, nor that he inserted the anecdote with the gloss added in the *Evangelion* (cf. Harnack, *Marcion*, 234*, 235*). Moreover, Origen (in *Lucam hom.* xxv.) gives no hint of the matter. As to Tertullian, what an outcry would he not have raised if he had found such a fantasy in Marcion's own writings!

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II.

Let us now examine the main question: as between Luke and Marcion, on which side is dependence to be affirmed?

Dealing first with the demand of the sons of Zebedee, which is not recorded in the Third Gospel, we are told by Couchoud that its presence in Marcion proves his Gospel independent of Luke. It proves nothing, since the passage in question was not in the *Evangelion*.

Appeal is also made to the Washing of Feet, which, as we have just seen, did not appear in the original *Evangelion*. But Couchoud would have it that Luke had his eye on the incident when he makes Jesus say "I am among you as one that serveth" (Luke xxii. 27). A preacher might thus use the incident for homiletical purposes, but it is certain that Luke had the Washing no more in mind than had Matthew (xx. 26–27) or Mark (x. 48) when reproducing the identical lesson of service.

Couchoud is "impressed" by the opening passage of the *Evangelion*, which he thus transcribes:

> "In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, in the time of the governor Pontius Pilate, Jesus Christ, Son of God, came down from heaven, and appeared at Capernaum, a town of Galilee."

Not all the details of this citation are equally certain. Harnack (*Marcion*, 105*, 106*) puts a point of interrogation before "from heaven" and before "Christ." He also omits "Son of God" and "appeared." There is a possibility that both "from heaven" and "appeared" are commentators' additions. In any case the descent from heaven to Capernaum is queer rather than impressive, and we may reasonably assume that Marcion wrote simply "Jesus came down to Capernaum," conformably to Luke (iv. 31). There is nothing, in short, to forbid the conclusion that the opening of the Marcionite Gospel is a violent and somewhat unnatural abridgement of Luke. On his side, Couchoud records his feeling that there is nothing in Marcion's manner to suggest that he is suppressing the birth stories or the preliminaries of the Galilean preaching. It is for Couchoud to control his own impressions; but we have the right to point out to him that the dependence of Marcion in relation to Luke is one question, and that another question remains as to the amount of editing Luke's Gospel had undergone at

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the time when Marcion placed it under contribution. Couchoud seems to imagine that acquisition of definite form by the three Synoptics, to say nothing of Marcion's own Gospel, was a single operation accomplished in a space of ten years. Nothing could be less conformable to what we can discern of their real history. The prologue to Acts informs us, in the part of it which has been preserved (Acts i. 1–2; with the evident surcharges removed) that the object of the first book addressed to Theophilus was to record "the acts and teaching of Jesus up to the day of his assumption." It follows that the third Gospel in its original state did not contain the birth stories. Even if we suppose that the birth stories were already added to it in the time of Marcion, comparison with Mark is enough to show that they were adventitious and posterior to the form of the Christian catechism represented by Mark. As they were not in harmony with Marcion's own doctrine either, he would not hesitate to cut them out. The same applies to everything relating to John the Baptist and the temptation in the wilderness, features incompatible with the conception of Christ entertained by Marcion. To account for these suppressions there is no need to suppose that Marcion was a Biblical critic many centuries in advance of his age.

Couchoud would have us believe that Luke, according to whom Jesus first preached at Nazareth, but implies in the course of his narrative (Luke iv. 23–24) an earlier preaching and even miracles performed at Capernaum, must be secondary to Marcion who introduces Jesus at Capernaum for the cure of the demoniac and afterwards takes him to Nazareth. Now this argument is not presented with sufficient exactitude. Observe, in the first place, that in Luke (iv. 16–30) this story is clearly derived from Mark (vi. 1–6) but transposed in time and symbolically developed so as to indicate from the very beginning the ultimate fate of the Gospel as destined for the Gentiles to the detriment of the Jews. Neither the inconsistency, nor the want of logic, which result from placing all this before the Capernaum stories is as great as Couchoud represents, the evangelist having already described how Jesus returned from the wilderness to Galilee, became famous in the country, taught in the Synagogues and was glorified by all (Luke iv. 14–15). Capernaum must certainly have been among the places in Galilee where these things happened. And more than that, Marcion himself in placing the story of the Capernaum demoniac before the preaching at Nazareth falls into a

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logical error worse than that attributed to Luke, though Couchoud has not noticed it, or at least says nothing about it. For Marcion has placed after the preaching at Nazareth the events which belong to the first day at Capernaum and are correlated with the healing of the demoniac (Luke iv. 40–44). Indeed the scene at Nazareth is flattened out by Marcion to the point of meaning nothing, so that one is at a loss to understand why he introduced it at all, except that he felt himself bound to retain something from the source where he found it—that is, from Luke himself. Clearly he could not retain either the texts from Isaiah (lxi. 1–2, lxiii. 6) which Luke makes Jesus explain to his compatriots, nor the examples taken from the legends of Elijah and Elisha, since all this was intended to indicate the substitution of the Gentiles for the Jews as the beneficiaries of salvation. One can only conclude that the Marcionite version is a systematic cutting down of Luke.

The other instances brought forward by Couchoud are far from having the same importance. They belong to a class of subtleties which it is almost futile to discuss. In Luke x. 25 a lawyer asks Jesus what he must do "to inherit eternal life," and Jesus, on his side, asks what is written on the subject in the Law; the lawyer answers by quoting the two precepts about the love of God and of one's neighbour. Jesus replies "do that and thou shalt live." Further on (Luke xviii. 18–23, riches being now in question) it is a notable ("a certain ruler") who puts the same question, and Jesus replies by asking his questioner if he keeps all the commandments of the Law relating to his neighbour. Receiving an answer in the affirmative, Jesus declares that one thing needs to be added: the questioner must sell his goods, give them to the poor and follow him. According to Couchoud the two answers are inconsistent. In reality they are different presentations of one theme, for the absolute renunciation prescribed in the second is not far from being in exact correspondence with the divine love prescribed in the first. But in Marcion the lawyer asks "what shall I do to inherit life," and it is Jesus, not the lawyer, who answers by affirming the precept of divine love. Couchoud holds that Marcion's version is the original, and that the question concerned the natural life on earth for which Luke has substituted *eternal* life. How comes it that Couchoud has not seen, or not wished to see, that, in the one story as in the other, the question turned on the great precept to love God and the neighbour, intercalated by Mark and Matthew

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in the Jerusalem ministry, and that the issue in both cases was, beyond doubt, eternal life. Marcion has deliberately suppressed the word "eternal" in the scribe's question and transferred the great precept from his mouth to that of Jesus lest a Jewish doctor should appear to understand the way of salvation.

Another instance (Luke xvi. 17): "heaven and earth shall pass away rather than the smallest tittle of the Law fall out." Marcion reads "rather than the smallest tittle *of my words* fall out." Again Couchoud supports Marcion; but Couchoud, by referring to the Synoptic Apocalypse in Luke xxi. 33, shows that he has failed to see, or not wished to see, that the former passage (Luke xvi. 17) does not belong, as the latter does, to the discourse on the end of the world, but is a parallel to the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 18). It must also be pointed out to him that the "smallest tittle" in question means a small sign used in writing and that Marcion, through not understanding this, takes the saying as covering the teachings of the Christ in general. The secondary character of the Marcionite version at this point could not be more distinctly accentuated.

But we must be brief. These discussions are becoming tiresome, as well as superfluous.

Luke viii. 21: "My mother and my brothers are those who hear the word of God and do it": Marcion, "who hear *my* words, etc." The reading in Luke, says Couchoud, is a correction of Marcion influenced by the Old Testament. We can only ask him to take the trouble to compare the parallel passages in Mark iii. 35 ("the Will of God") and Matthew xii. 50 ("the Will of my father in heaven"). Marcion has changed the text to "*my* words" for no other reason than to divert attention from the God of the Old Testament. Luke xii. 8–9, "before the angels of God," and xv. 10, "joy in the presence of the angels of God"; Marcion in both cases "before God." The angels introduced to satisfy "theological scruple" on the side of Luke. "Theological scruple," then, let it be, but we suggest it was on the other side. Did not Marcion suppress the angels because they belonged to the court of the Demiurge?

Luke xii. 7; xxi. 17: "All the hairs of your head are numbered," "not a hair of your head shall perish." These parts of the sentence are absent in Marcion, and are, therefore, we are told, a surcharge on Luke. But Matthew (x. 30) agrees with Luke (xii. 7). In any case the divergence is of little importance. Moreover, it is possible that in dealing

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with these eschatological passages, Marcion, who denied the resurrection of the body, may have thought that the conservation of the hair had an undesirable implication (*en disait trop*).

Luke xi. 29: "This generation is an evil generation: it seeks after a sign, and no sign shall be given it save the sign of the prophet Jonas." Here Matthew (xii. 39) confirms the reading of Luke, and explains how the sojourn of Jonas in the whale's belly was a figure of *Christ's* resurrection. This is the primitive interpretation of the sign; and Luke (xi. 30) gives the interpretation a different turn (which, whatever Couchoud may say, does not seem to be understood as referring to the *general* resurrection). Marcion reads simply "no sign shall be given it." Enough to remark that Marcion could not admit the sign of Jonas, prophet of the Old Testament God, and that, in addition, he denied the bodily resurrection. This instance proves nothing.

III.

What the above instances demonstrate, then, is not the dependence of Luke on Marcion, but the dependence of Marcion on Luke. It follows that Marcion is not Proto-Luke, nor is there any need to examine the proposal which Couchoud, with a friendly smile, addresses to certain scholars that they should accept his Marcion in place of the Proto-Luke which they postulate as a source of the canonical Gospel. No more need we dwell on what Couchoud would have us believe as to the ease with which a catholic editor could adapt the heretical Gospel to orthodox requirements. This hypothesis, useless in itself in view of what has just been said, is acceptable to its author only in the light of a false assumption—namely, that about the year 140 the Christian communities were not familiar with the Gospel catechisms, under one or other determinate form, and were ready to accept the first text that came in their way. In like manner no good purpose would be served by discussing Couchoud's argument for the dependence of Luke on Matthew for those elements which are common to him with Matthew without being in Marcion, as though the editor of the first Gospel had himself invented the elements in question and Luke not been able to take them from the source where Matthew had found them.

Couchoud's manner of understanding the origin and interrelations of his four Synoptics is somewhat discon-

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certing to readers who have not been initiated into the mystery of his thought. We are asked to believe that none of the Gospels is anterior to the year 135, and that Luke in particular was not composed till after the death of Marcion in 144. In choosing this latter date Couchoud's imprudence has resulted in homicide. Justin in his *Apology* (26 ; cf. 58) which was written about 152, speaks of Marcion as an heresiarch then living and seeking to spread his pernicious doctrine everywhere. To contest the witness of Justin on this point is morally impossible. Moreover, the rapid progress of Marcionism would be inexplicable if we suppose it had lost is founder at so early a date. Couchoud further imagines, under the pretext that Jerome speaks of a woman sent by Marcion to Rome before he went there himself, that Marcion employed this woman to carry his Gospel to the city. A pure assumption. Tertullian was well informed as to the activities of Marcion in Rome, where Marcion was for some time an accepted member of the community. As far as we can judge Marcion did not publish either his *Evangelion* or *Apostolicon* separately from his *Antitheses*, which were intended to justify them, and at the same time to fix the doctrinal standards by which they were to be understood. We have seen that Marcion depends on Luke and it may be confidently affirmed that the Marcionite Gospel, with all its omissions and retouchings, contains no passage where Marcion openly introduces his system ; and the same may be said of the *Apostolicon*. That being so, Marcion cannot be accused of trying to deceive the Roman or any other community of the Church, by dissimulating his doctrine—whatever certain scholars may have said to the contrary. His doctrine was plainly exposed in his *Antitheses*. And if, at first sight, both his *Evangelion* and *Apostolicon*, would cause no shock to Catholic feeling, this was because he had some respect for the text he was elaborating, and with which he was taking no greater liberties than were commonly practised in the orthodox communities of the Church, both on Gospels and Epistles, by ordinary copyists. Justin himself, when he speaks of Marcion, reproaches him only with his dualism, according to which there is a God superior to the Creator and a Messiah who was not the one whom the Creator, the God of the Jews, had announced in the Old Testament.

Couchoud makes clear his reason for dating the composition of none of the Gospels before 135. These are, first, that the prophecy of Daniel about the " abomination of

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desolation," reproduced in Mark (xiii. 14) and in Matthew (xxiv. 15), was not fulfilled till that year, when, the rising of Bar-Kochba having been suppressed, Hadrian set up the statue and altar of Jupiter Capitolinus, with his own statue in the precincts of the Temple; and, second, the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen (Mark xii. 1–11) which is supposed to have been suggested by the analogous parable in *Hermas* (Sim. x.).

As to the first of these reasons, Couchoud is not ignorant, though he gives no sign of knowing, that the discourse on the end of the world (in Mark xiii., reproduced in Matthew xxiv., also in Luke xxi. but without reference to the "abomination," which he replaces by the siege of Jerusalem, Marcion reproducing Luke with 21–24 omitted) has a very long history. It is one of the fragments which were the last to find their way into the compilation of Mark—no doubt the reason why they are pronounced in presence only of the four disciples. The base of the discourse, it has long been recognised, is a brief Jewish apocalypse, of older date, supposed to have been written when Titus besieged Jerusalem or even in the time of Caligula. Whatever the date may be, the passage which Couchoud brings forward together with the advice to flee to the mountains belongs to this first Jewish source. It is a fragment of some old Jewish apocalypse, never fulfilled and passed on from apocalypse to apocalypse without any clear meaning attached to it. Couchoud ought to have told us what meaning would have been found, in 135 or 140, by readers of Mark and Matthew scattered through the Roman Empire, in advice to flee to the mountains because the Jerusalem temple was to be profaned.

Next, as to the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. Couchoud, who seems to have made an inventory of Mark's library, finds there *The Shepherd of Hermas*, and informs us that Mark, inspired by Hermas, constructed the Parable of the Husbandmen for the purpose of introducing his theology, which was that of Paul; Luke has taken it over, but Marcion omits it, which shows that he was ignorant of it, for he had stronger motives for retaining it than for leaving it out. Such is Couchoud's argument. The truth is, however, that this remarkably well-constructed parable is original, and we have only to place it side by side with the watery and incoherent allegory in *Hermas* to see that no close connection exists between the two, and that, if there is dependence on either side, it is Hermas who has awkwardly imitated the Gospel parable. But there is more to be said. The Parable

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of the Wicked Husbandmen is an apocalyptic allegory which has no special relation to Paul's theology, at least to that of Paul the mystic. This Marcion rejected, though he found it in Luke, his system not permitting him to retain a line of it. The preamble of the parable is from Isaiah (v. 1–3); the conclusion is taken from a Psalm (cxxxiii. 22–23), while the body of the parable symbolises the mission of the prophets, precluding that of Jesus, and the whole aiming to show that the Jews deserved rejection in favour of the Gentiles. But he who sent the prophets, and he who sent Jesus is, of necessity, the Jewish God. In all that there was nothing for Marcion. It may be added that the parable has a history of its own even in the compilation of Mark. The notice which follows it (xii. 12, except for the words "they left him and went away" which belong to xi. 27–33) shows that this anti-Jewish allegory, at an intermediate stage of its history, before the insertion of the great apocalyptic discourse (xiii.) was the conclusion of the Jerusalem preaching (cf. xiv. 2) in the collection of evangelical material attributed to Mark by Christian tradition.

No need to inquire at length why Couchoud is so determined to delay the birth of the Gospel literature: his fundamental theory regarding the non-historicity of Jesus has an interest in the matter. Let us note rather the fundamentally mechanical character of his hazardous assertions. He does not ask himself what the earlier documents were on which the evangelical catechesis, preserved by Christian tradition, was built up. He seems to attribute to the editor of Matthew, as a personal creation, everything in the First Gospel which cannot be found in Mark or in Marcion. In like manner the editor of the Third Gospel appears to have drawn from his own imagination whatever he has not drawn from Mark, Matthew and especially Marcion (!) Finally, Marcion himself being independent of Luke, it does not seem to have occurred to Couchoud that, if this were true, the sources of Marcion would still have to be found. All that has far more artificiality than life. And reference to an earlier opinion put forward by Couchoud himself concerning the Acts of the Apostles, to the effect that the first edition was the work of a Marcionite, if not of Marcion, and the catholic edition the work of Clement of Rome, does not render more solid the total edifice which, dazzling as it may seem, is a castle built in the air.

Ceffonds, Montier-en-Der. ALFRED LOISY.

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TELEPATHY.

IS THERE EVOLUTION OF A NEW FACULTY?

C. E. M. JOAD.

I PROPOSE in this article to consider the philosophical bearing of the recently published results of Dr Rhine's experiments at Duke University, U.S.A. Dr Rhine has, it appears, been experimenting over some three or four years on telepathy and clairvoyance, which he defines as follows : " The perception of the thought or feelings of another (telepathy), or of an objective fact or relation (clairvoyance), without the aid of the known sensory processes."

The experiments, which have been going on for a period of rather more than three years, are in essence very simple. Packs of twenty-five cards were prepared, the cards being inscribed with geometrical diagrams such as a rectangle, a star, a plus sign and so on. There were five such diagrams, and each diagram appeared on five separate cards in each pack of twenty-five. The experiments consisted in asking the subject to name the order in which the cards were arranged in the pack. There were three variations. First, the subject named each card as it was removed face downwards from the pack. Secondly, he named the order of the cards as they lay face downwards in the pack on the table, no card being touched or moved. Thirdly, he named the order of the cards from the images present in the mind of another person who was looking at them. The first two were experiments in clairvoyance, the third in telepathy. During the three years between 90,000 and 100,000 separate experiments were made. Now, it is easy to work out the number of correct guesses on a purely chance basis, and so to arrive at the figure for the probable error in every twenty-five guesses. Most of the subjects experimented with gave answers which did not rise above this " chance " figure. It presently became apparent

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however, that some students were producing results which were considerably in excess of it. A group of about eight of these students were accordingly subjected to a prolonged and intensive series of experiments with surprising results.

For example, in the course of 2,250 witnessed trials in the first type of clairvoyant experiment, a subject called 869 cards correctly. This is 419 above the chance figure and constitutes an average of 9·7 correct calls for each pack of twenty-five cards. Another subject returned an average of 14·7 correct calls for each pack of twenty-five cards over 300 different trials. There are, again, records of twenty-one correct calls out of twenty-five, even of twenty-five correct calls straight off the reel. In some of the experiments the caller was separated from the cards by a screen, in others by a wall and in others by a quadrangle, the caller being at one end of a long college building and the cards being turned in a room at the other. The telepathy experiments returned similar results. For example, over 3,400 trials an average of 11·0 correct calls per twenty-five cards was returned, the two people concerned in the experiment, that is to say, the mind-reader and the person whose mind was being read, being situated in different rooms. More sensational were telepathic experiments in which the minds attached to two bodies separated by a distance of 250 miles managed to communicate with each other to the tune of an average of 10·1 correct calls per twenty-five cards.

Now I do not wish to enter into a discussion of *all* the various explanations of these results that imagination might suggest or ingenuity devise. Chance, it is obvious, may be ruled out, since it is easy to work out by means of the theory of probability the number of correct guesses on a purely chance basis. Moreover, experiments on the same lines which have been conducted at the University of London Council for Psychical Investigation have produced results whose variations from the purely chance figure were negligible. Something more than chance was obviously at work in the Rhine experiments. Fraud is a bigger stumbling block. Here I can only refer the reader who is interested to the account contained in Dr Rhine's book *Extra-Sensory Perception* of the elaborate methods which were taken to preclude it. The gravest objection to the fraud hypothesis is to my mind psychological. Is it really credible that half a dozen members of a University staff working with a constantly changing group of students would have been content to conduct a series of what must have been exceedingly mono-

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tonous and tiring experiments lasting for more than three years, with no other object than that of making fools of one another? Is it further credible that, if this were, indeed, the case, nobody would have given the game away? Dr Rhine's book has been widely read: yet, so far as I know, no one of those engaged in carrying out the experiments has been found to cast doubts on the *bona fides* of the author. There are, of course, various other possibilities; for example, the possibility of rational inference. By means of reasoning, it may be said, the subject might determine which was the diagram on the top card of the pack. Or there is hyperæsthesia on the part of some one or other of the known senses. A subject might discern faint indications on the backs of the cards not perceptible by persons of normal sensibility, or even hear faint whisperings on the part of the person looking at the cards. But apart from the complete lack of evidence for any such abnormal sensibility, it is difficult to see how it could have operated in a case in which the parties were separated by screens, walls and buildings.

Inevitably my personal interest is with the *philosophical* implication of these experiments. Let us suppose for a moment that we take the facts at their face value, and proceed to assume that a faculty, which we will call that of extra-sensory perception, does in fact crop up here and there in otherwise ordinary individuals. What light would this supposition and this assumption throw upon the nature of human personality? Or rather,—for my immediate concern is with the function and status of human beings in the scheme of things rather than with their nature—what light would they throw upon the purpose and destiny of life in general and of human life in particular?

The use of the word "purpose" begs, it is obvious, a good many questions to begin with. It not only begs the questions, but steals their answers, presupposing, as it does, that life can in some legitimate sense be said to have a purpose. Can it? I do not know; or rather, I think I do know, but must be excused from defending my alleged "knowledge" here. I am proposing to *assume* purpose as I am *assuming* extra-sensory perception, in order to inquire what, assuming its existence, its nature may be conceived to be, or, more precisely, what light is thrown upon its nature by my assumption of extra-sensory perception?

I have never been able to accept Materialism. If matter alone is real, if material events are the only ones that occur, if, in a word, we are all "body," then the belief that these

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things are so must itself be a material event. So must the arguments in favour of the belief. The belief, then, and the arguments in its favour, are causally determined, like almost all other bodily events, by prior events occurring in the body. Being bodily events, they cannot apply to anything outside themselves, in the sense of squaring with evidence, corresponding with facts, or being true *of* something. Indeed, if a belief or an argument is just a bodily event, it is meaningless to ask if it is *true*, as meaningless as to ask whether a state of the blood pressure is *true*, or the movements of the œsophagus are *true*; as meaningless, again, as to ask whether covetousness is purple or squareness warm. The belief in Materialism and the arguments for Materialism are not, then, evidence for what the belief asserts or the arguments are designed to support. They are evidence only for the fact that the brains and bodies of certain organisms are in a certain condition, or, if the beliefs are formulated and the arguments stated, that certain movements are taking place in the larynxes of these organisms. If, then, Materialism is true, it is meaningless to say so, and there cannot be any arguments for it.

But I am equally unable to accept any form of Idealism. The arguments for supposing that matter is illusory, that what I know is in some sense dependent upon, or an idea in, my mind, or that whatever exists is in its real nature mental or spiritual have never seemed to me to be convincing.

I am, then—and the alternative seems to me to be a forced one—a dualist, committed to the view that mind and matter are both of them real, and that neither of them can be successfully reduced to or analysed in terms of the other. Now it seems obvious to me that I have a body and that this body is material; equally obvious that I am not, or am not completely, my body. In addition, I have a mind. Some would say that I *am* my mind. Possibly, possibly not! But I want to keep clear of controversy so far as may be possible, and so I am for the present content to say that, whatever I may *be*, I certainly *own* both a body and a mind. How do the body and the mind interact? What is their mode of connection? I confess that I do not know. The difficulty of envisaging the relation between the two different sorts of entities which he affirms, is the lion in the path of every professing dualist. He does his best to suggest certain methods of meeting the difficulty. These are largely technical, and I cannot deal with them here; it must,

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however, be freely confessed that none is very satisfactory.

Now let us turn from the psychological to the biological field, and focus our attention on the relations of life and matter. Life exists, the fact is obvious. Disavowing Materialism, we shall have no disposition to resolve it into or to derive it from the material substances and forces of this planet. Life, we shall say, can neither spring from non-living matter, nor be successfully analysed in terms of non-living matter. What follows? Either life was present from the first in the material particles of which the earth is composed, or it was, as it were, smuggled into them from the outside at a certain determinate date in history. The first alternative seems unlikely. The earth was once a white-hot mass of flaming nebula, in which nothing remotely resembling life, as we know or can conceive it, could possibly find a foothold. It seems more plausible to suppose that it is only when certain rather rare material conditions, such as, for example, those which obtained on the hardening crust of a cooling planet, supervened, that life could associate itself with and make use of matter. To use a convenient metaphor from electricity, it is only certain kinds of matter which can *take the potential* of life.

Life, I conceive, as being at first unconscious, or rather as possessing only that degree of or capacity for consciousness which would, presumably, be necessary for the development of consciousness proper. One may put this by saying that life is initially unconscious in every respect except in that of its striving to grow to consciousness. To assist it in this endeavour, it must fashion instruments for itself, and the only material which it can find to its hand is matter which has reached the stage of development at which life can mould and make use of it. Everything, I suggest, goes to show that the development of life is not a passive process set going by the impact of changing material conditions upon living organisms. It is rather in the nature of an attack by life upon matter, wherein life seeks, as it were, to insinuate itself through the chinks in the armour of matter. It is only to-day that we are discovering how unlikely some of these chinks are. It has recently been found, for example, that fungus spores can swim and breathe after they have been frozen in liquid helium; an American biologist claims to have discovered living germs inside a meteorite; many kinds of bacteria have been picked up by aeroplanes flying several miles high. Reflecting upon these and similar facts, one gets an impression

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of life as trying ever to invade fresh territories, to snatch a new foothold in the alien stuff of the world, as it carries on its eternal struggle against Chaos and Old Night.

The result of life's impact upon and employment of matter is a living organism. Living organisms may, then, be regarded as life's contrivances to further its own development in the direction of the achievement of fuller and more intense consciousness. How is this development effected? One may discern three stages. There is, first, the conscious striving to achieve a new power or faculty. There is, secondly, its acquisition. There is, thirdly, its relegation to the unconscious part of our natures, so that it may thereafter be exercised and its benefits enjoyed without the intervention of consciousness. Achieved with difficulty, and, at first, precariously maintained, vital accomplishments are developed by use into habits. Having reached the stage of "habits," their performance becomes unconscious, and the habit, stamped into the vital inheritance of the species, appears in the next generation as an instinct. Originally, we may suppose, we had consciously to attend to such primitive physiological processes as the growing of our hair and nails and the circulation of our blood. When our ancestors had performed these operations sufficiently often through a sufficiently large number of successive generations, they grew so used to performing them that presently they could manage to do them without thinking. As with physical, so with mental acquisitions. A mathematician in the Middle Ages performed with the greatest difficulty the arithmetical operations involved in the calculation of accounts, which a child of average ability in a contemporary primary school takes in his stride as an exercise in simple mental arithmetic. The incredulity aroused by the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo was not entirely due to Catholic obscurantism. Even those who were convinced by the demonstration that the earth was not the centre of the heavens and that the sun was not a small yellow ball that rotated round it, found the greatest difficulty in compassing the imaginative reconstruction of the universe which the acceptance of the results of the demonstration entailed. They simply could not visualise the earth as a smallish planet attendant upon a prodigiously larger sun. We experience a similar imaginative difficulty in picturing to ourselves the sort of universe which is affirmed by the theory of relativity. If the past history of mental acquisitions by the human race is any guide, our descendants two hundred years hence will find it no harder

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to conceive the universe of Einstein than we find it to conceive the universe of Newton.

The evolutionary significance of this process is obvious. Every advance in skill, every acquisition of accomplishment, every mastery of a new process, every establishment of a new faculty, sets free vital energy for the making of further gains. It is because we have learnt to perform our bodily functions without thinking about them, that our minds have the energy and leisure for the conquest of new modes of activity. What I am suggesting, in fact, is a formula for the evolutionary process. Life evolves new powers and acquires new faculties by transferring to the sphere of unconscious performance old ones which have been won so long, exercised so often and learnt so well that they no longer demand our conscious attention.

How are the new acquisitions made? Sometimes consciously by a process of trial and error set going by the force of will animated by imaginative desire. We imaginatively conceive; we will what we imagine; we make efforts to perform what we will and, suddenly, we succeed. Thus our remote ancestor, who, disdaining the natural mode of progression on a tail and four legs, descended from the trees and achieved a precarious eminence on two, may be supposed to have imagined and willed this novel method of perambulation, before he attempted it. And, quite suddenly, after numberless ineffectual efforts, I picture him succeeding. The suddenness, the almost disconcerting suddenness, of success when it comes is a characteristic of the process. For hours, sometimes for days, we strove as children to ride our bicycles; for days, sometimes for weeks, we strove on skates for an outside edge. For hours, for days, for weeks even, we seemed to make no progress. And then, suddenly, we did it. Suddenly we acquired a new faculty of balance, and, in so far as we did it, we did it perfectly. The balance might be intermittently acquired and precariously maintained. But, for so long as it lasted, it was a perfect balance.

But conscious striving on the part of the organisms does not appear to be always necessary to the evolution of the new power or faculty. Sometimes the mere drive of the evolutionary process seems to be sufficient. It seems unlikely that any creature ever imagined or willed to possess so complex a sense organ as an eye or an ear, and such faculties as mathematical ability, virtuosity at chess, or a good eye at games crop up in fortunate individuals unsought. It is as if life, having laid up a sufficient reserve of already existing faculty,

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were venturing upon a course of trial and experiment in search of a new one. And a new one accordingly appears, at first in a few exceptional individuals, then, if it turns out to be a success, in more and more, until it finally establishes itself as part of our evolutionary endowment. This brings me back to extra-sensory perception.

Everybody will remember in Shaw's *Back to Methuselah* the sudden and unexpected development by chance individuals of the faculty of living longer. It was, Shaw surmises, an outrage from the evolutionary point of view that people should die, just when they had acquired enough wisdom to enable them to live intelligently. Longer life being needed, if the consciousness of the race was to advance, the evolutionary process in due course evolved individuals with a capacity for living it. It is precisely in this light that I should be disposed to regard the faculty of extra-sensory perception which Dr Rhine believes himself to have demonstrated.

Consider that form of extra-sensory perception which is commonly called telepathy. How urgently, from the evolutionary point of view, it is needed! It is, when we come to reflect upon it, a fact no less astonishing than it is humiliating, that the only way in which we can normally obtain any knowledge of what is passing in other people's minds is by inference from the behaviour of their bodies, an inference, moreover, which must depend for its plausibility upon an often misleading analogy. We have, in ordinary experience, no direct knowledge of any mind other than our own. Why is it, for example, that I suppose you to have a mind?

You are standing, we will suppose, under an apple tree. I observe that your arm lifts itself into the air, that the fingers of your hand extend and encircle an apple. The arm is then lowered, and as a result the apple is dragged from the tree. The arm is then lifted again in such a way that the apple is brought near to your mouth. This opens, leaving a hole into which part of the surface of the apple disappears. When the apple is presently withdrawn, some of it is missing. These and similar movements are what I observe, and they are *all* that I observe. Now, I know that I frequently act in a similar way, and I know, further, that, when I do so, my actions are the results of certain events which have been going on in my mind which produce the actions. I *see* the apple, I *want* to eat it, and I accordingly *decide* to pluck it. When, therefore, I see another body very like mine going

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through the movements which I perform when *I* see, *I* want and *I* decide, I infer that they are produced by certain events which I describe as *you* see, *you* want, *you* decide, and the occurrence of these events seems to presuppose the existence of a mind in which they occur. I infer, therefore, that you have a mind and that in this mind there occurs a desire for the apple. Similarly, I deduce a person's anger from the flushing of his face, the flashing of his eyes, the raising of his voice; a person's love from other facial movements which it should be unnecessary to specify. And, if it be said that the words which people use are what really convinces me that they are angry or that they are in love, I am compelled to recognise that even words are only movements in the larynxes of the people uttering them, movements which set going waves in the atmosphere which in due course impinge on my ear-drums and cause me to hear sounds.

But what a clumsy, what a roundabout procedure! To what mistakes does it give rise! What feats of insincerity and hypocrisy does it encourage!

Clearly, direct knowledge of other people's minds is a power which life has an urgent incentive to evolve. Like the capacity for living longer, it is something which life's most advanced representatives were, given the truth of the hypothesis of creative evolution, almost bound sooner or later to manifest. And this, I suggest, is the most plausible interpretation of the facts which Dr Rhine's experiments have revealed. Extra-sensory perception bears all the marks of a newly acquired faculty. It is, for example, intermittent and precarious. Let the subject be fatigued, let him be excited, let him take certain drugs, let him be placed in novel circumstances, and immediately the percentage of correct guesses begins to drop. The faculty, again, is easily put out of action. For this reason, if Dr Rhine's subjects were brought before a committee of sceptically minded experts, they would, as he himself freely admits, probably acquit themselves with so little credit that their scores would drop to the figure which would be given by pure chance.

A significant, even a sinister, fact? Possibly! It all depends on your view of the experiments as a whole. But, on the hypothesis which I am suggesting, it is a perfectly plausible fact. Pavlov's dogs, it will be remembered, lost most of their acquired reflexes when some distracting object, for example a stranger, entered the room, and salivated promiscuously to any and every stimulus, or salivated not at all. Again, the faculty functions only when the subject is in

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good health and serene mind, a fact which prompts the question: Why should not a man *guess* as well when he is ill, as when he is healthy? Assuming, however, that we have agreed to rule out the fraud and the chance hypotheses, the fact becomes entirely plausible on the assumption that the extra-sensory faculty is a novel vital acquisition, as yet rare and precarious, and that to manifest it the subject must be at the top of his form. Again, when it does appear, it does so suddenly, capriciously and surprisingly. Just as you may try for hours when skating to do an outside edge, and then suddenly and surprisingly do it, so after long spells of comparatively blank calling, the subjects suddenly begin to return high percentages; and just as in the skating instance the effort involved in the unsuccessful trials is far greater than that expended in the successful achievement, the outside edge, when we do at last do it, seems surprisingly effortless and easy—so the strain felt in comparatively unsuccessful calling was less than that involved when high percentage returns were rendered.

Finally the two faculties, the clairvoyant and the telepathic, were often found to go together. Those who exhibited the one exhibited also the other; those who at any given moment were doing well with the one were also found to be doing well with the other; temporary loss of the one accompanied a corresponding loss of the other.

There is a fairly widespread presumption that telepathy occurs more frequently among organisms less highly developed than ourselves. It is said—the assertion, explicit or implied, pervades current literature—that our intellects are so over-developed that our other faculties have tended to atrophy. Hence philosophers like Bergson and novelists like D. H. Lawrence bid us look askance at the processes of the intellect, and to value what is vaguely known as intuition. Stop thinking, they seem to say, and there will be restored to you that intuitive sympathy, that heightened sensory power, that feeling of being at one with nature and your fellow beings, that ineffable conviction of harmony that belongs of right to the children of nature, to birds, to beasts and to savages.

That intuitive sympathy exists between birds, for example, in a highly developed degree of which we have no conception, I do not wish to deny. Savages also have modes of communication which are inaccessible to us. But such evidence as can be gathered on the subject seems to suggest that both in birds and in savages these are modes of *sensory*

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perception. It is *sensory* perception developed in a very high degree that seems the most likely explanation of the homing and migration of birds. It is because his eyes can discern faint indications of leaf and twig, of face and form, which are beyond the range of our vision, his ears catch faint sounds which are inaudible to our duller sense, that the savage is capable of his sometimes astonishing feats of divination and communication.

Now it seems to be fairly clear that the faculty to whose existence Dr Rhine's experiments point is not a sensory faculty at all. The cards were often called by subjects who did not even look at the pack. Sometimes the eyes of the subject were closed and his head turned away; sometimes he was in another room. The ordinary senses, moreover, seemed in general to be in abeyance. That the attention of the subject had to be concentrated, I have already mentioned; but the concentration was of the mind, rather than of the senses. Directly the ordinary senses were brought into play, as, for example, when somebody entered the room, the percentage of correct calls began to drop. The inference seems to be that the processes which are involved are not sensory but mental. It is the mind which is active in extra-sensory perception, just as it is the mind which is active in mental arithmetic. What, then, the experiments seem to establish is, in Dr Rhine's own words, "the relatively independent agency of mind under certain conditions of the sensory world." Now there are good grounds for the view that sensory perception appears earlier than thinking in the history of the organisms whose development constitutes what we know as evolutionary process. If thinking is interpreted strictly to mean the abstract ratiocinative processes of the intellect, it is probable that only human beings can think, and even with us the functioning of the senses inhibits the activity of the mind. If, then, telepathy and clairvoyance are mental rather than sensory functions, one would expect them to manifest themselves as functions only of highly developed minds. Take the latest product of evolution, life's most lately and most highly evolved contrivance for furthering its own development, the human mind, and it constitutes, it is obvious, the most likely soil for the manifestation of a new vital faculty. On this view it is no accident that Dr Rhine's telepathic and clairvoyant students should have been people of good, though not necessarily of exceptional, intellectual attainments.

My suggestion is, then, that the emergence of this faculty

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is an indication of the achievement of a new level of evolutionary advance. Just as the faculty of thinking appeared at first intermittently and precariously in a few exceptionally gifted individuals, and subsequently became general in our species, so may the faculty of "perceiving" without the aid of the senses on the part of minds which can transcend space, a faculty which is at present new and rare, become one day a more or less general possession of our species. For it is, I further suggest, being evolved in response to the clear need of living creatures to possess it. The suggestion, it is obvious, owes much to Shaw. Shaw I believe to be fundamentally right when he represents living organisms as the unconscious instruments of a vital impulsion, developing through trial and error those characteristics of which life has need in the furtherance of its own progress to the achievement of an ever more intense consciousness. But he seems to have erred in identifying with longer living the next stage in the evolutionary advance. It appears, if we may trust Dr Rhine's experiments, to lie rather in the acquisition of non-sensory perception.

Non-sensory perception is the first rung of the ladder which leads out of the realm of sensory experience altogether. Already our senses grow duller, as the occasions for their use diminish. One day, we may surmise, consciousness will take the form of non-sensory knowledge, a knowledge which, as in Shaw's Ancients, will proceed to the exploration of the non-national universe without the aid of the senses.

HAMPSTEAD. C. E. M. JOAD.

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HOW FUNDS FOR "GOOD CAUSES" WERE RAISED IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

LILIAN G. PING,

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In these days when appeals for funds for charitable purposes, for the preservation of ancient monuments, and for rebuilding, pursue rich and poor alike, through the Press, by circular, in "flag days," and especially over the ether, it is pertinent to inquire whether there was any intervention at all comparable to this in former times. "Friends" of the cathedrals, the Hospital Saturday Fund, the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or National Beauty, and the other voluntary associations which come to the rescue when endowments fail or become inadequate, when structural decay outpaces available funds, when a world economic crisis depletes the purses of those whose inborn habit it was to give for these purposes, may care to take part in a certain quest which will be limited to two and a half centuries, beginning about A.D. 1200. The search is richly rewarded, for not only is the question answered, but in its course many interesting and often picturesque details of the life of the times are brought to light.

The ground to be covered lies within the archives relating to petitions to the Popes, and especially to the response to these—the Papal Letters or bulls—which took the form of appeals to the faithful, and particularly to penitents, to give alms to the cause in question. It is truly impressive to come upon appeals addressed by the Pope from Rome, from Avignon, Villeneuve-by-Avigion, from Orvieto, Perugia, Lyons, or wherever the pope of the day happened to be residing, expressing concern that a church in some remote spot in the British Isles, or in "the suburb of London," should be falling into ruin, that a chapel could not be reached

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because of a crumbling bridge upon or beyond which it lay, and lamenting that many of the faithful were drowned in the attempt; or that a portion of the king's highway should have become impassable or church-goers be constrained to toil through ways deep in mud; that the patients in a "poor hospital" or the lepers in a lazar-house should lack food, medical attention and nursing; or even for the less tragic, if unseemly, plight of a prior without means to exercise "becoming hospitality," or an impoverished bishop deprived of the usual "ecclesiastical ornaments," who never had but a *tin* chalice and now has none at all.

To enlist the papal aid for this purpose, as well as for the many other matters which called for his intervention, mediation, arbitration or judgment, the procedure was to draw up a petition and present it to the pope either personally or by proctor. In the course of time strict regulations for the presentation of petitions became imperative, as will best be appreciated by an indignant and determined bull issued by Pope Clement VI. in 1344—a document too humanly interesting to omit. It reads:

"Whereas certain persons, as We have frequently learned from experience, casting from them their regard for decent manners and the reverence due to Ourselves, have presumptuously dared, and still do dare, when We are in consistory, and at other times when We are riding, to cast before Us, and sometimes upon Us, their petitions in which they even wrap up stones, to Our perturbation; We, with intent to restrain by suitable measures, the unbridled audacity of such persons, and promote due modesty, do, by these presents forbid all and singular, of whatsoever condition, in any wise to dare henceforth in such manner to cast down any petitions in Our sight, in consistory or elsewhere, unless We shall demand them from them, or order them to be demanded or received. Moreover, those who shall presume to the contrary, if they be clerks We render incapable of receiving ecclesiastical benefices, but if they be laymen We will that they thereby incur sentence of excommunication. Let no man, therefore, infringe or contravene this Our prohibition, inhabilitation, and will. And if any presume, etc. Given at Avignon on the 5th day before the Kalends of September, in the second year of Our pontificate."

To these petitions the Papal Letters were the answers.

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They were entered in the Papal Registers, and it is from this source that those here presented in translation have been chosen from among many hundreds of their kind, in the company of myriads relating to other matters.

The Papal Letter is sometimes addressed "To all the faithful" who are exhorted to give alms for the cause outlined in it; very often it takes the form of a commission or mandate to the petitioning bishop or other authority, to grant an indulgence, or "relaxation of penance," in return for good works consisting of money offerings, the appeal in this case being directed to the multitudes of penitents. Frequently both forms are included in one appeal:

> "Exhortation to all the faithful to give alms for . . . with relaxation of [say] three years and three quadragenes [1] of enjoined penance to penitents who visit and give alms to . . ."

One of the earliest appeals in the period chosen relates to the church of the Abbey of St Augustine, Canterbury. It comes from Pope Honorius III., is dated the 2nd day before the Kalends of May, 1222, and grants "relaxation of ten days of enjoined penance to all the faithful of the province of Canterbury who shall assist in the restoration of the Abbey church of St Augustine." In 1243 Innocent IV. also makes an appeal for this church of most sacred association, "the body of St Augustine being buried there." Particularly interesting, too, is a bull of 1250 appealing for funds for the rebuilding of Westminster Abbey by Henry III. Addressed to the King it grants relaxation of penance "to all penitents who lend a helping hand to the fabric of the church of wonderful beauty now being built by him at Westminster." It is not surprising that accounts of the beauty of the Abbey moved Innocent to an expression of æsthetic emotion, quite unusual in a bull, for in this very year Matthew Paris refers to its "incomparable Chapter House," which was then nearing completion. At this date, too, the transepts, the crossing, and works to the east of these were in progress. We have to wait about a century and a half for an expression of similar emotion when York Minster was the subject of an appeal.

Building upon unsound foundations, and an expensive canonisation were responsible for the sorry plight of Hereford Cathedral in 1320 when an appeal, which not unnaturally

[1] Periods of forty days.

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savours of grievance on the first count, was issued for its rebuilding:

> "the old foundations were said by architects to be sound, and 20,000 marks having been spent on the superstructure the whole threatened to fall, so that this sum, and that spent on the canonisation of Thomas de Cantalupo [bishop of Hereford] have burdened the Chapter with debts."

Sixty days of enjoined penance were commuted to penitents who contributed offerings for the work. Further measures being deemed imperative, the pope grants to the dean and chapter "the parish church of Scenigfeld [*i.e.* Shinfield, co. Berks] value £20, and the chapel of Swallefeld [*i.e.* Swallowfield] for the rebuilding of the cathedral so long as the work shall last."

The lamentable condition of St Olave's, Southwark, and the macabre spectacle originating in its cemetery in 1327 are brought to the notice of Pope John XXII. who responds from Avignon with a commission and mandate to the Bishop of Winchester

> "to relax sixty days of enjoined penance to penitents who, within three years, contribute to the repair of the church of St Olave in the town of Southwark, injured by the thrice [*sic*] daily flowing and ebbing tide which beats against the walls and has carried away bodies buried in the churchyard."

This was, of course, the St Olave's in Tooley Street, which was rebuilt in 1737 and again in 1843.

Inundations were a frequent cause of damage and impoverishment to a church or religious corporation, and in some of these cases it became necessary to petition the pope for emergency measures. Here is a petition from the prior and convent of Spalding, dated 1351:

> "A great part of their possessions is situated between streams of fresh water and the sea, so that they suffer from inundations, and that their monastery which was begun on a great scale, is very costly, so that they are burdened with debts and the duties of hospitality; they therefore pray for the appropriation of the church of Gibbetey, otherwise called 'Sibbesey' [*i.e.* Sibsey, co. Lincoln], of their patronage, value 73 marks, besides a pension of 13 marks, a portion of 30 marks being reserved

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for a vicar to be instituted by the Archbishop of Canterbury."

The pope granted this and added an appeal "for subsidies to the fabric of the monastic church" granting indulgence to those who responded.

A petition of sinister significance dated 1352, conjures up a picture of stricken England in the years following the ravages of the Black Death in 1348 and 1349. It comes from Walter de Mauny, lord of Mauny in the diocese of Cambrai, and makes known

> "that he, during the epidemic in England, dedicated a place near London for a cemetery of poor strangers (*perigrinorum*) and others, in which 60,000 bodies are buried, and built there a chapel with licence of the Ordinary. He prays for an indulgence of a year and forty days to those who visit the said place on the feasts of Whitsunday, Corpus Christi, and Saints Mary Magdalene and Margaret, and who give something to the support of the said chapel of the poor who flock to it."

A Papal Letter granting the request was issued from Avignon. Stow, in his *Survey of London*, says that two if not three new cemeteries were opened, and locates that of de Mauny:

> "In the year 1349 the said Sir Walter Manny, in respect of the danger that might befall in this time of so great plague and infection, purchased thirteen acres and a rood of ground adjoining to the said 'No Man's Land,' [1] and lying in a place called 'Spittle Croft' because it belonged to St Bartholomew's Hospital, and caused it to be consecrated by the said Bishop of London for the use of burials. In this plot of ground there were (in that year) more than 50,000 persons buried, as I have read in the charters of Edward III."

Was not, perhaps, the pestilence responsible also for the impoverishment which, in 1354, necessitated an appeal from Innocent VI. for "the church of the thirty nuns of Stratford atte Bowe, who are now suffering from poverty," and granted relaxation of penance to penitents who visited it on the four principal feasts of the Blessed Virgin? This is none other than the convent over which, some thirty years later, presided Chaucer's "Prioresse who was clepe'd Madame

[1] This "No Man's Land" was one of these cemeteries opened on ground where subsequently the Charterhouse was built.

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Eglintyne who spake French ful faire and fetishly, After the scole of Stratford-atte-Bowe."

The case of the Hospital of St Giles (then truly "in the Fields") is typical in and following these years of the "mortality," when not only endowments failed to yield, but the monastery's own lands cultivated by the brethren themselves, and let out to farm, went to waste, for few monks or tenants were left alive. Its piteous plight is set forth in a petition to Innocent VI. in 1355 :

"The warden or master of St Giles without the Bar of the Old Temple, London, and the brethren and sisters of the Order of St Lazarus of Jerusalem in the diocese of London: Signification that the said hospital was founded for a warden and three brethren, and two sisters of the said Order, and two secular chaplains, according to the disposition of the Master of Burton St Lazarus, master of the Order in England, of the diocese of Lincoln, and for fourteen lepers on the nomination of the mayor and council of the City of London, and that the said hospital has suffered loss by fire and is burdened by debts, and that the lands which they used to cultivate and those let to farm to seculars are, by reason of the horrible mortality, now uncultivated, so that they are unable to maintain the fourteen lepers. Wherefore William de Cornewayl, sergeant-at-arms of the king and of Henry Duke of Lancaster, prays the Pope to grant an indulgence of five years and five quadragenes to those who visit the hospital and give alms for the maintenance of the poor therein."

The petition is subscribed : "Granted for one year and forty days, to hold good for ten years."

In 1360 and 1363 come touching sidelights on conditions arising out of the great pilgrimages to Canterbury and to Rome. The pope grants mandates for raising funds by relaxation of penance for

"the poor hospital of Canterbury commonly called 'Estbruge' or 'Estbrigge' [Eastbridge] founded by St Thomas the Martyr for the poor, for persons going to Rome, for others coming to Canterbury, and needing shelter and for lying-in women."

The following year it is to remote Lindisfarne that notice is directed by an appeal from Urban V.

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> "for re-building the church of the priory of the cell called 'de Insula,' in the diocese of Durham, where rested the body of St Cuthbert, by whose piety and intercession God works many miracles; the said church having been burned in the wars."

And here is a petition in 1363 from a "citizen of London" who became Lord Mayor and was an outstanding benefactor of the monastery of Benedictine nuns of St Helen's, Bishopgate:

> "Adam Franceis, citizen of London. He has built a chapel of the Holy Ghost near the monastery of the nuns of St Helen's, and prays for an indulgence of one year and forty days to those who visit the said chapel at Christmas, the Circumcision, Epiphany, Easter, Ascension, Trinity Sunday, Corpus Christi, Pentecost, the Invention and Exhaltation of the Cross, and All Saints, in perpetuity."

This is granted and the appeal made. Adam Francis built a second chapel, dedicated to St Mary. These two chapels are still in existence, forming a south transept to the two parallel naves which constitute respectively the conventual church and the parish church of St Helen's. The little church of St Ethelburga was a source of income to St Helen's for its advowson was vested in the prioress and nuns of this monastery until its suppression in 1539. In 1364 the abbot and convent of Kingswood in Gloucestershire plead that

> "they are come to poverty and have to go about begging. They ask that alms might be collected from penitents, for their chapel which seems to have been important as a centre of healing for the sick who come from far and wide to their chapel of St Mary the Virgin 'in which miracles are done by her intercession, and to which many blind and lame come from England, Wales, France, Ireland and Scotland'."

A number of bridges call for rebuilding in the later years of the same century, and are the subjects of papal appeal. Among them are "the bridge which existed on the river Newdach, in Corval in the diocese of Argyle," the one "by the town of Fordynbrygg[h]e in the diocese of Winchester," the bridge of Islepe in Lincolnshire "which is about to fall into ruin," and the wooden bridge at Shelforde Parva in the diocese of Ely.

Two appeals of interest to Wykehamists, entered under

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the date 1391, announce indulgence to penitents who "visit and give alms for the conservation of the Chapel of St Mary the Virgin, of the college of scholar clerks founded near Winchester by bishop William." The second, issued a little later in the year makes clear the cause of its need, for it adds "the animals having perished and the arable lands being uncultivated on account of the pestilence."

From Winchester to remote Sodor, in 1392, whose woes have been brought about by enemy invasion. Its petition is answered from Perugia by Boniface IX., in an

> "Exhortation to give alms for the repair of the church of Sodor which, with its buildings, is so destroyed by the invasion of enemies that its own resources are insufficient for its repair, on account of which divine worship is almost utterly diminished."

In 1394 Boniface responds to petitions of distress from two most venerated churches in Ireland: that of St Patrick in Dublin "whose bell-tower has fallen and thrown down a great part of the church," and that of St Brigit of Ireland whose church at Kildare was perishing for lack of conservation funds.

The year 1395 brings an item of documentary history which may interest the "Friends of Canterbury Cathedral"—an appeal which reads:

> "Relaxation of enjoined penance to penitents:—(I) seven years and seven quadragenes to those who, on the principal feasts of the year and those of St Thomas of Canterbury visit and give alms for the repair, conservation, or fabric of the church of Canterbury and the tomb in which his body was placed after his canonisation and now his—or either of them; (ii) three years and three quadragenes to those who on the said feasts and on every Wednesday from the beginning of Lent until Whitsun day, similarly visit and give alms to the chapel called the Crown in which there is preserved a part of the Saint's head; the altar at which he was martyred, and the tomb in which his body lay before canonisation —or any one of them."

It is particularly fortunate that among the frequently interrupted records of the amounts received in offerings at Canterbury Cathedral, the one for the year following this bull is extant; its interest is the greater in that the amount offered at each holy place was methodically entered. Here is

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the entry in the Prior's roll: "1396. Shrine £393 2 10; Corona £75 13 0; Tomb £6; Martyrdom £13; High Altar £11; St Mary £2 5 0; Money Box (*pix*) in Nave £2. Total £503 0 10." The next available record is for 1410 and shows a total of £265 18 4, but it is to be borne in mind that the cult of St Thomas was then on the wane; at its apogee the yearly average of offerings for the years 1370–1383 was £545 8 10—which represents an average enhanced by the inclusion of the year of the funeral of the Black Prince in which, alone, £692 4 7 was contributed.

The years 1400 and 1401 were evidently years of crisis for a number of bridges and bridge-chapels, as well as for certain highways. An opportunity is afforded to commute stated periods of penance to those "who give or bequeath aught for the repair of the bridge over the Toryge [*i.e.* Torridge] between Great and Little Toryton [Torrington] in the diocese of Exeter"; or for the bridge chapels of St Mary on Bristol Bridge or that of St Mary the Virgin "on the bridge called 'Westbrugge,' Leicester." The faithful are exhorted to save two other bridges "the wooden bridge called 'Harlkedon' [*i.e.* Harrowden] and Kerdyngton in the diocese of Lincoln for which repair are no fixed emoluments or rents," and "the bridge of Bradeforde in the diocese of Salisbury, part of which has fallen, the rest threatening speedy ruin." John Wolf, finding the burden of bridge-building heavier than he can continue to bear single-handed, his petition brings an

> "Exhortation to give alms for the repair of the bridge of Staveton on Avon in the diocese of Salisbury which John Wolf, nobleman of that diocese has begun to build and whose completion and repair require no small expense."

An appeal is made for the bridge-chapel of St Mary the Virgin, and the bridge itself of Corbridge, Northumberland, "they being in large part destroyed." The pope is concerned, too, about the condition of "the king's highway commonly called 'Worton Way' and 'Elbryg Way,' from Gloucester towards London" and appeals for its repair. The needs of two other "ways" are brought to the attention of penitents in an appeal to them to

> "visit the chapel of St Anthony without the walls of York, near the hospital of St Mary in 'le horsfayre,' and give alms for its conservation, and for the new construction and sustentation of the ways commonly called 'Giligate' and 'Horsefair'."

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In connection with this it is painful to have to record a case of the fraudulent collection of alms intended for the chapel of St Anthony, and in 1403 the pope issued a bull annulling the letter above quoted. It seems that

> "a certain pretended hermit, dwelling at the said chapel . . . has, without licence from the brethren presumed to seek and usurp in the saint's name such alms, and in many ways to misuse the pope's said letters; the pope hereby orders the said letters to be cancelled from his register . . . and no credence be given to them. He further inhibits the said pretended hermit, and any others, from using them, and if they do so he orders that they be punished as forgers. . . . If the said pretended hermit further molest the brethren, a papal notary is instructed not to permit it, and if necessary, to invoke the secular arm."

An example of the devastation and disruption of religious houses during wars is afforded by a Papal Letter relating to a Welsh community in 1405:

> "The Pope having learned that the Benedictine monastery in the town or borough of Usk in the diocese of Llandaff, and in which only girls of noble birth are received as nuns, has, on account of the long wars in those parts, fires, plunderings and other accidents, become so impoverished that the nuns will be compelled to go about in search of food and raiment, or live in the houses of their kinsfolk, whence possible scandals; and that a copious multitude of people resorts to the chapel of St Radegund the Virgin, situate within the monastery, especially on the feasts of Easter and Whitsuntide and during the octave of Easter . . . "

offers indulgence to those who come to the rescue in the usual manner.

In 1405 it is not surprising to learn that a bridge over the Severn was causing grave disquiet, and that Pope Innocent VII. made an appeal

> "for the conservation and repair of the bridge and chapel of All Saints which John Pleyden, priest, of the diocese of Lichfield, has caused to be built at his own cost at the town of Bryggenorth, over a certain perilous water called the Severne, which bridge, on account of the strong current of the said water, requires no little repair."

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During ten years penitents are invited to commute three years and three quadragenes of penance each time they visit the chapel and give alms for this repair.

In 1408 comes, from Gregory XII. a very moving and unusually detailed appeal for York Minster, tragically stricken in her splendour by a tempest. It reads:

> "Exhortation and injunction to all the faithful to be generous and to be ready to help in repairing the church of York—the fame of which stands out among the celebrated churches of the world; which from times most ancient has been adorned with many and large papal privileges; which in accordance with its excellence and dignity, has been built in the form of a cross right splendidly and most sumptuously, with wondrous work and beauty, and has had in its midst a bell-tower, lofty and delectable to see, to whose corners the aisles of the church seemed to cling, which tower of late stricken by a horrible tempest, has fallen to the ground, a spectacle dreadful to the beholder, greatly deforming the church, so that the bells, cast at great labour and expense, and heretofore uninjured, have likewise fallen to the ground and been broken—the dean and chapter, who desire to restore and repair the church and bell-tower, and to place new bells, for which their means and those of the fabric are not sufficient—with relaxation, during ten years, of seven years and seven quadragenes of enjoined penance to penitents, each time that during eight days, in their own person or by others at their expense, they give manual aid, or the equivalent in money or materials, to the masters and workmen employed in the repairs."

This is followed in 1411 by another appeal for the completion of the work of repair which is in progress, and for the conservation of the fabric.

A bull of especial interest because it is in favour of the monastery of St Bartholomew, Smithfield, reveals its prior beset with misfortunes coming from all quarters. Alms are besought

> "for the repair and conservation of the Augustinian monastery of St Bartholomew in West Smythfeld in the diocese of London, the Pope having learned that through the malice of the times, the monastery is in great part destroyed in its houses and buildings, that its said houses are greatly ruined with age; that its tenants in

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city of London which ten or twelve years ago were wont to bring in more than a hundred marks a year, hardly bring in to-day, on account of the penury of men, half that sum; that the monastery, a short time ago, through the enemities of a certain powerful enemy, lost sixty marks out of which the prior was and is bound to find two priests for the celebration of masses for the soul of a certain person deceased, and to minister to them the necessaries of life; that on account of the frequent impulse of the sea and its floods many goods of the monastery within the parish of Sowthton by Jernemth in the said [*sic*] diocese have been and are much annihilated, that for seven years the prior has received for them little or nothing; that the same prior has rebuilt the cloister, bell-tower, high altar and chapter house of the monastery church at no small cost, whence he has many creditors; that the monastery requires several reforms which cannot be carried out for want of money, and that the monastery being situate in a very famous place of the realm, very many resort thither from the realm and from divers other regions, to its great burden."

The puzzling reference to the sea and property at Sowthton becomes clear when it is known that Southtown near Yarmouth is the place in question. The last sentence in the appeal is of somewhat pathetic significance, for while the churches and monasteries ardently desired the visits of pilgrims, penitents and sight-seers, for it was part of their vocation to receive and help them, and though their offerings were needed—hence the petitions asking for them—yet the duty of hospitality and succour these visits were bound to involve, frequently led to an adverse balance in the Treasurer's office.

In certain exceptional cases, when for example, circumstances rendered it dangerous for would-be alms-givers to attempt to reach their bourne, permission (indult) was given for messengers to be sent out to collect their offerings. The Augustian monastery of St Mary at Cluaintuaisgert (Cloonbuskert, co. Roscommon) was a case in point, in 1410, when an appeal was made

"for the building of an infirmary for the sick, a hostel for its guests, and a refectory for its canons, all which it lacks, to which monastery, on account of continual wars in the neighbouring parts, access is unsafe. An indult

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to the prior and convent for the collection of such alms to send their messengers (*nuncios*) one a year through the parts of Ireland only."

The possession of holy relics was not only a very solemn trust for which it was incumbent upon the church or monastery to provide a worthy shrine, but was a great incentive to multitudes to visit them for the sake of the pardon and healing to be obtained through the intercession of the saints represented by the relics. Mention of them in an appeal would stimulate the response. An appeal for the monastery of St Mary, Welnynge (*i.e.* Wendling], in the diocese of Norwich, in 1412, states that it holds "pieces of the true wood of the Holy Cross, a foot of St Lucy the Virgin, and relics of other saints."

Pope Martin V., in 1427, calls attention to the condition of roads and bridges over a large area in Lincolnshire:

> "The Pope having learned that between the town (*oppidum*) of Boston in the diocese of Lincolnshire, to which every year resorts a great multitude of both sexes from far and near, for trade, and the towns (*ville*) of Seynt Saviour in Kestervyri, Spalding, Stykford, and Waynflete, in the said diocese, the roads are, especially in winter, on account of sea floods, very muddy and deep, and that often the bridges and causeways, between the said town and towns are destroyed and broken down. Exhortation etc."

In 1428 Llandaff Cathedral—so frequently devastated and neglected both before and since, in spite of its holy relics—was in pitiable condition. Martin V. appeals

> "for the restoration and conservation of the building and ornaments of the church of Saints Peter and Paul, Llandaff, to which resorts a great multitude out of reverence for Saints Peter and Paul and of many other saints whose relics are kept therein. It is so greatly devastated by wars, pestilence and calamities with which those parts are greatly afflicted, and the bishops and chaplains made destitute, and has its buildings so ruinous, and is so wanting in books, chalices and other ecclesiastical ornaments, that its total desolation is to be feared."

Etonians are sure to be familiar with a bull dated 1442 in favour of their college founded two years previously. An

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interesting feature is that the appeal is coupled with one for repelling the Turks. Pope Eugenius IV. proclaims

"a plenary remission of sins, valid only during the life-time of Henry, king of England, to all the faithful being penitent and having confessed, who from the first to the second vespers of the Assumption visit the Collegiate Church of St Mary, Eton by Windsor, in the diocese of Lincoln, which the said king has founded and endowed, and give alms for repelling of the Turks and for the fabric of the said College and the maintenance of its ministers. A fourth part of the said oblations is to be applied to the said fabric and maintenance, and the other three-parts to the repulsion of the said Turks, and especially in aid of the city of Constantinople, the Isle of Rhodes, etc."

A second similar appeal follows in 1444, but this time the validity is "in perpetuity." Funds must have been contributed sparsely on account of the political ferment, and moreover the bias of the appeal in favour of the "said Turks" would leave little for the College which was not completed until 1523.

Funds are asked, in 1440, "towards the completion of the costly bridge over the Tay, flowing near the city of Dunkeld, which Donald Macnachtane, dean of Dunkeld, has begun to have built at his own expense." And in 1445 comes an unusually long bull with many informative details, concerning a situation that has arisen at "the bounds of the earth" in Wales, Pope Eugenius IV. having learned

"that at the town (*villam*) of Newport in the diocese of St David's which is situate in the remoter part of Wales and the bounds of the earth, and has a very famous seaport, there is a certain stone bridge, great and sumptuously built, under which the water of the sea ebbs and flows daily in great abundance, and by which alone people have been wont to cross from the said town to the greater, more fertile and more useful part of all the territory of the said town, as also from thence to the city of St David's; but that the said town has long been diminished in its inhabitants and means by pestilence and divers other sinister events, so that it is feared that unless help be forthcoming the said bridge will go to ruin . . ."

Relaxation of penance is proclaimed to those who contribute

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to its repair and to that of the contiguous chapel, together with permission

> "to those who pay to the repair or conservation of the said bridge, in person or by others, if rich one pound sterling, if of moderate means half a pound, and others a quarter of a pound or as much in other money or in other things and goods, or work or cause work to be done at the foregoing rates, that the confessors, secular or regular, which each of them, after having thus visited and paid or worked, shall choose, may grant them, being contrite and having confessed, plenary remission of all their sins in the hour of death: with the usual clause 'Et ne quod absit,' against abuse, and the usual Friday fasting . . ."

A clause is added in recognition that a knowledge of English alone by confessors would not suffice in this part of the land:

> "faculty [is granted] to Richard Caunton, rector of the said church, doctor of civil law, who understands and intelligently speaks English, Welsh and Latin, and to his successors, who likewise understand and speak, to hear, by themselves or other fit priests, secular or regular, appointed by them, the confessions of all who visit the said church and lend helping hands as above, and to grant them absolution."

The bull ends by ruling exactly how the oblation shall be applied, and adds the proviso "all expenses which shall be incurred having been first deducted therefrom."

A kindly-worded appeal for a "poor hospital"—one of great renown and much beloved in its time, though no longer in existence—comes also in 1445:

> "The Pope having learned that in the Augustinian monastery of St Mary the Virgin, without the walls of London, there is a hospital of poor sisters, in which poor and sick and other miserable persons are kindly received and refreshed, and children and pregnant women cared for, and many other pious works of charity done, by the mistress and sisters, whereof the faithful of those parts have a singular devotion to the church of the said monastery and the said hospital, and to whose said mistress and sisters, and certain revenues have been assigned which are not enough. Relaxation, etc."

This was the hospital of St Mary without Bishopsgate. It

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cared for a large number of patients and was one of two London hospitals which took in lying-in women and whose institutions provided that should a mother die the child should be brought up there until the age of seven. St Mary's was also a hostel for wayfarers. It was never re-opened after the dissolution, although in 1538 the citizens of London, headed by the Lord Mayor, urgently petitioned Henry VIII. for the re-founding of "Saynt Mary Spytell" together with "Saynt Bartylmews Spytell and Seynt Thomas Spytell, founded of good devoc̃on by auncyent fathers and endowed w^t great possessions and rents." No response was made to this petition until 1544 and then it was granted only in respect of the last two.

Bethlem Hospital is the object of an interesting appeal in which two earlier Papal bulls are recapitulated and confirmed in 1445:

> "Confirmation with exemplification, at the recent petition of the master, wardens and friars of the house or hospital of St Mary Bethleem in the suburb of London, of the order of St Augustine depending upon the Church of Bethlehem in the Holy Land—of letters as below which the Pope has caused to be inspected in his Chancery, of Boniface VIII. and Urban VI."

He now grants relaxation of penance in perpetuity to those who visit and give alms to the hospital. Calixtus III. adds that Boniface's letter was

> "addressed to all archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors and other faithful, enjoining and ordering them whenever friars of the said church [of St Mary] arrive for the purpose of collecting alms, to receive them kindly, help them in their mission to obtain alms, and not give their own confraternities, which they can hold every day, preference over those of the said church, which takes place only once a year. . . . And if any of the said friars who are sent out for the said confraternity and collections come to a city, castle, or village under interdict, at this joyful arrival church shall be opened, once a year, and divine office celebrated, the excommunicated, even those interdicted by name, being ejected, etc. . . . "

Urban's letter was a confirmation of this one with its very interesting revelation of one method of broadcasting an appeal.

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Another famous hospital, that of St Thomas, obtains a papal bull for assistance in 1458; its terms provide quite an epitome of the life of its patron saint and demonstrates the importance of Tuesday alms-giving:

> "Relaxation of penance to those who, being penitent and having confessed, on Tuesdays from Quinquagesima to the octaves of Easter make offerings to the hospital of St Thomas the Martyr of Acre, in the city of London, in which there is great devotion and works of charity, and because the said St Thomas was born on the spot where the said house or hospital was built, set out on his journey to Rome [*sic*] on Tuesday, and because on a Tuesday Our Lord appeared to him at Pontigny in the diocese of Sens, and because the princes set down against him on a Tuesday, on a Tuesday he suffered martyrdom, and because a Tuesday was the day of his translation."

Among many other appeals too numerous for inclusion here, a very touching one is in favour of the cathedral of Derry:

> "To all the faithful. The church of Derry, notable amongst the cathedral churches of the realm of Ireland, is, on account of various misfortunes, with which these parts have been afflicted, almost entirely unroofed, and Bishop Nicholas and the bishop for the time being, has no house which he can inhabit, and that the said church in which used to be a tin chalice only, is without chalices, books, paraments, and other ecclesiastical ornaments. It is feared that, without the help of the faithful, the said church will fall utterly to ruin. The Pope, therefore, desiring that the said church may be roofed, and that the said bishop may be able to build himself a becoming house and buy the said ornaments, grants relaxation . . ."

This selection of appeals may perhaps fittingly close with one which affords a rare and arresting glimpse of the quiet work of piety and public service performed by a layman living in solitude in Hornsey in 1464, and keeping his small corner of the world in seemly condition in times when there existed no local public authority whose business it was to do this. John Cledro is described as "a layman of the diocese of York" in another bull which permits that a confessor of his choice may grant him, being penitent and having con-

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fessed, plenary remission of his sins, in the hour of death. The papal letter relating to his work appeals for

"alms for the completion and augmentation of the chapel of St Michael the Archangel, situate within the parish of the parish church of St Mary the Virgin, Harnsay, in the diocese of London, and in a solitary place; which chapel has been wont, with the consent of the rector and parishioners of the said church, to be governed by persons who lead a solitary life and devote themselves to the repair of decayed bridges and ways, and the burial of the bodies of persons slain by robbers, and exercise many other works of piety, and is governed at present by John Cledro who leads the said life, in which masses and other divine offices are celebrated daily, in which, by the intercession, it is believed, of the said Archangel, the Most High manifests divers miracles, so that there is great devotion and resort thereto, and whose buildings are not yet complete, nor do the resources of the said chapel, which has no yearly rents of its own, suffice for such completion as well as for the said works of piety." [1]

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London.

[1] The public is deeply indebted to the Public Record Office, London, for having made this material available by sending scholars to the Vatican —from about 1890 onwards—to select, transcribe and translate entries relating to the United Kingdom. These are published from time to time by His Majesty's Stationery Office, in a series entitled *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland.* It is from vols. 1-12 (1893–1934) *Papal Letters*, and *Petitions*, vol. i. (1896) that the many entries quoted in this article have been reproduced by the kind permission of H.M. Stationery Office.

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THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION IN MODERN LIFE.

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RELIGION is notoriously a word of many meanings; and the choice which one makes between these will largely determine the answer one gives to the question suggested by the title of this paper. If religion be, as some people appear to think, a belief in a magnified and irascible, non-natural man in the sky, the question of its function in modern life need hardly be raised. Or if, as is maintained by a very different school of thinkers, it be "the quest of a good life shared in a good world," the reality of man's need of it is so unquestionable, and the things that it does are so obvious, that again there would be no point in discussing its function in modern life. Since, however, neither of the extreme definitions suggested represents what most intelligent people mean by religion, the question raised in the title of this essay may be one of some interest and importance. But it is plain that no discussion of it will be worth the writer's or the reader's time unless it be prefaced by some statement of the sense in which the word religion is to be used. Quite briefly, then, let me say that for the purposes of this paper "*religion*" shall include both a cosmic and a moral aspect: one's attitude towards the Determiner of Destiny, and one's urge to worship, to bow down before an ideal, and to carry out actively the human and social implications that the highest ideal involves.

Although these two tendencies are normally dependent on each other, in less happy cases one of the two may be largely undeveloped, or may be deliberately repressed. In such a situation there results a lop-sided religion which is notably incomplete. If one can find in the Determiner of Destiny nothing of the ideal, nothing of the worshipful, one's

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attitude toward it will be a strange religion. And if one's religion consist in contemplation of or enthusiasm for an ideal which one considers quite non-existent and therefore purely imaginary or conceptual, one's religion, to say the least, will be rather thin, and in fact, as religion, will be hardly recognisable. A religion that is at all complete must include a cosmical attitude which finds in the Determiner of Destiny something that is worshipful; or it must be an urge to worship which finds the ideal worshipped in some sense real.

Has religion as the sort of thing thus indicated any place or function in our modern life? At the outset we are faced by the challenge of Freud, which has been re-echoed not only by several of his technical followers, but also by writers like Martin, Leuba, and to some extent by Lippman. Religion, we are told, is a case of escape psychology. It is a semi-pathological infantilism, it is a mark of a mind that is not really grown up, that dares not face the world as it is, but wishes to continue indefinitely the protected life of the childhood home, or even of the maternal womb. It is an abnormal desire to live indefinitely in a fool's paradise.

Whether we like it or not, this is a description which, I fear, fits many forms of contemporary Christianity better than most of us care to acknowledge. Does it fit religion in general as I have defined it? Certainly it does not apply to the cosmical sense as such. There need be no escape psychology about one's attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny. Neither does the description fit the ethical side of religion if taken by itself. Surely neither Bertrand Russell nor those who identify religion with social morality would urge us to live in a fool's paradise. But when the cosmical and the ethical or worshipful aspects of religion are blended —and we have seen that in religion at its best and fullest they always are blended—then indeed the question arises whether the Freudian criticism does not again apply. To many of the actual forms of our religion, as I have said, it does apply only too well. But, to be brief about it, I for one cannot feel that the union of the cosmical and the moral in religion need necessarily be open to the charge of infantilism or of the abnormal desire to live in a fool's paradise. The faith that there is something worshipful in the Determiner of Destiny may be only an hypothesis; but the same is true of the faith that in the Determiner of Destiny there is nothing worthy of worship, nothing that cares for ideals. Only a demonstrated and mechanistic Naturalism would justify one

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in writing down as escape psychology a liberal and open-eyed religious faith.

But the faith, if it is to keep itself free from the taint of infantilism, must be, and must remain, open-eyed. The religion which is to have a place and function in the life of to-day must not, like the ostrich, hide its head under the sand. It must not put loyalty to revered beliefs before loyalty to truth. Through ages of the past, men of God scorned earthly delights and led instead a life of self-inflicted pains; in the softer times that are upon us, the sincere man will find religion not only comforting but austere. The Freudian accusation does not hold: but it is a salutary lesson, a sobering threat, and we should keep it ever before our eyes. The religion of to-day and to-morrow must leave out of its book of sacred songs that hymn, beloved of our fathers:—

> "To doubt would be disloyalty,
> To falter would be sin."

Let us at last come to close grips with our subject: the function in the life of our times of such an open-eyed and sincere religion as I have tried to picture. And although, as I have said, this religion at its best and richest will be both cosmic and ethical, we shall find it helpful in estimating its functions to consider each of these its aspects somewhat separately and in turn. For surely both sides need emphasis.

All of the great historical religions have nourished ideals, and to a large extent have found themselves in these ideals. The ideals which filled the soul of the Founder of Christianity, and which pointed the way to most of his first followers, were both individual and social. This double aspect of Christian idealism has characterised it throughout its course. While neither side of the ideal, however, has at any time been quite forgotten, different generations have given different emphases in their devotion. There can be little doubt that in several periods of Christian history the individualistic side of the Christian ideal received too exclusive emphasis. And all of the older readers of this paper will recall the enthusiasm with which a small and devoted group of Christians, at the end of the last century, announced the rediscovery of the social side of the Founder's Gospel. Too exclusively had Christian workers in the past devoted themselves to the purely "spiritual" side of life. With almost fatal blindness they had forgotten two things of large importance. The first was the fact that innocent good things of this life are really good

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and that a truly Christian spirit could only feel sadly dissatisfied so long as a large portion of mankind was deprived of them. And the second truth rediscovered was the related one that soul and body, however different, were at any rate closely bound together and that the things of the spirit were in part dependent upon the conditions of the flesh. If the external, the physical, the economic were not of primary importance, they were at any rate of tremendous secondary importance. Thus the Social Gospel of the early twentieth century brought to our attention a side of the Christian ideal which never, indeed, had been completely forgotten, but had for long received too little emphasis.

The reiterated preaching and practice of the Social Gospel constitutes, and must for years continue to constitute, a large part of the function of religion in modern life. Though much has been accomplished there remains an enormous work still to be done before the great mass of our fellows have anything like a proper share in the good things of this world, and before evil external conditions cease to be a drag upon the progress of the spirit. Religion must do its share toward making this a better world, not only ethically and spiritually, but economically and physically.

The matter, however, is not so simple as the more enthusiastic advocates of the Social Gospel sometimes suppose. In the first place, it is plain that an ideal Christian community cannot be brought about by the simple means which at any rate a simple reading of the Gospels would suggest. Merely to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, to give to him that asketh and to cultivate that charity which suffereth long and is kind, are not enough to answer the needs of our day. The situation involves complicated economic principles; and the achievement of the social ideal would seem to require not only exhortation and education but also some sort of political action.

According to Professor Niebuhr, society is by necessity so much more "immoral" than the individual that the methods by which the lives and conduct of individuals have been raised to higher and higher levels can be expected to achieve but relatively small results when applied to classes and to nations. The preaching and teaching and other activities of the Social Gospel movement have had considerable effects upon the conscience and the conduct of persons; but it is mere romancing to suppose that they can do more than a little toward the achievement of social and international justice. The moralists, whether religious or

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rational, who trust to education and persuasion fail to understand the

> "brutal character of the behaviour of all human collectives, and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all inter-group relations. Failure to recognise the stubborn resistance of group egoism to all moral and inclusive social objectives inevitably involves them in unrealistic and confused political thought. They regard social conflict either as an impossible method of achieving morally approved ends or as a momentary expedient which a more perfect education or a purer religion will make unnecessary. They do not see that the limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behaviour, make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end." [1]

Doubtless the Social Gospel can do something toward the moralisation of society; but a frank facing of the facts makes one far less confident of the power of religion to reform the world than were the leaders of the movement twenty or ten years ago. To be sure, it is no fatal reproach to religion that it cannot do everything, even if many of our predecessors supposed that it could. But it is somewhat disheartening to be forced to conclude that the Christian ideal can be achieved only by recourse to non-Christian methods.

A less discouraging but not less puzzling question is the following. The aim of the Social Gospel is the reforming of our political, social and economic structures in such fashion that poverty will be reduced to a minimum and the charitable activities which now are so largely dependent upon the Christian Church will be taken over by the State. The Social Gospel thus appears to be labouring for its own obliteration. The logic of the matter would seem to be that the external matters with which the Social Gospel is concerned belong properly to the political and economic organisation of society; that in alleviating evil conditions Christianity is merely a stop-gap; and that in working for a better economic situation it is helping to bring about a time when it will no longer be needed, and when, therefore, religion will have no function in the social life.

[1] *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. xx.

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It may, of course, be said in reply that many of the great efforts toward reform and the increase of human welfare have been in the past, and are to-day, in a similarly paradoxical situation. Such, for example, were the abolition movement in both England and America, prison reform, universal suffrage, and many others. Reforms such as these have aimed at a goal, the effort to attain which has been their *raison d'être*, and the achievement of which meant or would mean their cessation. And it may well be that the Social Gospel as a movement is quite on a par with these reforms. But will anyone seriously maintain that religion as such is a mere episodic and temporary reform movement such as these? Or put it in another way. Let us suppose that the Social Gospel achieves its purposes. Let us suppose that the ideal economic situation (whatever that may be) has been attained; that there are no more poor; that all men have equal opportunity; that all the boys and girls go to good schools, and all the grown-ups have plenty of leisure and plenty of luxury; that wars cease and that charity is unknown because unneeded. My question is, would this satisfy the heart of man? Should we not soon take for granted all these external things, and find still within us a deep longing that nothing of this external sort could satisfy?

I do not pretend to know what is the full answer to the problems suggested by these various and puzzling considerations. But at least two partial conclusions do seem to emerge. One of them is that a realistic facing of the actual situation must persuade us that neither the Social Gospel nor religion in some more inclusive sense can do for the individual and society all the things that need to be done. Religion is only one force in human life and in human society among several. The refusal to be sentimental about the situation, the insistence upon a realistic attitude toward actuality, need not, however, drive religious men to the opposite extreme of defeatism—as Professor Niebuhr seems to think, or at least to fear. If religion cannot do everything, it does not follow that it can do nothing. And the contribution to social progress that can be made by men who are filled with the religious spirit may be, and is, very great indeed.

The other conclusion which would seem to emerge from the facts we have been considering is this: that if religion is to be more than a merely temporary stop-gap for more powerful and fundamental forces, it will have to place external things, such as material, economic and political conditions, in the second rank of its objectives. It must not,

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indeed it cannot, neglect them. The Christian spirit is too overflowing in its good will to see any form of need without eagerly making its contribution and pouring out its unstinted devotion. But in aiding good political and economic movements it is acting, in a sense, only negatively. The achievement of economic and political ideals would be merely the opening up of a road toward something more positively worth while. Good laws do not create the values for which religion longs; they merely "hinder the hindrances." The combination of good laws and good State schools may do something more positive than this. They may inculcate good habits in the population, diminish crime, bring about a smoother and happier working of society—surely a consummation devoutly to be wished. But proper conditioning of behaviour even of this excellent sort is still in some sense negative and external. The State with proper laws and by the use of wise psychological and pedagogical methods could very well do much toward the achievement of this end without the aid of religion. If religion is to have a lasting function in the life of the future it must have something to contribute which the State when unaided by religion cannot produce. It will always seek to influence externals, but it cannot stop with them. It must aim at something more inward than an unreligious psychology and pedagogy can achieve.

As I understand it, the ethical ideal which religion cherishes is something more than a situation in which men should happen not to be bad. It is something more than even a kind of external conditioning in which men should almost necessarily perform good acts. The ethical ideal of religion is that men should *be* good. And this, I suppose, means that they should love goodness. Although Kant, in my opinion at any rate, fell very far short of answering the central ethical question, there is still a profound truth in his doctrine that the will which wills the good has a unique kind of goodness which nothing else in heaven or earth approaches. The proper arrangement of external conditions can perhaps prevent men from hating or ignoring the good; something more is needed if they are to be led to will and love it. Only something which gets down not merely into their muscles but into their hearts can do that.

Can religion do this thing? The answer is as empirical and as certain as is anything in natural science. In innumerable cases in every generation for several thousands of years religion has done it. As we have seen, religion is in part a

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deep longing to find and worship an ideal; and the great historical religions have directed this native human urge into lofty channels and conducted it into seemingly miraculous victories.

One way in which they have done this has been by the direct teaching of the moral law with all the sanction of a divine authority behind it. Even when no authoritative revelation has been appealed to, the religions have connected the good life with the Determiner of Destiny, and have taught that the highest ideals we know have the backing of the Universe. Religion, said Kant, consists in viewing all our duties as divine commands. Another and a more successful way in which some of the greatest of the religions have sought to win the devotion of their followers in the service of the Good has been by placing before their eyes a glowing picture of what life at its noblest might be. To this picture, in a rather surprisingly large number of cases, the hearts of men have responded. It is not the abstract goodness of Ethics which religion has used as its beckoning ideal, but goodness incarnate—the Word made flesh and dwelling among us. Many examples of this might be cited. Here belong, as Bergson in his recent book has pointed out, the whole noble army of genuine mystics, the unusual individuals who by immediate intuition have come to that direct realisation of universal life and universal love which he calls "dynamic religion." Foremost among the men who have made goodness contagious should, I suppose, be mentioned the Buddha and the Christ. Few things in the history of the race are more notable or more heartening than the way in which these two lofty lives, these two great names, these two ideal and idealised personalities, have brought about genuine conversion, a turning away from the little, the self-centred, the sensuous, to the larger view, the more inclusive interest, the more ideal devotion. The image of the pure, the calm, the wise, the pitiful, the devoted Gotama has been the inspiration for genuine good will to millions of our fellows during these last twenty-five hundred years. And, I suppose, no other one thing has ever been such a power for the moral transformation of life as the experience of falling in love with Jesus.

Now it is the opportunity and the function of religion in our day, as in all the days of the past, to make use of forces such as these, not merely in reducing crime, but in setting men's hearts on fire with a new love of goodness. I do not think that the abandonment of the dogmas of the immaculate

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conception and the virgin birth and the various doctrines of Christology need take from religion these well-tried forces or destroy the "power of Jesus' name." Nor need religion confine itself to the use of the two great personalities to whom I have referred. Europe has had its St Francis, India its Gandhi, and every land has to-day innumerable known and unknown lovers of God and of man, whose devotion to the good, when honestly and lovingly presented, often rouses response in most unlikely quarters. And more than that, the religious man who wishes religion to function to-day will not stop with teachings nor with the presentation of historical cases in which the ideal has in part become incarnate in human flesh: he will himself embody the Good that he has seen, and by living a life of religious idealism among his fellows he will, perhaps quite unconsciously and without effort, change many whom his life touches from conventional, harmless, law-abiding citizens into genuine lovers of the Good.

It is no mere chance coincidence that the men who by their example and their words have been able to inspire this warm devotion to the ideal have been almost invariably religious and not merely moral men. By this I mean that the ideal which they have loved has been envisaged by them not as something abstract and non-existent, not as something precarious and merely conceivable, but as possessing some sort of cosmic backing. This was true of the Buddha no less than of the Christ. It was true of Confucius and Laotse no less than of Mohammed and the Hebrew Prophets. An incipient suggestion, at any rate, of this faith that the stars in their courses fight for the Best is to be seen in the extraordinary and (from the point of view of their own philosophy) quite unjustifiable confidence of the atheistic Bolshevists that somehow or other the highest social ideal is bound in the end to triumph. A merely moral man can be not only useful but admirable and noble. But a man who is not only to be moral, not only to lead a reform movement, but to turn many to righteousness by kindling within them an inner love of the Good, usually requires a kind of courage which comes most naturally to those who believe that in their efforts they are not alone, but that in some high sense the Determiner of Destiny is on their side. And this brings us to the other of the two great aspects of religion with which this paper began.

One of the great functions of religion—perhaps the greatest—has always been, and is to-day, and (I believe) ever

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shall be, to keep alive in man the cosmic sense. I do not refer here to anything mystical, though the mystical certainly has its place within the thing I mean. It does not take a mystic to realise our human setting within a larger whole. But if this realisation is to be more than an abstract and absent-minded taking-for-granted, it requires thought, reflection, cultivation. This sense of a Beyond, this refusal to let all of our attention be taken up with the passing and the particular, this conscious attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, is something which the animals do not share, it is something peculiarly and gloriously human. Like the sense of beauty, it places man upon a new and higher level, it opens up to him broader vistas and wider realms. It is the human opportunity. It stretches the mind and enables man to take a synoptic view, and thus to some extent places him above the little chances of his fate.

The great historical religions have always stimulated and nourished this cosmic sense. There have been times (as I have already pointed out) when our own religion did this perhaps too exclusively. Not that one can remember God too well: but that in remembering God one can forget man. It was fortunate that the preaching of the Social Gospel remedied this over-emphasis upon the other-worldly. But I sometimes wonder whether the Humanism inherent within the Social Gospel has not done its work rather too thoroughly: whether in remembering man we have not begun to forget God. A colleague of mine tells me that nearly all the sermons he has heard during the past twenty-five years are of one general type. The preacher says, Brethren, there are two Great Commandments: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Leaving aside the first of these for the present, let us consider the second.

Let me repeat, then, what I have said already, that one of the great functions of religion in our time, perhaps the greatest, is to restore to our minds and to keep before our attention our easily vanishing sense of God. And by the word "God" I do not mean necessarily a personal Creator. He may be that, and He may not. Perhaps we may never know. How we should envisage the Divine is a theme upon which theologians and philosophers will perhaps ever be divided. As philosophers and theologians we may properly dispute and discuss. But religion is not theology, and for the religious life it suffices to know so much as was revealed to Moses on Sinai: "I am that I am." Man can get on very

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well without a complete metaphysic or an exact creed; but he must sink to something less than fully human if he have no sense for the cosmic and divine, no conscious attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny.

It is for this reason that I cannot feel that Humanism, with all its admirable good will and energy, even begins to fulfill or to understand the function of religion in these times or in any other times. Social reform and soup kitchens are admirable and needed. But man was made not only for these but for something greater than these. To forget this highest and most blessed of all man's potentialities seems to me far from humanistic. A genuine Humanism must inevitably point man on to the more than human.

Some years ago I attended a conference at Hartford (in Connecticut), the aim of which was the discussion of matters closely related to the topic of this paper. One of the speakers at the conference was a psychiatrist who had a wide acquaintance among the many very modern clergymen of the metropolis; and he chose for his subject: "The Task of the Clergyman in our Times." His paper was based on his own personal observations, and it was largely devoted to a description of the way in which the typical parson went about to psychiatrists, to physicians, to social-workers, to economists, to politicians, saying that though he himself had no special knowledge or training he would greatly like to be of assistance in some subordinate way if that were at all possible. The speaker's conclusion on the matter was that the clergyman had no special field of his own, but that his function was to be everybody's little helper.

I believe that the clergyman of to-day has a very special field and a very definite function. That field is not economics nor psychiatry, nor abstract morals, but religion; and that function is just what it has always been since the days of the Founder, since the days of Socrates, since the days of the Buddha: the saving of souls. This salvation does not mean merely going to heaven when you die, though in some high sense it may include that too. It means primarily the salvaging, the reawakening, the nourishing of the spiritual life. It means awakening man to his true nature both morally and cosmically. It means the cultivation of the infinite aspect of the human self. For in man at his best, and in his humanest, there is a longing for more than a life of shreds and patches, for more than a collection of separate satisfactions. As the peculiarly human, the more than animal, is progressively developed in man, he becomes

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increasingly conscious of his inability to find complete satisfaction in the finite. Never, even in the most luxurious of pleasures, can he say to the passing moment, "*Verweile doch, du bist so schön.*" His spirit longs to ascend to the more than finite, to the more than human, and worship there.

It is the function of religion to save and to nourish this sense of a worshipful Whole, of a living Ideal. And furthermore, it is the function of religion to find within this Whole thus realised a place for all man's lesser purposes and for all man's life. Religion must make real to us the synoptic point of view, teach us to see our lives and their petty details in their proper setting, to view ourselves and all our little gains and losses *sub specie æternitatis*. We must still look to it as did our predecessors to lift us to a plane higher than the economic and hedonic, to expand our purposes into larger ventures, to fill us with a new enthusiasm for the Good, to vouchsafe us some insight as to the purpose of human life, to show us, in Dante's words, *come l'uom s'eterna*.

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THE GOSPELS AND HISTORY.

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It is abundantly clear that considerations of doctrinal interpretation and of moral necessity have largely coloured the Gospel records. Attempts to remove this colouring and to find in what is left the material for drawing a portrait in black and white of the historical Jesus always fail. Not only is it impossible to make such an artificial separation between fact and interpretation, but also the attempt is always made according to preconceived ideas. The records themselves bear witness to a belief that the Jesus of the Gospels is a unique person, that he cannot be confined within the limits of any preconceived category, in terms of ancient or modern thought: he is neither the Prophet, nor the conventional Jewish Messiah; he is neither the Big Brother, nor the ecclesiastical Son of God.

Fact and interpretation are inextricably interwoven in the Gospel stories. And modern critical methods reveal in the Gospels, not biographical statements, but collections of anecdotes arranged and developed according to the beliefs and needs of the primitive Christian Church. Must we, then, as does Professor Lightfoot at the close of his book, *History and Interpretation in the Gospels*, lapse into an attitude of scepticism in regard to the question of whether or not the Gospels are historical? Must we necessarily conclude that "the form of the earthly no less than of the heavenly Christ is for the most part hidden from us"? The Jesus of the Gospels is seen through the eyes of those who had faith in him as the Risen Christ. Is he the Jesus of history?

Are the primitive records of Christianity historical? Is the Jesus of the Gospels the Jesus of history? We set ourselves to give answers to these two questions. But a problem of philosophy concerning the nature of history is involved.

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It is necessary to determine what history is and what constitutes an historical record before we can adjudge whether or not the Gospels are historical and present us with a fair history of the life or Our Lord.

I.

Facts by themselves do not make history. It is only when events enter into the life of humanity, being noted and remembered, that they become historical. And only when past events are brought into the present, whether by means of written records or by oral tradition or by traceable influence on the life and thought of later generations, do they make history. There is a history of the immediate present, made up of the sum total of the histories of all the individuals of any particular present age; and there is a history of mankind made up of the life of humanity throughout the ages. But the latter is discerned as a direct development from age to age, a stream of traditions and influences arising out of a succession of happenings, and passing on through each generation up to the present day. An essential feature of all history is that it is of significance for the present.

"All history is contemporary history." That is to say, there is nothing which can be termed historical which does not enter into contemporary life; this is the point of view which I adopt in this article. An event unrecorded in any way whatsoever would become as though it never had been. But the recording of events does not, of itself, make history. Whether the records be in documents, or in human memories, or in discernible changes in environments, it is necessary, before they make history, that they shall be read by men; they must draw out a response from humanity. The historian should sift all the evidences for the past upon which he can lay hands, including the discoveries made by antiquarians; but his judgements in regard to the probable course of events which have taken place in the past are necessarily affected by the particular environment to which he belongs. Further, men of each present age understand the pronouncements of historians of all ages in relation to their own lives. Thus, man sees facts in the light of his conceptions of their influence and meaning in relation to human life as he knows it; and in so doing he makes history out of fact and interpretation. The present, therefore, gives its own meaning to the records of the past, and it always determines for itself what is factual and what is legendary.

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An illustration will make the issue clearer. In the Old Testament, in the book of Joshua, it is recorded by the prose writer as an historical fact that the sun stood still until Israel had avenged themselves of their enemies. To-day, in view of scientific hypotheses, it is generally considered to be impossible that any such event can have taken place. Before ancient conceptions of the universe had given place to modern views on the solar system it was possible to believe that the sun stood still. But no amount of rationalising can make the miracle intelligible to the modern mind; we can only assume that the writer has misunderstood or misapplied a quotation, perhaps taken from an old poem on the creation. That is to say, what has in the past been taken as factual is nowadays accepted as legendary. Yet even so, its historicity is really called in question, not only because of the scientists' scepticism about it, but also through the realisation of the modern world that such an event, even were it actually to have taken place, is of little or no significance in human affairs as they are now studied. In fact, such an event as the one recorded in Joshua finds no real place in a world whose ideas about God and whose interests in science show the story to be, if not actually contrary to, at least unimportant for its moral and mental and spiritual discernments. This story enters into history as a record in the Old Testament, and it takes its place, therefore, in human development. But it does so quite apart from the question whether or not the sun did actually stand still.

History, then, is not a string of bare facts; it is a process, arising out of the reactions of men to events and environments, culminating in an attitude of the present to the past. It changes with the development of humanity, and is thus always contemporary. But we shall do less than justice to such a theory of history if we fail to take into account three very important considerations.

Firstly, history is built upon facts. There is a series of events woven into the history of humanity; it is hidden in a network of interpretations both true and false. Human experiences have their causes in a succession of factual happenings. Men may err in their conclusions in regard to what these facts are. But we must assume that it is possible to differentiate between fact and supposed fact, and to find out with a fair degree of accuracy whether or not the records of the past are true statements of fact. Nor is this assumption without justification; the truth or otherwise of any report may be tested in accordance with certain principles,

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"This also I believe, that unless I believe, I shall not understand." Anselm supplies a clue for providing us with tests to be applied in differentiating between fact and supposed fact. Every person is hedged about with various prejudices. The environment in which a man lives, hereditary traits in his character, his own reactions to the experiences of his past, all these things necessarily influence him in his present life. It is necessary, therefore, in deciding whether a "fact" is true or false, to assess the value of the beliefs and prejudices both of those who witness to it, and also of those who give opinions about it. But a man's beliefs can only be valued in the light of the moral and spiritual enlightenment of humanity. Further, as a tree is known by the leaves and the fruit which it bears, so a fact is recognised by the reactions and responses which it produces within humanity. Without a tree of some kind there would be no fruit; and without a fact of some kind there could be no response. We must, then, judge whether the responses and reactions resulting from a "fact," need for their explanation some such underlying event as is recorded.

But records must also be scrutinised from the scientific and archæological standpoints; this enables us to a great extent to gauge their value. The critical faculty gives us the power to sift evidences, account for developments, and subject beliefs to the refining influence of common sense. While it is true to say that prejudice or belief is a most important factor in deciding whether or not something happened and what exactly did happen, it is equally true that such beliefs and such prejudices will be a hindrance to the discovery of truth unless the critical faculty is allowed constantly to affect them; that is to say, sound judgements are made by a man only when he freely allows his beliefs to be affected by knowledge obtained critically and scientifically.

Secondly, the past is brought into the present along a direct line of development; and the present cannot be isolated from the future. The history of the past, founded upon a succession of events in their relation to the life of humanity, is built into the history of the present; and the events of the present, in their effect upon human environment through the responses made to them by human beings, will carry the history of the past and present into the future. Whether we think of individuals or of groups or of nations or of mankind as a whole, life involves a series of experiences, each indelibly written into the character of the unit under consideration. But with each new experience the character

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is changed, however imperceptibly, and the former happenings are seen in a new light. Thus, for example, a man who, in the past, has believed that he has seen a ghost may, in later life, have so changed his character as to believe that his former experience was a delusion.

The present, then, cannot ignore the past. It grows out of it. But events which happen in the past are brought into the present through channels of human lives which are affected by them; they are clothed upon with interpretations which change according to the enlightenment of each successive age, and there is a constant interplay between changing interpretations and changing characters. If the events of the past had not taken place the present would be entirely different. So, too, the future grows out of the present which itself contains the past. The present is significant in so far as it points towards its own fulfilment in the future. History, therefore, while it is contemporary and changing, yet points towards an ultimate and complete history of the human race wherein all events and their interpretations will be seen clearly and separately in their relation to the whole range of human development.

Thirdly, whereas fact and interpretation are so interwoven in history as to make it impossible to detach with certainty either from the other, there is not involved in such a theory any idea of a double standard of truth, a truth of fact and a truth of value. A record is either true or it is not. But we can only approximate towards a true estimation of exactly what has happened in the world. Given omniscient powers it would be possible to distinguish exactly between truth and falsehood. But without such powers we can only judge, to the best of our ability, what is fact and what is not. We can, therefore, only find an approximation to truth in history, which is made up of fact and interpretation of fact. Thus, certain things may be true, though they cannot be demonstrated to have arisen out of actually known facts; and other things may be false though they can be shown to be rooted in fact. In the former case events have given rise to responses and have lost themselves from human discernment in the history which has grown out of them: in the latter case false interpretations have been put upon events. In both cases a fact or facts occurred. The records, judged as merely setting out the course of events, are either true or false.

To sum up, I have claimed that history is the story of the reactions of men to a continuous series of events and environments, a story which is retold and understood afresh in every

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present age; it is a process which culminates in an attitude of the present to the past. History is always contemporary in the sense that the past is interpreted into the present; each individual in every age has his own ideas both in regard to what is and what is not factual, and also in regard to the extent and value of interpretations which have been placed upon events. But, whereas history is thus a compound made up of fact and interpretation woven together in such a way as to make it impossible to distinguish with certainty between a true and a false record, there are three other important points to be borne in mind. Firstly, by the application of certain tests, it is possible to approximate towards a true estimation of the truth or falsehood of historical evidences; secondly, the past moves into the present and the present into the future along a direct line of development, forming one continuous process; and thirdly, there is not ultimately a truth of fact in contradiction with a truth of value.

II.

In the records of human history fact and interpretation are compounded together. But the historian must work on the hypothesis that it is possible to approximate towards an estimation of what has actually happened in the past. In order to make this approximation, we have seen, he must first take into account the conditions under which records have been made and the prejudices and beliefs of those who have been influenced by them or of those who have given judgements upon their accuracy; and secondly, he must consider them in the light of the history which has developed out of them; lastly, he must judge them in accordance with his own knowledge obtained critically and scientifically, having regard to the developments of human thought and belief in his own time.

For the great historical religions of the world, of which Christianity is one, the claim is made that certain historical facts have given rise to them. It is asserted that God has revealed himself to humanity in a specified series of events, and that these revelations have educed in men a response of faith. But the records of these acts of God in the world presuppose a belief in the possibility that God may so reveal himself, and they are written by those who already have faith in the truths which they are intended to make manifest. Thus the historian who would concern himself with the origins of these religions, before he can judge whether or not

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the supposed facts occurred as they are recorded to have done, and before he can state how far the records represent a true historical picture, is bound to recognise that his judgements must be affected by his attitude to the questions of the supernatural and religious faith. If the idea of the supernatural is categorically denied it is impossible to contend that God can have acted in the world in any particular event; and if a man has no faith to see an event as the action of God he must regard that fact as being falsely interpreted by those who do see it as God's action.

The mystico-moral ideal, which is the soul of religion, is built upon the assumption of the existence of a supernatural sphere and upon the belief that it is possible for communion to be established between man and God. The ideal has grown up within the development of humanity, and therefore it would be unreasonable to rule out, as inaccurate, all records which tell of facts witnessing to the reality of an environment other than the physical universe, and telling of contacts made between man and God. But equally unreasonable would it be to assume that all such records are true, and to place them outside the realm of historical criticism.

The word supernatural is difficult; it is used to express different ideas. But we may divide its uses into two categories. We may speak of a "magical supernatural"; this we find in fairy tales, in superstitions, and in stories which arbitrarily assign to God the responsibility for supposed dislocations of the established physical order. The word in such contexts is devoid of moral significance; the cause of any extraordinary and unexplained phenomenon in the physical world is attributed to a supernatural activity which whimsically breaks in upon the natural world and which is unaffected by any moral or physical laws. But there is a second aspect of the supernatural; this we find in the religious activity of man, which ever causes him to persevere towards a perfection denied to him in this life, and which manifests itself in his devotion to God and to humanity. Here the word has a definitely moral content; it defines the spiritual environment as an essential field of experience for man, revealed to and apprehended by man in the normal moral and mental and spiritual development of humanity. The natural and the supernatural are two inter-related parts of the whole environment of God and man.

It would appear, then, that if, in the light of modern knowledge, we are to test the claim made by the great historical religions that certain specified supernatural revela-

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tions in history have given rise to them, we must bear in mind the twofold division we have made. Once assume both the existence of the supernatural and also the possibility of revelation no story purporting to describe actual supernatural happenings can be denied with absolute certainty. Each story must be judged on its own merits. But it seems reasonable to suggest that the touchstone of judgement is whether or not a supposed event does violence to the moral aspect of the supernatural. The modern historian must find it difficult to accept as true the evidence in religious literature and teaching of the occurrence of "facts" where such evidence necessarily assumes the reality of the "magical supernatural." A certain recorded miracle may or may not have taken place; if its performance contravenes the highest moral and spiritual convictions of humanity the balance of evidence is against it, and it belongs to the class of improbable possibilities.

Whether or not a story is judged to be an accurate representation of fact, in so far as there is a response to it, it makes history. A continuous series of happenings is interpreted into living history in a constant stream of records and traditions handed on from generation to generation. In religions the chief factor in this process of interpretation is faith. Facts and myths and stories of miracles, whether true or false, are built into the fabric of human history by the interpretative power of religious faith, and they take their place in the general representation in history of the course of events. Thus the historian who studies the origins of religions not only is concerned with the question of the supernatural, but also must reckon with the faith which characterises each religion. By faith a myth may be transformed for the faithful into "fact"; by faith an event may be interpreted as a revelation of God; by faith a man may be discerned to be an oracle of God. Religious literature and teaching is an expression of faith, and thus an important factor in assessing its historicity is the value of the faith upon which it is grounded.

We are now in a position to turn to the questions we originally asked ourselves: Are the primitive records of Christianity historical, and is the Jesus of the Gospels the Jesus of history?

III.

The Gospels have taken their place in the life of each successive age since the beginning of the Christian era.

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To-day the attitude of men to their contents and message influences to a considerable extent the life and thought of contemporary society. They are therefore historical; the facts and interpretations which lie behind and within them have become a part of the historic process which has developed out of the varying reactions of men to the Gospel story of Jesus. But Christians claim both that the Jesus of the Gospels is no mythical personage, and also that the records of his life are very largely in conformity with the actual facts of his career. Two problems confront us. Firstly, dismissing the untenable proposition that there was no such person as Jesus of Nazareth who "suffered under Pontius Pilate," is it possible to identify the Jesus of the Gospels and of later Christian experience with the actual Jesus of Nazareth? And secondly, are the Gospel stories factual or legendary? The answers we give to these two interdependent questions will determine the character of the historicity we ascribe to the Gospel records and to the portrait of Jesus drawn in them.

I have suggested that the historian who concerns himself with the claims of religions to be historical must give heed to their assumptions in regard to the supernatural and to the faith which is their basis. Let us follow up this suggestion.

The Christian ideas about God are evolved out of a Jewish background. The New Testament theology is rooted and grounded in the Old Testament. The God who is revealed in the Christ of the Gospels is Jahweh, the God of Israel. Both in the Old Testament and in the New it is assumed that man is the child of God, created by Him, and able to be indwelt by His spirit. That is to say, there is no unbridgeable gulf between the natural and the supernatural. The heritage of man is to be a citizen of both the spiritual and also the material kingdoms. But through disobedience humanity has thrown away its right to eternal life and communion with God. Only the actions of God can re-endow it with this gift. Thus Christianity teaches that through Christ communion between man and God is re-established; what the Old Testament reveals to be necessary for salvation, and what in part was achieved in Judaism, has been fulfilled in the new dispensation. But there are two important ideas in the Old Testament which are necessarily carried over into the New.

First, fundamental to the whole range of Judaistic religious development is the belief that the relationship between man and God is a moral one. Progressively, and particularly in the Prophets, God's character is revealed in

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accordance with a growing sense of its moral nature; but this progressive revelation is in conformity with the growth of moral aspirations and perceptions on the part of the great leaders of Judaism. Thus with the evolution of the apprehension of the true nature of God, there develops an increasingly sure conviction that a moral God must demand a moral response from those who would hold communion with Him.

Secondly, arising directly out of the former idea is the further consideration that God works in and through human channels. A revelation of God which shows Him in the character of a moral being can only be apprehended by man in his capacity as a moral being. For an essential feature of morality is personal relationship, and personal relationships are only possible where there is mutual understanding and sympathy between the persons concerned. Thus the God of the Old Testament is revealed through the men who witnessed to His existence and to the moral nature of His character.

The aspect of the supernatural which is prevalent in the Old Testament, and thus also in the New Testament, is therefore to be found in the religious activity of men, such as were the Prophets, who strove towards a moral perfection which has God for its pattern. God reveals Himself in the world, in the ordinary course of human history: He manifests His character and His claims through humanity. It is true that both in Judaism and also in Christianity there are considerable traces of what we have formerly defined as the "magical supernatural." Such traces, frequently appearing in the Old and New Testaments and in the later developments of Christian teaching, are natural to religions which have evolved out of primitive animism; and they are instructive in so far as they support the contention that revelation is given only in and through human channels. But another problem emerges. Are the miracles in the Gospels to be accepted or rejected on the basis of the foregoing argument?

The Christian religion is founded upon the belief that Jesus rose from the dead. The miracle of the Resurrection stands at the very centre of its theology. And the New Testament as well as the Old is full of stories of miraculous happenings interpreted as witnessing to the divine activity in the world. Throughout the history of the Church there have been those who accept the Divine Sonship of Christ on the grounds of his supernatural power to perform miracles.

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But it would be unreasonable to place all the Bible miracles in the same category and make them all stand or fall together. It was suggested previously that, in judging whether records of supernatural happenings are true or false, the touchstone of judgement is whether or not the supposed event does violence to the moral aspect of the supernatural. By the application of this test it is possible to divide miracles into two classes. Firstly, there is the miracle which is a revelation of a truth apprehended by the moral perception of man; such an event manifests the power of God in the world, the power of the supernatural working within the natural; but the manifestation is made through the channel of human responsiveness. Secondly, there is the miracle which mystifies and whose only value is to demonstrate that its performer is a wonder-worker. The former, whilst it may be inexplicable in terms of natural scientific thought, does no violence to the human reasoning faculties and may generally be explained in terms of human moral or spiritual apprehension. The latter is a complete mystery and violates the moral relationship between man and God.

If our criterion of judgement is correct we may reasonably agree that miracles, such as the Resurrection of Jesus, may be true, even though the Gospel narratives may give inaccurate or false accounts of the manner in which they took place; and we must reject from the realm of fact many of the miracles recorded in the Gospels, even though some of them may serve as admirable mythical symbols for teaching purposes. But whether we regard a miracle as true in fact or as only a symbol it is understood by faith; and the recording of it witnesses to the faith of its recorder. The Christian aspect of the supernatural, which runs through the whole of Christian theology, and which is exemplified in the Gospel emphasis upon miracles, is arrived at and accepted through faith in the risen Jesus as the revelation of God. Only, therefore, if the faith of the Christian is evaluated is the historian in a position to state an opinion on the historicity of the Gospels.

The fundamental basis of Christian faith, the faith which inspired the writers of the Gospels, is a personal relationship which exists between the believer and Jesus. Such a faith can only exist and grow where that relationship is a living reality. Hence the Jesus of faith is the risen Christ. It is possible, therefore, to contend that the Resurrection is a myth transformed by faith into "fact." But such a contention fails adequately to account for the faith of the

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original apostles. Their faith arose as a response to the actual Jesus of Nazareth, and it enabled them, in the light of their later experiences, to know that he had risen from the dead. Christian faith, then, is rooted in a response made to a real person; and all the actions of Jesus are interpreted by that faith and are discerned as the activities of the risen Christ, the revelation of God. Such a faith is a development within humanity, a response to a human personality; and it has given rise to the growth of moral fruits which, in the form of Christian teaching and Christian lives, are judged by enlightened humanity to be good.

We may now conveniently face the two problems noted at the beginning of this third section. It would appear that we may justifiably identify the Jesus of the Gospels with the actual Jesus of Nazareth, so long as we are thereby neither committed to believe that all the Gospel stories are statements of fact, nor required to hold that we have anything more in the Gospels than a collection of anecdotes centred round the person of Jesus and suited to the needs of the primitive Church. The identification must be made by the operation of a reasonable Christian faith. The Jesus of the Gospels is the risen Christ of faith; but the faith which interprets the actions of Jesus of Nazareth into the activities of the risen Christ is born of a personal response made to the actual Jesus. Faith did not create out of nothing the myth of the Resurrection; but the faith of the Apostles in the Resurrection of Jesus was the crown of a long process of moral and spiritual evolution within human history.

Secondly, the Gospel stories are both factual and legendary. Each story must be judged on its own merits; and each, therefore, must be subjected to the tests to which, we have argued, all historical records must be submitted. Throughout the Gospel narratives the interpretative power of faith has been at work, and it is possible only to approximate to the knowledge of what is fact and what is interpretation. In the Gospels, as in all records in which faith is the interpreting medium, faith has in certain places probably transformed myths into "facts" and interpreted ordinary happenings as divine revelations.

The two major questions which have concerned us throughout may now be answered. The primitive records of Christianity are historical; and the Jesus of the Gospels is the Jesus of history. But the character of the historicity of the records and of the portrait of Jesus in them is not such as to enable us to say that they are exactly true to fact. The

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records, a mixture of fact and myth compounded with interpretation, were written in the light of a faith in the Resurrection of Jesus which interpreted his life as a unique revelation of God; the portrait of Jesus is not photographic but imaginative, artistic, drawn to reveal his character and personal magnetism rather than the bare facts of his career.

The Gospels, then, are historical not because they can be shown to record an accurate but bare account of a series of events, but because they reveal to those who will make a response of faith a living person who is seen to be the unique revelation of God in human history, apprehended by man in his normal capacity as a rational and moral and spiritual being. There is one great fact which underlies the whole fabric of Christianity and which is the kernel of the Gospels. It is the life of the actual Jesus of Nazareth which gave rise to the response in humanity which has "turned the world upside down." This great fact is the one certain historical rock upon which Christianity is built. It stands secure whether the Gospels were written in the first or second centuries and whether the recorded miracles are true reports or false. The response to it must be judged in accordance with the highest enlightenment of humanity; and, if Christianity is to be a vital force for good in the world, the fact itself must constantly be re-interpreted into a living reality within each successive age of human history.

L. J. COLLINS.

WESTCOTT HOUSE, CAMBRIDGE.

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THE LIBERAL-MODERNIST VIEW OF JESUS.

A REJOINDER.

THE REV. R. A. EDWARDS

In the issue of this Journal for July 1935 I wrote an article criticising the Liberal-Modernist theory of the historical Jesus, and in the January issue of this year Dr C. J. Cadoux replied with a group of very gentle criticisms of my article. He said that he had felt stirred to get his teeth into my arguments, but bit only some of them, and those not very firmly.

In the first place it is important to be clear about the exact line of my argument. I suggested that the Liberal-Modernist view of the person of Jesus was incredible from several points of view, and assumed as fundamental to the case that were the Liberal-Modernist theory correct what happened was indisputably the deification of a man. Before turning to the detailed run of my argument and Dr Cadoux's criticisms it is worth while attempting to get that point quite clear. I deliberately took as my opponent an extreme view of the theory. For one thing that saved me from the endless work of dealing with first one and then another particular Liberal-Modernist theory. I had neither the scholarship nor the time to attempt anything so complete, and I claim that I was justified because in the end the issue remains exactly as I described it: either the doctrine of the Incarnation is true or it is not. I felt that I was further justified by the fact that when the Liberal-Modernist theory has emerged from the studies into the ordinary ways of ordinary people the modifications count for nothing whatever. In a very great number of more or less popular books Jesus appears as a very gifted teacher described by some

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such phrase as "the wisest of the sons of men," while in many novels of the more serious kind references are made to Him that assume exactly that position. The word "peasant" was not first applied by me to our Lord; it is with "villager" quite a normal term. That this or that scholar may have elevated the term with some such expression as "so complete was his communion with God" or "so profound was his insight into spiritual realities" is utterly beside the point. Dr Cadoux holds no brief for the peasant theory as I envisage it, but it is equally clear that neither does he hold one for orthodoxy. Now that is where I experience a very real difficulty. I cannot for the life of me imagine any genuine halting place between the two. Set Jesus in the first place among the seers if you like, but the one thing you must not do unless you want to tumble over into Orthodoxy is to say anything to cloud your opinion that Jesus was just a man. That word "just" is of the utmost importance. It is not reasonable to apply to Him the descriptive phrases used by the classical tradition if you are in fact describing something else. There is nothing to be gained by trying to let the orthodox down lightly, for if Liberal-Modernism is correct down they have got to come. For example, the description "Divine Saviour" with its capital letters is not fair if by it you do not mean what orthodoxy means when it uses the words, but instead that His position was really that of a prophet, a man with a divinely given mission. "Divine Saviour" is really not the kind of phrase you would use to describe a man if you were speaking accurately and not taking a large measure of poetic license. To call Plato a "divine teacher" would no doubt be understood, but it would scarcely be considered a precise use of words, and if you used capital letters most people would feel that honour was being overdone. But the point here is rather that to use the phrase "Divine Saviour" of the Liberal-Modernist Jesus is, speaking quite strictly, to cloud the issue, for it is a phrase borrowed from a totally different view of Him. I used the word "peasant" in my article because it served exactly my purpose of fastening attention upon the gulf that indisputably stands between orthodoxy and any one of the Liberal-Modernist theories. Liberal-Modernists do postulate a man as the starting-point of their theories, and it is foolish to try to evade that issue by attempting to tone down the edges of the word, for the classical tradition has been the worship of Jesus as God. That is where we begin.

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Next a word must be said about Dr Cadoux's suggestion that I impute dishonesty to Liberal-Modernists in their treatment of the texts. Nothing could have been further from my mind. In the passage he quotes from my article I commented upon the way in which scholars have been inclined to date the books of the New Testament or to remove this or that passage from the "earliest tradition" so as to make some form of the peasant theory possible. I had in mind the nineteenth century, when beyond question the idea that an incarnation was absurd was very nearly common form among "thinkers." Science would have nothing to do with it. It was the century when humanism reached its highest point. Man was mastering all the secrets of nature and was rapidly perfecting himself by his own efforts. Beyond an intellectual use for God as a possible First Cause thinkers were finding incredible the whole idea of the world that for want of a better term we call supernatural; and the general opinion was that the orthodox account of Jesus, with His birth, His miracles, His resurrection, and above all the doctrine of His person, must be classed with similar fancies as part of the impedimenta of man's childhood, useless baggage that he must shake off if he wanted to deal adequately with the realities of the real world. That is the root from which Liberal-Modernism sprang. Men who were perfectly honourable scholars, convinced that there was something in religion, convinced that God was more than an infinitely distant First Cause, convinced that, for example, the teaching of Jesus was part of the divine message to man without which man would be immeasurably the poorer, began to look for the truth that lay behind orthodox Christianity. But they started their work with orthodoxy heavily discounted in their minds. To that undoubtedly the orthodox themselves contributed; they were covering the scientists with abuse as they derided the doctrine of Evolution; they were defending the most ridiculous positions about the Bible, claiming even for its text an inerrancy which it patently did not possess; and in countless ways contributing to make even the main stream of their tradition appear childish. On the one side of the scholars were the scientists with their frankly materialist interpretation of the universe, and on the other there were the orthodox claiming inspiration even for the punctuation of the Authorised Version; while brooding over it all there was humanism asserting that man was the master of his fate as he built the only possible heaven on the fields of earth. In such a

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position it was not easy for the scholar to look impartially at orthodox Christianity. He was a child of his age, and inevitably he began his work with the idea deeply fixed in his mind that orthodoxy was mistaken in what it had to say about Jesus. In effect the Modernists were saying: "Orthodoxy is obviously mistaken. Science has taught us that miracles and incarnations do not happen; our researches into the Bible have shown us that so far from being a divinely dictated record, it was made like other ancient books; our growing knowledge of ancient religions has revealed that orthodox Christianity is only another version of a universally told story. But here is this amazingly strong Christianity, a thing which has obviously effected a very great change in human life. Let us then look for the truth behind it."

That was not a dishonest position, but in the nature of the case it could hardly have been impartial. Modernism, I suggest, was in fact the nineteenth century in its religious aspect. The same group of assumptions was being used in the religious world as in the scientific, though in the former case they were modified by the specifically religious assumption that God, far from being no more than a remote, doubtful, and in any case probably negligible First Cause, was knowable. It would be possible to illustrate that thesis almost endlessly. The story of the criticism of the Fourth Gospel is admirably to the point. Its date was moved far into the second century, though to-day we have watched its author, though still not St John, slipping back into the apostolic circle. There is the very similar story of the criticism of the Pauline Epistles. There was a time when he had been robbed of almost every Epistle that bears his name, though to-day, with the still outstanding exception of the Pastorals, they are being restored to him. Or it was quite normally suggested that St Paul knew nothing of the earthly life of Jesus, and that is a particularly good case in point, for except to make room for a Liberal-Modernist view of Jesus what was the point of that quite gratuitous and, of course, ridiculous suggestion?

But my point, for I was not attempting then to account for the rise of Modernism, was really very plain. I was pointing out that the position has been made extremely complicated by the intricacies of the long discussion about the dates and authorship of the books of the New Testament. The real issue is apt to be lost in a maze of details. I therefore tried to lift it out of them by pointing out that St Paul died within a comparatively short time of the crucifixion

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that in the interval he had written his Epistles, and that in them the orthodox view of the person of Christ is unmistakeable. I suggested that the interval is far too short for the process of deification, and it is. Start with the fact that Paul was a Jew overcoming with immense difficulties his racial prejudice, never able in fact to leave it alone, but arguing over and over again that Gentile and Jew could be together in the same covenant, then it becomes extraordinarily difficult to credit, indeed it becomes beyond belief, that such a man, and a man into the bargain of immense intellectual power, could have acquiesced in so peculiarly a Gentile process as the deification of a hero, above all of a hero so recently dead. Quite possibly had he been presented with a copy of the Nicene Creed he would have read it and remained for a long while silent as he stumped up and down the room thinking it over, but who can doubt that in the end he would have said, "Yes, that is a good statement of the truth about my ever-present Lord." The language of his Epistles is simply not the language anyone would dream of using about any one of the Liberal-Modernist Christs, any more than the most ardent Platonist would dream of singing, "Plato, lover of my soul," and he used that language, was using it naturally as he wrote to his converts, was taking it serenely for granted that they were completely familiar with it, was resting the whole structure of his teaching upon it, when, if the Liberal-Modernists are right, the divinely inspired prophet had not been thirty years dead. The gulf between the peasant-theory and the beliefs of the early Church indeed yawns so wide that the former must be regarded as inconceivable.

That there were current in the early years various views of the person of Christ is what anyone with any historical imagination would expect, though, as I said in my article, it is remarkable, if the Liberal-Modernist theory is correct, that so quarrelsome a body as the early Christians apparently settled down to the normal traditional doctrine without any outstanding controversy on the point. There they were with a prophet behind them, and they were worshipping the prophet, singing hymns to Him, talking fantastically about a simple meal He had asked them to use to keep His memory green, thinking of His execution as a sacrifice for sins, and all without so much as a word of protest from the influential circle who had been the prophet's friends. Paul might have difficulties with Peter about eating with Gentiles, but where is Peter's protest against the kind of teaching about Jesus

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that Paul was giving to the people at Philippi? Whatever may have been the views of the average convert and however far short they may have fallen of the considered Christology of St Paul, we know singularly little about them, and the Christology of St Paul prevailed apparently without so much argument as was provoked about eating meat from animals that had been offered to Gentile gods.

But Dr Cadoux has ignored what I offered as the major point in the discussion, the inescapable fact that the main stream of the Christian tradition has been the worship of Jesus as the incarnate Son of the Father, and that if "by their fruits ye shall know them" is worth anything whatever, that tradition stands justified. I cannot repeat again the long passage in which I asked him to consider the splendour of the Christian Church. That splendour of devoted life has always had as its heart St Thomas' declaration, "My Lord and my God." Place a man however lovely in the position occupied by Him who has hitherto stood at the centre of Christian life, and is it really conceivable that the life could have been what it was? Even a Liberal-Modernist (I wonder if Dr Cadoux has read Professor Angus' beautiful book *Jesus in the Lives of Men*?) is compelled to use all the phrases of orthodoxy as he speaks of Christ, and the phrase "Divine Saviour" slips from Dr Cadoux's pen quite naturally. Why? Because the traditional language lingers with its haunting beauty even when the truth that it once described has for him long been abandoned. But nevertheless the words for him cannot and of course do not represent what they meant for, shall we say, St Francis or St Bernard. "Jesu, the very thought is sweet" does not accurately express Liberal-Modernist thought. Let the adherents of that school then ask themselves this question. Why have they not mended their phraseology? Why have they taken over the old language though its content has for them utterly changed? Why write "Divine Saviour" when the meaning to be conveyed is really "divinely inspired teacher"? Is it not because subconsciously they are aware that the thing they have to offer in the place of the old devotion is not only not the same, but has none of the saving power of the faith that held up the hands of, shall we say, John Wesley or St Paul? Do they really think that had the truth behind Christianity been what they say, Christianity would have been quite what it has been in the lives of ordinary men and women?

That, after all, is the crux of the position. It may be, and of course it is, immensely difficult to solve all the

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problems presented to any thoughtful person by the records of the early days of Christianity. There is not enough knowledge of the period for us ever to put all the facts quite beyond the reach of dispute. But always confronting the student there is the long sweep of Christian life, a piece of evidence that he can never securely leave out of his reckoning as he attempts to weigh the story of the early days. He must ask himself the question, Would Christianity have been what it has been, indeed, what it is, had it rested upon a mistake? for if the Liberal-Modernist theory is right, Christianity does rest upon a mistake, and the contact between the Christian soul and Jesus Christ is an illusion. Does the Liberal-Modernist really think that with any one of the modern Christs at its centre Christianity could have been the lovely, gracious, saving thing it has in fact been, or, for the issue is not just an exercise for the student of history, be what it is to-day, or, for the issue does not concern only ourselves, survive to help our children? Clearly not. If the Liberal-Modernist theory of Christ were true, not only is Christianity doomed, but it could never have happened.

Meanwhile, and perhaps Dr Cadoux has overlooked the point, exactly what the Liberal-Modernists have done with their Christs that range from the simple-peasant to the super-prophet, is to impress upon the world outside their studies that Christianity is for the most part sheer childishness, and that behind it there stands the faintly discernible figure of a teacher, who, although very kind and in some respects in advance of his day, was egregiously out of touch with the realities of the world of his day or any other. That impression is a very heavy handicap to the ordinary working parson. The modernists may not have meant to say "peasant," but that was what the world heard. Christianity will not die because of it, for now that we are taking courage we are beginning to see that much of Modernism was as foolish as the Science that nourished it, but all the same it has made extraordinary difficult the road that young people must take if they want to find Jesus Christ and a solid standing ground in a very troubled world.

R. A. EDWARDS.

WISBOROUGH VICARAGE,
BILLINGSHURST.

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"WOMEN UNDER FASCISM."

SYLVIA PANKHURST.

[We have received letters from various sources alleging inaccuracy in a statement made by Miss Sylvia Pankhurst in her article on this subject in the January 1936 number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL. We have therefore requested Miss Pankhurst to present, precisely, the evidence upon which the contested statement was based. We append her reply, together with one of the protests referred to.—EDITOR.]

My article, "Women Under Fascism," in the last issue of the HIBBERT JOURNAL, has aroused, as I anticipated, both keen interest and grave consternation. The position is seen to be so serious, and indeed so terrible, that many English people have doubted the truth of my statements, in particular my charge that whilst, in Italy, adultery by a wife is punished by imprisonment up to two years, and divorce is prohibited, concubinage has been established on a legal basis by the accommodation of the Church.

I have before me a copy of the Lateran Treaty, and a collection of all the State and Church laws and regulations arising from it, by Avv. Giambattista Migliori, published by Casa Ed. "Pro Familia," Milan. These clearly give the condition of the law in Italy to-day on all matters touched by the Concordat, for the use of students, lawyers and officials persons dealing with these matters.

In this document I find the Instructions of the Sacred Congregation (Sacra Congregazione per la Disciplina dei Sacramenti). In Capo II. 18, of these instructions are provisions of which the following is a literal translation:

"When the obstacle to the marriage proceeds from a previous civil marriage contracted by one of the two parties with another person, the parish priest (il parroco) will refer the case to the Bishop (l'Ordinario) who, if he thinks fit, will permit the religious marriage. This marriage cannot be

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inscribed in the civil registers of the State; therefore it is useless to notify it" (Art. 12, nn. e 2 della Legge).

Capo III. 28 directs that State officials, soldiers, diplomatic officials, and all who are forbidden to marry without special State authorisation, may be given a religious marriage without civil consequences (cfr. Istruzione della Sacra Congregazione dei Sacramenti, April 2, 1909).

The instructions further direct that widows with pensions, and particularly war widows, may also receive the religious marriage carrying no civil rights, in order that the pension may not be withdrawn by the State (cfr. però Istruzione della S.C. dei Sacramenti, January 25, 1927). These are the Church regulations issued by the Vatican.

The State law of May 27, 1929, N.847, Article 12, declares that persons may not marry if they are already legally married to someone else, or in case of mental infirmity, but the Ministerial Circular of July 18, 1929, N.2232, definitely states that the obstacles referred to in Article 12, of the law of May 27 above, impose no obstacle to the celebration of a religious marriage, but they prevent its registration. It must not be forgotten that the registration of the religious marriage is "not a mere formality, but constitutes an act indispensable for the acquisition of civil rights."

The Ministerial Order of September 3, 1929, N.2234, again clearly states: "Two persons already united by a valid civil marriage to others may later enter into a religious marriage celebrated by the parish priest, but this second marriage will have no legal value, and ought therefore not to be registered," unless it be in a special register merely for statistical purposes.

I am fully conscious that these facts make painful reading to members of the Roman Catholic Church in this country who have read them in my article for the first time, but in the interests of truth I cannot fail to give them. They are absolutely authentic and cannot be controverted in any way, and I can only refer objectors to the official documents.

E. SYLVIA PANKHURST.

A FASCIST PROTEST.

ANNE B. GRIGGS.

Miss SYLVIA PANKHURST in her article in your January issue entitled "Women under Fascism," launches a purely destructive attack on Fascism.

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With regard to the status of women in Italy, after various generalisations, which those acquainted with modern Italy would dismiss as inaccurate, she proceeds to analyse various portions of the Penal Code (as it applies to women) out of their context. We thus get a distorted view, and the comparison between these laws and our own make no allowance for the difference in outlook between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon.

The sources of the author's information, given at the end of the article, make one view it, compiled upon such data, with suspicion. Among others she quotes from bulletins issued by the Women's World Committee Against War and Fascism; F. F. Nitti (nephew of the Italian Ex-Premier of that name) who escaped from the penal island of Lipari. For Germany the authorities include Miss Gustave Heyman, the German feminist, now a refugee in Switzerland; Doctor Vaerting, who was relieved of her professorial chair in Germany.

Miss Sylvia Pankhurst alleges that in Italy adultery by a wife is punishable by imprisonment but, in the case of a man, only if he keeps a mistress. This is not correct, as the new Penal Code of 1931 gives the wife more power to obtain redress than the law of pre-Fascist Italy. The woman may prosecute her husband for infidelity through the Public Prosecutor and the law may punish the husband's offence by imprisonment. A woman deserting her home in Italy, as in Britain, forfeits her husband's support, unless she proves by law she has just cause. In Italy a wife can obtain separation and alimony in the same way as a wife in Britain. With regard to the lowering of the minimum age for marriage, this was done in order to bring the civil law into line with that of the Church. One might go on pointing out inaccuracies in the article. A moment of sane reflection would show us the inaccuracy of an article which does not even mention the magnificent work done by Mussolini for the physical and mental health, not only of mothers and children but of all his people.

The same warped outlook characterises Miss Pankhurst's attack upon the National Socialist Movement of Hitler. I will content myself by pointing out a few of the more flagrant misstatements. Miss Pankhurst alleges that women are being excluded from public life, and that their organisations were dissolved. The contrary is the case. Under the Central Body of the "Frauenwerk" all women's societies and unions are unified (such as women's lawyers societies, etc.). Women

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occupy many high positions, such as professorships at universities, principals of girls' schools, in science, and in the law. These millions of professional women in Germany have their own organisation, their own representation, and a full recognition in the New Germany. The 10 per cent. quota for the Universities was a temporary measure, and abolished in the Spring of 1934. Employment among women has increased from 1933–35 by nearly 500,000. Incidently, both Italy and Germany have women Radio Announcers, whereas the democratic B.B.C. has none (unless you include the Aunties in the Children's Hour). Again, a woman, Leni Riefenstahl, was chosen by Hitler to make the great Nazi Propaganda Films, such as "The Day of Freedom" shown at Nuremburg, in 1935.

Presumably, the tendency to which Miss Pankhurst and those of her way of thinking take exception, is an accentuation in Fascism to-day of the woman as mother, and of her education for motherhood—a not unnatural reaction in Germany from the sordid days of the post-war period, in which even women themselves denied and dishonoured motherhood and its dignity. I will not comment on the conclusion of this article, for I feel it is hardly likely that anyone will fail to perceive its incredibility and distortion.

ANNE BROCK GRIGGS,
(for the British Union of Fascists).

[An article by the Reverend Father W. Dempsey, S.J. replying to Miss Pankhurst and dealing with the law and practice of the Catholic Church in regard to marriage has arrived too late for publication. It will appear in our next issue.—EDITOR.]

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

ONE by one the older leaders of philosophical thought are leaving us. Let us trust that younger men will fittingly take their places.—The death on December 6 of Professor J. Stuart Mackenzie, in his seventy-sixth year, removes from our midst a well-known writer on philosophical subjects, some of whose works have had a wide circulation. He spent his student days in Glasgow and Cambridge. After taking his degree in Glasgow, he became George A. Clark Fellow in that University in 1882–84, and Shaw Philosophical Fellow in the University of Edinburgh 1884–89. Then he came to Cambridge, working under Henry Sidgwick, and was Fellow of Trinity College 1890–96. In 1895 he was appointed to the Chair of Logic and Philosophy at Cardiff, in succession to Professor Sorley, and for twenty years he held that position, retiring in 1915. Dr Mackenzie's first book, *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, was published in 1890 (2nd ed., 1895), and contains the substance of his Shaw Fellowship Lectures delivered in 1889. It is an attempt to apply philosophical principles to the treatment of social facts, and, considering the time of its appearance, is, in many ways, a noteworthy production. The general point of view adopted is that of the Post-Kantian idealism, for the author was then largely under the influence of Edward Caird's teaching. Social philosophy he conceived to be a systematic effort to deduce the laws of social life from certain primary principles which are ascertained by philosophical analysis; it has to investigate the meaning of social life and consider its significance as having reference to an ideal. Three years later, in 1893, appeared *A Manual of Ethics*, a book which has been very extensively used in University teaching, and which has gone through several editions, on the occasion of each new edition undergoing thorough revision and enlargement. There followed in 1902 a thoughtful little treatise, *Outlines of Metaphysics*, intended as a short sketch to provide sufficient indication of the nature of fundamental problems and to enable the student to find his bearings among them. In 1917 Dr Mackenzie published a much larger and

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more comprehensive volume, entitled *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, in which he surveyed, in a manner at once illuminating and suggestive, the whole field of philosophical research. Subsequently, a number of other works proceeded from his pen, amongst them *Outlines of Social Philosophy* 1918 (2nd ed., 1921), *Ultimate Values in the Light of Contemporary Thought* 1924, *Fundamental Problems of Life* 1928, and *Cosmic Philosophy* 1931. Much of his more original contributions to philosophic thinking appeared in the form of articles in *Mind*, in *The International Journal of Ethics*, and in this JOURNAL. In later life he seems to have deviated more and more from the Hegelian position of his earlier years. For instance, he came to lay stress upon the notion of "Creative Imagination" rather than that of Thought, as the ultimate ground of nature; and, instead of accepting self-realisation as the final moral end, he came to regard the good life as consisting essentially in the effort to create and conserve what is beautiful.—The death, on January 6, of Dr Alexander F. Shand, in his seventy-eighth year, removes from our midst one of the few remaining psychologists who deal with the facts of mind in a broad and comprehensive way and handle resolutely the fundamental principles of mental life and development. Shand was educated at Eton, and from Eton he proceeded to Peterhouse, Cambridge, graduating in the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1881. His earliest published work was concerned with metaphysical questions. In 1888 there appeared in the pages of *Mind* two outstanding essays of his—one on "The Unity of Consciousness," and the other on "Space and Time." He argued in these, as against idealism, that knowledge presupposes an object out of, and not in relation to, the finite consciousness, but that the finite subject knows this object, though not completely. If, then, we are compelled to recognise objects of knowledge which are independent of consciousness, there can be, he contended, no necessity to bring in an infinite subject to explain the possibility of the object, for to borrow from subjective idealism the doctrine that all objects are due to a subject, and from realism the doctrine of quite another kind of object, and then attempt to reconcile their principles by inserting a reference of all objects to an infinite subject, is obviously an illegitimate procedure. There followed in 1890 a paper on "The Antinomy of Thought," and another in 1891 on "The Nature of Consciousness." His later articles in *Mind* were on psychological topics, dealing with the nature of Attention and Will, and culminating (1898) in an essay of far-reaching psychological significance on "Feeling and Thought." Shand's most important contributions to psychology are, however, contained in his imposing volume *The Foundations of Character*, published in 1914 (2nd ed., 1920; 3rd ed., 1927), a truly great work which has, in fact, become a classic. The aim was to get back to the roots of conduct as the bases of character, to the primary emotions and sentiments, and to formulate tentatively the laws to which their innate tendencies conform. As against the theory which regards the primary emotions as parts of the systems of instincts, Shand tried to shew that

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some instincts are parts of the systems of primary emotions (fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, sorrow and joy), that in the system of a primary emotion there may be not only one but several instincts, and that sometimes the same instinct may be found organised in the systems of different emotions. For some twenty years Shand was engaged in gathering material for a second volume, treating of the sentiments in the same detail as he had dealt with the primary emotions. One can only trust that it may yet be possible for this contemplated second volume to see the light.—On February 8, Dr Alfred Caldecott passed away at the advanced age of eighty-five years. At Cambridge he was a scholar of St. John's College, and took a first class in the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1879, being afterwards elected a Fellow of his College. In 1891 he became Professor of Philosophy in King's College, London, retiring in 1917. Few men had a larger share than he in the development, in those days, of the University of London; and he was one of the small number of scholars who were instrumental in establishing the Theological Faculty in the University. He was the first Dean of King's College, and held that office from 1913 to 1917. As a theologian, Caldecott was a man of broad and liberal views, constantly seeking for light from whatever quarter it might come. And as a philosopher he exhibited the same characteristics. For many years he was Chairman of the Board of Philosophical Studies, then in its infancy, and the present curriculum of the Honours Degree owes not a little to his insight and guidance. He was the author of a work on *The Philosophy of Religion in England*, published in 1901, and he was one of the contributors to the volume of *Cambridge Theological Essays*, published in 1905. He also brought out a book of *Selections from the Literature of Theism* in 1904. Although he refrained from any attempt to construct a philosophical system of his own, he was a most patient and careful expositor of the thoughts of others; and many of his former students acknowledge their debt of gratitude to him for leading them to understand the meaning of philosophical reflection.

Among recent additions to philosophical literature the elaborate work of Dr Rudolph Metz, *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1935, 2 Bände. Unbound RM. 36, Bound RM. 40), is perhaps deserving of first mention. Dr Metz has long been known as the foremost expounder of British philosophy in Germany. He wrote the treatises on Berkeley and Hume for Frommans' *Klassiker der Philosophie*, and he has contributed many articles on English thought to various German periodicals. The present work is planned on a very large scale. It is no less than a comprehensive survey of English philosophical thought from the early years of the nineteenth century to the present day. The work is divided into two Parts. Part I., which is concerned with nineteenth century philosophy up to the advent into this country of German idealism, opens with an account of the Scotch school, especially as represented by Hamilton and Mansel, and goes on to deal in greater detail with the empirical and utilitarian

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movement. Of the latter, J. S. Mill ("the greatest philosophical writer of his time") is naturally regarded as the leading figure, yet ample space is given to the writings of Croom Robertson, Sully, Henry Sidgwick and Carveth Read ("the last straggler of the empirical tradition"). Then follows a lengthy chapter on the Evolutionist theory, Herbert Spencer being regarded as its chief exponent, whose self-imposed task "must awaken astonishment, even though its fulfilment be thought to be questionable, or to have ended in failure." This chapter concludes with a careful and sympathetic account of the work of L. T. Hobhouse, "a mind of truly encyclopaedic knowledge, and an investigator of high rank and independence." The fourth chapter of Part I is devoted to the religious philosophy of the period. Starting with the Oxford Movement, an appreciative sketch is given of the writings of J. H. Newman and W. G. Ward. A full treatment is accorded to the philosophical writings of James Martineau, who is regarded as fulfilling in England a mission similar to that of Lotze in Germany. Stress is rightly laid upon Martineau's theory of cause, as carrying with it the two great principles of his metaphysic, the postulate of human freedom and the belief in a divine authority. More briefly the teaching of C. Barnes Upton ("one of the first who recognised the dangers which threatened ethical idealism from the side of the absolute idealism of the Hegelians") is delineated. Part II, which comprises about three-fourths of the whole book, opens with a chapter of over 200 pages on the Neo-idealistic movement. After describing the early advent of German idealism in England, as evidenced in the works of Coleridge, J. H. Green, Carlyle, and more particularly J. F. Ferrier, Dr Metz proceeds to deal with "die Bahnbrecher," J. H. Stirling (who "in the truest sense awakened British philosophy from its dogmatic slumber"), T. H. Green (whose "fundamental metaphysical principle was presented by him in various colours—now as Reason in the Kantian sense, now as Spirit in the Hegelian sense, now as the Berkeleian God") and Lewis Nettleship. Coming then to the Hegelians proper, the foremost place is assigned to Edward Caird (who "possessed the superb gift of expressing dark and difficult things in clear, limpid and beautiful language"). The author evidently conceives Caird to have been the most faithful expositor of Hegel's thought in English. But he does not neglect the contributions of Wallace, Ritchie, Henry Jones, Muirhead and J. S. Mackenzie. Under the heading "Absolute Idealists," Bradley, Bosanquet and Joachim are dealt with. A fairly full account of Bradley's ethics, logic, and metaphysics is given. Of *Appearance and Reality* Dr Metz observes that no second work has so profoundly disturbed current English philosophising, aroused so much reflection, and so deeply influenced metaphysical thought. Bosanquet's speculation, we are told, centred round the problem of individuality, yet in his system the individual is virtually lost in the Absolute. On the other hand, in the pluralism of McTaggart the reality and worth of individual personality is re-emphasised. As working out the theory of "Personal

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Idealism," the writings of Pringle-Pattison, Sorley, and Rashdall are treated. And lastly, in this chapter, the theistic philosophy of James Ward and A. E. Taylor is described, although it is doubtful whether either of these thinkers should be classed as idealists. The second chapter (with which Vol. II opens) is concerned with pragmatism as set forth in the writings of F. C. S. Schiller, A. Sidgwick, H. V. Knox and H. Sturt. Then comes a long and an extremely able study of English Realism in two chapters extending over more than 200 pages. Dr Metz institutes here a distinction—a somewhat arbitrary distinction, it must be confessed—between what he calls the older and the new realism, meaning by the former that which was developed from a critical examination of the Kantian system, and by the latter that which may be said to have originated with Moore's famous essay of 1903. The author's account of the work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Adamson, amongst the older "realists," is carefully and judiciously done. Of Adamson he justly remarks that none of his contemporaries came near him in the width and range of his knowledge of philosophical literature, and he makes manifest also that Adamson was not only a man of enormous erudition but an acute and original thinker, whose contributions to philosophical criticism and psychology are invaluable. The sketch of Cook Wilson is perhaps less satisfactory, owing largely to the difficulty of summarising his position. The following chapter on the "new realism" is concerned primarily with the philosophies of Moore, Russell, Whitehead and Alexander. These are expounded in considerable detail; and the author has, I think, succeeded in stating the leading positions of the thinkers in question with commendable accuracy. He has evidently a thorough and intimate acquaintance with their writings. A discerning account is then given of Lloyd Morgan's theory of emergence and of his conception of God. There follow sections on the writings of C. D. Broad, John Laird and Kemp Smith, while another section is devoted to the logical work of W. E. Johnson, although it is not clear why Johnson should be regarded as a "new realist." The second volume concludes with four shorter chapters on Mathematical Logic, on the Philosophy of such natural scientists as Eddington and Jeans, on Psychology, in which the work of Stout and Shand calls to be considered, and on Theism and Religious Philosophy, in which scant justice is done to the writings of A. J. Balfour, while those of W. R. Inge and Baron von Hügel receive more adequate treatment. On the whole, Dr Metz is to be congratulated on having produced a striking and significant book and one of great usefulness. May it succeed, as he ventures to hope, in bringing the thought of our two countries into closer connection and in thereby awakening and furthering mutual understanding.

—While Dr Metz has been writing of current English philosophy for German readers, Dr Werner Brock endeavours to represent current German philosophy for English readers. The latter's *Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge: University Press, 1935, 6*s.* net) is, however, a very much more limited undertaking

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than that of Dr Metz. His volume is based upon three lectures delivered at Bedford College in the University of London in 1934. The author's aim, so he tells us, has been to draw attention to those German thinkers who since the time of Hegel have achieved the few important advances hitherto made towards answering the question as to the essence and scope of philosophy. I cannot help thinking that he has attempted at once too much and too little. Too much, because in a course of three lectures it was manifestly impossible to indicate even briefly the nature of the speculation of the numerous writers to whom he refers. Too little, because merely to consider the views which these writers take of the task of philosophy throws but scanty light upon the contributions they have actually made in their handling of specific problems. For instance, the treatment of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, which occupies the whole of the second lecture, might well have been omitted, seeing that there are already many books in English dealing with their work. Whereas, if Dr Brock had confined himself mainly to the writings (say) of Husserl, Dilthey, Jaspers and Heidegger he might have produced a volume that would have been of real value to English students. What he does write about these thinkers is interesting so far as it goes, but it does no more than touch the fringe of their thought. In six short pages he speaks of Husserl's elaboration of the phenomenological method and of his attempted analysis of "pure consciousness," yet what exactly is to be understood by "pure consciousness" the reader will seek in vain to discover. A somewhat fuller treatment is accorded to Karl Jaspers, Professor of Philosophy at Heidelburg. Probably what is here said of *Existenzerhellung* (Elucidation of *Existenz*) will be for English readers of chief significance. The term *Existenz*, it is pointed out, is not to be confused with "existence" (*Dasein*), but can only be applied to men, and denotes even a special peculiarity of men. As a first presupposition of the realisation of *Existenz*, Jaspers describes the apprehension of the "I—myself," placing it in contrast to the thinking consciousness in general and to the vital and social forces in life. Further, he describes the relationship of free individuals which he calls "communication," the process by which they become more and more comprehensible and real to one another. Again, he analyses the process of the realisation of *Existenz* in the single self in communication with other selves by considering the historical structure of the individual life. And these three together, the "I—myself," "communication" and "historical structure," form the basis for any elucidation of *Existenz*, just as the conception of the World is the basis for common-sense knowledge in general. Martin Heidegger, Husserl's successor in Freiburg, attacks the problem of Being, we are informed, in a new way, by asking the preliminary question, "what is man?" Whilst the Greeks analysed the perceptible existent thing in its categorical structure in order to proceed to the question of Being, Heidegger essays with the same strictness of thought to analyse the much more intricate, and more fundamental, problem of the structure of human

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existence. Moreover, his analysis is directed towards one essential feature of human existence which had not been sufficiently investigated by Greek philosophy or by the ontology dominated thereby down to Hegel—its temporal and historical character.[1] I hope that Dr Brock will someday produce a far more extensive volume, dealing in detail with the work of these thinkers. It would be welcomed by English students of philosophy.

Mr H. W. B. Joseph's *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935, 15*s*. net) ought to meet with a cordial reception from a wide circle of readers. In all, eleven essays are here collected together. The first five, that fill nearly half of the book, develop theses which formed part of a course of lectures on Plato's *Republic*, which the author used to give at New College, Oxford, and have not before been published. These do not cover the whole of the *Republic*, but on those portions of it with which they are concerned it may be safely asserted that nothing so suggestive has appeared since R. L. Nettleship's *Lectures on Plato's Republic* in Vol II (and not, as is erroneously stated, p. 33, in Vol. I) of his *Lectures and Remains*, 1897. The third essay on "The Nature of the Soul" is perhaps that which most calls for special mention. What Plato wants us to see is, it is contended, that reason (τὸ λογιστικόν) works differently in the soul from the way in which *any* particular desire does, not merely because of finding means to ends, though only as rational can a man do this, but by arousing the thought and desire of good. The sixth essay, on "Aristotle's Definition of Moral Virtue, and Plato's Account of Justice in the Soul," contains some searching criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Mr Joseph thinks that, while Aristotle in his definition of moral virtue was following and trying to improve upon Plato's analysis of justice in the soul, yet that by the modification he made in it, by introducing, namely, the doctrine of the mean, he in fact largely spoilt it. Three of the essays (viii, ix and x) are on certain aspects of the Kantian philosophy. In the first of these, Mr Joseph compares Kant's idealism with that of Berkeley. Kant, he thinks, asks of mind in us more than, on his theory, it could achieve; Berkeley, in a sense, asks too little. Kant should have allowed to the principle which is not in us more kinship with the intelligence which is; Berkeley to us more kinship with the intelligence which is not in us. Both doctrines require to be supplemented, it is suggested, by a further theory. It may be, namely, that as the pains I feel are bound up with my feeling them, so real things without me are bound up with the being of knowing and perceiving minds. "The empirical conditions of the apprehension of them by finite minds, and the development in finite minds of that apprehension, may depend together upon a reality or intelligence which shows itself in nature to itself in minds" (p. 231). The other two Kantian essays deal critically with fundamental portions of the first *Kritik*—"the Syntheses of

[1] By the way, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* appeared not in Bd. vii. of Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, as stated on p. 132, but in Bd. viii.

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Sense and Understanding" and "the Schematism of the Categories." The last essay in the volume, on "The Concept of Evolution," was the author's *Herbert Spencer* Lecture at Oxford in 1924. It contains some very acute, and, I think, convincing criticism both of Spencer's definition of evolution, and of later biological attempts to indicate its implications. If we are to speak of development at all, we must, it is argued, find a subject which develops—which is one through a succession of phases, and yet different in these phases. We have here, in fact, the old problem of the one and the many, of unity in diversity. The unity in a living body is, in point of fact, immaterial, though more adequately revealed at one time than at another in what is material. But the one thing which quite manifestly and indisputably develops is a mind, and a mind is one in its various thoughts, acts, and feelings, both simultaneous and successive. In a mind we find both the profoundest diversity, and the most assured unity, yet this unity is never sensibly manifested.—Another volume of valuable and suggestive papers is that by Professor G. C. Field, *Studies in Philosophy* (Bristol : J. W. Arrowsmith, 1935, 10*s*. 6*d*. net). After the opening article, entitled "The Examination of Assumptions," in which it is maintained that this is the best expression of the nature of philosophical thinking, and in which the exact meaning of assumptions, as well as the ways in which they are to be examined, is discussed, there follow three able essays on some crucial psychological questions. The first of these, on "Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology," is a searching piece of criticism, directed to showing that certain writers virtually erect Instinct and the instincts to the same false position as was formerly occupied by the so-called "faculties." If, for instance, an instinct be defined as an inherited or innate tendency to act in a certain way, without previous experience and without foresight of the end to be attained, it is clear that we can only describe or think of any such tendency in terms of that to which it is a tendency. We cannot examine it or describe it by itself, or say anything about what it would be like when it was not actually issuing in action. And this is the more obvious when, instead of Instinct, these writers begin to talk about the instincts. Thus, in ascribing to bees a 'cell-building instinct,' the word 'cell-building' is entirely superfluous and tells us nothing at all that we did not know already from the inspection of the action. To speak of an instinct as though it were a definite thing within the mind, of which we can have some idea apart from the behaviour which it produces, and which may shew itself in entirely different kinds of behaviour or conscious experience, is meaningless and unintelligible. The second of the psychology papers is on "The Psychological Accompaniments of Instinctive Action," in which Stout's view that instinctive conduct does and reflex action does not presuppose the co-operation of intelligent consciousness is examined and rejected. Perhaps, however, the third of these psychological essays is the one which will arouse most interest. It is on "The Conception of the Unconscious in Psychology." The author contends very decisively

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that the notion of the Unconscious and of unconscious mental processes is not of value in psychology. It does not help us to understand more clearly what sort of thing the mind is, or what sort of thing the concrete human being is. It does not afford us a real explanation, an explanation that gives us real knowledge, of the mental processes of this human being. To ask us to think of something which has all the characteristics of a wish or an emotion or a feeling except that it is not conscious seems to the author like asking us to think of something which has all the attributes of red or green, except that it is not a colour. Coming, now, to the last half of the book, after a suggestive article on "Ancient Philosophy and Modern Science," there is a thoughtful and judicious treatment of "Some Modern Proofs of the Existence of God." Two types of proof are selected for consideration—the teleological argument and the argument from religious experience. As regards the former, Professor Field holds that, while the appeal to purpose as a satisfying principle of explanation has certainly considerable force, it cannot claim to be decisively established. If it points to anything, it points in the direction of a God working in a universe which includes Him as a part only of the whole, and a part which, however powerful and important, is at some point limited and restricted by other elements in this whole. As regards the argument from religious experience, the author holds that if examination should really succeed in shewing that the religious experience in all its different manifestations retains an identical and unique quality of its own, different in kind from any other, then we could say that, with as much certainty as we believe in the existence of other human minds, we may believe in the existence of a God, the object of religious worship. The next four of the studies are concerned with ethical subjects and the volume is brought to an end by two interesting articles on Plato.

Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, edited with an Introduction by Professor N. Kemp Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935, 10*s.* 6*d.* net) is a very welcome addition to the texts we possess of philosophical classics. The manuscript of the *Dialogues* in the library of the Royal Society of Edinburgh gives what is believed to be the first version of the work as completed in the period 1751–55. In this Hume made extensive revisions in, or prior to, 1761, and again in the year of his death, in 1776. From this manuscript Hume's nephew obtained the text which he published in 1779, omitting whatever Hume had marked for omission, and incorporating the revisions and additions. In all subsequent editions the nephew's text has been simply reprinted, but Professor Kemp Smith felt that we cannot now any longer afford to neglect the light which the manuscript casts on Hume's own understanding of the course and outcome of his argument. Accordingly, in re-editing the text, he has transcribed the omitted passages, and taken note of all alterations in wording which have a bearing on the argument. The additions referable to 1776 (notably in the concluding Part of the discussion) are among the most definitely negative utterances in the work, and

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this has an important bearing on the question how far, and in what precise respects, the spokesmen in the *Dialogues* (Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea) express Hume's own personal views. Usually it has been supposed that Cleanthes, the "natural theologian," is to be considered as speaking Hume's real opinions. Professor Kemp Smith rejects this view, and contends that Philo, the sceptic, from start to finish, represents Hume; and that Cleanthes can be regarded as Hume's mouthpiece only in those passages in whch he is explicitly agreeing with Philo, or in those other passages in which, while refuting Demea, the defender of rigid orthodoxy, he is also being used to prepare the way for one or other of Philo's independent conclusions. Professor Kemp Smith's Introduction is very full and comprehensive, dealing with Hume's relations to his Calvinist environment, his views regarding religion in general, his reasons for retaining the terms 'God' and 'religion' in defining his own positions, his argument against miracles, and his criticism of the Design argument, and concluding with an admirable analysis of the argument of the *Dialogues*.—Attention should be drawn to two articles by Mr. M. B. Foster on "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature" (*Mind*, October, 1935 and January, 1936). The Christian apologists, it is contended, are primarily concerned to establish a conception of God as being wholly immaterial, and therefore to be identified neither with nature as a whole nor with any material object. And at first sight it might seem that Plato's conception of God in the *Timaeus* as the Artificer of nature was similar. But in the *Timaeus* the doctrine of the Artificer is inextricably confused with another doctrine according to which God is conceived to be related to the world as father to son. And this implies that the being of God is akin to that of the natural world which he has produced. In short, Plato failed to distinguish the two relations of manufacture (τέχνη) and of paternity. Now, the Christian theologians, although they too attributed to God the two activities of technical production and of generation, yet distinguished, as Plato could not, a separate relation for the exercise of each. In the doctrine of the Trinity God was conceived as Father and not as Maker, in the doctrine of Creation as Maker and not as Father. God as Father generates the divine Son, God as Maker produces the natural world; God shares the same nature with what He generates, but not the same nature with what He makes. If God is the parent of nature, nature must possess within itself the spring of that same productive power by which he at first produced it; if, however, He is the artificer of nature, nature must lack all participation in the power by which it was itself produced. The extirpation of the former conception of God under the influence of Christian doctrine could not but be followed by the rejection of the former philosophy of nature and its replacement by the latter. And the former is the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, the latter is the philosophy of nature presupposed by modern physical science.

There are several other noteworthy articles in current philosophical

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periodicals to which I can allude only briefly. Professor A. K. Rogers's treatment of "Plato's Theory of Forms" (*Phil. R.*, November, 1935 and January, 1936) contains much that will appeal to students of Plato. He is not prepared to deny dogmatically the *possibility* that Plato intended in the last resort to locate the Forms themselves as active principles in the mind of God, or that at any rate an occasional passage might be thought to point to this. But he urges it is certainly not what we should gather ordinarily. Even when in canvassing various theories of the Forms Plato raises the issue of God's knowledge (*Parmen*, 134), this appears as knowledge of an independent real and not as "thought that thinks itself"; and if Aristotle had been aware of a doctrine so similar to his own it is hard to see how he could have failed to make reference to it. Mrs Helen Knight's criticism of "Stout on Universals" (*Mind*, January, 1936) is a sustained and able piece of argument, to which I hope Professor Stout will reply. In an article on "Causality and Modern Physics" (*Phil. R.*, November, 1935), Mr. J. W. A. Hickson criticises the doctrine of indeterminism as set forth in the works of Eddington and Herman Weyl. To the series on "Great Thinkers" Professor A. Boyce Gibson contributes an article on Descartes (*Philosophy*, October, 1935) and Professor J. Laird one on Malebranche (*Philosophy*, January ,1936). Malebranche's views may be summed up, Professor Laird thinks, in the saying that he elaborated a Christian philosophy in which Descartes was the Doctor in things natural and Augustine the Doctor in things of grace. In a paper on "Freedom in the Present-day World" (*Philosophy*, October, 1935) Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé submits General Smuts's plea for Freedom, in his Address as Rector of St. Andrews, to a sympathetic examination. Democratic method, it is contended, can flourish only in a healthy society among sane men, whereas in sick societies, maddened by war and the aftermath of war, by defeat and shame, by poverty and unemployment, democratic method cannot flourish. In the January number of the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* there is a long article of over fifty pages on "La Poésie et la Littérature" by Benedetto Croce, in which the author seeks to defend and to develop views he has previously expressed as to the difference between poetry and literature.

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REVIEWS.

Jesus. By Ch. Guignebert. Professor of the History of Christianity in the Sorbonne. Translated from the French by S. H. Hooke.—London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935.—Pp. xviii + 563.—25*s.* net.

This is a volume in the series, *The History of Civilisation*, edited by C. K. Ogden. It sets out to examine all the sources for the life and teaching of Jesus. The reader will find in it many acute observations upon various points of detail. In substance it offers little which will be new to those who have followed the development of radical criticism of the Gospels. Its distinction lies chiefly in the clear and orderly arrangement of the argument, and in the charm and vivacity of the style, which Professor Hooke has succeeded to a remarkable degree in carrying over into the translation. A tone of bland irony gives a certain piquancy to the writing. Professor Guignebert brings to the task of criticism a sceptical turn of mind which leads him to reject alike the elaborate reconstructions which orthodox writers have often based upon inadequate foundations, and extravagances such as those of the "Christ-myth" school and of modern writers like Dr Eisler, whose credulity he exposes with a light touch. Yet scepticism may easily become a habit, and even a bad habit. To set out with a rooted contempt for your authorities may give results in the end as misleading as the determination to believe everything they report, however inconsistent or unlikely. In the Gospels there are admittedly certain features which recommend caution in dealing with their data. Indeed, in view of the lateness of our documents, and the paucity of external confirmation, we could not quarrel with an historian who should conclude that there are few reported events in the life of Jesus for which certainty, in the strict sense, could be claimed. But our author is not content to leave it at that. After rejecting most of the Gospel data, he constructs a picture of the ministry as it must have been. The picture is familiar enough—the rustic enthusiast whose teaching "does not possess a permanent character," since it presupposed that the world was about to come to an end; who went up to Jerusalem in the expectation of that event, and died a disappointed and discredited man. Now it is the business of an historian who decides that complete certainty is unattainable to

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weigh the probabilities with as much detachment as he can command. If the estimate of probabilities is not to be purely subjective, it is necessary that he should have a clear and convincing view of the total situation, and, in detail, should follow undeviating canons of source-criticism. Of Professor Guignebert's view of the situation as a whole, that is to say of the origin of the Christian religion, there will be a word to say at the close of this review.

In the matter of source criticism he does not always command confidence. He assents to the generally agreed position that our fundamental sources are Mark and "Q." His Mark, however, is an "Urmarcus" which in the last resort can be defined only as those parts of the second Gospel which are acceptable to Professor Guignebert; and his "Q" is similar. Even so, however, he does not consistently prefer Mark and "Q" to the later strata. Three examples will suffice. He attributes the saying "The Kingdom of heaven is at hand" to John the Baptist (p. 158), although both Mark and "Q" give it as a saying of Jesus, and Matthew alone adds it to the "Q" version of the preaching of the Baptist. He bases an interpretation of the teaching of Jesus upon the words "If thou wilt be perfect," said by Matthew to have been addressed to the "Rich Young Ruler" (p. 379) though the Marcan form of the story does not contain these words. Consider, again, the following remarkable passage (p. 346): "This lends probability to the view that Jesus announced a time-limit for the present age, a time-limit in the immediate future. Two passages in the Gospels confirm this view. In Luke xix. 11 we read that as they drew near to Jerusalem the companions of Jesus believed that the Kingdom would immediately appear (παραχρῆμα), so much so that they were thrown into the depths of despair when the death of their Master shattered their hopes (Luke xxiv. 17: ἐστάθησαν σκυθρωποί)." The two passages have no connection with one another. The second occurs in a context where there is no reference to the end of the world. The first says, not that Jesus thought that the Kingdom of God would immediately appear, but that he tried to disabuse the minds of his followers of that idea. But let that pass. The point is that our author here argues from a text which is an editorial note added to a passage from the common tradition by a late evangelist, while in another place (p. 199) he rejects the saying "The Kingdom of God is come upon you," which occurs in "Q", as a "secondary redaction." Upon what principle? Can it be because Luke appears to support his preconceived idea of what the teaching of Jesus must have been, while the "Q" passage is inconsistent with it?

The fact is that his treatment of the sources is in the last resort irresponsible, because he does not think them worthy of serious consideration. They are "hagiography directed to apologetic ends." Let us translate these rather question-begging terms into plainer language. The evangelists aim at giving an account of a person whom they hold in reverence, in order to show him to others as worthy of reverence. May it not after all be true that he was worthy

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of reverence? In that case the facts are most truthfully presented when they are seen to be such as to arouse reverence. Professor Guignebert, on the other hand, knows that he was not worthy of such reverence. He knows that the early Christians "dropped many recollections which did not harmonise with their present belief, and 'revived' others which appropriately strengthened it. Actually it was from their imagination and not their memory that these latter were called forth" (p. 44). It is upon what the disciples had forgotten, we must suppose, that the "radical" picture of Jesus is based. "There must also be added" (he continues) "the influence of the 'prophets'—of whom Paul is the most striking example—who in all good faith confused and blended the recollections which they may have owed to a genuine tradition, with the ideas derived from their own special revelations and visions" (p. 45). So the stories in the Gospels are the product of the visions of "prophets." The only example of a "prophet" cited is Paul. But what is there in the Epistles of Paul that suggests narratives like those of the Gospels? At most, the narrative of the Last Supper, which stands in a special category. For the rest, the epistles are notoriously barren ground for the historian of the life of Jesus. The one undoubted example of Christian "prophecy" in the New Testament is the Revelation of John. It is not in literature of that sort that one would look for stories of Jesus. The material of the Gospels, with few exceptions (such as Mark xiii), shows a form and character totally unlike the products of prophecy, so far as we have evidence for them.

Our author's account, therefore, of the growth of the Gospel tradition makes several unverifiable assumptions. The picture of Jesus with which he works is so well-established a dogmatic tradition in the school to which he belongs that he is probably unaware of the extent to which he assumes it as given, and tests the Gospels by it. So far as his criticism of the Gospel *data* rests upon any clear principle, it may be stated thus: Whatever in the Gospels is in harmony with the faith of the Church is incredible. But if all *data* in the Gospels upon which the faith of the Church might have been founded are removed, upon what did that faith rest? It is easy to dismiss this question airily by saying that Christianity was a syncretism of elements current in the religious thought of the Hellenistic world. There were many different forms of such syncretism, and Christianity differs from all the others in placing the centre of religion in an historical memory. The chief task of an historian of the origins of Christianity is to make this fact intelligible. No reconstruction can be accepted as probable which leaves it unexplained. "The rise of the Galilæan prophet," says Professor Guignebert, "marks the beginning, however accidental, of the religious movement from which Christianity sprang" (p. 538). The word "accidental" confesses the bankruptcy of the method of which his book is a distinguished example.

CAMBRIDGE.

C. H. DODD.

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An Unpublished Fragment of the Fourth Gospel in the John Rylands Library. Edited by C. H. Roberts, M.A.—Manchester: University Press, 1935.—2*s.* 6*d.* net.

THE John Rylands Library at Manchester possesses a collection of Greek papyri derived from the finds of Grenfell and Hunt, some account of which is given in the current number of the Bulletin of the Library. The task of editing them, which was left incomplete by the late Dr Hunt, has been taken over by Mr Roberts. Last year he identified among the unedited documents a small fragment containing portions of the text of the Gospel according to John ch. xviii. 31–33, 37–38. In view of the importance of the discovery, the issue of the next volume of Rylands papyri has been anticipated by this separate publication. The work of the editor is a model of what such work should be, giving to the student all the information necessary and available, and discussing the palæographical problems involved in an authoritative way.

The fragment formed part of a codex, that is, a bound volume, and not a roll. Its provenance is uncertain. In view of the company it keeps, Oxyrhynchus, or some neighbouring site in central Egypt, seems likely. On palæographical grounds the editor dates it to the first half of the second century, and as he can claim the concurrence in this view of such eminent papyrologists as Kenyon, Schubart and Idris Bell, the non-expert may feel confidence in the dating. The editor, cautiously, lays no stress upon certain features which would point slightly to a date early rather than late within this half-century.

The papyrus may, therefore, be regarded as the earliest piece of Christian writing known, and the earliest direct relic of Christianity in Egypt. The editor shows it to be almost certain that the codex to which it belonged contained the Fourth Gospel alone, and not, like the Chester-Beatty and all later MSS., the four-Gospel Canon. It may, accordingly, belong to a period when the four-fold canon was not yet established in Egypt.

The significance of the discovery cannot be fully estimated without taking into consideration another recently published papyrus, the "Fragments of an Unknown Gospel", edited last year by Bell and Skeat, which is dated about the middle of the second century, and contains striking parallels to the Fourth Gospel. If, as seems probable, these are of the nature of quotations from the canonical work, then the two papyri together afford convincing evidence of the currency of the Fourth Gospel in Egypt during the first half of the second century.

The question arises whether, in view of the fact that this evidence is earlier than any similar evidence from other provinces, we should consider the possibility that the Gospel was written, not at Ephesus, but at Alexandria. It seems, however, difficult to set aside the large body of evidence in favour of Ephesus. Assuming that this was the original home of the Gospel, then we must allow time for it to become current at so great a distance from its place of origin. Consequently, the date 135–140, to which many critics assign the

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composition of the work, becomes highly improbable, not to say impossible, and a substantially earlier date is likely.

Evidence for the reception of the Synoptic Gospels in Egypt earlier than the time of Clement of Alexandria is scanty and uncertain. On the other hand, the Egyptians seem to have had a predilection for Apocryphal Gospels (the Gospel according to the Egyptians, the two (?) sets of "Logia" from Oxyrhynchus, the documents represented by Oxyrhynchus papyrus 840 and by the Fayyum Fragment, and the new "Unknown Gospel"). It looks as if the first of our canonical Gospels which obtained pre-eminence in that province was the Gospel according to John, which (as this papyrus proves) circulated separately during the first half of the second century, and (as the "Unknown Gospel" proves) was used as a source in the compilation of other Gospel-writings. Even Clement, who recognises the four-Gospel canon, treats the Gospel according to the Egyptians with respect, and he, as well as Gnostic teachers in Egypt, places an especial value on the Fourth Gospel, which continued to hold a pre-eminent place in Alexandrine Christian thought.

The Rylands fragment therefore, slight as it is, has a bearing on several interesting problems of early Christianity, and Mr Roberts deserves both our congratulations upon a discovery of such importance, and our gratitude for placing it before the public in so exemplary a form.

CAMBRIDGE. C. H. DODD.

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2 Corinthians. A Study in Translation and Interpretation. Pp. 87.
Hebrews. With some Interpretative Suggestions. Pp. 115.
By W. H. Isaacs, M.A.—Oxford: University Press.

THE former of these two volumes is dated 1921, the latter 1933. They are an experiment in New Testament exegesis. The author in the preface to his earlier work gives us his theory of translation. The merit of a translation lies in fidelity to the matter of the author and accommodation to the style of the reader. English style and idiom differ so greatly from Greek that a literal translation of an Epistle of St Paul would be unintelligible. To interpret any of these Epistles for an English reader needs a far bolder departure from the style of the original than has been customary. Long sentences must be broken up; transitions of thought, left to be understood in the elliptical style of St Paul, or indicated by particles, must be made explicit, even by intercalating whole sentences. When the Greek is really ambiguous, the translator must not be content to be ambiguous too; he must come down decidedly on one or other side of the fence. Mr Isaacs follows this preface by a very free rendering—he dislikes the word paraphrase—of 2 Corinthians, and by notes, "the sole purpose of which is to account for the choice of the renderings adopted and the rejection of others." Occasionally he has to discuss doubtful readings; and here he strongly disapproves of the method of Westcott and Hort, who almost invariably follow the great uncials even when

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they give very unsatisfactory sense. There are two examples in this Epistle—2 Cor. viii. 19 and xii. 9; in both cases I think Mr Isaacs is right.

The author is a fine Greek scholar, though the accentuation of Greek words all through needs much more attention than he has given to it. His critical judgment is sound, and he is not afraid to differ from the eminent scholars who have commented on this Epistle. I may call special attention to his notes on διὰ δόξης, iii. 11; σάρξ, x. 3; δοκιμή, viii. 2; χάρις, viii. 9; ὑπόστασις, ix. 4; ἱλαρόν, ix. 6; ἄμετρα, x. 13; ἀτιμίαν, xi. 21. No student of St Paul's Epistles ought to neglect this volume.

The later book, on Hebrews, differs from the earlier in including a short commentary. Unfortunately, the author's conception of the purpose of the Epistle differs so radically from mine that I find it difficult to do it justice. There are permissible differences of opinion on that question; but nothing can excuse such tampering with the text as we find in his translation of chapter iii. 6 and 14. "That house we are if we hold firm to the end our happy certainty *of our Master's return.*" "We have been made partakers *in the millennial glory of Christ.*" These chiliastic references are entirely foreign to the text of the Epistle, and I should say equally foreign to the writer's thought.

This Epistle has long been a prime favourite of mine, and my study of it has led me to agree with Peake more closely than with any other scholar. I think it was written in the last decade of the First Century, and that it was addressed to a group of converts from Judaism, who were tempted, under the double stress of the failure of the Messianic expectation and of threatened persecution, to revert to Unitarianism in the form of Liberal Judaism. The central portion of the Epistle, which could have but little interest for Gentile Christians, and which, it must be confessed, has not much interest for us, is directed to prove that Christ is the real High Priest, and the Church the beneficiary of the New Covenant. But the permanent value of the Epistle lies in its philosophy of history, and in its doctrine of the transvaluation of faith and hope. The writer's affinity to (perhaps Alexandrian) Platonism is shown by his conception of all history as a symbol or sacrament of eternity. As Isaac Penington says, "every truth is shadow except the last, but every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place. And the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance." Hence, as he shows, faith can survive the disappointment of all earthly hopes. The fathers received not the promise, nor was it ever fulfilled as they dreamed; but no pure hope shall wither, except that a purer may rise out of its roots. Thus faith and hope are given a firm foundation in the world "within the veil."

Mr Isaacs' later book is not, I think, equal to the earlier; but it has many of the same merits, and I hope he will continue his original and scholarly studies on other books of the New Testament.

W. R. Inge.

Brightwell Manor, Berks.

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A Portrait of Peter. By J. Alexander Findlay, D.D.—London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935.—Pp. 324.—5*s.* net.

The first impression made by this work is that of wonder that so little is known about a man who has so large a place in history. This is swiftly followed by the conviction that Dr Findlay has the faculty of making such little fascinatingly interesting. He induces belief that Peter is as important as those who have exploited him for the purpose of asserting ecclesiastical prerogative say that he is. Possibly another impression will be made, an impression that goes deeper and remains. This is that the most important element in this volume is something suggested but not developed. No attempt is made to minimise the pre-eminence of Peter in the earliest band of Christian disciples. The utterance attributed to Christ: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church," apart from all questions concerning its authenticity, is the attestation of fact. "There can surely be no doubt that, in so far as the Church had a human founder, Peter was the man."

The present study has nothing to do with the dust and heat of ecclesiastical controversy. It is definite contribution to devotional literature. If ever a book was written *con amore* it is this, although there are traces here and there of prostrating mental strife. It has sent the author to his knees many times. If it is read with understanding it will send many others to seek light, and truth by use of the same means. Its expositions, both of life and literature, read so easily and there is everywhere so fascinating a facility of phrasing that the tremendous wealth of scholarship behind it all may be missed. Dr Findlay writes—the reference is to 1 *Peter*, which he accepts as genuine: "The simplicity of style is beautiful . . . I wonder if I am alone in thinking that the First Epistle of Peter has a quality unique even in the New Testament." His own style and thought are beautiful; only a Puck-like element again and again breaks through. For instance, in referring to the indestructible quality of the Jewish people, he says: "As the Book of Jonah expresses it, they are the most indigestible of all the world's peoples." And, summing up on the contention between Paul and Peter at Antioch, when Peter seemingly went over to the reactionary party in the Church, he writes: "Paul may have been right on the long view, but there was a case for Peter, and I, for one, cannot help the feeling that Paul might have remonstrated privately with Peter instead of attacking him 'before them all.'" Yet, surely, in a case where explosive matter could be encountered in abundance, seldom has there been a more conspicuous example of Christian charity triumphant than the book displays. Nothing is evaded, nothing set down in malice, there is no special pleading. The result is a volume that deserves to become "a joy for ever."

Details of textual and historical criticism must be put aside with the observation that Dr Findlay uses his powers of interpretation unobtrusively, but wisely. It is not certain, however, that he gives an altogether satisfactory explanation of Peter's strange words in

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Luke's story of the call by the lake-side: "Depart from me, because I am a sinful man, Lord!" Is it not possible that this was a case in which Peter had desperate intention in saying what he did? This may not have been his first call. That may have been earlier, and the following may have ceased abruptly when Christ refused to go back to popularity at Capernaum. Had He been preaching alone in Galilee? If so, Peter had departed to his fishing. Now he confesses his folly, and it seems to him only right that his Lord should depart from him. It is interesting to accompany Dr Findlay in his endeavour, following a clue given him by the late Professor Gwatkin, to show that Peter was not the man so often described by preachers—"a warm-hearted and impulsive young man, who blurted out whatever came into his mind without weighing his words or caring very much about their consequences." It will not be a simple matter to upset such a tradition, but the evidence brought forward for this purpose is impressive, so far as it goes.

The frank recognition of the primacy of Peter is arresting and helpful. There is nothing here to buttress the attitude, which even the late Baron von Hügel took when support of the Papal claims was the question under review: Peter was the first among the Apostles. He was chosen to be the foundation of the Church. Thus the Papacy was instituted. And it continues in direct succession from him to this day. The ecclesiastical implications of Dr Findlay's position are not elaborated, and it is not easy to select any passage that sets forth his convictions on Church problems. He does, however, cling to the conviction that the Church must live on because "she keeps a place in her cumbrous organisation where men and women can forget themselves in the worship of the Crucified and Risen Lord in Heaven." And here is one of many statements that give the clue to Dr Findlay's convictions: "If we want to know how the church began, we must imitate Paul and 'interview Peter.' But it is also true that the study of his life will prove to be our best guide to the manner in which the Church has been maintained ever since. He is not only the rock on which the Church was first built; he is the rock on which it is still being built. I mean something very definite by this. Peter is not merely important as an individual who was chosen to do unique service for the Church of Christ, and, as a matter of history, rose magnificently to the occasion, piloting the new movement through the first difficult days when any false step might have meant irretrievable disaster; he is also a type of the kind of man who has kept the Church alive for nineteen centuries. This man has 'stretched forth his hands' in utter surrender, has given himself away, leaving on record the story of the humiliation which made him great, in order that, understanding him, we may understand ourselves. People like Peter—though not often as brave as he was—have always been in an overwhelming majority in the Church. Moreover, fortunately for us, he was an unusually outspoken person; that is why he becomes spokesman for us as he was for his fellow-disciples. This deeper meaning of the saying, 'On this rock I will build My Church,' I hope

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to bring out in detail later, because it is the most important thing I have to say, and then because the realisation of this fact was the turning-point in the history of my own soul." The insistence on experience as a vital element in religion is here clearly expressed and characteristically Methodist. Here also is the crux of all endeavours towards Christian reunion. These, after the flourish of trumpets announcing their beginnings, tend to become fumbling and foolish because this matter is evaded. Dr Findlay insists that the disputed text concerning Peter has meaning. "Peter is first and remains first in the glorious company of the apostles, not because of any claim he made for himself—these are conspicuously absent in his case—but because of the dominating force of his personality." Can this position be maintained, and can it become the inspiration to a great spiritual adventure, at the risk of mistake, adventure to the uttermost; abandon that opens the road to reality and gives meaning to what is deepest in conscience, conviction, and courage? Or is the Christian way blind submission to a prejudiced dogmatic declaration concerning the meaning of a text?

The primary business of the book is not with ecclesiastical matters. Peter and prelacy are poles apart in the writer's thought. "Peter is the rock on which our Lord built His Church, partly because it has always been recruited by men and women of his type." And again: "It is true that history will not save us, that the only thing of which we can be absolutely sure is not what Jesus meant to Peter, but what Jesus is to ourselves. But it is also true that God still comes to men through the incarnate life, as well as through the death of Jesus, and can save us in any way he chooses. Nor shall we ever be able to pass beyond the Jesus of history, for this reason, if for no other, that we shall all meet Him again, for 'we believe that He shall come to be our Judge.'" Such statements as these give a clue to the kind of contribution Dr Findlay could make to the insistent Church question that tends to obliterate religion. It would be a service well worth rendering if he would return to this subject and give us a reasoned statement of what is involved, ecclesiastically, in the position he takes in his study of Peter. Meanwhile, we thank him for having made Peter better known, and also Peter's Lord better known. For Peter knew that he "could never be the rock on which the Church was built or anything else" unless his life was centered upon Jesus Christ.

St Ives, Hunts. J. C. Mantripp.

An Introduction to the Books of the Apocrypha. By W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D., Litt.D.—London: Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge, 1935.—Pp. x + 345.—10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Dr W. O. E. Oesterley has added to the many benefits he has conferred on students of Biblical Literature by the publication of his new work on the Apocrypha. Many readers of this review will at once call to mind his earlier book, *The Books of the Apocrypha; their*

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Origin, Teaching and Contents (1914). It is important, therefore, to say at once that Dr Oesterley explains that the new volume is in no sense another edition of the earlier book, but " is from beginning to end a new and wholly independent work."

It comes to many of us with a shock of surprise that it is twenty-one years since *The Books of the Apocrypha* was first published, and so much do we owe to that work, that it is with feelings of regret that we find it quietly set aside by its author. Might it not have been possible for Dr Oesterley to have re-edited it after the comprehensive manner adopted by German scholars? Dr Oesterley has chosen to re-write the book, and his reasons are difficult to resist. He explains that since 1914 much new literature on the Apocrypha generally, and on its individual books, has been published, and that, during these years, he has had opportunities for studying a good deal of this new material, besides paying attention to the older literature. He hopes, therefore, that the present book " will be found to be a considerable improvement on the former." It is rather a nice problem to decide if this hope has been fulfilled. With respect to much valuable information contained in the *Introduction* there can be no question that we gain a better book, but I think *The Books of the Apocrypha* was better written and presented, and was a more interesting and readable work. It also contained a brief but important section on the individual books included in the Apocalyptic Literature. In the *Introduction* this section has disappeared, though there is still a useful chapter on the Apocalyptic Literature in general. Can it be that Dr Oesterley desires to treat these books separately, and that we may look for a further volume which will do for the Apocalyptic Literature what is now accomplished for the Apocrypha in the present *Introduction*?

The new work consists of two sections. Part I. deals with Prolegomena. The opening chapter expounds the term "Apocrypha," and discusses the Greek Canon, the character and general content of the collection, and the Hellenistic influence reflected in many of its books. Successive chapters treat the Apocrypha as literature, its historical background, its doctrinal teaching, the importance it has for the study of the New Testament, and the position it has occupied in the life of the Church. " It is a welcome fact," writes Dr Oesterley, " that in modern times the value of the Apocrypha is being increasingly recognised as a source for the understanding of the background of the New Testament in all circles, and that the modern view of inspiration . . . can find much in the Apocrypha which is as truly inspired as much that is in the Old Testament " (p. 130).

Part II. treats the special problems which arise in connection with the individual books concerning the titles, the contents, the sources, the redactional elements, the historical character, the text and versions, and the date of these books. Each chapter is supplied with a full bibliography, which will be invaluable to students of this literature. It is impossible here to mention all the intricate problems

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which emerge in the discussion. Dr Oesterley shows a special interest in the question of the Hebrew originals which in many cases lie behind the Greek or Latin versions on which we now depend. In his earlier volume he held our attention by his references to scraps of paper manuscripts containing the Hebrew text of *Ecclesiasticus* which had been discovered between 1896 and 1900 in the Genizah of a synagogue in Cairo. He now tells us that "more and more of these fragments were discovered as the years went on, all from the same home, the most recent having come to light in 1931," and he quotes the opinion of the finder, Rabbi Joseph Marcus, that possibly hidden leaves of *Ben Sira* may yet be brought to light (p. 246). The points mentioned about displacements in the text of *Ecclesiasticus* are not new, but they have an increased interest for the modern student of the similar problem in the Fourth Gospel. Dr Oesterley endorses the opinion of Fritzsche that all our Greek MSS. of *Ecclesiasticus* are ultimately derived from an examplar in which pairs of leaves had been transposed, whereas the Latin translator worked from a MS. in which transposition had not taken place. Would that theories regarding probable displacements in the text of the Fourth Gospel could be so neatly justified from manuscript evidence! In the chapter on the *Ezra Apocalypse* (4 *Ezra*, known as *II. Esdras* in the Authorised and Revised Versions), Dr Oesterley in a well-reasoned argument supports the view that the Eagle Vision (xi, xii), and the Vision of the Man from the Sea (xiii), are of different authorship from the rest of the book. Questions of date naturally occupy an important place in the discussion, and in this matter it is of interest to record that the author has modified some of his earlier views and now dates *I. Esdras* c. 300 B.C., *I. Maccabees* c. 90–70 B.C., *II. Maccabees* c. 50 B.C., and *Wisdom* c. 40 A.D.

Every student of Biblical history and literature has reason to be grateful to Dr Oesterley for yet another gift from the treasures of his wide knowledge, and also because he is so distinguished a representative of that small band of Christian scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of important, but often neglected, Jewish writings.

Wesley College, Headingley, Leeds.

Vincent Taylor.

Religion and Learning. A Study in English Presbyterian Thought from 1662 to the Foundation of the Unitarian Movement. By Olive M. Griffiths.—Cambridge: University Press, 1935.—Pp. viii + 202.—12*s.* 6*s.* net.

Students of nonconformist history and thought are greatly indebted to Miss Griffiths for an independent and valuable proof of the integral connection between the English Presbyterians in the middle of the seventeenth century and the Unitarian Movement at the end of the eighteenth. She has answered the difficult question how it came about that Presbyterians, who, before the ejections, "formed the

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most conservative and rigidly orthodox element in the Established Church," became a century and a half later "members of a dissenting body which refused to impose any test or creed, and whose only formula was a heterodox insistence upon the single personality of God and the proper humanity of Christ." She has done this by carefully examining "the intellectual forces with which Presbyterians were in contact during this period," and shown conclusively "that the general trend of their development resulted from their knowledge of contemporary movements in science and philosophy, epistemology and psychology." Stress is properly laid upon the influence of the nonconformist academies, with their tradition of freedom from restraint, and upon the Universities of Holland and Scotland, to which promising students were sent and from which their tutors were recruited. Particularly valuable is the critical analysis of the philosophy taught in these seminaries and colleges, and its comparison with that of modern thinkers.

It is a matter for regret that the plan of the book excluded any notice of Presbyterianism in Ireland, especially as the influence of Francis Hutcheson bulks so large in it. He was, of course, the son of an Irish Presbyterian minister, pupil in an Irish Academy, licensed to preach in Ireland, and tutor for nine years in an academy in Dublin. He sent pupils to Glasgow before he was appointed Professor there in 1729, when he took a score with him. One pupil, William Robertson, who entered Glasgow College in 1723, was described by Theophilus Lindsey as "the father of Unitarian Nonconformity."

On the purely historical side, *Religion and Liberty* leaves something to seek. The term "Presbyterian" is loosely used to include men like Lardner and Priestley, because during their ministry they took charge of chapels hitherto denominated Presbyterian. Presbyterian ministers were also called to the ministry of Independent chapels, and both Independents and Presbyterians were fellow-students in the academies.

On the influence of medical science taught at Warrington, reference might have been made to the treatise by Dr Fulton, of Yale, published in 1933, and since mention is made (p. 147) of the suspicion of Presbyterians that Newton was a Socinian, it might have been added that the recent biography of him by More proves that he was a Unitarian in the modern sense of the word. The statement that Presbyterians "preferred to be known as Unitarians, rather than Socinians" needs to be qualified. They were not in love with either name, unless Priestley, Belsham and their school are to be reckoned Presbyterians.

The reference to "Socinian pamphlets" and their "peculiar double-columned form" (p. 147) suggests that the writer is unacquainted with the full discussion of these tracts in 1928, proving that they were mostly the work of episcopalians. "Highgate" (p. 149) included amongst "heterodox" academies should probably read "Hoxton." "Thomas Smith," mentioned several times, is better known as "T. Southwood Smith." He began his education at

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the Bristol Baptist Academy, and can hardly be associated with Presbyterians. The "small number of converts from Methodism in Cumberland" (p. 149) seems like a mistaken allusion to "The Methodist Unitarian Movement"—a movement purely Lancastrian. "George" Smith, associated with the Trinity Bill of 1813 (p. 160), should certainly be "William Smith."

We would not end on this note. *Religion and Learning* should find a place in every nonconformist library. It proves the essential connection between them, and more particularly the influence of philosophy on doctrine in the history and development of one line of the old Dissent.

H. McLachlan.

Somerville, Manchester.

Guide to Philosophy. By C. E. M. Joad. Head of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Birkbeck College, University of of London.—London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1936.—Pp. 592.—6s. net.

Mr Joad has had the courage to face a demand which would strike most writers on philosophy with fear and trembling. There is a large body of persons, within the fold of the *intelligentsia* and outside of it, who want to know what philosophy is and to have its problems set before them in language they can understand. Further, beginners on philosophical courses feel the need of a general introduction, covering the whole field that lies before them, to save them, as they go forward, from losing the wood for the trees. Both these demands are natural and legitimate. But philosophers are proverbially shy of satisfying them. The task is extremely difficult; it needs special powers of exposition and a freedom from intellectual squeamishness that few serious thinkers possess. Compromise is called for at almost every point; grave questions have to be discussed in the phrases of common usage, which are rarely adapted to the purpose, and which, when once stated, have to be left hanging in the air. References to great philosophers must take the form either of fragmentary allusions cut adrift from their context or of *résumés* of systems, in which deep and intricate reasonings are telescoped into a jejune summary. Little wonder that philosophers are averse to such an undertaking. Moreover, the compromises referred to are inescapable. They cannot justly be censured, when an author like Mr Joad is bold enough to assay the impossible and produce a "Guide to Philosophy," ranging over the entire field, for the benefit of the unphilosophic *demos*.

Mr Joad is well qualified for the task. He has always shown a generous sympathy with the speculative aspirations of the general public. He possess a wide historical knowledge of his subject, a grasp of its main problems, and a keen interest in its latest developments, especially in its relationship to the kaleidoscopic transformations of modern science. His competence as an expositor is beyond question and he knows how to arrange a mass of complicated material

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in clear order and to present it intelligibly to his readers. In this book he has resisted very successfully the temptation which has at times beset him, to colour his criticisms of views that he dislikes with jibes and epigrams. He has written almost austerely, keeping close to the points under discussion, and marshalling the arguments *pro* and *con* without pedantry or rhetorical exaggeration. Where necessary he states his own views with a definiteness and candour that disarm criticism. He never thrusts them unduly into the forefront. One of the chief merits of his book is the fairness with which he presents doctrines that incur his displeasure or dissent. The chapter on Kant's philosophy (Chapter XIV.) is a conspicuous example. The fact that Mr Joad, belonging as he does to the Platonist succession, is naturally unsympathetic to the whole Kantian movement only makes him the more scrupulous to do justice to Kant as a great philosopher. The chapter is, in fact, one of the most satisfactory pieces of exposition in the volume.

Everything in a book like this depends on the method of its construction. Mr Joad has thrown into relief the problems of philosophy rather than the theories of individual philosophers. He points out in the Introduction that his selection of topics has been determined by two conditions, viz. to include only what is intrinsically important and what can be made intelligible to the general reader. We shall best serve the interests of this JOURNAL by outlining the manner in which Mr Joad applies this principle, rather than by insisting on criticisms of detail. Such must occur to the mind of the expert reader at almost every point; but Mr Joad is precluded by the scope of his book from defending his statements by arguments which he doubtless has in mind when making them. In Part I he begins, we think most rightly, with the natural starting-point of speculation, our knowledge of the external world. The problems of sense-perception raise at once the issue of Idealism *versus* Realism, and thence lead straight to questions of epistemology, the respective claims of empiricism and rationalism, and the nature and limits of *a priori* knowledge. It is well that Subjective Idealism should be fairly faced by the student at the outset; for, as Bosanquet said somewhere, every beginner has got first to think himself into that position and then to think himself out of it. Mr Joad puts the Realist arguments excellently in Chapter III. Chapter V., on "Logic and the Laws of Thought" is less adequate. Mr Joad may be within his rights in declining to discuss formal logic, whether Aristotelian or mathematical, but the result is rather to emasculate his treatment of the subject. He cannot avoid reference to the syllogism, of which he says that it is not "the route by which our thinking proceeds when it leads to new conclusions which are also true" (p. 142). He forgets that Aristotle valued it chiefly as the form in which an argument is presented that starts from the so-called conclusion and demonstrates the necessary connection of its predicate with the subject by the discovery of a middle term as the *vera causa* of that connection. The reasoning in the sections on Induction is not as

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convincing as usual. The belief "in the resemblance of the future to the past" is hardly to be identified with that in "same cause, same effect" (p. 130); it implies, further, that the same causes do in fact recur. Page 133 is obscure; we are left in doubt whether the author is stating his own view or pillorying that of an opponent. Are we to understand, for instance, that the truth of the Principle of Induction must be assumed because otherwise we are unable to justify an erroneous belief about physical objects? And when a little later (p. 139) we are told that this Principle, like that of Implication, is "intuitively apprehended by the knowing mind," does this mean that both principles are equally self-evident?

Part II., entitled "Critical Metaphysics," is a discussion of the concepts of Substance, Change, Causality and the Self. Among leading philosophers, Aristotle and Hume receive most attention, as in Part I. do Locke and Berkeley. The antitheses of body and mind, mechanism and teleology, determinism and freedom, are expounded, as in a second reading debate, preparatory to fuller consideration in Part III. It is characteristic of Mr Joad's method to recur, on different levels, to the same problems, with constant backward and forward references in the footnotes, thus bringing out the unity in philosophical enquiries and accustoming the student to carry forward what he has read in an earlier chapter for fuller enlightenment at a later stage. Of the four topics above mentioned, Change, Causality, and the Self are handled with competence and skill. But the claims of Substance seem to us to be dismissed much too cavalierly. Mr Joad is highly contemptuous of what he subsequently calls "the improper conception of thinghood" (pp. 572–3). We are left with an uneasy feeling that there is no serious difficulty in holding that change is thinkable without a permanent motion, without a *mobile*. Here and throughout the book Mr Joad is too prone to assume that the assurances of common-sense are incompatible with philosophical criticism. He is apt to say in his haste that the plain man is always a liar, under provocation, perhaps, from the appeal to these assurances from the side of the Logical Positivists.

These gentlemen from Cambridge are assessed and genially ruled out of court in the introductory pages of Part III., which, under the rubric "Constructive Metaphysics" comprises more than half the volume. The leading historical, and, we must add, contemporary, systems here assume greater prominence. The chapters fall into three groups. (1) In Chapters X.–XIII., the text is the philosophy of Plato. The problem of universals is developed through Aristotle and the scholastics up to the theories of modern physics. In Chapter XI. the present-day concept of subsistence and Russell's theory of descriptions are interpolated, excusably but rather unnaturally, between the Aristotelian and the Mediæval doctrines as to universals. Chapter XIII., on "The Philosophy of Æsthetics" is one of the most interesting in the book. If the fulness of treatment is disproportionate to that of other leading questions, we are not inclined to cavil or to grudge Mr Joad indulgence in thus enlarging on his favourite

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topic. He goes to some length in vindicating, with special reference to Mr Clive Bell, the objectivity of æsthetic value against such subjective theories as that of Dr I. A. Richards. He is, we believe, entirely right when he follows Plato in maintaining the claim of art to reveal truth. If this be so, then knowledge and truth must be attainable otherwise than by discursive thinking; and their limitation to statements in propositional form must be thrown overboard. Mr Joad does not pursue this line of reflection, either here or in the later chapter on "truth and error," but it surely follows from such an assertion as "the æsthetic knowledge of some will be truer than that of others, and of some (æsthetic?) knowledge (*sic*) it can be affirmed that it is false" (pp. 330–331). Can the field of æsthetic knowledge be restricted to explicit æsthetic judgements? Does not the work of art itself convey truth? This same chapter, further, has the advantage of enabling the discerning reader to apply Mr Joad's arguments to the case of values other than æsthetic, and especially moral values, which the author has deliberately excluded from consideration in the present book. (2) The second group of chapters starts from Kant (Chapter XIV.), the handling of whose philosophy by Mr Joad we have already commended, and proceeds, by way of Hegel (XV.) to what the author calls the "developments and applications of Hegelianism." Under this head he discusses the Problem of truth and error together with Pragmatism (XVI.) and the philosophy—confining himself strictly to this aspect—of Dialectical Materialism (XVII.). These last chapters are admirable, as also are the three final chapters forming (3) the third group, entitled "Philosophies of Modern Science." They deal respectively with Scientific Materialism—the mind-body problem being reviewed in more detail,—and with the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead. All this later portion of the book, illustrating as it does Mr Joad's power of clear exposition at its best, is bound to stimulate the interest even of the least proficient tiro. Our only regret is that he could not find room for a similar survey of Mr Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*. True, Mr Joad tells us in the Introduction that he has not tried to bring in all even of the great philosophers. And Mr Alexander's system is certainly not easy to interpret to the amateur in simple terms. But it should at least have received mention, if only by way of reference in the short bibliographies appended to each chapter.

We close our notice by assurances, to Mr Joad, that he has done a very difficult thing extremely well, and to the general public, that if they are curious to discover what philosophy is about, they cannot do better than read this book. They will probably find themselves attracted by it to the serious study of philosophy.

W. G. DE BURGH.

READING.

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THE
HIBBERT JOURNAL

"OUGHT WE TO FIGHT FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE NEXT WAR?"

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BROAD.

STEPHEN HOBHOUSE, M.A.

THERE are *prima facie* strong reasons for giving careful consideration to what the Professor of Philosophy of a famous university, writing in the calm deliberation of peace time, has to say of the obligations which will confront men of military age if this country becomes involved in war—more especially as many of the younger members of his own University appear to be in doubt as to whether or not they should refuse all participation in war service. It is true that Professor Broad somewhat disarms criticism by saying that he has no idea what is the right answer on this really urgent problem, and that if he had he would not be able to prove it to people with different ethical principles from his own. But, inasmuch as in the course of the "few relevant remarks" of his concluding pages he reflects seriously upon the honour, consistency and good sense of the conscientious objector, his article seems to call for a considered reply—even at the

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risk of my words appearing to him as only the "emission of so much emotional hot air."

By no means every reader will be able to follow Professor Broad in the intricate subtleties of his various forms of judgments of value and obligation, though I fancy a careful perusal of this part of his article may help many of us pacifists to a clearer view of the issues involved. The only class of war-resisters ("refusers" he calls them) whom he lets off lightly from the ethical standpoint are those who hold what is evidently to him the unreasonable view of "the universalistic form of the teleological theory of obligation associated with the hedonistic theory of value." The actual convictions concealed under this terrifying piece of phraseology are held, I should imagine, by few if any of the pacifists who may be called Christian. The standpoint which I am concerned to defend against the Professor's imputations is that of the Christian pacifist who believes that personalities have a supreme and ultimate value, that the value of experiences depends on some quality other than mere pleasantness, and that for the great majority the obligations to "conserve the good and check the evil" are in some degree stronger as to one's country than as to foreign communities (though here there need not in the long run be any conflict). I write as one who has (without indeed the Professor's "conclusive evidence") been able hitherto to retain a scarcely shaken faith in a spiritual and eternal universe, far more real than the visible one, in which are conserved together with our own personalities all our efforts to increase love, truth, and beauty, all our prayers and thoughts which can pass the high standard of the ethic of Jesus Christ; so that the persistence and the purity of our efforts is of far greater benefit to mankind as well as to ourselves than the prosperity or the liberty or even the survival of our homes and our political institutions. Moreover, having had some personal experience of the penalties visited upon war-resisters during the years 1916–19, I have had occasion to think out seriously the basis of my convictions.

I recognise indeed that not all conscientious objectors may be genuine, and that, even among those who are, motives are sometimes mixed and the courage of conviction sometimes fails. Nevertheless, past experience indicates that there is a sufficiency of pure motive and of brave conviction to form a solid basis for the claims advanced in this article.

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It is not necessary to be a complete Tolstoyan or to forswear the use of all outward weapons against personal aggression in order to feel profoundly that the highly organised and quite indiscriminate killing, which is the essence of modern warfare, is utterly alien to the Truth, Love, and Beauty, which are the realities of the Eternal World, as well as to the spirit and teaching of Jesus. The last war and its aftermath has made it clear to those who have eyes to see that an increase on a large scale of hatred and fear, of slander and deception, of disease and squalor, together with much relaxation of different forms of self-control, would be inseparable from any such conflict, far outweighing whatever minor benefits may be conferred by the stimulation of patriotic self-sacrifice and co-operation.

But, indeed, with the vast increase of the available powers of destruction, especially from air attack, prophets are not wanting, as much among the isolationists and the sanctionists as among the true pacifists, who tell us that another European war almost certainly means for all parties concerned the destruction of our present civilisation, a reversion to a second dark age of anarchy, demoralisation and poverty. Professor Broad himself suggests that "under the conditions of modern war a complete and early defeat might be better even for the defeated country than victory after prolonged fighting."

I am myself prepared sorrowfully to admit that short of some miraculous, heaven-inspired revolution of public sentiment—indeed of religious faith—our country may be expected to drift into a catastrophic European or world war. It is not to be supposed that a government, which (quite apart from the Dominions) controls such an obviously unfair share of the territorial expanse and material resources of the globe and of its strategic positions, will be indefinitely left in peace by strong nations that chafe within narrow boundaries. The tradition of national and imperial sovereignty and prestige, a tradition completely alien to the spirit of the Gospels, is so deeply rooted in political Britain that it is difficult to hope for the rising to power in any near future of a government at all likely to make the willing sacrifices which alone can avail to prevent war and introduce a new spirit into the relationships of the Great Powers.

The seeds of war are sown too widespread and are growing too rapidly, the organisation of nationalistic propaganda is too insistent, for there to be any likelihood at all that the slowly growing influence of the small pacifist

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minority should avail either to prevent the threatened war or to put an end to it before irreparable damage has been done. As for the idea of any lasting "collective security," either with or apart from the League, in a world of jealously exclusive and competitive nations, armed to the teeth, it appears to be sheer illusion.

But to a believer in a spiritual universe, the home of a God who is Love, this unhappy conviction is far from being any ground for despair, especially if he be also a philosophic student of history. Nor is it any ground for accepting Professor Broad's rash and most unphilosophic conclusion, that "the large scale effects of refusing to fight are likely to be negligible," because neither the duration nor the outcome of the threatened war will be appreciably affected thereby. The life and death of Jesus was, in one of its aspects, a protest against the militarism of those Jews who were ready, at whatever cost to the life and morality of their nation, to organise armed revolt against the Roman oppressor. The immediate protest failed almost completely, but the spiritual forces which that life and death released are working to-day in every corner of the globe. The heroic stand of Socrates did not avail to save Greece from internal corruption and disintegration, but the currents of aspiration set in motion by the Athenian seer have by no means spent their force.

Even so, the Christian pacifist believes that the spirit of non-violence, the spirit which is ready to accept a diminution of national and imperial prestige, a loss of trade and territory, even bitter humiliation and impoverishment, rather than expose countless millions to the unspeakable horrors of modern war, rather than lead the young men of Europe into the sin of indiscriminate killing with bullet, shell, and bomb, rather than rouse up an orgy of hate and fear and lying throughout the continent—that this spirit proceeds from the very essence of the unseen universe, of that Divine Kingdom, which will some day be on earth as it is in Heaven. However catastrophic the coming Armageddon may be, every effort, every prayer of unalloyed goodwill now, whether consciously directed against the forces of militarism or spent in the sphere of ordinary social relationships, unnoticed and unrecorded as it may be in human annals, will bear its appointed fruit. By such prayers and efforts we are laying the invisible foundations of the fairer, more Christlike civilisation destined to arise, under the guiding hand of Providence, out of the ruin of our

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present semi-pagan, machine-ridden order, which appears swiftly and surely to be digging its own grave.

The Christian movement of the first four centuries A.D. was not widespread enough and became too much corrupted by the spirit of the world about it to save the Greco-Roman civilisation from perishing gradually under the blows of a long and terrible succession of barbarian invasions. Nevertheless, desperate and hopeless as the condition of the European world often appeared to pagan and Christian alike in the long years of chaos, it was the faith and the love of those believers in the spiritual universe of Christ, at a time when armed resistance to the barbarian had shown itself all but useless, that laid the foundations, under barbarian sovereignty, of a nobler civilisation than the Greco-Roman, and preserved invaluable elements of the old culture to blossom again in a healthier environment. The chief visible instruments of this transition were the monastic communities and the wandering missionaries, together with some of the secular clergy and of the Popes and a few administrators and jurists. The spiritual atmosphere which made their work of conversion and education possible was, one is justified in believing, formed by the influence of thousands of Christian lay individuals and families, the humble homes from which there radiated faith and prayer and forgiving love. And the monasteries, it is important to remember, were originally associations of laymen, not an order of the clergy, as in more modern times. The great majority of these Christians were certainly not conscious and thoroughgoing pacifists. But most of the monks and priests would probably be faithful to their vows not to take part in war or to use violence, even in self-defence, and many of them would teach their flock the Christian duty of forgiveness.

No modern Hun or Bolshevik could appear to the British "patriot" more unspeakably godless and bestial than did the pagan Franks, Lombards, and Northmen, the warriors who ruthlessly destroyed the towns and monasteries of the dark ages. And yet these wild savages were gradually converted to the gentler, humanising faith of the Church, and their children became, indeed, the leaders of the new mediæval civilisation.

Think what it must have cost in expenditure of humbled pride and repressed desire for revenge to exercise the love and faith which alone made possible the conversion of the murderous oppressor!

The prophetic words of William Blake's *Grey Monk*

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were as true in those days as they will be true in the future.

"My father drew his sword in the north,
With his thousands strong he is marched forth;
My brother has armed himself in steel,
To revenge the wrongs thy children feel."

But vain the sword and vain the bow,
They never can work war's overthrow;
The hermit's prayer and the widow's tear
Alone can save the world from fear.

The hand of vengeance sought the bed
To which the purple tyrant fled;
The iron hand crushed the tyrant's head,
And became a tyrant in his stead.

Until the tyrant himself relent,
The tyrant who first the black bow bent,
Slaughter shall heap the bloody plain,
Resistance and war is the tyrant's gain.

But the tear of love and forgiveness sweet,
And submission to death beneath his feet;
The tear shall melt the sword of steel,
And every wound it has made shall heal.

For the tear is an intellectual thing,
And the sigh is the sword of an awful king,
And the bitter groan of a martyr's woe
Is an arrow from the Almighty's bow.

The Christian pacifist believes that the acceptance of suffering at the hands of the unjust by persons who have chosen to be defenceless as regards material weapons, while trying from their hearts to forgive the aggressor, is the *only* effectual way to true and permanent peace; and that at best only a false and insecure peace can be won by the endeavour—even by an internationally organised endeavour—to inflict a greater suffering on the unjust for the purposes of deterrence and retribution. If he has thought out the deeper implications of this conviction, he believes that it is just the human application of God's universal method for overcoming evil with good, of which the scene on Calvary was the great exemplar.

The recognition of these truths appears to be far clearer to-day, though only to a few, than it was even to the most enlightened Christians of the decaying Roman Empire. If then civilisation is destined to break down once again and we are entering into another dark age, we have a great advantage over those who lived in that earlier twilight. We can have good courage that we shall be able in the midst

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of the chaos to help in our turn to build the bridges which will carry the nations through much tribulation into the dawn of a new era. As Gandhi has said prophetically, true *ahimsa*, that is non-violence, is the weapon not of the weak and abject, but of the strong who are confident that, in spite of temporary outward failure, love and faith will win in the end.

If I have made clear the ethical and metaphysical background on which Christian war-resisters take their stand, it should not be difficult to deal with the various controversial and disparaging suggestions which Professor Broad makes in regard to their position in time of war. I am not concerned here to defend the standpoint of pacifists who have no supernatural faith, though I believe many of them could make out quite a reasonable case for refusal to fight for their country. The Professor is clearly an agnostic as regards the survival of our human personalities; and though he does admit the pleasure-value of "a state of heroic self-sacrifice" (a state, incidentally, within reach of the pacifist as well as of the militarist), he hardly appears to believe in the absolute reality of truth, beauty, and active goodness, that is love. At any rate, he fails to recognise that the man who refuses to participate in war, because its spirit is the negation of those values, is making a permanent contribution to reality.

For we pacifists are confident that the obligation not to take part in the mass-murder of modern war is an inherent part of the supreme obligation to worship the absolute values of truth, beauty, and love. And this obligation (however "absurd" it may appear to a Professor of Ethics) *does* override all conflicting and partial obligations, such as the duties of promoting the *immediate* good of our family and neighbour, and of conforming cheerfully to the existing laws and standards of the community in which we live.

Moreover, to most of us these absolute values are objectified not merely in an indwelling God, Creator and Father, but in the divine-human personality of Christ, to whom as Lord and Saviour of humanity we owe supreme loyalty. Dr. H. R. L. Sheppard, for instance, can say that "Christian pacifism means not so much acceptance of the doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount as a walking in company with Christ, sooner or later with face set towards Jerusalem"—that is, towards the Cross and a sharing to a greater or lesser degree in its great symbolic drama of love, all forgiving and all suffering, and thereby victorious over evidence.

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> "Great as is the debt of service," it has been said, "that a man owes to his Fatherland, the claim of Christ remains supreme, and the State can only demand the wholesale loyalty of its citizens, when its action is guided by the same moral principles as the private citizen is taught [*i.e.*, presumably, by Christ] to apply in his relations with his neighbours. . . . Loyalty to our own country must be subordinate to the larger loyalty that we owe to the whole human race for whom Christ died."

These words are not those of any extreme pacifist, but of a report drawn up and endorsed by the Bishops and Archbishops of the Anglican Church assembled in the Lambeth Conference of 1930.

To turn to another point, if our refusal to fight has its roots as deep as I have tried to show, it is surely clear that the extent to which other people will also refuse is not (as the Professor claims) "an extremely relevant circumstance" in the case at issue, any more than (say) the extent to which our neighbours practised polygamy would be a relevant circumstance to us, if we are convinced that monogamy is founded on a law of God. And, as A. A. Milne cleverly elaborates, compulsory polygamy might quite conceivably be imposed by the State as a measure of national defence. Here we have issues altogether different from (for example) the rules of traffic control, where the duty of keeping to the left or the right of the road depends mainly on the course of action followed by the great majority of road-users.

Most of those for whom I am speaking would, I think, refuse to admit Professor Broad's sharp distinction between the universalistic form and the restricted form of teleological obligation, a distinction surely based on a very superficial and materialist view of what is good and evil. For we believe that the organisation of the nation for modern warfare and its victorious achievement increases the virulence of evil in one's own nation as much as, perhaps even more than, in the ranks of the defeated enemy nation. Victory means, indeed, a greater capacity for killing and maiming human beings. So that the refusal to take part in the mass-murder of modern war as organised by our government is the greatest contribution that we can make to the welfare of our own nation as well as that of other nations, including the enemy, even if at the time the effect of our action may appear to be negligible. As A. A. Milne puts it, in simple

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words that mean much the same as my own explanation above,

> "there is no hope for us, save that in the midst of the condition of war, which our rulers are making inevitable by their policy, we may be able to maintain the idea of peace; so that, when they are dead and dishonoured, what is left of the world may try again." [1]

To this I may add: our faith teaches us that the private or corporate prayers of the minority who are faithful to the peace ideal are among the greatest instruments for bringing nearer its ultimate realisation, especially where all other more external means of promoting it seem closed to us.

This leads us on to a serious charge which the Professor twice levels, though with some faint suggestion of misgiving, against the "refuser" of war-service. He asks him to reflect whether he will not be guilty of a dishonourable act in accepting, as must be almost inevitable in time of war, food and protection from men who are, even though they do not recognise it, sinning against their higher nature in keeping the enemy at bay by acts of violence and deception. The pacifist will answer confidently that it is rather these men, who by their acquiescence in the policy of the Government—a policy based on armaments—have brought into jeopardy the means of civilised existence, which they now have to try and defend with shot and shell. For it is our contention that with an unselfishly oriented national and imperial policy, with a deliberate abandonment in a spirit of faith and goodwill of the use of the death-dealing machines which we call armaments, none of our neighbours would be at all likely to seek our destruction by slaughter or starvation. If I am a prisoner in a robber fortress, is it dishonourable for me to accept indispensable food and shelter which my masters can only secure by the plunder and slaughter of my friends who are their enemies? It is, indeed, morally incumbent upon me to exercise self-denial and the avoidance of luxury, when the majority of my fellows are suffering privation. But so it is in peace-time, if I belong to the privileged class that reaps undeservingly an entirely disproportionate share of the rewards of our system of property and industry.

Honour may, indeed, require the pacifist to die for his country. (It is perhaps not irrelevant to recall that some seventy of the conscientious objectors during 1916-18—

[1] *Peace with Honour*, p. 210.

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many of whom might have kept "safe jobs" without difficulty—died as the result of their repeated imprisonments under unusually harsh conditions, while others who shared their convictions laid down their lives in the war-zone on Red Cross service.) But ordinarily he feels that honour requires him to live, in order to express, even under conditions of painful unpopularity and persecution, the essential sanity and peaceableness of mankind.

And, indeed, it is a rash thing for a philosopher who refrains from condemning the activities of British Governments, when war is threatened or in progress, to throw the imputation of dishonour in the face of those who presume to disobey them. May I refer once again to Mr. Milne's admirable chapters in his *Peace with Honour*, where, under the headings of "England's Honour," "National Prestige," and "National Pride," it is shown with brilliant irony, and with no more exaggeration than is permissible to a master of wit, that the patriotic convention of honour, which often leads direct to war, is, even more than the honour of the duellist, little or no better than dishonour, from the true Christian or ethical standpoint. Consider the position of our own country. We control, in our colonial Empire, vast territories and alien populations, as well as places strategically threatening to other nations. Over all these we have no national right, they are certainly not indispensable to our civilised existence, and indeed the great mass of our population probably reaps no benefit at all from them. Yet our statesmen would admittedly be prepared, rather than let some at least of these alien territories, styled "British possessions," pass under a form of foreign or international control, to plunge with open eyes our own country and all Europe into a catastrophic war, in which it is quite certain that hundreds of thousands—indeed, probably millions of men, women, and children, would die miserably from shells and bombs, disease and starvation. Or they would be ready to initiate a similar world catastrophe in order to expiate some humiliation to the British flag, some injury or outrage suffered by a handful of British nationals. What a strange notion of honour! It is as if the master of the house, rather than surrender to a gang of half-starving bandits some jewellery which they demanded at the pistol's point, chose to allow the raiders to burn his house and his own family alive, if he only had reason to think he might himself survive to wreak vengeance upon them and upon their families. If Britain voluntarily disarmed, in a spirit not of fear but of

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goodwill, she might indeed lose most of her Empire, her people would probably have to put up for a time with a lower standard of living; but there would be no bombardment of our cities, nothing of the mass-murder of war. Best of all, we should not be inciting our young men to dishonour themselves by becoming the instruments for the infliction of such slaughter on their fellow-creatures. There are risks in unilateral disarmament, but they are far less than those of war. Such disarmament has never yet been put to the test of experience, except in the case of quite small groups and of the Quaker State of Pennsylvania. There it did, in fact, succeed in preserving peace and justice in the State's relationships with warlike Indian tribes, as long as those who had faith in it remained in control.

The annexation of our country by a foreign power would in any case seem unlikely. It would hardly be worth while, at this stage of history. But if it ever were to come to such a grievous issue, so unthinkable a prospect for the proud Briton of to-day, it is not irrelevant to recall that in the case, not only of the Jew and the Greek and the Indian, but of our own English forefathers after the Norman conquest, it was under the domination of alien rulers that great steps forward were made in true national well-being.

Professor Broad's suggestion that the death penalty should be inflicted for the refusal of war-service is, indeed, a solution that would solve many of our personal doubts and difficulties, and would assuredly, if imposed, be accepted courageously by genuine pacifists. But its imposition argues a sadly low level of conscience on the part of the community which acquiesces in it; and the disappearance of the rebels would only mean a still greater lowering of the national standards of liberty and fraternity. How greatly, for example, have Spain and Japan lost in past centuries through the complete destruction, in the interests of national solidarity, of the Christian bodies who were at variance with the State religion! Where should we be now if the Imperial Government of Rome had succeeded in exterminating the primitive Christians, who, by their religious exclusiveness and their refusal of military service, appeared to be a grave danger to the Empire?

I suppose I must say something about Professor Broad's final suggestion that pacifists (or even those who "are not convinced that they ought to fight") should, on the outbreak of the next war, put themselves quietly to death rather than wait for the enemy's poison gas to fall from the skies. This

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has characteristically received some attention in the daily Press. I hope it will not be regarded as advice seriously given. If it were, it might, in days of stress and despondency, prove infectious among many who are quite outside the ranks of war-resisters. I cannot believe that a Professor of Moral Philosophy would give forth seriously such a counsel of despair, when he knows that there are dozens of impressionable young men, many of them possibly suffering from nervous strain, who are anxiously debating whether their highest duty to their country and to mankind may not involve refusing to take up arms in the next war. My own reply to the Professor, both here and on other counts, would be, that, however strait the gate and narrow the way of life, it is to be preferred to the broad way that leads to destruction.

Professor Broad asserts that there is "no evidence at all" for the "allegation" that if we survive the death of our bodies (which he regards as very doubtful), the position of the suicide in the next life will be worse than that of the non-suicide. This is putting the question frankly on the hedonistic plane. Clearly on such a matter conclusive evidence is unobtainable. But our healthy intuitions tell us that the kind of suicide which the Professor recommends is not the way of the brave man, but that of the coward or the mentally distraught. And we cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that along with Christianity all the higher religions and nearly all the great philosophies would condemn suicide in the circumstances supposed. In the words put by Plato into the mouth of Socrates, "a man has no right to open the door of his prison and run away," but he "should wait and not surrender his life until God summons him."

There is a sense, however, a very real sense, in which the nations of the world are preparing to commit corporate suicide at this supreme crisis of history by allowing themselves to drift with open eyes into a fratricidal death struggle which will soon end in universal ruin. The time of respite is short. Is it too late—if I may forget for once my pessimistic expectations—is it too late for the peoples to listen to the warnings of impending doom, and, rising up, to insist on a peacemaking and a disarmament ample enough to avert it? Courage and trust, like fear and suspicion, are infectious. If only the voice of one nation gave the signal, mankind might enter upon the brightest phase of its chequered history.

STEPHEN HOBHOUSE.

BROXBOURNE, HERTS.

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A DEMILITARISED LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

L. P. JACKS.

I.

War-preventing and Peace-promoting.

"The League of Nations," said Professor Gilbert Murray in a recent speech,[1] "was meant for the prevention of war." This, apparently, is what most of the League's supporters understand it to be, or as meant to be—a war-preventing institution. In what follows the contention will be that the essential function of the League is, or should be, not primarily the prevention of war but the promotion of peace, and, further, that the reform or reconstruction of the League after its recent failures should be based on a changed conception of it from that of a war-preventing to that of a peace-promoting institution.

The prevention of war and the promotion of peace are obviously related; but they are not identical. Whatever is successfully done for the prevention of war will make it easier for peaceful activities to operate, but it will not actually promote them. On the other hand, anything done to promote the activities of peace will tend to prevent war by the setting up of counter-interests and to that extent diverting energy from war-making channels. In this way a peace-promoting League of Nations, while not aiming directly at the prevention of war, would contribute effectively to that object.

The line of action adopted by the League and the general character of its activities will differ widely according as it aims at war-preventing or at peace-promoting. If war-preventing is the object the League will be chiefly occupied in devising means for restraining the military forces which

[1] Reported in the *Oxford Times*, May 15, 1936.

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make war and in drawing up treaties or covenants for that purpose. This will necessarily immerse it in a military atmosphere; its mentality will tend towards a nightmare condition perpetually haunted by the spectre of war, and it will ultimately be confronted with a quite insoluble problem, itself a product of the nightmare—that of so controlling the action of the war-making forces as to reduce them to inactivity, in other words, of employing these forces to suppress themselves. Under these conditions failure is inevitable, with the added danger that the nightmare may become a general obsession and suddenly transform itself into a reality, like a man brooding on suicide until finally he commits it. Which danger is very great at the present moment.

A League of Nations devoted to the promotion of peace would not be thinking perpetually about war. It would be thinking rather about a multitude of possibilities, hitherto unexplored, of bringing the nations together on lines of positive cooperation. Instead of challenging them with summary and sweeping measures, which their habit renders them incapable of implementing, our peace-promoting League would be content at first to plant the seeds of cooperation, but always with the certainty that such seeds when wisely planted grow rapidly into trees. Its business, starting from small beginnings, would presently become immense; forces now occupied in war-making would begin to flow towards it and be harnessed for turning its machinery; new interests, attractive to every kind of talent, would become active; the valour and wisdom of the warrior would be tempted by a less destructive occupation. As the objective of the League, peace-promoting has greater promise than war-preventing.

This is not to say that war-preventing is a vain enterprise and to be immediately abandoned as such. It should be continued as long as it is found necessary. Let the Foreign Offices of great nations continue to do their best—for it is their appointed business—by means of such political alliances or regional pacts as may be suited to an unstable and tumultuous world slowly moving towards equilibrium and order. Let the war-preventing work of the Foreign Offices and the peace-promoting work of the League run concurrently. Keep them separate, but with this assurance, that in proportion as the peace-promoters get on with their business the war-preventers will find *their* problem gradually eased. And let patience preside over the double operation. It is a peace of the world is not an arrangement in space. It is a process in time and will never be achieved until the time

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thinkers take it in hand. The time-thinker is always content with modest beginnings, and more concerned in finding the right direction than in attaining the maximum speed. Had the existing League attempted less it might have accomplished more.

II.

The Frailty of Military Alliances.

It is a highly remarkable fact, or would be so if custom had not dulled our sense of its peculiarity, that one method of keeping the peace, and one method only, has so far found favour with the diplomatic minds which control and conduct the foreign policy of nations. This is the method of forming a military alliance embodied in a treaty or covenant committing the parties to military action in certain eventualities. In all these peace-keeping experiments, of which the Covenant of the League is the most ambitious, the contracting parties are armed nations and their armed forces, combined according to the terms of the Treaty, are the instrument invoked and relied on for keeping and, if need be, enforcing the peace. We may call it the Foreign Office method of preventing war.

It is also remarkable that in none of these treaties or covenants is the precaution taken of requiring the contracting parties to deposit security for the fulfilment of their obligation. This indeed is the most remarkable feature, or absence of feature, in the Foreign Office method. For, on the one hand, the obligations incurred under military alliances are invariably such as to commit the parties to very considerable risks, while, on the other hand, the reputation of political States in the matter of fulfilling obligations which turn out to be inconvenient under changed circumstances is notoriously blemished all round, and in some cases completely bankrupt. In view of their frequent lapses in the past, of which there have recently been some flagrant examples, one would expect that the deposit of security, and of very substantial security, subject to forfeit in the event of default, would be made an indispensable element of any treaty in which armed and powerful nations bind themselves over to keep the peace. This however is not done, nor, so far as the present writer is aware, has it been proposed.

That the Foreign Office method of military alliance still holds the field, as the only method recognised as practicable for creating collective security, is clearly seen in the manifold discussions now proceeding as to the future of the League of

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Nations. Proposals for the reform of the League invariably lie within a framework of the military-alliance or Foreign-Office type. From a large collection of statements to that effect we select the two following as typical:

> "The essential condition of the system of collective security—or as Sir Norman Angell has more accurately called it, collective defence—is the certainty that an aggressor will meet with an overwhelming resistance. . . . A League of Nations can only maintain peace if all its members are prepared to fight collectively for it. . . . Peace cannot be made certain by any other method." (The Earl of Lytton on "Basic Principles" in the *Spectator*, May 22, 1936.)
>
> "The fundamental condition of the League or of any system of collective security is that the parties likely to be loyal to it shall possess a collective preponderance of strength over probable aggressors. This condition must be established; without it any reform of the League organisation is useless." (Sir Arthur Salter in *The Times*, May 14, 1936.)

The reformed League, then, is to be in essence, like the League as it now exists, a military alliance or armed combination of the many against the one—the many being conceived as keepers of the peace and the one as a breaker of it. This armed combination is to be so overwhelming that resistance to it by a single state will be impossible—an enormous fighting force which, just because it is enormous, will never have to fight, and so be in the condition of winning a perpetual victory without having to risk itself in battle. The picture of such an overwhelming force, with the enemy always subdued in advance by the knowledge that he will be overwhelmed if he challenge the Colossus, and never having to shed blood on the battlefield, is a picture not easily formed, and would certainly be a new phenomenon in military annals. Such, however, seems to be the picture of the League of Nations as painted by the imagination of many reformers of it. It is to be a military alliance, or combination of armed force, on such a scale as to be irresistible, so efficient for its warlike business that it will never have to engage in war and so certain in action that it will never be called upon to act, but only to threaten. We cannot help being reminded of a proposal made, apparently by a humorist, at the recent meeting of a certain Peace Society. It is impossible to abolish war, said the speaker, but quite

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easy to render it innocuous. This could be done at once if the members of the League were to enter into a covenant to load guns with non-explosive powder and to furnish bayonets with cork tips.

We have now to suggest that military alliances are, precisely by reason of their military nature, highly precarious instruments for keeping the peace, and this irrespective of whether the alliance takes the extended form of a League of Nations or some form more restricted. We shall suggest further that such alliances become more precarious, rather than less, in proportion as the number of parties to them increases. And, finally, that these alliances, when embodied in treaties the parties to which deposit no security for the fulfilment of their obligations, are, not precarious merely, but foredoomed to collapse in the first crisis which calls for their implementation. In other words, our contention will be that the system of collective security, so long as it rests on any form of military alliance, is itself fundamentally insecure. This is the negative side of our thesis.

On the positive side we shall submit that the way to assured peace, no short cut in any case, lies in a direction entirely different from that which leads only to compacts, negotiated according to the Foreign Office method, for the prevention of war by *force majeure*. It lies, we shall contend, in the initiating and fostering of cooperative enterprise between nations on positive and mutually beneficial lines, the reaction of these on the military situation being such as gradually, and perhaps rapidly, to weaken the war-making forces, by diverting and canalising some part of them into more profitable forms of operation. A reformed League of Nations, as we conceive it, would have the character of an international business organisation, administered and managed by international trustees for the benefit of the member states, entirely dissociated from military problems defensive or otherwise, and having the minimum connection necessary with political machinery and the electioneering fortunes of political parties. Our reformed League, lifted clean out of the military atmosphere, would definitely abandon the attempt to become an armed combination for the maintenance of peace or for the suppression of war; not indifferent, indeed, to those desirable results, but contributing to their achievement by the indirect method of setting up a common interest—the principle of strengthening the opposite of that which is too strong. Let the question of military alliances, if they are still called for—as doubtless

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they would be—be left to the Foreign Offices where they properly belong; but let the League of Nations have nothing whatever to do with them. In a League thus demilitarised we may discern the promise of a beneficent future; in a military League no promise, save of deepening confusion and recurrent disaster. And, lest this conception should appear too novel for creatures of habit like ourselves to assimilate, let it here be noted that the existing League, in its minor activities, has even now the character and the machinery proper to an international business organisation; and, further, that in these minor activities it has been remarkably successful while, in its predominant character as a military alliance for the prevention of war, it has failed most disastrously. This difference should give the clue to its reform.

III.

Inverted Militarism.

The work of the League, as an institution for preventing war, has been carried on from the beginning in an atmosphere psychologically most unfavourable to peace—an atmosphere charged with war-making elements and constantly stirred by war-making currents, coming now from this direction and now from that, the atmosphere, in short, of war itself. The statesmen assembled at Geneva have been, before all else, the representatives of *armed* nations, armed and therefore standing in dangerous relationships one to another. It would appear moreover that the influence of each on the policy of the whole is proportioned to the armed forces at its command—witness the argument familiar in this country that our armaments must be increased in order to increase our weight as a factor in collective security. From the moment of its birth the League has been haunted by the spectre of war, now more menacing than ever; the thought of war has been uppermost in the minds of its members; the fear of war has been the dominating motive [1]; rumours of war have been the constant accompaniment of all the major deliberations: the vision of war has filled the foreground, while at the present moment the mind of the League is preoccupied in contemplating the war it has failed to prevent. *Arma virumque cano* might well have been adopted as the League motto, with the letters turned upside down

[1] The fear of war should never be confused, though it often is, with the love of peace—a much rarer quality and doubtfully existent in many quarters where the fear of war is obviously very strong.

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to indicate the inverted militarism of an institution intended, as Professor Murray says, to "prevent war" by an armed combination. In this war-saturated atmosphere, and with a mentality dominated to the point of obsession by the image of war, what wonder that peace-keeping itself tends to the form of war-making, that the only peace-keeping plans forthcoming are to be war-operated in the last resort, and statesmanship inhibited from conceiving any better road to peace than that of a war-making alliance against the offending war-maker. For, as we have seen, the League in its last analysis is simply a combination of fighting elements on the grand scale, arrayed for the suppression of fighting, differing in scope from its numerous predecessors in that line but, like them, invoking Satan to cast Satan out. That lasting peace can be generated under these conditions still appears to be the hope of many. To the psychologist it is a rank impossibility. Mr H. G. Wells is not unduly exercising his imagination when he describes a League of Nations so conceived as a "vegetarian league of wolves." [1]

All this, though perhaps inevitable, has proved most unfortunate. Of all the forms in which the life of nations clothes itself their war-life with its combative tempers, violent passions and dangerous relationships is precisely the least fitted to furnish them with a ground of common action, a principle of international unity, or a lasting support to peace. Their economic life, their social life, their cultural life—any one of these would have formed a firmer basis for the League. So far as the present League has adopted the war basis, so far, that is, as the member states enter the Covenant in the character of armed and war-making powers, the operation of the League as the instrument of peace is foredoomed to failure. Were it ever to focus itself, as some propose, into an International Army, its disruption and defeat, on going into action against a powerful antagonist, is far from improbable.

IV.

Incapacity of the Political State for Altruistic Warfare.

In what degree does the virtue known as benevolence, altruism, or disinterested regard for justice and fair play exist and operate in the mutual relations of sovereign states? To what extent does it enter as an actuating motive into

[1] In a letter to *The Times*, May 19, 1936.

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their foreign policy? How far may we count upon it as likely to come into action when a crisis arises which can only be solved by a self-renouncing or benevolent policy on the part of some or all of the states concerned? It is obviously important to obtain a clear answer to this question before entering into treaties or covenants which commit the contracting states to such action. To contract obligations which exceed their capacity for altruism, as revealed by their past conduct, customary habits and present disposition is to invite "collapse in the hour of performance." [1]

That the virtue in question is not altogether wanting in international morality, even at its present low level, is proved by the willingness of some fifty states to impose economic sanctions on Italy in the crisis now proceeding. This involves some loss of profitable trade to the participating states—self-sacrifice to that extent. But the self-sacrifice is not enough to imperil the vital interests of any of them, nor to impose a severe burden on their national resources. It cannot be compared with the conduct of the hero who risks his life to bring in a wounded man on the battlefield nor with that of a lifeboat crew setting out in a hurricane to a sinking ship. Nor were these modest sacrifices accepted without opposition by the interests affected; a few states declined them altogether, and their maintenance, under circumstances that seem to require it, is proving difficult.

The Covenant of the League commits the participating states to much more than this. It commits them, in the event of the milder measures failing, to wage collective warfare on the unjust aggressor, and to do so in the name of the international justice which is the common cause of them all. What does this involve? It clearly assumes in each of the participating states a self-renouncing disposition, or capacity for self-sacrifice, comparable to that of the hero bringing in a wounded man, or the lifeboat crew going out in a hurricane. No state can go to war collectively or otherwise for any cause whatsoever without willingness to shed the blood of its nationals, expend their treasure and imperil the vital interests of the body politic. It has to be remembered also that any Power going to war against another thereby exposes its flank to other aggressors, of whom more than one may be waiting for precisely that opportunity, with all the risks of a spreading conflagration. To suppose that political states would be willing to incur these formidable perils on behalf of some victim or cause

[1] A phrase of Mr. Gladstone's. See below, p. 503.

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not directly involving their own interest is to conceive them as having adopted the code of chivalry in their mutual relations. It assumes, at least, that international altruism has reached the level attained by the Good Samaritan, if not that of the Round Table.[1] This, as recent events clearly prove, is an over-estimate of the self-renouncing disposition characteristic of sovereign political states.

History affords no example of a political state willing to risk its vital interests in this heroic and self-forgetful manner. Such action, whether collective or otherwise, would be a new departure in international morality, which nothing has occurred to render probable, but which much has occurred to render highly improbable. Had Abyssinia, like Antwerp, been "a pistol pointed at the head of England" or at the head of any other great Power, there would have been a very different story to tell. As it was, no Good Samaritan came to her rescue when fallen among thieves, no Knight of the Round Table risked his life to save her from outrage, no Grace Darling put out to the sinking ship—though many were pledged so to do. It was the misfortune of Abyssinia to point no pistol at any powerful head. Whether she will remain equally innocuous, as part of the new "Roman Empire," remains to be seen.

If further evidence to the same effect be demanded, the recent doings of sovereign states on the field of economic policy will furnish it in abundance. From the day the Covenant was signed until now the covenanting states, with hardly an exception, have been busily engaged in building tariff walls, each for the protection of its own interest, with no regard whatever to the damage thereby inflicted on the interests of its neighbours. Not much of the Good Samaritan in that department and still less of the Round Table! To expect that nations governed by self-regard so reckless of foreign interest in their economic relations will be ready, at the call of justice and fair play, to shed their blood and spend their treasure altruistically when any one of them happens to become the object of unjust aggression can only be

[1] It is interesting to compare the two standards, especially in connection with our present subject. Had a Knight of the Round Table encountered the man fallen among thieves, he would probably have done all that the good Samaritan did and something more. After depositing his man at the inn he would have whetted his sword on the inn grindstone, remounted his horse, returned to the scene of the outrage, tracked the robbers to their lair and taught them a lesson, at some risk to his own life, which would have rendered the road from Jerusalem to Jericho thenceforward a safe Sunday walk for peaceably minded pedestrians.

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described as an astonishing over-estimate of their present capacity for that species of virtue. Yet is it not precisely on such an over-estimate that Article XVI of the Covenant was founded? Does not that Article clearly commit the covenanting nations, or their governments, to self-renouncing action far beyond their present powers of fulfilment? Would any existing government, cabinet or body of statesmen, holding the position of trustees for the life and fortunes of a nation, take the responsibility of exposing them to the manifold risks of warfare in a cause which was none of its own? Would the ruling government of any of them be held justified by its own nationals in so doing? What would be the fate of any statesman or political party rash enough to propose it? Individuals can act in this manner, and often do so; corporate states, never. Can we wonder, then, that a Covenant binding them to such action turns out in the day of performance to be little better than a paralysing entanglement which, far from restraining the aggressor, seems rather to give him the opportunity he is waiting for?

How does our own country stand in this matter? Without raising the question whether we are more or less benevolently disposed to our neighbours than they to us—a question on which the views of foreigners might differ considerably from our own—let us ask, in the first place, what the position of the British Empire would be were it to become the object of aggression by some foreign Power, Germany, Japan or any other? How many of the fifty odd nations adhering to the Covenant could be relied on to fulfil their covenanted obligation to combine forces for our defence, and to incur the risk to themselves involved in so doing? Exactly how many no man can tell. But may we not say with complete confidence that our only friends in the day of peril would be those who found it to their own interest to befriend us—those, namely, who deem their own safety involved in the preservation of ours? If Abyssinia, ill able to defend herself, has been deserted in the day of her peril by so many who were pledged to defend her, is it likely that they would all rally as one man to the defence of the mighty British Empire? We know very well that nothing of the kind would happen. Our statesmen know it. Why else do they tell us that our Air Force must be equal to that of any other single Power? Why else must our contribution to collective security be on such a scale of armament as to render us independent of collective security in the event of the others deserting us—as we have all deserted Abyssinia?

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Reversing the picture, let us now imagine the British Empire called upon, under the terms of a Covenant, to resist aggression on one of our European fellow-covenanters—an attack by Germany upon Austria or by Japan on the Soviet Republic or any other of the numerous "attacks" now deemed possible or likely? Is there any reason to suppose that our policy would not repeat what we did (or refrained from doing) in the test case of Abyssinia—unless, indeed, it were evident that the attack we were called on to resist was an indirect attack on ourselves? Would the British Government embark on the conflict, or the British public approve of their so embarking, merely as a redressor of wrong done to Austria or Russia, or as a champion of international justice in general? Or if it were alleged that such action could only be taken "within the framework of the collective system," would not the said framework be found in the day of performance to be the same paralysing entanglement we have found it in the present crisis, and should not we have again to confess, to our shame and dismay, that action within the "framework" was little better than inaction called by another name? Perhaps the answer to these questions may best be given in words written by Mr Gladstone in 1869:

"Is England so uplifted in strength that she can with prudence advertise herself as ready to undertake the general redress of wrongs? Would not the consequence of such professions and promises be either the premature exhaustion of her means or a collapse in the day of performance?" [1]

What more is needed to explain the collapse of the League "in the day of performance" when Abyssinia, fallen among thieves, called for the fulfilment of Article XVI? How comes it to pass, we may well ask, that this inevitable result was unforeseen? The explanation is simple. It lies in a pair of connected illusions which still hold their ground in face of events which have proved them false. The first is the odd assumption that no more than one aggressor would have to be dealt with at a time. The other is the belief, already referred to, that the combination of armed force represented by the Covenanting states would be so overwhelming that no single aggressor would dare to challenge it; that the mere threat of it would be enough and, therefore, that the peace-keepers would never be driven to the extremity

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, volume 3, page 317, quoted by Mr Alwyn Parker in *The Times*, May 28, 1936.

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of implementing their pledge by shedding their own or the aggressor's blood. This satisfies the pacifist supporter of the League. When faced by the objection that he is false to his principles in supporting a scheme which might eventuate in bloodshed he can always reply

> "not so: the scheme I support is so contrived that it will be automatically arrested at the stage of a threat; there will be no shedding of blood but only a brandishing of irresistible arms in the aggressor's face."

A queer reply, to be sure, but the substance of which we have often heard repeated. And, naturally, having started with the assumption that collective force, by reason of its overwhelming preponderance, will remain perpetually at the stage of a threat, no consideration was given to what might happen to it in the extreme case of having to face the aggressor on the battlefield—the possibility, namely, that it might not prove so overwhelming after all, that its composite character would render it exceptionally vulnerable both to hostile strategy and to political intrigue, and that a powerful aggressor, with a couple of million men behind him and a military genius to lead them, might conceivably make short work of it. Powerful aggressors are not so easily terrorised, especially when more than one of them happen to be active at the same time.

V.

A Few Deductions.

Assuming the above considerations to have some force, what are the lessons to be drawn from them? As they present themselves to the mind of the present writer they may be summarised as follows:

(1) That in the present state of international morality there is no infallible method of preventing war. The utmost we can hope for, or profitably aim at, is to render war progressively less attractive to war-makers.

(2) That all treaties, compacts or covenants to suppress war by a general combination of armed force endure only so long as their application is not needed and are certain to collapse in the day of performance.

(3) That no future Covenant adopting the above method is likely to yield better results than its ill-starred predecessor, or to be anything else than the old medicine in a new bottle.

(4) That, therefore, the League of Nations, if it is to continue, must cease to be predominantly a League of *armed*

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nations and find for itself a new direction no longer dominated by war-making considerations, leaving these latter to be dealt with by whatever agencies exist for the purpose.

(5) That the new line of direction should aim at the creation of a common interest, at once cooperative in basis and businesslike in pursuit.

(6) That in pursuing this new line of action efforts should be concentrated, at first, on establishing a nucleus for positive cooperation, a nucleus likely to grow and by its growth to act as an increasing deterrent on war.

(7) That such an enterprise, if wisely conceived, would, even in its inception, be one of considerable magnitude, and such as to challenge both then and afterwards the best talent of the covenanting nations.

(8) That in framing the requisite Covenant to embody these aims no higher demand should be made on the altruism of sovereign political states than is customary in business transactions or contracts intended for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties.

VI.

Fund *versus* Force.

Can any practicable scheme broadly answering to these requirements be devised? The answer is "no" or "yes" according to the assumptions behind the question.

(1) Unless we can assume that the nations concerned are really desirous of living at peace one with another—and on this there is unhappily some room for doubt [1]—the answer is definitely "no." To this we must add, however, that except on the same assumption *all* schemes for keeping the peace are equally impracticable and collective security flatly impossible.

(2) Assuming, contrariwise, that the nations professing the desire for peace are really in earnest, and dismissing the above-mentioned doubt, the answer is as definitely "yes." Had the statesmanship of the world been disposed to spend the talent and ingenuity, hitherto devoted to the fruitless task of preventing war by armed combination, on the fruitful task of promoting positive cooperation, we may be well assured that many such positive enterprises would by this time be well afoot, and collective security, though still perhaps far off, would be considerably nearer than it now is.

[1] At this point it is especially important to observe the distinction, already mentioned, between the love of peace and the fear of war.

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To those whose outlook on international affairs is not too deeply coloured by a Foreign Office mentality, the following specimen of such an enterprise, selected by the present writer from among many that have come to his notice, may possibly seem to have some promise. It is here presented in the roughest of sketches and is intended as no more than a suggestion, germinal thought, or mental finger-post by following which we might ultimately arrive at something better than itself. That the line of action about to be indicated is attended with difficulties and dangers the writer is well aware. Possibly some of these may be solved as the idea, passing through the medium of other minds, gradually assumes a better shape.

In the proposals recently put forward by the French Government for the safeguarding of peace the project of an International Army figures conspicuously. Presumably such a force would be constituted by contingents contributed by the covenanting Powers. The size of these contingents is not specified, but at a low estimate not less than 10 per cent. of their existing armed forces would have to be contributed, and their maintenance paid for by each contributor, if the force is to make even a tolerable show of strength. This would have to be vastly increased in certain eventualities; for example, if an aggressor as powerful as Germany or Russia, or even France herself,[1] had to be restrained.

Though the project of an International Army has been generally condemned, both on the grounds already stated and on many others, it rests nevertheless on a sound principle, *that of requiring contributions from all nations that would benefit by collective security*, contributions, moreover, more substantial and costly than the Geneva oratory in which the main contributions have hitherto been made.

Armed force, we must admit, is a more effective form of contribution than oratory. But is there no other alternative to that windy article? Oratory indeed has proved itself inadequate, but armed force is a dangerous substitute. An international powder magazine is no less liable to explosion than a national; "a pistol shot at Sarajevo" will explode the one as effectively as the other. Besides all which, contribu-

[1] It is noteworthy that the authors of military projects for restraining aggression rarely contemplate the case in which their own country might be judged an aggressor. The British advocates of collective security, in particular, seem incapable of contemplating it—at which foreigners are apt to smile.

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tions of armed force seem more appropriate to the age of feudalism than to our own.

We have said that at least 10 per cent. of existing armaments would be required for the French project. But suppose that instead of contributing 10 per cent. of their armies, navies and air forces, the states concerned were to deposit in money-value what 10 per cent. of their armaments is now costing them, and agree to reduce their expenditure on armaments to that modest extent. And suppose, further, that the sums so saved from unproductive expenditure on armaments were collected, under the supervision and management of the League of Nations, into an International Peace Guarantee Fund. And a guarantee fund in this sense, that the contributions, or deposits, would be treated as security for peaceable behaviour, and held subject to forfeit in the case of any state breaking the pledges it might otherwise have given to keep the peace. This, at least, would be a check on the notorious tendency of political states to break such pledges when found inconvenient, doubtless a small check at first, but increasing as the fund accumulated, though never sufficient to check the madness of a nation whose rulers had "eaten of the insane root"—but still something to the purpose.

Such an arrangement would have the further merit of imposing no additional burden on the taxpayers of any nation. Instead of transferring 10 per cent. of their armaments to an International Force, thereby reducing the armaments left at their independent disposal to that extent, they would now transfer the equivalent expenditure to an International Fund. The military and financial position of each would be exactly the same under the one arrangement as under the other; no difference whatever would be made in the relative strength of their armed forces, and there would be no interference with the right of any sovereign state to employ them for independent belligerency in its own defence. At the same time—and this is important—the pace for armaments would, so to speak, be given a slight turn in the downward direction—to the extent, that is, of 10 per cent.—a tendency which would certainly increase if the arrangement proved satisfactory. In this way the French project, which is military, would be translated into its economic equivalent, the principle of a substantial contribution to collective security remaining the same. The appeal would now be, not to altruism, but to common sense.

The annual expenditure on armaments by the five Great

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Powers of Europe is currently estimated at the lowest as £1,000,000,000.[1] To this must be added about half as much for the smaller Powers. Ten per cent. of this total would represent in the first year alone £150,000,000. Allowing for variations in the annual contributions, which might change either upwards or downwards, allowing also for the abstention of some nations, it is conceivable that in ten years an International Property worth £1,000,000,000 would have come into existence as a bulwark and security for peace. A League of Nations so furnished would have no armed force at its disposal, but it would have something which might prove of even greater efficacy in an economically conditioned world. It would have capital. And capital saved from what? From unproductive expenditure on armaments—not bad business.

To what uses would this International Property, Fund or Capital, be put? *Imprimis*, it would not be locked up like a miser's hoard, but employed, and employed for the benefit of the contributing nations in proportion to their several contributions, their position being analogous to that of policy-holders in an Insurance Corporation or of shareholders in a great industrial enterprise. The problem of the International Trustees charged with its administration would be to employ it in that way, a problem familiar to the managers of any trust fund on the great scale, the duty of the League of Nations being to see that it was so administered, and to frame rules of equity for that purpose. Enterprises of investment, of development, of currency all over the world would be its occupation, care being taken to distribute the investment of its assets widely enough to render them virtually inaccessible to predatory designs. In particular it might address itself, and probably would, to the task of merchandising and distributing the surplus production of commodities and raw materials, and so render valuable service towards solving the problem known as "Poverty in the midst of Plenty," a problem of international incidence as well as national, and a likely cause of war and revolution. Many vested interests would, doubtless, tremble in its presence. But what of that? The difficulties would be many and the dangers not a few. The need would be equally great for the valour of the hero as for the skill of the business man and the integrity of the trustee. What scheme for the pacification of the world can dispense with these qualities?

[1] Some authorities put it much higher at the present moment.

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But the principles involved are the main consideration. There are two of them, each supporting the other. In the first place, the principle would be introduced of backing the peace-keeping treaties with security for their observance, thereby making good that weak spot, that fatal omission, which has rendered these covenants heretofore the frailest of instruments for keeping the peace. In the second place, the League of Nations, delivered at last from the hopeless task of manufacturing non-explosive gunpowder, would find itself freely launched on the lines of its proper destiny, that of *creating a common interest and fostering positive cooperation*, of a mutually beneficial kind, between the nations of mankind. These things would *grow* and their fruits would last. The goal might still be distant but the right direction would be found.

Many other possibilities suggest themselves, some perhaps more promising than any we have named. But we must leave the matter in the rough-hewn condition to which we have now brought it. We offer it in the hope that it may suggest a line of thought, worthy of further exploration, to those whom recent events have brought to the conviction that the method of ensuring peace by a fighting combination of the many against the one, simple though it seem, is dangerous, self-defeating and doomed to collapse in the day of performance. The constructive work of promoting peace can never be accomplished through the medium of forces essentially destructive. The League of Nations must find another medium and speak another language. What that medium might be, and what that language, we have tried to indicate.[1]

OXFORD. L. P. JACKS.

[1] This article is in sequence to an article on "Collective Security," by the same writer, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1936.

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GLEANINGS FROM A NOTEBOOK.

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE.

[For some thirty years of my life—about 1890–1920—I filled notebooks with "Pensées" in the French fashion, often suggested by my reading. A few gleanings, on philosophy and religion, are here collected.]

Mysticism.

(1) Tauler's "union with the Divine Life of Christ" is a sort of inward transit to our archetypal ideal. But perhaps we ought to be content with union with His human life. Our true life is "hid with Christ in God," but it is still "hid," while we live in the world of becoming and conflict. To aspire to the supposed immobility of the Divine life is dangerous. It is indeed a fallacy to suppose that by denying change and motion to God we are raising Him above time and space. A preacher, on the miracle in Joshua, began: "My brethren, there are three kinds of motion—the progressive, the retrograde, and the one which is mentioned in my text, the standstill." It was not quite so absurd as it sounded. We must remember Aristotle's ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας.

(2) Mysticism, says Keyserling, always ends in impersonal immortality. But as a matter of experience, is a man who knows that he shares a common life with nature, his fellows, and God, who has discovered that individuals are not, like Lucretius' atoms, "solida pollentia simplicitate," more or less of a person than his unmystical neighbour? Immortality is the removal of barriers which keep spirits apart from each other. "Impersonal" negates a conception which has not been fully examined.

(3) We ought not to talk of "earth's vain shadows" until we know something of the substance of which they are shadows.

(4) Important for mystical philosophy is the doctrine of

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Proclus. "There are three sorts of wholeness—(1) anterior to the parts; (2) composed of the parts; (3) weaving whole and parts together." In this third sense the whole resides in each part, as well as the parts in the whole.

(5) Mysticism is an attempt to bring the dark background into the light—to conquer it for consciousness. It should not remain bare of contents, but the mystic is most anxious not to contaminate it by infusions from the conscious life, whether intellectual or affective. He wishes to interrogate the background which is still dark, and to get *its* answer. The margin "fades for ever and for ever as we move," but the proportion of experience which is subliminal and irrational diminishes. The region of twilight which half emerges from the dark as we go on is of great value.

(6) "La thèse dernière du mysticisme c'est au fond l'identité de l'intuition et de l'action." (Delacroix.)

(7) When the mystic says that God is *not* Will, Being, Life, etc., he means and implies that He *is* these things in a transcendental sense. It is because we have a dim knowledge of these attributes "sub specie aeternitatis" that we condemn, as inadequate to God's nature, what we commonly mean by them. The mystic believes in progressive knowledge of God; but there can be no degrees in the knowledge of bare existence. We progress in knowledge of *what* God is, though in theory the mystic sometimes denies this. We cannot separate knowledge that God is, and knowledge of His nature. When we say that God is, we have already said a great deal about Him.

(8) There are no hard outlines in nature, except dark shadows. Light is continuous. Selfhood is the circle which we choose to draw round our centre of consciousness; while we stay inside it we are our own prisoners.

Religion, Myth, and Dogma.

(9) No dogma is destroyed by being incomprehensible. Defenders of orthodox tradition say that their opponents refuse to accept "mysteries." It is precisely because materialistic dogmatism, which is the clerical form of dogmatic materialism, is not at all mysterious, that we find it unsatisfactory.

(10) "Epaississez-moi la religion, dans la crainte qu'elle s'évapore." (Madame de Sévigné.)

(11) "Revelation reveals to us what is or what ought to be, not what happened or will happen. The work of the

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Paraclete is to make the life of humanity itself a theophany." (Martineau.)

(12) Religions are plastic only for a limited period. While in that state they swallow the science and philosophy of the day, which henceforth remain embedded in the substance of the religion, like a fly in amber. The fly does not do much harm.

(13) With what admirable appropriateness people are said to be *adherents* of this or that form of religion!

(14) Max Müller rightly, I think, attaches great importance for the growth of legend (which must not be confounded with myth) to the conversion of metaphor into fact by the simple. Our Lord habitually spoke of "death," "blindness," "hunger," etc., metaphorically. The earliest liturgies were highly metaphorical; and symbolical pictures no doubt helped. We can believe that some simple folk believe that Christ actually carried a lamb on His shoulder.

(15) Religion requires (1) the witness of spiritual experience; (2) speculative truth or consistency; (3) historical verification. The third, which is no longer supplied by miracle-stories, must now be sought in the lives of the saints. It is in the great personalities of Christian history that we see the substance of Christianity manifesting itself.

(16) Lotze speaks of the obscure impulse which drives us to pass in our thought, as we cannot help passing, from the world given in sense to the world not given in sense, but above and behind sense. It is this underlying ground which justifies our saying that if there be a many, there must also be a one; if a transitory, then an eternal; if a conditioned, then an unconditioned.

(17) The fellowship of higher beings with lower beings is immediate and direct; that of co-ordinate beings on the same plane, in and through their own higher spheres, is mediate and indirect. We know each other through God.

(18) The active practical worker demands a spiritual world-order in which spiritual facts happen in time, as his own activities are devoted to making things happen in time. The philosopher does not want to make anything happen, but to find out what always happens. Hence their religious symbols are quite different.

(19) When the scientific type of explanation has obtained the ascendancy in everyday matters, but is excluded from certain selected points, there arises the bastard conception of miracle. From the purely religious, as from the purely scientific point of view, there can be no miracles.

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(20) The opposite of natural religion is not revealed but artificial religion.

(21) Monism is the philosophy of the intellect, dualism of the moral consciousness, pluralism of the artistic sense.

(22) The Bishop of Lichfield (Legge) in conversation suggested interesting parallels between the sacraments and the physiological processes with which they are joined. "A new birth"; but birth is not the beginning of life; it is only the admission into a new environment. "Eating and drinking"; do we not take what is itself without life, and change it into living tissue? Faith, in the Holy Communion, corresponds to the digestive process. He added that he had asked extreme High Churchmen, "Can Christ withdraw His presence from the elements?" If the answer is "Yes," there is not much to object to.

(23) Why is it that all the great religions were born in the thousand years or so which closed with Mohammed? For nearly fifteen hundred years there has been no important new religion.

(24) A man's personal religion is that which corrects the obliquity of his own spiritual vision; a prophet's religion corrects the obliquity of his generation's vision. The clergy are spectacle-makers—a very difficult trade.

(25) The supreme Christian sacrament is a life of love, which is a symbol of the life of eternity.

(26) The symbols with which religion works are the product of the imagination; but its pictures are attempts to reproduce, in line and colour, the dimly seen shadows of the real world within the veil. They are not pleasant fairy-tales, for some of them are anything but pleasant; but they have the essential and most significant quality of being all connected with the ends of moral activity, that being the necessary form of the eternal values in a world of becoming.

(27) Mark Rutherford in his autobiography says that instantaneous conversion, which still sometimes occurred when he was a child, "is now absolutely untrue." John Wesley thought it a universal phenomenon; he knew of no exceptions; but Methodist ministers have told me that their experience is quite different. These rapid and drastic changes in psychical experience are a very remarkable phenomenon, which has not been nearly enough studied. These fluctuations show how much experience is affected by the intellectual climate in which the subject lives. A believer in miracles will not have to wait long before seeming to himself to have witnessed one.

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Catholicism.

(28) Churches never present religion in an undiluted form. They always embody social and political aspirations, which find in cultus and dogma their most congenial forms of association. The "Friends of God," who have no other axe to grind, form brotherhoods or societies, not churches or sects.

(29) Catholic theocracy. Nothing quoted by Harnack is so strong as the preamble to a bull of Bonifice VIII. "God has set us over kings and kingdoms, to set up and to pull down, to waste and destroy, to plant and build in His name and doctrine, to feed the flock of the Lord, and strengthen the weak, to heal the infirm, to bind up the broken-hearted, to restore the abject, and to pour wine and oil into wounds. Wherefore, dearest son" (the King of France, I think), "let nothing ever persuade thee that thou hast no superior, and art not subject to the high priest of the Church's hierarchy." Quoted by Father Dalgairns, who is in complete sympathy with these sentiments. Later, he goes on, "the Church had to rule as best she might over disaffected and disloyal subjects." Such language is very instructive. The dissolution of the Roman Empire under its priestly Cæsars began in earnest only at the Reformation, and is not yet complete. A non-political Catholicism is a contradiction in terms.

(30) Architecture and ritual are the language of Catholicism; the written word is the language of Protestantism.

(31) The conversion of Constantine was a victory of the Church over the Empire, rather than of Christianity over paganism. The Church won by offering the public all that it wanted—a philosophy, a mythology, a mystery-cultus, asceticism, a system of public and private morals, faith-healing, charity-organisation, and a subordinate but luxuriant polytheism. While struggling for supremacy, its policy was to find room for everything which met a popular demand, but its other principle, to tolerate no revolts, ended in binding it in chains of its own forging.

(32) Weak minds have a "besoin énorme d'une affirmation étrangère. Peu leur importe la réponse; pourvu qu'elle soit nette et décisive, ils sont immédiatement soulagés." (Janet.) "L'existence d'une société stable garantissant l'existence d'un état psychique stable, l'individu . . . se trouve personellement intéressé à la conservation des croyances et des coutumes traditionelles dans son entourage, et les novateurs deviennent ses propres adversaires." (Murisier.)

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(33) The great principle of Christianity in social relations was to abolish all man-made barriers by ignoring them. This is plain from the New Testament. But when the Devil captures an institution formed to defeat him, he never hauls down the old flag.

(34) The Church Fathers, both Greek and Latin, would have been much more valuable to us if they had obeyed the maxim, "Take rhetoric and wring its neck."

Science.

(35) The expectation that we shall find reason and harmony in the laws of nature is itself a reason for believing that the universe is rational and harmonious; for the demand is not at all prompted by self-interest, but by an instinct the roots of which lie deep in the nature of things, an ultimate fact not to be disputed.

(36) Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν. Euripides here sums up the religion of the priest, the man of science, and the philosopher. With regard to natural science, I see more and more clearly that since all natural phenomena seem to be reducible to problems in mathematics or molecular physics, it can give us no religion or philosophy whatever. The practical creed of the man of science involves the recognition of values, like any other, and he does not find these values in his studies of stars and atoms. Popular Christianity has stood face to face with a rival religion—a very pure and austere monotheism or pantheism which has strong affinities with ancient Stoicism. This creed is more acceptable to scientific men than the supernaturalistic dualism or occasional interventionism which popular religion adopts as a rough and ready means of connecting the two worlds in which we all have to live. I believe the real objection to the "curiosum et plenum negotii Deum" of popular religion is partly moral; it is unworthy of God. In arguing with an agnostic man of science who is a high-minded and cultivated man, the right approach is to convince him that his scientific knowledge is not the source of the higher values which he acknowledges. There are no facts without valuation; Truth, which is the supreme object of the scientist's devotion, is itself one of the absolute values in which, for the theist, the nature of God is revealed. Why do you care about truth, Professor? Tell me that.

(37) The theory of psycho-physical parallelism is an attempt to reconcile mechanism and psychology. The

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synthesis, if it could be found, would be in the region of ψυχή, not of νοῦς (to use the classification of Plotinus); it would solve none of the higher mysteries and problems of philosophy.

(38) It is not so much scientific results which cause the quarrel between religion and science, as the scientific habit of mind. The quarrel is not irreconcilable, if one side will renounce dogmatic materialism, and the other materialistic dogmatism.

(39) Why are most of us so much afraid of the word "mechanism"? A machine is an instrument devised by a rational designer to do certain work for him. Its characteristic, if it is a good machine, is to work regularly. If we aspire to be little first causes ourselves, we naturally dislike this arrangement; but why should we protest against it in the interests of theism? The fact is that most people would prefer a God who asserts Himself by breaking His own laws. And so they take refuge in gaps; when the gaps begin to close, they find themselves in a tight place.

Life in the World.

(40) Strokes of misfortune, and crippling physical infirmities, curtail the usefulness of the individual through no fault of his own, and are a severe trial to faith. But for the most part they leave open the avenues of correspondence with the spiritual world and with all that is above us. In this way a man may enter into full possession of his true self, and attain happiness and dignity, though precluded from a life of active service. So Milton testifies in a noble sonnet; so Plato observed, in the case of his friend Theages, whom weak health debarred from a public career. "We have to make the best shoe we can with the leather that is given to us," says Aristotle.

(41) Pindar's Γένοιο οἷός ἐσσι μαθών is admirable advice. Find out your true nature, what God intended you to be, that which in a sense you are already, and then "become it"—"make it so," as they say in the navy. The maxim is expressed in a more commonplace way by Persius—learn "quem te Deus esse iussit, et humana qua parte locatus es in re."

(42) Kant's famous maxim, "Treat mankind always as an end, never only as a means," should be supplemented by its opposite. "A man is never a mere end, but always a means to something better than himself."

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Evil.

(43) The belief in "a personal Devil," now derided by almost all theological Liberals and by many others, simply means this—that evil is not merely a stage in the process of becoming better, or a mere privation of good. It may, as Augustine says, have no "substantia"; but in the world as we know it, it is a very positive thing. It has invaded the sphere of personality, of real existence. The moralist, while thinking as a moralist, must be something of a Manichean. The Devil, while we are struggling in the arena, is as real as God. Those who deny his existence have generally a very inadequate view of sin. They worship "le bon Dieu," who is even such a one as themselves. "Dieu me pardonnera; c'est son métier." To entrap people of this kind, the Devil shams to be dead.

(44) "Sin has invaded the sphere of real existence." It is possible then for a man to lose his soul, though not the soul which would have been his if he had not been a bad man. How does this affect the doctrine of Plotinus, that the higher part of the soul is impeccable, and remains always in the eternal world "Yonder"? Most of his followers reluctantly deserted their master here. "If the will sins," asks Iamblichus pertinently, "how can the soul be sinless?" Plotinus would answer that since like can only be known by like, if the soul "comes down entire," and is cut off from communion with its own higher principle, it can never find its way back to heaven. Most of the Christian mystics followed Plotinus. There is at the centre of the soul a spark which can never consent to sin. How is this related to the Christian doctrine of forgiveness? It does not deny that the Soul may be sunk deep in the mire; but if it can be lifted out and washed, it may be "whiter than snow." So long as the Soul lives, and the possibility of restoration remains, the corruption has not touched the core of the man's being; the filthy rags may be stripped off. I think Augustine would have said that an *incarnational* philosophy of religion can alone solve the difficulty. Recovery would not be possible when the desire for it is almost extinguished, if God Himself did not "come down" to help us. Proclus, writing when Christian doctrine was better known than it was to Plotinus, quite abandons the idea that there is any guilt or misfortune in the "descent of the Soul."

(45) In opposition to the argument that there could be no good without evil, Plutarch says that by parity of reason-

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ing a chorus could not have harmony unless someone sang out of tune, nor a body health unless some member were diseased.

(46) It seems to me that the problem of evil may be stated in this form. Why does the world seem to be so much worse than we believe that it is? If we did not believe the world to be good, there would be no problem in its appearing to be bad. The sufficient answer to the question, "Why is the world so full of sin and sorrow?" would be, "Well, why should it not be?" The pessimist starts by affirming an optimism, and ends by refusing to surrender the optimistic postulate which alone enables him to pass sentence on the world of experience. For a real pessimist there is no problem of evil; for a devil there is only a problem of good. I have often thought that one might write an interesting essay on "The Problem of Good," in the form of a thesis for the degree of bachelor of devilry by Mephistopheles junior.

(47) Justice to individuals cannot even be discussed until we know what an individual is. The "I" is not a fixed term. Justice, like freewill, like joy, like reason even, must die that it may live. Justice to the self which claims justice for itself would not be justice to the higher self. For the consummation of the personality we must look beyond all earthly conditions. "Person" is a legal term, signifying a man or woman as the subject of rights and obligations; it belongs altogether to this world. In another sense we may say that "personality" is realised in God only. The real difficulties about Justice are due to the comfortable acquiescence in a false standard of values. St Paul (2 Cor. xii.) supports the distinction between the transfigured self concerning whom he will "glory," and his present self, concerning whom he will not do so.

The Will.

(48) Paulsen and many others just now attribute too much importance to the Will. Impulse, when it becomes conscious of itself as impulse, passes into will, and will, when it becomes conscious of itself as will, passes into intelligence. At the stage of will, we know what we want but not why we want it. The higher and freer motions of the intelligence, when it deals with universal truth, are impossible at the stage of mere willing. Misuse of the term "will" is the one serious defect in Münsterberg's admirable *Eternal Values*. A will which is indifferent to its objects, and exists only for itself, is an absurdity, and so is the phrase "the continual *enhancement* of the eternal will."

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(49) The truth about the Will seems to be something of this kind. The Will of the creative Mind must be pure intelligence, not a struggle against an external and hostile medium. But the creative Mind includes in itself purposes, which in the lower world are polarised as processes. Among conscious creatures, when the organism has reached its full development in any direction, the will becomes habit or instinct, and passes into the unconscious state. In the meantime the will gradually becomes conscious, passing through the three stages of feeling ("I want something"), will proper ("I want this"), and intelligence ("this is wanted of me"). Consciousness seems to be a phase of mental life which arises in connection with the formation of new habits. When a habit is formed, consciousness intervenes only to spoil our performance of it. So in species which have reached a stable equilibrium, like the social instincts, consciousness would be harmful, and it has been withdrawn.

(50) Since all will or purpose is solely directed towards suppressing the conditions of its own existence, it must either be for ever frustrate, or must pass into something other and higher, in the act of realising itself. Eternal purpose is a contradiction, for it would be a purpose which was never formed and which can never be fulfilled. All purpose must be finite and particular. If there is any single purpose in the world, the world must have had a beginning and must have an end. Such a world would not be the whole content of the mind of God, for otherwise we should have to attribute to God an eternal slumber, broken once by a period of activity. A rational universe must consist of an infinite series of world-orders, each expressing some unitary purpose of God. If these were combined into an infinite system, we could not call the system rational, though it would be composed of rational parts. There is nothing in this argument to preclude wheels within wheels—interlacing purposes of various range—nothing to preclude a single purpose for the human race, which is surely doomed to extinction in the far future. But some of the purposes are probably quite independent of others; *e.g.* what connection can there be between life on our planet and on another a million parsecs and a billion years away from us?

Time.

(51) When we lose something that we love, we grieve, not that it has left us, but that we have left it. We travel through time as we travel through space; past, present, and

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future are equally real and actual, and are present together in the mind of God.

(52) Schopenhauer's propositions concerning time please me better than the views of more recent thinkers. According to him, there is only one time, and all different times are parts of it. Time is homogeneous and a continuum. It has no beginning and no end, but all beginning and end are in it. We know the nature of time *a priori*. Time has no duration, but all duration is in it. All motion is only possible in time. Time is not measurable directly through itself, but only indirectly through motion, which is in space and time together. (Why does not Professor Alexander say "motion" instead of "space-time"?) Time cannot be thought away, but everything may be thought away from it. Time in itself is empty and without properties. The main source of confusion, I think, is to mix the idea of time with its concrete filling; the same error is made about space. Both ideas are given *a priori*; the idea of time is the bare idea of succession, the idea of space is the bare idea of coexistence. To imagine that time has a beginning and end, and that space has limits, contradicts the ideas of time and space. The two ideas, empty themselves, are the warp and woof of all concrete experience. To talk of the expansion of space, or of space bending back on itself, is to confound ponderable matter in space with space itself. No physical discoveries can touch the ideas of time and space. They underlie all phenomena, and cannot be explained by them. But they are not the warp and woof of the world of values; in this realm we transcend them constantly. They do not, it seems, belong to the eternal world at all. (I once said that we cannot think of empty time. I now see no difficulty in thinking of empty time.)

(53) Relativism usually goes wrong by turning relativity into an absolute.

(54) There is no attitude more "static" than that of our new Heracliteans. If all things are merely flux, there is one static reality, the law of change, and a whirl of objects, as formless as a cloud of dust. Nothing on this theory is real, except the law which forbids anything to be real.

(55) Bergson says that teleology is only mechanism from the other end, and that both destroy his idea of time. So much the worse for his idea of time.

(56) To turn the Real-Ideal into the "future" is the death of all sane idealism. Compare Carlyle (*Past and Present*, Book 3): "Ils s'en appelaient à . . . ," "A la

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posterité ?" "Ah, Monsieur, non, mille fois non! They appealed to the eternal God, not to posterity at all. C'était différent."

Miscellaneous.

(57) Prudent advice! Don't be a pioneer. It is the early Christian that is got by the lion. The safest mountain paths are those trodden by mules and asses. Follow them.

(58) The qualifications of a historian: a scientific conscience; a poetical imagination; a prophetic soul.

(59) The men who have "made history" have generally been linked to their own age by some flaw or perversity in their characters.

(60) "Christian" Socialism. (Genesis xxviii. 20): "If God will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and raiment to put on, then shall the Lord be my God." Iliad 3, 406: "Go and sit by his side, and depart from the way of the gods, and let thy feet never bear thee back to Olympus; but still be vexed for his sake and guard him, till he make thee his wife or perchance his slave."

(61) "The Social Organism." Society has no resemblance to any closely knit organic whole; it is not likely ever to take this form, or at any rate to keep it for long; if it did, all freedom and individuality would be gone. It rather resembles such organisms as are little more than aggregations; it can be broken up without much injury to the component parts. We may also point out that man belongs to several "organisms," some narrower and some wider than the State; of these the State is only one, and by no means the most important. This disposes at once of the alleged right of the State to a man's exclusive devotion, and the alleged right to seize all his property. There is an important side of life in which each man is a "corporation sole."

(62) How enormous has been the influence, in political and social history, of the physiological error about generation embodied in Æschylus' *νικᾷ δ' ὁ θρώσκων*! The error of course is that the mother is only the *τροφὸς κύματος νεοσπόρου*.

(63) Remarkable cures have no doubt been effected by suggestion. But it seems to be essential to the success of the operation to suggest to the patient that there has been no suggestion. The cure must be credited to Æsculapius or the Virgin Mary, or someone else. This will make it extraordinarily difficult to put faith-healing on a scientific basis. Imposture is an essential part of the treatment.

W. R. INGE.

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THE SEARCH FOR ERASMUS.

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If the faithful observance of anniversaries be anything to go by, our age is certainly not lacking in piety towards the past. In the case of almost every great man's centenary, judgments are revised, biography rewritten, the image of a personality recalled. Impatient at marking only the lapse of each hundred years, the oldest German university this year celebrates its 550th birthday, and most of us have secret pleasure in a jubilee of one sort or another. Why this cult of remembering, assessing, revising? Does it cloak the respect of a turbulent age for the passing of time, an instinctive homage to stability, or an assumption of the duties of the recording angel? Among other things it certainly induces scepticism about historical judgments revised to order for a given date. In the grip of such a fashion, it is increasingly unlikely that its fresh estimates be any more than hasty *ad hoc* conclusions.

In the case of Erasmus this may mean disaster. On July 12 next it will be four hundred years since he died, and there will, of course, be tributes. We shall in a way offer our own by turning back to that fascinating figure, enjoying his wit, admiring his learning, watching his attitude to those aspects of his time that happen to interest us, separating with the hauteur inevitable to posterity that which "remains" from what we think ephemeral. We are, indeed, in a better position to do this than any preceding generation, not excepting that of Thomas More. Recent years have seen the achievement of a monument of critical method and industry in the Oxford edition of the correspondence. We owe it to Percy and Mary Allen that we can read easily the letters so eagerly received in the early sixteenth century, that we can read not one or two, but the whole extant

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collection, in a perspective of accurate information and insight that multiply their value as human documents. Our debt to these scholars is the greater in that Erasmus wrote no finer work than his letters; in no single treatise are his mind and temper so patent, so active, so attractive. In the range of fascinating information which they gather up and pass on they leave something more like the impression of the modern newspaper than any other Renaissance writing.

Allen's edition makes a real estimate of Erasmus' work possible; it does not make it easy. This is the most elusive of personalities to recapture. He is always refreshing, whether relating a road robbery or a servant's quarrel, whether rebuking a cardinal or the boorish father of one of his Cambridge students. But he is more than refreshing. His wit is so sharp in the *Encomium* that it has been thought impious by some of his latest as his earliest critics. But he is more than witty. The Christianity he tirelessly preached and defended was so free that he has been dismissed, then as now, as a rationalist. He is more than all these, a nature so complex that one seeks in vain for the real axis of the personality; the evidence of the letters is confusing by its variety and its contradiction. What was this man? A trimmer? An academic don who avoided harsh realities, or a far-sighted politician whose tactic was revealed by no single document?

So there have been constant attempts to explain him, to interpret what seems now so fully revealed. Professors in France and America have written able books about him. English and German scholars have made minute investigation into his policy in the deciding years. There have been all kinds of biographies, ranging from the new impressionism to packed volumes of tedious detail. Learned societies are busy reprinting forgotten works, so that we have not only interpretation but the means of controlling it, of dispensing with it if we will, and of undertaking first-hand acquaintance. What can a fourth centenary bring, more than this? It is easier to supply the answer than the want. One has the impression that a certain type of judgment—impartial, critical, sympathetic—has not yet been exercised upon Erasmus. There is something which scholars and thinkers have not so far achieved. We do not know him, his aims, his "action," as the French say, as we know those of most of his peers in learning or in religion. For so great a man, the esteem in which he is generally held is curiously uncertain. To his contemporaries there are works which use the new

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material to reach conclusions which are henceforth more or less established. Luther, More, Milton—these and others we know in a sense that we do not know Erasmus. Scholars differ, of course, on salient points, but the difference has passed the partisan stage; fuller knowledge has silenced controversy, and is increasingly doing so. It is no longer usual to find Luther treated as a hero by Protestants and a devil by Catholics, or Milton decried by those who have no sympathy with his Puritanism.

With Erasmus the case is different. Like his modern prototype Renan he is decried or lauded without having been first patiently observed. We do not yet see the real Erasmus; the correspondence, the single works, the reputation, all these may hide as much as they reveal him. We seem to be still at the stage of allowing preference to determine whether he was right or wrong against Luther, Christian or rationalist in his views, honourable or not in his conduct. We have not yet found the thread which links these various expressions of his personality. There are good reasons why he remains obscure and unknown. Like Renan, he was an Independent in an age of sharp decisions. Agreeing with neither party in a religious struggle greater even than that which raged round Renan, he has received no sympathy from either side. *Erasmus est homo pro se;* since it was true in his time has inevitably been so since. It is doubtful whether justice can be done to him as long as the traditional views of Protestant and Catholic remain alternatives. To the Protestant he naturally seems more timid, to the Catholic more far-sighted than Luther. But he stands not only midway between the great confessions. He is not happy with any formulation of religion. The most undogmatic of men, he waged constant war against the primacy of doctrine, always making it yield to life. His favourite word "philosophia" was for him a way of living rather than of thinking. This distaste for all subscription brings him up sharply against churchmen of all schools. He appears to many as little more than a rationalist, a forerunner of Voltaire, whose religion is without "content."

Again, his versatility is against him. What were his main interests? Scholarship? Religion? Polite conversation? Certainly all these, but in what measure? For Jebb, whose Rede lecture of 1890 is one of the most satisfying accounts of Erasmus, he is almost exclusively the learned man of letters; his religious work is curiously judged. Even the controversy with Luther was on a side issue.

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The question Erasmus should have answered was: "Which is the greater evil, to endure the corruptions or to rebel?" This looks like entire misunderstanding of Erasmus' real interests. For him the main issue was never one of practical policy; that would be determined by events. He watched the Reformation for eighteen years and refused to take sides in the way both parties wanted. The main issue was one of belief or of personality. Dr Preserved Smith brings us nearer the mark: "The dogma [of the bondage of the will] lay at the very heart of the Protestant system, being in fact no more than the reverse side of the famous doctrine of justification by faith only." If Jebb was wrong in neglecting the religious thinker in Erasmus at the expense of the scholar, the popular view of him as the humanist educator is surely no less so. Here again the manifold nature of his activity has led us astray. The religious treatises were less popular than the *Adagia* and *Colloquies*. We might well go back to the *Colloquies* and catch their spirit. A school book of the most original and successful kind, this they certainly were, but how much more than a textbook of reading and writing. Pen pictures, dramas in miniature, topical allusions, views of ordinary men on religious questions, living dialogue, this they are also. Religious issues are bound as closely into them as into their author's whole existence. To call Erasmus a humanist means giving the word a much wider connotation than it frequently bears.

It is not enough to appraise his activities separately. They are products of a personality which transcends each particular sphere of its exercise. His intellect is not to be isolated from his integrity. His delicate constitution, his love of comfort, his innate conservatism, these are part of the man as much as his wit, his industry, his trenchant denunciation of abuse. It is inexact to speak of him as a religious thinker unless we add that he was unable to divorce religion from what many consider secular activity. Nor may we call him a scholar and pass over his emphasis on the primacy of the gospel as fount of all scholarship. From the mass of his work a round half-dozen publications stand out as events in European culture, hammer-blows upon the conventional notions of the opening sixteenth century. The *Adagia* in 1500, the *Enchiridion militis christiani* in 1503, the *Moriæ Encomium* in 1511, the *New Testament* in 1516, the first *Paraphrases* on the New Testament from 1517 and the *Colloquies* beginning in 1519. And these were the work of a man who produced a constant stream of editions of the

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Classics and the Fathers, and an equally constant flow of political, educational and religious pamphlets. The pamphlets were eagerly read by all kinds of humble people to whom literature had until then been hardly accessible; the editions have made him famous in the history of scholarship. But these other works belong to no category, they are the foundation and illustration of the Renaissance view of things; they cannot be disentangled from the intellectual witness of their century. And being such, they have something to say to us. Careless of form and surprisingly discrepant in matter, they convey an attitude which runs close to some essential preoccupations of our time. Space allows a glance only at a couple of aspects of this relevance to what men are now saying and thinking. If one isolates what Erasmus has to say first about Christianity itself, then about the Church, he seems not merely to speak to the modern age, but as one of its own voices.

Of Christianity he always wrote as a popular thing, in the real sense of his favourite word "communis." His epoch-making *New Testament* was produced chiefly that more might read and understand; it appeared with a preface which later became a popular pamphlet in both France and England. It is in this preface that he has the oft-quoted passage (taken up in English by Tyndale) about the gospel accompanying the farmer, the weaver and the pedlar through their daily work. Like Luther (with whom he agreed on many essential issues) he insisted that the scriptures were for the many and not the few. His reason for this insistence would alienate him from many religious movements of to-day. He constantly wrote that the usual works of theologians, arguments, doctrines, were not the real fruit of the gospel. The *philosophy of Christ*, as he called it, appeared rather as life than as argument; it was seen in action, in a man's "features" and affections rather than in his intellectual position. This in the sixteenth century was a daring stand to take. We have not exhausted the implications of what a Catholic writer calls this "*christianisme dynamique*." It has frightened more than one modern critic: "It is no longer the belief which makes the Christian. . . . To be a Christian it is enough to be pure, simple, patient, charitable. These virtues are the equivalent of Christ. Who has them has Christ."

Erasmus answered this attack on his position more than once, but he offends certain schools of thought still more by his emphasis on Christianity as natural. As Christ called it

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a rebirth, he claims to term it a return to our real nature. Of absolute corruption in the Lutheran or Barthian sense he seems to have known nothing. With the clarity of conviction he constantly puts the opposite view. "*Evangelica doctrina renovat ac perficit naturæ sinceritatem*," or elsewhere, "*Nonne quod naturæ ratio dictat, idem et sacra lex jubet?*" It is easy to make this man a rationalist. The difficulty comes when we see that the praise of reason is a feature of his faith, as liberty was of his thought. At bottom it is a question of psychology. He is no less profound than his dogmatic contemporaries in that he is nearer to modern thought. We have still to discover the real nature of a man who in an age of external authorities dared to write of reason and nature and liberty, all in the name of Christ. As we do so we shall find in him a synthesis of many strands of thought now often appearing as contradictory. His real descendants are not the deists or rationalists, but liberal protestants, particularly perhaps the independents in this country. They, like him, reject credal subscription as a sign of faith; they have his preference for life before intellectual definition: *vita magis quam disputatio*.

Yet the writer of these words had the highest doctrine of the Church. He was at one with More in his refusal to separate, or to sanction separation, from the great visible congregation of the faithful. He condemns dissent and particularism of all kinds. The very sign of the Church for Erasmus, its real cohesive force, is the actual agreement among its members: "*Non est ecclesia Christi ubi non est unanimitas*." This insistence on what he refers to in another context as *fraterna caritas* is the real explanation of the middle course which he steered through the decisive years of modern history. Timidity might have kept him from identifying himself early with a particular party; it could not account for the constant reference in all his writing to a fellowship whose comprehensiveness and continuity are its strength, and within which agreement may bring forth a wisdom superior to that of any individual.

This, if I mistake not, is the chief discovery which we have yet to make in Erasmus. He saw clearly something towards which men are to-day everywhere groping. Those who doubt his insight should read Allen's translation of the latter part of a treatise on Church unity, written in 1533. "We have had enough of quarrels; perhaps sheer weariness may bring us together to concord to dwell in the house of the Lord as friends." That is precisely what the weariness of

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longer quarrels than he saw or foresaw is doing now. It was no fleeting glimpse which happens to make some of his words relevant to our very different situation. It was the basis of his thought. If we could get closer to the measure of his mind, we should be able to appropriate his definition of the content of his religion: *Summa nostræ religionis pax et unanimitas.*

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IS DEMOCRACY AN EMPTY WORD?

J. A. HOBSON.

It is not without significance that peace can best be made popular by organising a peace-campaign, or a crusade, that is to say by expressing it in terms of conflict. For "peace" is itself a vacuous term, the mere negation of war or other human struggle: as such it carries no positive content and, therefore, no human appeal. "Perfect peace" has, indeed, no meaning, intellectual or emotional, for a live man. It puts him in the grave. This statement may seem at first sound fantastic and perverse. But put to the test of actual thought and feeling, it is neither. No ordinary man, however civilised, no peace-lover wants peace at any price and all the time. The pretence that he does, or ought to want it, has brought dislike and discredit on the term pacifism and the movement for which it stands.

Nor does it suffice to answer that pacifism is inherently a struggle of the power of good against the power of evil, or that the abolition of physical conflicts would feed the active demand for struggle by lifting it on to a higher plane, a conflict of thoughts, emotions, creative activities. Experience of pacifist movements and organisations has sometimes led me to doubt whether their very conduct and professed aim may not germinate an atmosphere of controversy and even of personal hostility, as a subconscious method of escape from vacuity. Many of the active leaders of such groups have been among the most self-assertive quarrelsome persons I have known, their tempers out of harmony with their convictions. The outbreak of the War shed, indeed, a strange light upon the unreality of peace professions in this and other countries. My point is not so much that active pacifists were insincere in their professed attachment to peace, but that the positive realities of war brought a human

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appeal to emotions and activities which the peace cause failed to provide.

In a word, if the choice lay between perfect and continuous peace and an occasional outbreak of war, with all its horrors, cruelties and losses, I have no firm belief that the "average sensual man" would prefer the former. As for the pretence that civilised man has shed entirely, or even substantially, the combative, predatory urges and desires of his original animal make-up, and would like to live upon a higher plane which held no place for physical conflict and personal risk-taking, such a pretence does not accord with our experience of civilised countries to-day. The notion that the general population desires either unbroken peace or complete security, and is misled into contrary courses of conduct by the propaganda of little groups of interested war makers, ambitious statesmen, professional fighters, or war-traders, does not accord with history or psychology. Here I have intentionally attached the term "security" to "peace." For security suffers from the same defect. It also is negative. The complete continuous absence of fear or care (*sine cura, secura*) is not desired by individuals or nations. If "collective security" were achieved in its completeness, it would cease to be attractive. In order to appear attractive it needs to be set against some actual peril the fear of which gives a temporary appeal to the "security." If there were no longer any sense of peril, the value of security would evaporate. Complete security would imply either an absolutely static life, without changes, without risk, and, therefore, without interest, or else a full knowledge of future changes which equally would rob that future of all prior interest. The quandary is, of course, no novel one. It has always confronted a theology whose God is at once omniscient and omnipotent, that is, deprived of the sort of interest man feels in acquiring knowledge and in overcoming difficulties. Neither hope nor fear could exist in such a being and if man could attain such divine characteristics, his "humanity" would disappear. All happiness would also go, for, as its name indicates, happiness requires that things shall happen, that is to say occur by "hap" or chance or luck.

Security is perhaps a less vacuous term than peace, for there is a "sense of security." But its value is only considerable in the aged and feeble. Young full-blooded people do not want too much of it. Some risk-taking, some chance, is needed to give spice to life. That is why against the routine security of ordinary civilised life to-day the artificial

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insecurity of gambling is so rife among all classes. Nor is this feeling for hazard and the indeterminate, the insecure, confined to the thoughtless multitude. Philosophers are to-day seeking to incorporate it in their *Weltanschauung* as an attractive protest against the "security," the certainty, the boredom, of causal determinism.

The absurdity of the notion that the Great War was going to make "the world safe for democracy" is not, however, confined to a false approval of the term "safety." Its emptiness extends to the terms in which democracy is commonly expressed, "liberty, equality, fraternity." I do not suggest that any of these words is destitute of content and of human interest. But the emotion that attaches to them is largely artificial. An active sense of liberty is only aroused when it is assailed, or else when it is directed to some positive achievement of an opportunity. Mere non-interference has no emotional value for one who has never suffered or feared interference. A slave set free to starve has no true liberty. Opportunity is needed to give a real content to liberty. A realisation of these commonplaces is required to strip the false glamour from fine-sounding words. A still more futile contribution to democracy is the term "equality." For men are not born equal, nor do they become equal in any intelligible meaning of that term. Neither in health, or strength, or intelligence, or goodness, or circumstances are they equal. It may, indeed, be held that in physical and even mental make-up they are more alike than different, and that equality of circumstances and opportunities is a sound ideal. But my point is that their equality and similarity are uninteresting, it is their differences that evoke our interest. It is only so far as equal opportunities bring inequalities of achievement by giving free scope to natural differences of capacity that they are valued. If equality of opportunity led to abolition of all differences of social status and of standards of living, though such a reformation might give some substance to the sentiment of fraternity, it would diminish the interest which attaches to inequality. In fact, equality is only desired and valued in so far as it provides opportunity for the emergence and expansion of inequalities in nature and achievement.

In dealing with the third person of the democratic trinity, fraternity, the charge of unreality takes a somewhat different shape. For, unlike the other two, fraternity does make a positive appeal. Its unreality in the democratic formula is that it claims too much. It is a wild exaggeration of the feeling which men entertain towards strangers even

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of their own nation. Patriotism does, indeed, carry some regard for the well-being of other members of one's own nation, and can evoke a willingness to undergo efforts and sacrifices for the national well-being. But here the sentiment of national brotherhood is nourished and stimulated by a variety of interests and fears that arise directly from the failure to realise the wider brotherhood of man. If there were no outside nations for competition and possible conflict with our own, the sense of brotherhood in a nation would be feeble and infrequent in its appeal: ordinary feelings of sympathy and goodwill towards our neighbours would not deserve so strong an epithet. As for the wider brotherhood of man, the appeal of humanity, which inflamed the early prophets of democracy, it is a misrepresentation of the feelings of ordinary men and women towards their unknown fellows. The indifference with which almost all of us receive the tidings of some famine or other catastrophe, destructive of lives in China or Bolivia, attests the unreality of human brotherhood. Such idealism is sometimes defended on the grounds that pretending to be better than you are helps you to become better than you are. There is probably some truth in this provided that the ideal is not too far ahead. The economy of ideals is a nice problem for the psychologist. The carrot must not be too far from the donkey's nose or it loses its attraction. Nor must it be too near.

If the three factors of Democracy are thus recognised as little more than empty rhetoric, is Democracy itself discredited? Does the discovery, that ordinary men and women have so little positive regard for Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, explain the rise of oligarchies and dictatorships and the visible collapse of popular self-government? That this discovery contributes to the rise of autocracy there can be little doubt. But there are other causes, more positive in their appeal. The two chief of these causes are the conscious development of individual, class and national conflicts of interest and power, and the growing recognition of the necessity, in all departments of government, of an expertise which reduces the claims of democracy either to empty formalities or to troublesome, inefficient interference. Turn first to those conflicts between individuals, class and nations. What are they about? Shall we say the acquisition and ownership of property? The fact that most men in every class or nation spend most of their time and energy in trying to get for their own possession and use some portion of economic wealth seems to bear out the view that property

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is the cause of conflict. For property always implies scarcity, and scarcity a struggle between would-be possessors. This struggle, or its consciousness, is often softened by the term "competition," which is robbed of its hostile sting by being represented as "fair" and "free," or even as a form of co-operation in which the competitors are sharers in the final economic gains. Even when organised economic classes come into conscious recognition, the reality of economic conflict is repudiated by the propertied and employing classes as based upon a false analysis of economic processes. A free competitive system will, it is maintained, give to every man "what he is worth." The economics of class-conscious proletarianism is so abstract and difficult as to make little impression on the mind of the great majority of the workers. The only property which concerns them is their personal wages and standard of living. Yet they are gradually acquiescing in a class organisation which is used by its conscious leaders in a struggle about property. If these leaders are Socialists, they would destroy private and class ownership of property in land and capital. If they are not, they are out for something like an equal ownership of property; at any rate, a standard of wage-income, comfort, leisure and social amenities which will remove the barriers that divide classes.

For it is noticeable that personal distinctions, resting on traditional class cleavages, are coming to play an important part in policies of inter-class adjustment. This opens up the wider consideration that, though property figures as the immediate object in the class struggle, it really counts more as a means than as an end. Among the poorer classes it continues to rank as the first necessity for decent living, but in proportion as this end is attained other interests and values tend to displace it. Ambitious individual workers value property largely as a means of social rising, the passage from employee to employer. But the ordinary wage-earner after a secure standard of living wants access to sports and amusements, improved education for his family and occasional participation in politics. These values and interests do, however, depend for their attainment upon conditions of public and private property. A fairer and more equal apportionment of income and property thus emerges as a strong proletarian demand.

The psychology of the owning classes is somewhat different. They are apt to take their rights of property for granted. For half a century after democracy had been

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formally established in this country, by a wide extension of the franchise to the masses, the ruling and possessing classes continued to rule and to possess without any serious menace to their political and economic domination. Democracy was found to be innocuous. The leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties were in unconscious agreement to keep all grave issues concerning "the condition of the people" out of politics. Orthodox economic principles, secretly moulded or selected by class interest, put very close restrictions on the interference of the State with free enterprise and current rights of property. The workers who formed the majority of the electorate showed little initiative even in the factory and other economic legislation framed for their defence or benefit. This was the fruit of upper-class philanthropy. Such political enthusiasm as assumed large popular dimensions was concerned either with the forms of democracy as in the Chartist movement, or with some external issue, such as Bulgarian atrocities, Irish Home Rule, or Imperialism, kindled by the eloquence of a Gladstone or a Disraeli. It took over half a century for the workers to discover that they could not gain any considerable share of the economic benefits of the new productivity of industry without the assistance of the State, and that Democracy could not be brought to bear effectively upon this plane without the formation of a new workers' political party. Though active leaders in this movement sometimes took the title Socialist, the movement itself presented no general challenge either to private property or private control of industry. It merely or mainly sought to supplement trade union bargaining by legislative aids. It carried no obvious menace to the competitive capitalist system or its "rights of property." But even before the workers formed their third party, the intelligent leaders of the two historic parties began a policy of economic concessions, half-consciously designed to buy off any revolutionary assaults upon ownership which might proceed from class conflict. The owning classes did not abate their traditional outlook in meeting the new political situation. Their concessive policy was adapted to the several pressing needs of the new political-economic situation. Taxation, according to the size of income or inheritance, for the needs of a state which adds to its duties of defence and order an increasing number of social services, was recognised as a legitimate encroachment upon rights of property. So likewise with the increasing assumption by municipalities, or the State, of economic

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operations which, if left to private unfettered enterprise, would become oppressive monopolies or would encourage graft and political corruption. The claims of the State to own, administer or control, some focal activities such as transport, power, banking, mining, has been gaining practical recognition in most advanced nations. The attitude of the possessing classes towards this advancing socialisation is not quite simple. On the one hand, they recognise that economic concessions, alike in the form of taxation and of expanding social enterprise, are conducive to a defence of the major rights of private property and private enterprise. On the other hand, they are genuinely alarmed at the extension of this "socialism" by an organised proletarian party which threatens the confiscation (with or without compensation) of all ownership and utilisation of private property in land and capital. The early possible adoption of such a confiscating policy is definitely linked up with the organised voting power of the workers who constitute the democracy under majority rule. While it is recognised that a real majority rule is impracticable without authoritative leaders, the propertied classes fear that the left wing of a working class party, formally committed to Socialism, may furnish a leadership adequate to carry out this policy. The defence of property is therefore recognised more consciously than before to depend upon the adoption of a policy and a propaganda which shall split the ranks of Labour and impose a leadership which, though "class" in origin and purpose, shall assume the rôle of "national defender of the faith." Italy, Germany and Japan have been successful, temporarily at least, in this policy of healing class differences by opening up the wider conflicts of nationality. "Stay giddy minds with foreign quarrels." But here, again, the analysis is not quite simple. The appeal to nationality and for leaders congenial to this spirit does not openly profess itself a hostile procedure. Though military organisation forms an integral part of this nationalism, the first place is allotted to the spirit of internal integrity, transcending and healing class and economic divergences in an all-embracing enthusiasm for the national well-being. The difficulty encountered in this process in countries where popular self-government has never been a reality does not lie in displacing the forms and substance of democracy by oligarchy or personal leadership. With the due control of propaganda and censorship this has been so easy that it seems not impossible for Britain or France, if the threat of Socialism or Communism evoked the

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necessary energy and skill in the possessive leaders. The difficulty lies in reconciling the demands of a spirited "defence" policy requiring a competitive increase of armed expenditure with labour conditions that will retain the acquiescence and sympathetic support of the masses of the people. This is the problem at present confronting Hitler and Mussolini. It gives the determinant place to the economic needs of "the people" in a country where the productivity of modern scientific methods is generally known and the perils of a spirited foreign policy are recognised. But this does not imply a direct encounter between democracy and dictatorship, or between capitalism and Socialism. For it becomes evident that, though working-class conditions may be worsened by a policy of large employment of men and money upon armaments and upon conscription, it is the pressure of taxation upon the profits and other income of the industrial and professional classes that is more immediately dangerous to dictators who have been placed in power by the financial and personal support of these classes, in the hope and expectation that the existing economic order will be preserved intact. Finance is the economic sphere in which this conflict emerges most plainly, as is indicated by the notorious Hitler-Schacht quarrels. But it cannot be taken for granted that a growing divergence of interests between militant dictatorship and the masters of finance and industry will lead to open conflict, the collapse of dictators and the restoration of popular self-government. For the financial and business classes may prefer to come to terms with their political masters rather than commit themselves to a rising tide of democracy, and dictators may on their side recognise the necessity of preserving a profitable career for the owning and managing classes. This would involve some limitation upon the recent rush to increased armaments and some intelligent consideration alike of profits and of wages. In other words, aggressive nationalism may be driven to moderation so as to keep capitalism alive and loyal in its support. This, of course, assumes that a dictator, especially one quickly elevated into power, can keep his head sufficiently to see that his foreign and domestic policy must pay regard to the plain financial and personal interests of those who control the resources necessary for the conduct of his policy. A megalomaniac may encounter disaster even more surely by internal misrule than by foreign failure. Even where dictatorship is not vested in an individual but in a class, as in the militarism of Japan, the same problem

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is encountered, that of recognising some moderation in the personal and economic demands upon the business and the working classes for the expenditure upon armaments and war operations.

The broad lesson to be learnt from recent history in many countries is that the repudiation of democracy or popular representative government is part of the defensive technique of the propertied and ruling classes in meeting the new attempts of democracy to pass from a political into an economic phase involving an attack upon capitalism and private profiteering.

This defence is strongly supported by another. The ordinary worker-politician is habitually irritated and depressed by the apparent failure of democratic governments in such a country as Britain to secure reforms in law and administration which will rapidly transform industry in the direction of Socialism and workers' betterment. Accustomed to view politics and economics in large loose general terms, he cannot recognise the intricacy which besets the members of a Socialist Government in dealing with practical reforms. In particular, he fails to recognise the degree in which such reforms are liable to go astray or be thwarted by the interests, view points and intentions of expert servants of the State. Most of these men are exceptionally able and efficient, but are naturally averse to disturbing changes in their work, and, drawn almost exclusively from the middle and upper classes, have naturally imbibed their interested views and values. Now as economic issues have become more and more complex and enter more and more into administrative politics, this class of public servant holds more and more the key positions in the successful application of drastic reforms affecting property and the control of business. Though there is no reason to suppose that our official bureaucracy would offer any conscious concerted obstruction to legal measures affecting property and private business enterprise upon which a Labour-Socialist Government might embark, they would almost certainly withhold that sympathetic aid in the difficult tasks of interpreting and administering laws which would appear to them unjust and detrimental to the interests of the nation. How could it be otherwise? These expert instruments are human and their expert skill cannot be divorced from their sense of right and expediency. The relation between the voter and the administrator is only one form of the problem of the dependence of the ordinary man upon the expert which comes up in a score of

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different cases. The ordinary man cannot himself gain expert knowledge in medicine, law, architecture, education or any of the applied sciences. He must employ experts who are often interested parties in their advice. He must trust them, but his trust cannot be unlimited. He may change his shoemaker when the shoe pinches. But such *ex post facto* remedy does not satisfy, and involves a too simple analysis of cause and effect. The political field presents the problem in a far subtler form and demands a more positive solution. If democracy, as representative government, is to be competent to grapple successfully with problems of property and business control, it must secure an officialdom that is in reasonable sympathy with its economic policies. This condition cannot be fulfilled unless the ladder of education is broad enough to enable the children of the workers to enter the upper grades of the public services, central and local, in numbers approximating to their voting strength as citizens. For only thus can representative government be extended from the parliamentary into the administrative sphere. Though recent developments of higher and university education have made substantial progress, they have not gone nearly far enough to meet this need. The minority of working-class boys who obtain posts of determinant power in the civil service are apt to succumb to the traditional intellectual and social atmosphere of the dominant majority. Equality of intellectual opportunity is far from attained. Its absence is, of course, closely linked with the remnants of economic servitude which derive from the inequalities of economic opportunity. How to remove these two interdependent forms of inequality is the problem which is becoming conscious in every modern country. The survival of democracy depends on its solution. But a sound solution demands that political democracy shall avoid the temptation to secure a remedy by force of numbers, or, in the last resort, by the still more dubious use of arms. It must make good its claim to a policy which shall put the claims of property upon an agreed equitable basis.

J. A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

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PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY.

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I TRY in this paper to give a philosophical account of democracy, which is a thing rarely attempted. That is to say, I begin by stating a general theorem, which originates in other fields and applies to many other things besides politics, and I go on to show how it applies to politics and how in the light of it the principle of democracy may be satisfactorily stated and defended.

(1) In early modern philosophy there was a prolonged dispute concerning the part played by sense and thought respectively in the genesis of knowledge. Some were inclined to give the primacy to the senses, and these were called empiricists, because they stressed experience, actual contact with things. Others rejected the senses as untrustworthy and argued that the most important ideas, *e.g.* that of God and the fundamental conceptions of mathematics, could not be traced to the senses, and therefore required another pedigree. Therefore they were disposed to assert the independence of the human reason, its ability to evoke knowledge from its own being and resources. The clearest and most certain truths at least were of this order, and the thought directly connected with the use of the senses they tended to regard as an inferior activity: sensation for them tended to be equivalent to confused thinking. This tendency is called rationalism. In the eighteenth century Kant attempted a solution of this age-old conflict by means of the ancient opposition of Form and Matter. He propounded the view that these two cognitive functions are complementary; that there is accordingly no cognition in the full sense which does not owe something to both, sense contributing always certain material which submits to organisation, and thought

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contributing always the organising form and principle. Thus every genuine judgment in Kant's view has two parents and presupposes a mind which is at once passive and active. As passive it is sensitive to its environment and receives the necessary material, as active it gives the material shape and form. "Thoughts without content are empty: perceptions without conceptions are blind." By this formula he seeks to reconcile the two opposed tendencies, recognising that each party was engaged in over-emphasising one side of a complex truth. The one side, empiricist or sensationalist, had seen the passivity only and exaggerated accordingly the rôle of sense; the other had seen the activity only, exaggerating in consequence the rôle of thought. By his formula he is able to do justice to both factors.

(2) There is a similar antithesis in regard to human equipment on the practical side between desire (appetite, instinct) and will. A desire stands for a tendency to action of a certain type, which is at least in its more primitive and inescapable forms—hunger, thirst, etc.—for a reasonable being a mere datum, a fact which requires to be recognised and taken into account, a limit on his rationality. Here again, there are two one-sided solutions of the resulting problem—on the one hand, a rationalism which violently asserts man's freedom against the appetites which limit it and seeks to prove that freedom by systematically denying them all. That is the erroneous extreme of asceticism. On the other hand, a naturalism which deifies the instincts, spurning this independent reason as a morbid perversion of human nature, and proclaims that intelligence is only healthy when it is their faithful servant. "Reason," wrote Hume, "is and ought only to be the slave of the passions." Here again the antithesis of form and matter may be invoked to effect a compromise and a reconciliation of the two opposed tendencies—a mean position from which justice may be done to the half truth involved in each. For instinct and desire are evidently in their pure form blind, devoid of plan and forethought, sure to lead those who trust them to frustration and disaster. What they offer to a reasonable being is this shapeless material out of which a course of constructive and consecutive action may be made. As thought is both the master of sense and its servant, so will is both the master and the servant of desire. As thought which is not fructified by sense is empty, and sense which is not organised by thought is blind, so the life which denies desire is empty of substance and delight, while the life that concedes everything to it and

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denies the sovereignty of reason, blunders blindly in the dark. The moral life depends, as Aristotle argued against contemporary exaggerations of asceticism, on the proper discipline and organisation of the natural appetites.

(3) My argument in this paper depends on my being allowed to apply the simple considerations concerning individual thought and action which I have just advanced to the case of a community of men organised under government. I ask the reader to let me make that application, without asking too closely for the moment what he is allowing me to do. To make the application I shall have to speak of such a community as though it were a unity possessing these attributes of thought and action. The question how far this assumption is correct is a legitimate one, and any results which the argument may reach must subsequently be qualified and corrected in the light of the answer to it. But there is no harm, as far as I can see, in reserving the question for the present. The only use I want to make of this point now is to observe that from the point of view of extreme individualism (or pure social nominalism) no fundamental defence of democracy is possible.

(4) If a whole community, as organised under a single government, can be said to have a will at all, its government must surely be that will; and by the term government we must understand the whole complex of sovereign authorities which have the right to make the laws of the land, to decide points of law, to execute and administer the laws, or to take any other action in the name of the community. These various forms of government activity will in fact be in complicated relations of interdependence, of control and subordination, with one another, as the law and practice of the constitution may determine; but these complications can safely be ignored. For our purpose it will be sufficient to regard the whole complex as what it is always trying to be, a unity, a single will, declaring in its various concurrent expressions a single purpose and policy; adding perhaps that in modern times it is usually taken for granted that in the formation of policy the legislative body plays in some sense the preponderant part. This government, then, dominated by a representative legislature, may be taken to embody in its decisions the reasonable will of the community so far as such a will exists.

My further suggestion, on this basis, is that if the community is united and healthy, and if the principle of representation is working satisfactorily, the corporate decision

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embodied in government action will be the resultant of the fruitful interaction of two factors, viz. *first*, incipient tendencies to corporate action arising in the general body of citizens; *second*, proposals for corporate action on the part of the central authority, formed largely in the hope that they will meet and satisfy these tendencies. These tendencies are of course demands and desires of various grades of definition and urgency. My suggestion is that the fruitfulness of the interaction of these two forces—on the one hand a representative government anxious for a mandate, on the other hand a mass of people ready to give one—depends on this that the interaction is a process in which matter receives form, in which the spontaneous and unorganised movements of desire and impulse in the body of the people are ordered and articulated till by a continuous process they issue in a conscious corporate decision which is a law or an executive act.

(5) Democracy, reduced to its simplest terms, is the principle that everyone shall have a say in matters of common concern. Under a representative system this principle encourages every citizen to play a part in the selection of the representatives who have power to decide such matters. The election of representatives is conceived as the first stage in the continuous process by which out of the uncoordinated and inconsistent impulses of the citizens is produced a definite national policy and line of action. Consequently the decision of the representative body and of any smaller body, such as a cabinet, on whom they confer or with whom they share power, is not a wholly free decision. They do what they think best in the circumstances, the chief circumstance being these popular impulses above mentioned, or, as they more commonly say, the state of public opinion. That is to say, their range of decision is severely limited (as the choice of form must always be) by the material available.

These considerations give us the first and fundamental justification of the democratic principle. Its invitation to every citizen to take a part in the selection of representatives is justified because by this invitation it provides an opportunity for the citizens singly and in groups to make known to those who will be their representatives what is stirring among them by way of protest or demand. Legally the citizen may (as by the laws of England) have no other opportunity of making his wishes felt beyond this opportunity which comes at each election time. But the formal opportunity provided by the occasional election is expected to

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create both in electors and in elected a state of mind favourable to the informal application of such pressure in the intervening periods. So that by this simple piece of machinery a situation is created in which we have a people continuously interested in the larger matters of common concern and continuously expressing its desires in regard to them, and a government continuously sensitive to such expression and continuously active in transforming the material thus provided into corporate action by which the community stands committed.

If the general body of citizens were provided with no such formal right of interference, if, that is, no element of democracy entered into the constitution, the informal give and take between ruler and subject might still subsist. The citizen body might nevertheless attend to what was being done in its name, and the rulers might pay considerable regard to their wishes. To some extent they certainly would, because laws which no one wants are apt to be ineffective. But *first*, the chances of these conditions being realised would obviously be much diminished, and *secondly*, almost inevitably the rulers would tend unconsciously to be unduly dominated by the opinions of the circles with which they were in daily contact, those of their friends and of their neighbourhood. If England lacked the democratic machinery, the opinion of London, for example, would be far more influential on policy in comparison with that of the rest of England than it now is. The democratic machinery corrects this tendency to some extent. It ensures further, generally, that the representatives shall feel these popular impulses, each so to speak directly and in his own person, and it makes the political life of each of them depend on his responsiveness to them. (But in very small bodies, like social clubs, literary and dramatic societies, effective democracy is compatible with the complete absence of any such machinery for the simple reason that the officers are in continuous contact with the members.)

(6) The interpretation of democratic government outlined above can be shown to resemble the Kantian formula from which I started in this, that it effects a reconciliation and combination of two sharply opposed extreme views of the political problem, to which men are at all times prone, and does fair justice to the half truth contained in each. Let us have a look at these two extremes. The first one exaggerates the necessary receptivity of the central authority until it makes government merely the faithful register of a popular

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activity; the other exaggerates the formlessness and incoherence of popular movements until they cease to have any positive significance, so that the government becomes sole creator and sustainer of national unity and only begetter of law and national policy.

This exaggeration of the central function, of the activity of the government, is analogous to rationalism, and if will is rationalistically interpreted—*i.e.* understood as action infused by knowledge, as it was by the Greeks—the doctrine becomes simply a form of rationalism. Accordingly we find that it is an attitude to which rationalistic philosophers are prone. Plato's plea for the philosopher king in the Republic is paradoxical not because it suggests that philosophy is the best education for a statesman—Berkeley said almost as much as that[1]—but because it argues that the ruler should be guided rather by the pattern in heaven than by the facts on earth, because it maintains further by implication that in an ideal state ideally well governed the body of the people would have no positive contribution whatever to make to the conduct of state affairs. On the first of these two points—the pattern in heaven—the theory which I am expounding has no great quarrel with Plato: its difference is mainly one of emphasis. Plato seems to take delight in emphasising the philosopher's detachment from the world, and his disdain for earthly affairs and ignorance of them. This may be regarded only as a kind of superficial perversity, but I think it goes deeper. My account on the other hand emphasises the necessity in the ruler of extreme sensitiveness to earthly affairs. As to the pattern in heaven itself it is difficult to believe nowadays in absolute political forms, and metaphysical issues also come in to complicate the issue: thus the detail may be questionable; but on my account also the ruler has to supply the Form, and therefore requires in some measure the detachment and independence which Plato claims for his philosopher king. The other point of difference is much more serious. To deny that the body of the citizens have a positive contribution to make is to reduce them to the level of mere brute matter, like the marble or bronze of the sculptor, which imposes on his work only fixed and distant limits capable of being discounted once for all before he begins to operate on it. But animal and still more human

[1] "Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman" (*Siris*).

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material is far from being so simply malleable as that. The general point has already been made and the argument need not be repeated. I would only add here that this fundamental error and misapprehension—as I regard it—is made worse in Plato's case by the fact that it is incidental to the definition of a perfect polity. If he had merely argued that ordinary human nature, as he knew it, was incapable of making the positive contribution to policy that democracy requires, and that attempts to encourage such contribution in the name of democracy were therefore futile or disastrous, there would have been much to be said in favour of his view. Even to-day there is something to be said for such a view. The point anyhow could have been challenged and investigated on the plane of fact. But to elevate such incapacity into an ideal principle is to accept as desirable the sharp division of the community into rulers and subjects, an active minority and a passive majority, and thus to destroy once for all its unity and its power of corporate action. This result becomes even clearer, when the rationalist interpretation of will is withdrawn, so that idealism gives place to materialism and the political formula in consequence is merely authoritative force as the sole condition of social unity and effective corporate action. Such is the view of Hobbes and of his modern imitators in Italy and Germany. What the ruler's source of inspiration may be is now no longer apparent. It is hardly a pattern laid up in heaven. But from their subjects they ask only obedience, and it would seem that for them, as for Hobbes—" the Common People's minds, unless they be tainted with dependance on the potent or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Public Authority shall be imprinted on them." They have shown that the " potent " and the " Doctors " can be broken or silenced, and that obedience can be obtained on these lines, but at what cost and for how long the world does not yet know. The simplest name for this extreme is Despotism.

(7) The other extreme view consists in the exaggeration of the peripheral activity, of the positive contribution from the side of the citizen body. When Aristotle gave his account of the virtues he showed each as a mean state standing between two opposed extremes which were both vices. Thus the virtue of courage was in opposition on the one hand to the vice of foolhardiness and on the other hand to the vice of cowardice. He commonly noted that one of these extremes was a good deal nearer to the mean than the other, so that

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it was in practice often confused with it. Thus foolhardiness is quite easily mistaken for courage, but cowardice not so easily. These two extremes with which I am dealing behave in this same way. The one I now come to, which exaggerates the periphery, is the one nearer to democracy and is often confused with it—so often indeed and so persistently that the theorist is often tempted to give up the struggle and choose another name for the principle in which he believes. But he can't do that in fact because the struggle for the name is really of far-reaching practical importance, and also because it is necessary to show that this pseudo-democracy, which represents itself as merely democracy made completely logical and consistent, is actually no alternative principle of government at all, but something which simply is not and cannot be actualised in practice. To revert to my parallel with courage—*if* courage means only absence of fear where most men are afraid, foolhardiness is extreme courage, something like total absence of fear, and must accordingly be a better not a worse state than courage. Similarly *if* democracy means simply a belief in the popular contribution to policy, it provides no ground for accusing anyone of exaggerating the extent of that contribution. Those who believe in it more are simply more democratic. They may be wrong, but to prove them wrong some other principle independent of democracy and forcing limits on it must be introduced. If we accept these two definitions, of courage and of democracy, we must also accept these absurd or unpleasant conclusions, but we have the alternative of amending the definitions, and this is the sensible thing to do. To that point I will return later; first, let us look this whole-hearted democrat, as he styles himself, in the face.

This view is the exact antithesis of the last. For that the government was active and the people passive; for this the people is active and the government passive. On the one view the government asks of the citizen only that he shall obey: on the other the citizens ask of the government only that it shall obey. The conception is frankly ideal: it does not pretend to be a picture of fact; but ideally democracy is taken to mean that a people governs itself, instead of appointing or accepting persons who shall govern it. Its officials are thus reduced to relative insignificance; their personal responsibility for what is done reaches vanishing point, except in matters of administrative detail. This is the goal to which the true democrat looks forward, the standard to which, if progress continues, democratic practice

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will increasingly approximate. Some such view of democracy as this is inevitably suggested by the hackneyed concluding phrase of Lincoln's fine Gettysburg speech—"government of the people by the people for the people." Its currency in modern times owes much to Rousseau's *Social Contract* and to the French Revolutionary leaders who were inspired by Rousseau's ideas. Many of the more unproductive features of modern democratic institutions are due to its continued influence, and much of the unsatisfactory working of such institutions is attributable to the false demands and expectations of those who work them connected with this set of ideas. Their examination and correction is therefore a matter of some practical importance, especially at a time when we are asked to observe a general breakdown of democracy. For what has broken down may well turn out to be, in part at least, not democracy, but something else.

In terms of the account which I have given, the fundamental inadequacy of this extreme is at once obvious. The one extreme asserts Form without Matter or requires Form to supply its own Matter: this extreme asserts Matter without Form, or requires Matter to supply its own Form, which is equally absurd. As the one extreme is analogous to a rationalist theory of knowledge, so this extreme has its analogue in the sensationalist theory of knowledge, which gives the senses the monopoly of truth.

(8) This theory of democracy seems to rest theoretically on the ascription of magical and as I think highly improbable properties to what it calls the General Will, and it culminates logically—though it is not often pressed so far—in what William Godwin looked forward to, the euthanasia of government. With regard to the term General Will, it is worth while pointing out that a will is to be found only where there is an act: consequently if General Will is rightly asserted there must also be General Action. Further will is preconditioned, according to the classical analysis which has never been superseded, by desire and deliberation; and deliberation is the typical act of practical thinking, in which means and end are seen in causal relation. Consequently, there must also be General Desire and General Thought. If, I insist, we are to take seriously the proposition that a people does or can govern itself, we must be satisfied that all these things are or may be true; and it is not easy to see how we can receive this satisfaction. Rousseau, it is true, was cautious enough to introduce a number of qualifications which go far to neutralise his hypothesis and deprive it of

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applicability to the states with which we are familiar. A General Will, he argued, was only realisable (though he did not stick to this) when all the adult male citizens are collected together in a single assembly : he therefore asked that states should be made very small, consisting if possible of a single town and the country round it. He refused to require, further, that there should be unanimity, that desire, thought and will should be identical in each voter ; he required only that each should ask the same question—what is the common interest ?—and try in good faith to answer it. In the assembly he supposed by some mysterious mechanical or chemical process the different answers would be fused into a single majestic unity of result. He saw again the absurdity of supposing that the general body of citizens, assembled or otherwise, could take responsibility for the execution and administration of its own laws : he therefore confined the General Will to the act of legislation and provided for the appointment of what he called an aristocratic executive. In these and other ways Rousseau made so many concessions to common sense that he may even be said to concede implicitly that government of the people by the people is a wholly unrealisable idea for a nation state. But Rousseau's followers forget or ignore his qualifications. Arrangements are made all over a country on a given day that every citizen male and female shall have the opportunity of voting : it may be in a general election, it may be in a referendum or initiative, it may be in a presidential election. Each goes into his little secret box and marks his cross. Busy clerks total the result. For these democrats forthwith the will of the people is manifest, and all the magical properties of the General Will are immediately credited to it. The decisive step has been taken: the rest is mere routine. Further, any general activity of the citizen body is saluted impartially as an expression of the General Will, and that country is regarded as the most democratic which gives its citizens the most frequent opportunities of putting a cross on a ballot paper.

(9) The only answer to rash and reckless theory is the twofold one, a closer study of the facts and the formulation of an alternative theory more adequate to their complexity. My own view as to the inadequacy of this theory and as to the correction which it requires has already been indicated in general. It is a fundamental error to suppose that will can emerge spontaneously from the citizen body, for will is form imposed upon desire and impulse, and desire and impulse are powerless to generate of themselves the form

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which will order them. But this general answer requires now some restatement and also on one particular point some supplementation.

In my account of democratic government I started by saying that the will of a community, if it exists, will reside in the government of the community, and by the government of the community I explained that I meant primarily the representative legislative body. Rousseau would in fact probably accept this statement as true in a sense. He would be ready to admit that what will there is in such a community is embodied in its government. He would merely add that in his view the will of a community has no effective existence where legislation is delegated to representatives. This objection will be met if it can be shown *first*, that a central authority must be created before anything of the nature of a corporate decision can come into being; *secondly*, that in the ideal case (*i.e.* where circumstances are favourable and everything works smoothly) the decision of such a central authority can reasonably be regarded as a national decision. The view on the second point implied in my earlier statement was that in a favourable case such an interpretation is seen to be reasonable when it is remembered that parliament's decision is not fully free, but is preconditioned by an elaborate process of give and take between the representatives and the electors, in which process the germs of will present in the citizen body may be regarded as gradually passing by a continuous process into definite considered action. I am far from saying that this is always so; I am only saying that it is what we as democrats are aiming at, and what we already to some extent achieve. This statement contains also by implication my answer on the first point. It is this process of give and take between the responsible politician and the relatively irresponsible citizen which is in my view the essence of democracy, because if anything of the nature of a general will is to come into being it must by this process be *created*. The idea that a general will exists, and that the political problem is to find a means of expressing it, is mere mythology. It has to be made before it can be expressed, and the political problem is to find a way of making it. The failure to see this point is the essential flaw in the Rousseauistic misinterpretation of democracy, on which blind faith in the referendum, the recall, proportional representation, and a dozen other things depends. Once it is seen they fall into their place, as relatively unimportant devices which may in certain conditions assist, but are more

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likely under present circumstances to hinder the democratic aim.

(10) At this point I must introduce, by way of supplement to my original statement, the necessary qualification to which I referred before. In that statement I over-simplified the case by representing the impulses in the body of the people to which a democratic government gives form as so to speak ready-made facts, pre-existent, which the government recognises and incorporates into its decision. But though no doubt there is always a certain priority on the side of the matter, as sense has always priority in relation to thought and desire in relation to will, this priority is not like that of, say, infancy to childhood, childhood to manhood, etc., where the earlier term ceases to apply precisely in proportion as the later begins to apply; it is the priority rather of the necessary condition in relation to that which may find in it occasion for actualisation. This may seem technical and obscure; but it is really quite simple. Desire is, let us say, a necessary condition of will. Every desire might pass by a continuous process into will, but not all do. Desire is only an opportunity for willing which is not always taken. But granting that many or most desires are abortive, *i.e.* do not issue in action—a fact which is generally recognised, but explained differently by different theories—it may still be maintained plausibly that Will is the child of desire. The statement is plausible, and is indeed true, if it is recognised that will, like the human child, both needs and has a second parent. The active formative principle which transforms desire into action begins its work from the moment when the blind impulse first raises its shapeless head. The abortive desire is not an impulse on which this principle has never worked, but one on which at a certain point it ceased to work, so that the impulse never came to maturity as will. Another and blunter reply to the view that Will is the child of desire would be to point out that it is at least as plausible to say that desire is the child of will. This reply comes in the end to the same thing: for what it asserts essentially is that in a some what different sense of priority action (or will) is prior to desire.

The application of these considerations to politics is, I hope, fairly obvious. The practical point, which acquires special importance from the prevalence of the misinterpretation of democracy now under discussion, is this: that a democratic government is not required by its principles to be at any stage of its dealings with the public purely passive

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and receptive. On the contrary theory shows—and practice simply confirms the lesson—that the part it has to play is essentially active and formative from beginning to end. The demands which it registers and meets with seeming docility are demands which it has itself evoked from the citizen body —not perhaps what it wished to evoke, but then no man's children are quite what he dreamed they would be. If the government sinks into inactivity and seeks to play a merely passive part in relation to public opinion, the popular movements at once begin to lose unity, relevance and coherence; they become feeble and spasmodic; finally perhaps increasing bitterness and frustration leads them to seek elsewhere the lead which government refuses to give, until by violent revolution the government itself is swept away and a new political situation is created.

All this is merely the formulation in terms of politics of the famous principle laid down by Kant that "thoughts without content are empty: perceptions without conceptions are blind."

(11) I do not claim for the theory which I have been expounding that it opens up any startling new truth, or suggests the need for any drastic alterations in the practice of parliamentary government: on the contrary I claim that in the main it only confirms principles which the wiser of our democratic leaders have for generations consistently put into practice. The substantiation of that claim would surely constitute the best possible recommendation of the theory: but I will not attempt it now. I would only, in conclusion, call attention to two general advantages which the theory seems to me to possess, the first of a more practical, the second of a more theoretical, order. On the practical side it has the merit that it gives the democrat an answer on both fronts. It gives him a case which he can state without asserting the imposture of collective wisdom, which excites the ridicule of one set of opponents, or the still more flagrant imposture of the inspired superman, which infuriates the other. Democracy seen as the fruitful interaction between rulers and ruled gains in definition and ceases to be one of those slippery principles, so common in politics, in the application of which the politician can always be outbidden by a rival who takes a more extreme or leftward position. But practice after all must look after itself and will not pay much attention to the theorist. It is the theoretical implications which interest me especially, and in particular this. If the account above given of democracy is correct, there is a close natural connection

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between the prevalence of democratic ideals in politics and the practice of methodical empiricism in science and other fields of thought. This empiricism, which is eminently characteristic of the modern era, had to fight its first battle with a rationalism which would lay down the law a priori for nature; and always it has had to resist a tendency encouraged by misinterpretation of its own successes to distort this empiricism into the absurdity of sensationalism. How similar is the history of the democratic idea, which during this same period has made steady and uninterrupted progress towards general recognition in Europe. Further, it is striking to observe that those countries in which the empirical tendency in thought has been most persistent are also those countries in which democracy has struck deepest root. It is surely no accident that among the Great Powers of Europe, France and England are at once the most democratic and the most empirical in their outlook on the world, while Germany, which is the least democratic, is the most friendly to ambitious metaphysical systems. This can hardly be mere coincidence, and it seems to me to provide a further confirmation of the substantial truth of the theory which I have been stating.

If then I am asked, finally, what is the philosophy of democracy, I would answer, taking the question now in a rather different sense from what my title intended, with the one word—empiricism. The natural temper of a democratic government is empirical, or, as we commonly say in practical matters, opportunist. It will with difficulty look very far ahead, or undertake very drastic and ambitious schemes of reconstruction. Its greatest achievements will tend to be anonymous in the sense that all alike will depend on the disciplined co-operation of immense multitudes of men, so that even the leader at the decisive point will see afterwards that he built better than he knew.

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MODERN CONFLICTS OF PRACTICE AND IDEALS.[1]

SIR E. J. RUSSELL, D.Sc., F.R.S.

It must have been very early in the history of the human race that ideals of conduct and of life were evolved. So soon as men passed beyond the stage of hunting and settled down to the life of farming they showed their faith in the future by entrusting precious seed to the ground, in the hope that it might later be returned to them five or ten-fold. And with this settled life and growing hope for the future, customs necessarily developed which would lead, one might suppose, to the setting up of standards of conduct and so to ideals towards which men might strive but which they could not hope fully to attain. The history of civilisation, apart from its material triumphs, is largely the story of man's efforts to attain his ideals, of their interactions with realities, and of the struggles and failures which led to the adjustments of the ideals to the actual facts of life. In his notable book, *Greek Ideals and Modern Life*, Sir R. W. Livingstone shows how the Greeks set up as their ideal the attainment of human excellence or virtue, in the old sense of the word. Man was the centre alike of their philosophy and of their morality, while the gods, even the great Zeus himself, were vague mysterious figures in the background: according to their earlier conceptions, no better than men. In Palestine the Jews were developing another view, involving other ideals, insisting sternly on the power of God as opposed to the weakness of man: before whom princes and kings are as nothing, but who requires from all complete obedience to His laws. The ideal then was to discover these laws and to learn how best to obey them. Then came the new ideals set up by Christ: insisting not so much on the power of God as on His

[1] The Hibbert lecture delivered at Cambridge, February, 1936.

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fatherhood and love, making all men brothers of one family, members one of another charged with the duty of bearing each other's burdens. However much we fall short of them these are the ideals we all set ourselves; the generally accepted ideals of our civilisation.

It is in the nature of the ideal that it is never attainable in practice. As one approaches it becomes more refined, more etherealised and distant, yet always gaining in hold and power. And it is in the nature of human progress that it is never in a continuous straight line. Men do not develop onwards and upwards for ever, as many in the nineteenth century thought. Each generation seems to be on a different plane from its predecessors, but not necessarily a higher plane: it moves in a completely different environment, so that the experience of one generation is not usually of much help to the next; at any rate, it is neither sought nor welcomed. And with all the accumulated experience of mankind, now so fully documented and systematised, it is impossible to predict what will happen a month hence. We are still, and apparently our children and their children always will be, in the difficult and rather tragic situation of having to work out our destiny without knowledge of the end; as a weaver would be if he knew nothing of the design and very little about the material with which he was working.

Conflicts between the ideal and the realities of life are of course inevitable. At each stage of history they have taken a different form. The early Christians often found themselves in conflict with the State; indeed, this conflict between the two allegiances, allegiance to the State and allegiance to the high ideal, still continues in parts of Europe and was officially ended in this country only when various Bills were passed annulling disabilities and discriminations against dissenters. Characteristically a compromise was reached here and in temporal matters the State claims obedience to its laws, but in spiritual matters the citizen is left free. In borderland cases a conscience clause is in general inserted, acknowledging the higher claims of conscience and the necessity for leaving each one free to contract out of the new law if he feels so impelled. Although in practice these conscience clauses have not always worked well, they show that the temporal authority recognises its limitations, and its need to defer to higher authority.

Another conflict arose in the nineteenth century. The rapid growth of science opened men's eyes to the marvellous

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range and complexity of the universe. Very limited ideas held until then were shown to be wholly inadequate; the reality was infinitely more wonderful than the imagination had depicted. It seems strange that this could ever have led to conflict between science and religion; yet it did. Looking back one can see how this came about: in the course of long non-critical years there had been a considerable growth of hypotheses and ideas irrelevant to the great central truths of Christianity yet deemed by the Church to be essential and therefore to be accepted as true. Men of science, on the other hand, asserted that a statement about the physical universe is not to be accepted as true simply because the Church thinks it is essential to religion; science, they maintained, must test all things that can be tested, and seek out the Truth with no other motive whatsoever except to find it. Of course all this is so completely recognised now that the famous address given by Tyndall to the British Association at its Belfast meeting in 1874 reads like an echo from a distant past. Certainly no such conflict would be possible to-day: in reply to Tyndall's rather pompous declaration, "We claim, and we shall wrest from Theology, the entire domain of cosmological theory," one cannot imagine a modern professor of theology doing more than say, "Certainly, my friend, go ahead." Nor could we picture him in such deadly strife with the professors of biochemistry, of astronomy and of physics as was worked up at Oxford in the historic discussion of 1860 between Bishop Wilberforce and T. H. Huxley. An interesting account of the position taken by the various protagonists is given by Alfred Noyes in his book, *The Unknown God*. That conflict is over. Both sides gained enormously by the clearing away of much intellectual lumber; both groups of fighters gained by the infusion of the spirit of humility; the scientists lost some of their arrogance, pardonably acquired during the rapid rush of sweeping discoveries and wide generalisations of the mid-nineteenth century, which had given an impression of almost limitless power of human discovery and control over Nature: they gained when they recognised the limitations of the human mind and the existence of vast domains beyond their powers of apprehension. Best of all, however, we now recognise that the dispute had really been about what one side thought necessary for science and the other side thought necessary for religion; between science and religion as such there can be no conflict. Alfred Noyes, whom one might regard as the poet of science, puts the facts admirably:

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"What is all science then,
But pure religion, seeking everywhere
The true commandments, and through many forms
The eternal Power that binds all worlds in one?
It is man's age-long struggle to draw near
His Maker, learn His thoughts, discern His law—
A boundless task, in whose infinitude,
As in the unfolding light and law of love,
Abides our life, and our eternal joy."

—(*Watchers of the Sky.*)

Each generation can transmit its knowledge to its successors, but not its interests or its enthusiasms. Scientific workers moved away from the search for great generalisations which necessarily sometimes brought them into conflict with religion and philosophy; more and more they devoted themselves to analytical processes, the study of the minute details of their subject. They were partly influenced by the seductive apparatus developed by the instrument makers, and even more by the University regulations which requires each candidate for a higher degree in Science to do a piece of so-called research work. This usually resolves itself into a detailed study of some small point of real or supposed interest. The process has been much discussed and Mr. Alfred Noyes has popularised the saying of some American student that modern scientific activity consists in learning more and more about less and less. Like all such simple generalisations this is only partly true; in the universe there is no precedence of greater and less; what to the fleeting vision of one generation appears as a minute detail is often revealed to the next as a vast new field for scientific study.

This intensive study of the many facets of the universe necessarily leads to intellectual isolation. It is a commonplace that scientific discussion is almost dead; proceedings of scientific societies commonly take the form of a series of summaries of disconnected papers, many of which are intelligible only to a small number of people and interesting to fewer still. After listening to a series of them one is sometimes tempted to say, with Tchekov:

> "It's a good paper, but it's strange; one might write a thousand such papers and things would not be one step forwarder, and it would still remain unintelligible why such papers are written at all."

This isolation is one of the grave dangers of modern science, not simply for its own sake, but because it tends to make the scientific workers and the science lose touch with the general

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life of the community. There is now no conflict between science and the ideals and principles of religion, but there is no community of action. The isolation is intensified by the circumstance that there is a certain solitariness in religious experiences. As the Archbishop of Canterbury recently reminded us, "the journey of the spirit must be made alone. No other human being, not even those who are closest to us, can share it with us." Scientific workers have thus become disinclined to take a serious part in the religious life of the community, especially since the habit of public worship became less general. This is worse than the old conflict between science and religion; the protagonists in that conflict were at least keenly interested in a great issue, while the modern scientist tends to get on with his specialising and to ignore other matters.

A second effect of science, also indirect, is more serious and more widespread. Scientific workers have in this generation moved far away from Aristotle's view, guarded by tradition until these days, that applied science is somehow less noble than pure science. Now both are recognised as of equal merit, and applied science has developed enormously. It has been used by the inventor and the big business man for the making of an astounding number of things which are poured out into an expectant world and have already profoundly altered our national life. The modern youth is so smothered with scientific and mechanical devices: gramophones, wireless, the cinema, the motor car, that he has no chance to stop and think. He is presented with a bewildering array of possibilities, but has little guidance in choosing between them. In the end he usually tries to sample them all, but there are so many that he has no time to work out a verdict on any one of them before he must move on to the next.

If we could somehow impart to all our young people a sense of values, they would reject merely trumpery things and ideas, and would not be confused by the host of views and ideas and new religions put forward by a crowd of advocates in a world flooded with other distractions. But a sense of values is the hardest of all things to impart. Certainly our ordinary secondary and University education does not give it; it is one of the last things that a man acquires, and may indeed never get. The result is confusion of thought and inability to concentrate for more than a short time on any subject. The twenty minutes' B.B.C. talk; the short, snappy magazine article; represent about the limits of the

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average man's endurance. On the other hand, there is no limit to the variety of subjects he is prepared to look at, if not to think about. There is no conflict with any ideals and certainly no feeling against them, but there is no widespread conscious upholding of ideals and consequently in the maze and confusion of the many inventions they no longer appear dominant in the national life.

Even those young people who deliberately seek for high ideals find the task difficult, for confusion is by no means confined to the ordinary people nor to the scientific workers; it extends also to those who devote their lives to the upholding of high ideals, the religious teachers of the nation. They do not speak with one voice, and in this free and independent country they never will. The polemics of our ministers and priests may be more clear cut than in the past, and they are certainly no worse than those of the technical men and scientists (they ought to be and probably are much better), but they are more in the public eye because everyone, whether trained or untrained, feels equal to joining in the fray and pronouncing his opinion. Now and again, too, something disconcerting happens, as when the Dean of Liverpool Cathedral was rebuked for inviting a distinguished Unitarian to speak in the cathedral, it being held by some that Unitarians are not Christians, though they certainly think they are. But the net result is that the confusion in its spiritual life is hardly less marked than in the material life of the nation.

Meanwhile modern economic and social movements have created a new situation which is in some ways more dangerous, because more insidious, than the old one. The enormous developments of science and technology have ensured the production of all sorts of things in quantities beyond any possibility of consumption, yet they have not shown us what to do with these powers now we have got them. As Heraclitus discovered 2,500 years ago: "Abundance of knowledge does not teach men to be wise." The people concerned in the making and handling of these things manage to secure a share, and methods exist for determining what the shares shall be. But an important percentage of potential workers remain unemployed. So much had been hoped from the wonderful developments of science, yet in the end we find ourselves still faced with problems of unemployment, of hunger in the midst of plenty. As every social worker of long standing knows, there have been enormous improvements in the conditions of the poorer classes in the last forty

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years; but one can readily understand the feelings of disappointment of generous-minded youth that with such vast powers for doing things as we now possess, poverty should still continue among us. On school speech days they have sung about building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land. All the appliances are here, but Jerusalem is not built and meanwhile the green and pleasant land bids fair to become sadly disfigured with poor bungalows.

These practical social problems appear in these days so urgent that they have for the present forced most other questions into the background. Many of the present generation think it futile to talk about high ideals and the spiritual life when there are so many and such important practical problems awaiting solution. There is no particular conflict of spiritual ideals and practice; the ideals are simply being ignored. This is causing serious perturbation to some of our best thinkers.

Sir R. W. Livingstone attributes much of our present trouble to

> "the absence of what Huxley (afraid of the word 'spiritual') called an ethical ideal. This explains, if not the disease, the difficulty of curing it. We do not know what we believe; therefore we do not know what we want. So we succumb to heady emotions, like Nationalism, Fascism, Communism, Pacifism. The modern world has no definite view of life. Christianity is no longer the creed of Europe and nothing has taken its place. The majority of men have exchanged the certainty of faith for the twilight of opinion."

We may accept the diagnosis, and yet feel that the case is more hopeful than it appears. In all ages of intellectual and social activity there is inevitably confusion, doubt, conflict of opinion. One can imagine a belated scholastic of the seventeenth century saying much the same thing about the new scientists who were then beginning to be active, who also did not know where they were going, but who desired only to experiment in order to find out. For them, too, there was a diversity of views, a "twilight of opinion," to quote Livingstone's attractive phrase, and yet this was better than the previous unanimity based on the "certainty of faith."

The stream of enthusiastic energy that in the nineteenth century went into science and invention is now turning to social experiment. It is not true to say that there is no ideal

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in the national life; there is the praiseworthy ideal of ensuring a fuller, richer life for every member of the community, and although there may be endless discussion as to what this ultimately means, there is widespread agreement about the first steps: the amelioration of physical conditions.

Never before in all our history has the social conscience been so clearly awakened to the need for improving the lot of the poorer members of the community. The demolition of the slums, the raising of the standard of nutrition of children, the removal of physical causes of distress, all are fervently pushed forward with unprecedented and truly remarkable speed. The English reformer is always very critical of English performances, and he usually compares performance here with promises in other countries, but if one keeps to actual achievement there is no country where more is being done for the poorer classes than here. This has become so important a part of our national life that one might almost speak of the emergence of a new religion of Humanity; a humanism that looks to the satisfaction of the material needs of all the population as the most urgent of our problems.

And if it is objected that this is not a very noble ideal one can at least reply that it is a necessary preliminary. For most people, as has long been recognised, the life of the spirit requires suitable material conditions within which to function. "The chief task of politics," said Aristotle, "is to produce a certain character in the citizens to make them capable of good and noble actions"; but this "good life" was in his view possible only for those who had the right conditions, not for the slaves who supplied them. Now that the slave is gone, displaced by the machine, these conditions should be possible for all. And the nationalism, communism, fascism and the rest, to which Sir Richard refers, are, I think, not heady emotions; their appeal lies in the fact that they seem to offer a speedy way of setting the machine to work, and so ensuring that these things that could be done for the betterment of life shall be done.

In several countries of Europe this practical humanism, this desire to get something done, has been taken up with such extraordinary zeal by militant parties that it has become the central activity of the whole State. Over a large part of central and eastern Europe the corporate social life is declared to be the only thing that matters; the individual life is unimportant except in relation thereto; the State can therefore compel in all things. This idea appears in three different forms in Italy, Germany and Russia. In Italy it

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has been adjusted without serious difficulty to the ideals and organisation of the Catholic Church, and the respective heads see to it that the Italian can reconcile his two allegiances, one to the Church and the other to the State. Remarkable changes in national life have been effected by this system of collateral autocracies; great material achievements and moral advances, as shown by the exalted patriotism and the marked decrease in crime.

In Germany the State is insisting with German thoroughness on its own superiority; the ideal set before the citizen is complete obedience, complete surrender [1]; and he must further equip himself by all means in his power to perform efficiently the duties imposed upon him. The system is logical and self-contained; it simplifies life for the citizens by taking decisions out of their hands. There is no conflict of ideals with practice simply because ideals and practice are alike in the hands of the rulers.

But we still have to see whether the system satisfies the Germans. The State has not yet effected its adjustments with the Churches; the problem is more difficult than in Italy because the German protestant Churches are less institutional and social than our own, and their religion is an extremely personal matter; some of the members and some of the Catholics look like making a stand. It will be interesting to see whether the limitation set by Bismarck forty-seven years ago still holds "Wir Deutschen fürchten Gott und sonst weiter niemand." The problem is further complicated by the existence in Germany of an important number of Jews, having, in addition to their national allegiance, their own bonds of union and outlook on life. They have been excluded from the new State.

It is, however, in Russia that the imposing of a new system of ideals and principles has been most triumphantly and relentlessly pursued. The ideals are those of a materialistic humanism; to each is to be given according to his needs; from each is to be taken according to his powers. The service of Man is the ideal, the purpose of life.

[1] "Hingabe" (surrender) occurs with ominous frequency in modern German pronouncements. Professor Sauerbach, a distinguished medical man, at the recent celebrations of the 140th Anniversary of the Military Medical School, Berlin, declared: "Arzttum und Soldatentum sind daher beide gekennzeichnet durch Hingabe an die Idee des Berufes, Hingabe an die Idee des Staates, und Hingabe an das Vaterland, an Deutschland." Dr. Goebbels at the Weimar Book Week, November 1935, said: "Bücher und Kriege die Mittel sind, mit denen ein Volk über die Jahrtausende hinweg sein Leben erhalten kann."

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"Science," we are told, "has proved there is no God"; so the cult of science takes the place of religion. The "good life" which men have sought all through the ages is now easily attainable; it is based on hygiene, politics and ethics; political rectitude is the highest aim. It all sounds very cold and impersonal, yet in my Russian journeys I have often been astonished at the fiery enthusiasm this new religion can engender in its followers. The absence of alternative modes of political thought gives an impression of irresistible power, and the perfect unanimity of the leaders seems to prove the complete rightness of the cause. The leaders of the revolution refused any attempt to compromise with the Church even if this had been possible; but in point of fact their aims were quite incompatible. They recognised that the supreme State could brook no other allegiance and so they set up a completely atheistic State. The difference from our system is so complete as to amount in many directions to an absolute reversal. For us, the central idea is that each human being is a separate creation, distinct from all that has been and all that will be, an undying spirit housed for a time in a mortal body passing only a stage of its existence here, then moving on to another life. On our view the individual owes only a limited allegiance to the community; his higher allegiance is to the spirit within him, the spirit of God with whom we associate our ideas of absolute standards of Truth, Justice and Right. For the true Communist, on the other hand, there is no God, and there are no absolute standards of Truth, Justice and Morality; these have meaning only in relation to the corporate life of the time; with changes in the corporate life they also may change; relativity, so important in modern physics, is given a new and much wider scope. This corporate life, the life lived in human society, is all; the individual is only a transient expression of it and ends completely when he dies, just as a wavelet on the sea ends when all is still. Offences against the individual are of minor importance; the criminal code is much more lenient than one might expect. But offences against the corporate State, political offences, are very severely punished and no opposition to the commands of the State can be tolerated; indeed opposition must be made unthinkable.

The system is probably the simplest, most coherent and logical now being practised. The supreme authority can make a definite plan of action for the nation to which all must adhere; a planned economy is thus substituted for the

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supposed chaos of capitalist competition. Once the plan is decided upon it must be accepted by all, and no discussion of the basic political principles is permitted. Thus there is no political strife. Further, there being no religion, there is no religious strife. The onlooker at a distance sees only a nation marching as one man, all of one heart and mind, following one leader, struggling not among themselves but only with Nature; each one struggling, not for himself, but to improve the common lot; in their work thinking only of the good of all instead of the benefit of a few. A glowing account is given by the Webbs in their new book, *Soviet Communism, a New Civilisation?* and they believe that it will be the civilisation of the future. They are entitled to a very respectful hearing. Mr. John Lewis recently argued (*Christianity and the Social Revolution*) that there is really considerable affinity between revolutionary communism and Christianity. This is only superficially true. The gulf that never can be bridged between ourselves and the socialistic States, Russia and Germany, lies in the attitude to the individual. So long as we believe in a Supreme Being, the God of Truth and Love, and in our continuing immortal life as individuals in kinship with Him, we must acknowledge an allegiance to these Eternals that is higher than any allegiance to a temporary State can be. Once a question becomes a matter of conscience the dissenter among us, whether religious, social or political, must be tolerated; he must be left free to think and within certain specified limits to speak and write as he wishes. Our system breaks down otherwise, and we become simply an autocracy lacking any logical basis. In these socialistic States (I am using the word in the Russian and German senses), the dissenter must be discovered by constant purging and suppressed. As Bernard Shaw has rightly pointed out in *On the Rocks*, the socialistic State must have the right of exterminating what he calls the "socially incompatibles." No one will ever know how many "socially incompatibles" were exterminated in Russia, or how many perished miserably in their attempts to escape. Nor do we know much of the sufferings of the refugees from Germany. The new system in both countries has been ushered in with much sorrow. More than a million refugees passed through the Nansen office, but these were by no means all, and the fate of many of them, especially the young women, has been tragic in the extreme. I doubt if any period of human history has such dark pages as those of recent years. And this refugee problem is not ended. Already there are fears

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of more expulsions, more exterminations, and we shall soon be faced with an even greater problem: what is to become of the children of these refugees growing up in alien countries and given only limited scope of life? In earlier periods there were great open spaces in North America to which they could go, but now these are closed by rigid Immigration laws and there is nowhere for the modern refugee.

If one leaves out of account the question of the dissenters there is now no great difference in practical conduct between the good Communist and the good Christian. There was at the outset; the Communists adopted a completely different code of morals, but found it unworkable and gave it up. They have adopted the main features of our code of morality not, as we do, on religious grounds, but because it is the only one that works.

These great social experiments deserve our closest attention. Social experiments are extremely difficult to carry out; they lack the neatness and tidiness of the ordinary scientific investigation; there can never be adequate controls or definite conclusions, and interpretation of results is always liable to be obscured by passion and prejudice. On the whole the least unsatisfactory procedure is by trial and error, but this is slow, painful and uncertain because the full results hardly emerge in one man's lifetime: "We are born too late to see the beginning of things," said Bolingbroke, "and we die too soon to see the end of them." But it is the best method we have.

These compulsory systems, however, can achieve great material successes; they did in the Empires of Antiquity and now, reinforced by the aid of science, they can do better. It is not yet possible to say whether they are more efficient than our method because of the great difference in level of the starting points.

Compulsory methods, however, would not suit this country. In the past we never agreed to more than moral suasion for the accomplishment of the Churches' prayer "that all may be of one heart and mind," and in no branch of public life is intolerance long permitted. No extermination of socially incompatibles, and no expulsion of dissenting minorities, is likely to occur here.

But practical humanism needs some great driving force to keep it going; left to itself it is liable to fade out and degenerate into political intrigue and mass bribery, to be dominated by considerations of expediency. If we abandon the driving force of a dictatorship, our only hope is to set up,

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instead, high ideals that will inspire people to look beyond the immediate practical problems of the moment to some greater hope, some loftier and nobler purpose with eyes not glued on the foothills but lifted up to the mountains beyond. Of all the ideals set before mankind in the long search of the last 3,000 years, the best for our purpose are those embodied in the Christian religion. Quite apart from any question of the Nature or Authority of Christ, the teaching carries its own authority as the one great power that has remained living and potent through all the changes of the last 2,000 years. But the interpretation and the application to the problems of the day change with each generation and that is where our difficulties lie: for in interpretation there must always be the element of human fallibility.

A generation ago it was all so much easier. Communications were less efficient: life was lived more in groups. People knew all, and sometimes more than all, about the lives of those in their own group, but very little about the lives of other groups. Unemployment, poverty, suffering—sometimes terrible in the extreme—all were there, but only occasionally did people hear about them. Our parents had a very simple ideal; to strive for the Perfect Life. This life was only the prelude: beyond it lay the full and final fruition of all that was best and noblest here. Their place in that life would depend on how they lived here. So they met troubles and trials with equanimity; it was hard now, but it would be better in the next life; they easily dispensed with doubtful pleasures: these might be agreeable at the moment, but they would have to be paid for later on. It was a simple philosophy, and it made a good guide to life. But it has lost its firm hold and nothing has effectively taken its place. Many young people are unquestionably interested, but by no means convinced. Belief in a future life may be as widespread as ever, but it is not held with such definiteness and it almost certainly does not exert much influence on present-day conduct. It is unlikely to serve to all people as a compelling reason for adopting any particular view of life. And while the principles of Christianity are not controverted, they are not held as a coherent system so widely or at least so definitely as they were a generation ago. It is, of course, no use railing at our young people for their lack of religious faith; many of them have had but little opportunity to acquire it, or rather the opportunity has been smothered by the enormous number of options presented to our young people to-day.

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As a young man, I had few options. I might be a member of the Church or of a recognised chapel—but a member I must be. Certainly I felt no constraint and I absorbed the teachings of my minister as I absorbed my daily food; imperceptibly, without much thought or questioning, they became part of my daily life and character. Anything else was "not done." But the modern youth has so many choices, and frequently no particular urge in any one direction; he tends to drift into something that becomes a habit.

Even those who feel the inadequacy of a purely materialistic view of life, and a need for something higher, are not always certain where to seek guidance; there are so many different voices in the Churches, at first sight so discordant—though much less so than they seem. In view of this confusion it is hardly surprising that some of the more sober-minded and thoughtful of our younger people are turning to the Catholic Church as the way out of the difficulty. For that Church claims authority on the basis of its continuous history; it is the only organisation in the world that has retained vitality for so long a period, and at all times, even in its worst periods, it has always attracted a number of saintly men and women who regarded it as the guardian of the Truth, the keeper of all that is best in life. By its organisation it has the merit of speaking with one voice; whatever divergences there may be among its rulers never appear to the ordinary man. The successive appeals from priest to bishop and finally to the Pope, the obligation on all members to accept as final the Pope's decision on all matters of faith, give a feeling of completeness and finality that is very satisfying. It is like a steady unchanging light that has already shone for nearly 2,000 years, and will so far as one can see, go on for another 2,000 years.

Another interesting movement among our young people results from the modern tendency to group-mindedness. The remarkable spread of the so-called Oxford Group movement is a striking example of the way in which out of the vague and unco-ordinated movements of to-day there comes occasionally a current which carries a large number in one direction—such as sometimes sweeps over the country in time of crisis, as in 1914, in 1931 and again last October. And somehow this group movement has captured the imagination of many of our young people.

I do not, however, think that either movement will solve our problem. The Englishman is a born individualist, and has a greater and more fundamental need of freedom than

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he is often willing to admit. It is easy to be misled by the fact that our young people not only say very little about the creed of freedom, but are apparently willing to surrender it to achieve some end; so that in defence of freedom one always has to turn to the older writers. But I have so much faith in the younger generation that I am convinced they would soon revolt if their freedom really were in danger.

An important reason why the noble ideals of Christianity have for the moment ceased to claim the widespread allegiance they deserve, is not that the teachings themselves are inappropriate, but that the circumstances in which we live have changed so rapidly that we have not worked out the proper way of applying them. It is no doubt true, as Dr Glover said, that "Belief is the real centre of life, and in spite of what Matthew Arnold said about conduct, it is belief that is nine-tenths of life and shapes conduct." But it is equally true that the average Englishman likes to interpret ideals in terms of action; to know what he himself is to do.

Perhaps our greatest need to-day is a frank discussion of the ideals and principles of Christianity to see how to interpret and use them in our present economic and social conditions.

What, for instance, should be our attitude to unemployment? It need hardly arise in rural communities, but it seems inevitable in a community in which some 80 per cent. live in towns on the products of the machine. What are we to do with the unfortunate sufferers?

In his impressive New Year's address, the Dean of St Paul's reminded us of the ideal, as one that should be central in the National Life; "Bear ye one another's burdens." One can accept the responsibility and yet ask: how are we to do it? Personal service in lads' clubs, unemployment centres, etc., is admirable, but often unpracticable after one's student years. Some vicarious service is called for, but what? Economic science and general experience alike show the harm done by indiscriminate money grants to all who are poorer than ourselves. Some service on the part of the recipient is needed in order to stem the moral decay that sets in when men feel themselves superfluous and unwanted, yet economic science makes it clear that "made" work is also bad. What then are we to do if, as seems probable, trade never becomes sufficiently active to absorb all the unemployed?

What is the value of human life as against other values? How should we train our children to live according to the maxim

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"Safety first," or to live adventurously? Is early death an evil for a man or should he be ready to give up his life for a cause, or for another man, or for his country?

How far should medical science go in trying to prolong life? It has done a great deal already, especially for delicate and sick people; though it is age, the "grievous pathway of old age," rather than vigorous youth that is prolonged. In order that age may continue to live after it can no longer earn, it demands control of its savings or of those of other people, and to that extent impedes the activities of youth.

Should the body be kept alive after the light and the power have gone? Efforts have already been made in the direction of rejuvenation of certain functions in animals. If these succeeded they would certainly be applied to men. Assuming partial physical rejuvenation possible, ought it to be done? Shall we set limits to biological and medical science and say: "While you may learn what you like about the mysteries of life and death you must not attempt to prolong life or vital processes beyond a certain point?"

Again, what should be done with defective children? Some physical defects can be remedied or mitigated; many mental defects cannot. Children suffering from them must be segregated in their own interest as well as that of the community. The segregation must continue all their lives or at least as long as the defect shows itself. Should such children be stopped at birth from a life that can never be normal?

Should we, or should we not, take thought of the future quality of our population? The science of genetics is steadily advancing, giving much knowledge of heredity. Its application to human beings is necessarily hampered by the fact that experiments are impossible and observations can always be ruled out as being exceptional. But the general rule emerges that, for many human characters (using the word in the physical as well as the intellectual and moral senses) like begets like; that of 100 children born of parents possessing a certain group of characters, a majority will inherit them. The whole tendency of modern social conditions is to restrict the numbers of children in the upper and middle and educated classes, more than among the poorer classes. Deterioration of the race, we are told by geneticists, is inevitable unless the birth-rate falls considerably among these classes. Should this be brought about?

There are many other problems of this sort growing in importance as knowledge grows, about which one feels that

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there must be a course of action that conforms with Christian ideals and principles. We could choose this if we knew it; or we could choose the method that appeals to practical-minded people as the best. But we know how often in history the solution that seemed the most "practical" was in fact wrong, and had to be reversed after years of suffering.

A small group of people, some with knowledge of these scientific and economic problems and others able to discuss them from the standpoint of Christian principles, seriously working together, not for a short time as in the Birmingham Conference of some ten years ago, but continuously, could clear up many of these difficulties, and could do much to infuse Christian principles and ideals into our modern humanitarianism, and so give it a nobility and a vigour that would keep it as a great force in our natural life. Of one thing we can be certain; the mass of our people will not be content indefinitely to forego the benefits that modern science could bring to them. This richer life seems so nearly within reach, and if they cannot attain it in one way they will try another. Humanitarianism alone is insufficient: it tends to be weak and flabby; it lacks driving force, and in individualistic communities like ours it is apt to degenerate into political intrigue or to be frustrated by the interests of groups. Driving force there must be, and I see only two possibilities: an all-powerful State on the Russian, German or Italian models, or a compelling ideal that will inspire men and women with a high purpose and fire them with energy and enthusiasm to achieve it. The highest ideals we are ever likely to find are those of the Christian religion; if one could somehow ensure their supremacy in the national life we could look without misgiving to the future. But if we cannot do this, I see no alternative to the assumption by the State of more and more authority over the deeds, the words and the thoughts of its citizens. It would indeed be a tragic ending to our wonderful epoch of invention and discovery if that struggle for freedom of thought and action which began with the Reformation and has continued ever since should, in the end, appear to have been largely a mistake and that the process must now be reversed and freedom curtailed for the sake of material comforts. But freedom is safe only when it is inspired by high ideals.

HARPENDEN.

E. J. RUSSELL.

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THE IGNORANCE AND ADVENTURE OF MAN.

W. J. BLYTON.

How may man, in a universe which, the more it is explored, appears the more assuredly to be *not* anthropocentric in its make, validly attribute stable value to himself and his religious and moral experience? Huxley and others have presented in vehement contrast the ethical note of man—his pity, altruism, codes of justice, devotion—with the "gladiatorial show" of the rest of Nature intent upon its next meal and the next generation. The contemporary Laureate visualised "man, her last work, who seemed so fair"

> Who trusted God was love indeed,
> And love Creation's final law—
> Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw
> And ravine, shriek'd against his creed.

Later, Conrad indulged in an artist's speculation:

> "The simply ethical view of the universe involves us at last in so many cruel and absurd contradictions where the last vestiges of faith, hope, charity and even of reason itself, seem ready to perish, that I have come to suspect that the aim of creation cannot be ethical at all. I would fondly believe that its object is purely spectacular; a spectacle for awe, love, adoration, or hate if you like, but in this view—and in this view alone—never for despair! Those visions, delicious or poignant, are a moral end in themselves."

This seems to leave something out: but it has this use, that it obliges those of us who look for the moral significance in the sum of things to face the antimonies which too commonly are glossed over, or simply ignored for secondary and tertiary questions in which men become absorbed and

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beated, unconscious that their first principles have not been grounded and defended aright yet. They should have by now some reasoned answer to a challenge like this: "If justice is not done on this earth, or done only in the exceptional case, why assume that it is implemented in the next state of being? Do dissimilar laws govern them?" Or this: "If this life be a school of virtue, a 'vale of soul-making,' how do so many lives and characters escape light and discipline, not by choice, but by place and circumstance?"

Again in the past it has shaken the confidence of the reflective to realise that this earth is but a dust mote amid myriads of bodies moving in the profundities of space. Some have got over or got round this difficulty of Size, of number without imaginable limit, in one way or another, for a time; though we are never immune from a return of this abasing thought. But there are other humbling discoveries, less emphasised. For instance, man is but one species among hundreds and has held his tenure upon this earth on similar terms of tactic and struggle as others: his has been a long and chequered history as an organism. Again, of 260,000 known varieties of plant, only a tiny fraction, *some* 500, as botany will tell us, are of any importance to man—Nature obviously having other and more general ends than the serving of *homo sapiens*;—the diffusion of life in any or all of its forms irrespective of man. The world is not anthropocentric: so much is clear. It illustrates design, skill, adaptation of means to ends; but these ends are not specifically human, or moral; they are the ends of the organisms, and structure is sufficient to indicate function. The salient fact about the sustenance of all living creatures is that life lives on life; animal devours plant and animal, and the ingenuity and delicacy of the organs with which plant, fish, insect and animal are provided to attract, snare, kill and digest other organisms, are wonderful. The visible creation is thus crowded with design and contrivance, but it is below morality which first emerges in man. At a certain stage in his development, morality together with the sense of beauty and aspirations of another world of values become for him *as real* as the sense-world of routine and effort, and much more important. Strange enough, that out of this visible arena of biological effort to maintain a foothold and outmanœuvre physical forces, there should arise a social formation permitting some security of body and leisure of mind which allow ethical, poetical and religious thought and conduct.

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It is then that a completely new and different set of values take rise, and intermittently influence individuals and groups.

All this has been an enormously costly and gradual and æonian process, of course; trial and error, with death penalties attached. With the mysteries of disease on a large scale (even yet eluding complete control), with the occasional dangers of great physical disturbances, the surface appearance is that of a species left largely to fend for itself; at least, nothing is so thankless to attempt to prove as paternalism in world-government, even to-day with the multiplication of human safeguards. It would appear that in the weary past, with its ebbs and flows, every conceivable mistake has been made (not once, to learn by; but often); every penalty has been paid; and every atrocity has happened. The fortifying view of life as a discipline, a task set, with marks to be accorded, has itself nothing to say of the casualties and tragedies in the moral sphere, as inexplicable as physical accidents; sensitive souls overborne, good will slowly tired out; and the tendency so noticeable in war being present also in peace, that the very good, gentle and brave are broken; while others are born into circumstances where the play upon them of moral or mystical influences are and must be scanty. "A hard heart and a good digestion" have been said to be an insurance against the sorrows of the conscientious; irony and a cynical humour a guard against the shock of disillusion; and some aphorist, unrefuted, has observed that life is a tragedy to him who feels.

"A belief in the best exacts a full look at the worst." Most people wish to believe positively, and this in practice means that they will simplify, and omit refractory groups of facts. But formulæ constructed of incomplete data revenge themselves by breaking down (in teachable minds) or by demanding revision. One general answer to every particular perplexity is, as Mark Rutherford said, a temptation. Example: sin is admittedly the cause in one form or another of masses of misery in the social and personal spheres. But it is a play on words, hardly even a trifling with ideas, to ascribe to sin many of the grimnesses and catastrophes of nature: earthquake, flood, famine, climatic and microbial visitations—as an earlier theology did, not considering that such penalties were disproportionate, that they struck not the guilty necessarily, and that in truth moral faults more appropriately receive moral penalties. Such upheavals, indeed, as far as the eye of science can see, are and have been

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always part of the rough general working of force and matter, perhaps beneficial to life in the very long view, highly inconvenient in the immediate view.

But mere revolt and scepticism are as untenable as credulity. A faith is necessary; we must think and fight for it; for only so will it become *our* faith; the value of a conclusion depends on the number of facts fairly faced, and on the thoroughness through which it is reached—and on the discriminating respect the inquirer shows for the wisdom enshrined in former answers. It may well be that no *complete, intellectual* theory of the world is possible, as Hale White, above quoted, thought.

"The storm, the rain slowly rotting the harvest, children sickening in cellars are obvious: but equally obvious are an evening in June, the delight of men and women in one another, in music and in the exercise of thought. . . . The provision in nature of infinity ever present to us is an immense help. . . . God was obviously to me not a person in the clouds, and what more was really firm under my feet than this—that the universe is governed by laws. These laws, however, were not what is commonly understood as God: nor could I discern any ultimate tendency in them. Everything was full of contradiction. On the one hand was infinite misery; on the other there were exquisite adaptations producing the highest pleasure: on the one hand the mystery of life-long disease, and on the other the equal mystery of the unspeakable glory of the sunrise on a summer's morning over a quiet summer sea."

In that attitude, of admitting *all* series of facts, sinister as well as glorious, resides profound wisdom; and it has the tonic moral value of all honesty. The Truth, whatever that may be, must fearlessly embrace the squalors and disgraces and injustices of existence; but also its splendours, hopes, and other-worldly horizons. Without the hasty and premature "reconciliations."

"Everywhere in nature we see exaction of penalties down to the uttermost farthing, but following after this we discern forgiveness, obliterating and restorative. Both tendencies exist. Nature is Rhadamanthine, and more so, for she visits the sins of the fathers upon the children; but there is in her also an infinity Pity, healing all wounds, softening all calamities, ever hasten-

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ing to alleviate and repair. Christianity in strange fashion is an expression of nature, a projection of her into a biography and a creed."

Natural theology, the theology of "design," does not take us far; does not carry us into the world of ideals and values, of human individuality and loyalty, of spiritual wisdom which the mind of man aided by a Divine Co-efficient has made its peculiar and preferred environment. The argument for workmanship in atom, amœba, reptile, insect, bird and mammal *can* only prove that a mind, a geometrical plastic power, has been concerned in evolution and its tremendously slow processes. It says nothing (which is not equivocal, provoking further queries) of the character of such a mind. Of "morality" all that it can say is that there are physiological and economic laws not to be transgressed without pain or extinction; and the latter penalty may accompany a first ignorant offence. Everything from polyp to peacock has a *function*, and success is merely the due discharge of the function: a watchful creature, regardant of self, is the only "moral" creature under that dispensation. Something of the same generalisation has seemed true, up to a point, of mankind and nations; history is no consoling or edifying bible. But in the morality which some men have reached these are not virtues but hindrances.

The change from the world of organisms, and force, and natural theology to that of any revelation—to spirituality, altruism, and expectation of a future evolution of the soul—is most striking. The former, though it accumulate fact upon fact, is a *vacuum*. The latter is a growing *plenum*: and here, experience is intuitive and direct. We simply feel and know that holiness *is* holiness, that veracity and humility and purity (aye, though they have no survival value in a debased environment) are good in themselves. Few can stay to collate and "reconcile" the two, or even understand how they co-exist as they do. Every deeply religious spirit must have been puzzled by the apparent *irrelevancy* of much of creation to his dearest-held beliefs and his intense inner experience. Look at a thousand objects, animate and inanimate: we ask, what could these have been created for if creation has a solely moral end? What is the spiritual use of a crocodile, the moral message of an ant-eater? Nay, of the incredible *bulk* of matter (compared with which, life is but a local and sparse surface stir, hardly visible), what has such a phenomenon to do with *us*, with all that we prize,

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hope or imagine? What an inopportune and uncalled-for production, it would seem, of excess material. And 95 per cent. of the forms of life exist for themselves, quite regardless even of the bodily calls (much more the spiritual aims) of man. True, this impression is somewhat corrected by the vague though powerful appeal which Nature *as a whole* makes upon the eye, ear and soul of man, subtly suggesting to him a contemplative nature-mysticism such as all sacred Scriptures and all poetries have expressed. But the *parts* testify otherwise. Analysis dissolves that charm which Job, the Psalmist, Homer, Dante and the rest have felt in the shows of the world.

"Can anything," asked Walter Bagehot again, "seem more stupid than a big stone *as* a big stone, than gravel-heaps for gravel's sake? What is the use of such cumbrous, inexpressive objects in a world where there are minds to be filled, and imaginations to be roused, and souls to be saved? Some of the world seems designed to show a little of God; but much more seems also designed to hide him and keep him off."

He himself was well aware that it is the human *mind* which itself creates these very difficulties by its own non-material activity; and that it is the soul's duty to its own dignity not to be run away with by images of its own conspiring. For the fact is, we incessantly see the magnitude of matter, but cannot see the magnitude of mind—something very much more great. Earth looms large when compared with its "puny" inhabitants; albeit it is this "puny" inhabitant who (by comparison with some mental or spiritual standard of grandeur) *calls* himself "puny." But intensity rather than extension is the true measure and criterion of worth; and if so, it is possible that a single human spirit far outweighs material things; much more will the myriads of souls existing now on that earth and the far greater majority who have done so. In such a view, then, they dwarf to naught the size of their temporary home; and, let their immortality be allowed, the importance of the physical theatre would be the merest optical illusion.

Just here, too, enters that bold but well-substantiated idea of the late J. R. Illingworth, that "matter exists for the sake of spirit"; not that we can trace the utility of every material phenomenon, or that any but a minority of phenomena have any human use, only that there is a constant order of relation between the two which is never reversed.

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"While matter is of use to consciousness, life, mind, spirit—consciousness is of no use to matter. . . . Electricity gains nothing by guidance along wires; marble remains marble, as much in the statue as in the rock; gold is no better for coinage, nor flowers for cultivation, except in their relationship to man. Reverse the picture and the opposite is the case. Our every state of consciousness depends upon the brain, and therefore on the chemical elements that form the blood. Tongue and ear are material things. Hellenic sculpture, Gothic cathedrals, mediæval painting, modern music, are only modes of matter when regarded by themselves; yet through them the soul of man has given utterance and permanence to all the varying phases of his inward spiritual story which else would have been fugitive and dumb. In every case contact with matter strengthens the spiritual fibre, forcing vagueness into outline, confusion into clearness, doubt into decision, hesitation into act. It is the necessary means by which our spiritual life becomes actual, concrete, real. It also has an important reaction upon character and conduct."

Thus, matter (however disproportionately abundant it may superficially appear) is not so stupidly opaque as the senses might suggest. The physical world is a transparency and a means of contact, as well as a veil and a screen and a problem. It has been profoundly hinted that if human morality is to be really disinterested and tough of fibre, some elements that are equivocal or irrelevant in the world are essential. If the universe is to be everywhere and unceasingly expressive and communicative of the Divine Nature and Will, full morality would be impossible for man. We would live under the continual coercion of a supernatural interference practically ensuring our choices and fore-ordaining our steps. This miscellaneous puzzling world is better for man's mentality and volition. For simple example, no faith could develop without outward dubieties. There could be no strength of mind and character (any more than of body and muscle) without opposition and resistances. Could wisdom have become what it is, without recalcitrant material to form itself by? No more than patience would be possible in the absence of "trying" people and events. It is ordinarily forgotten that the one sure way of humility to arrive is through humiliations; and the sense of dependence does not come except through events which have proved too much for us

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individually. It is frankly impossible to conceive again how love could be born, in the lack of our sense of need, half-and-halfness, and insufficiency. What would faithfulness to the Best be—could it be at all ?—without the presence and awareness of second-bests and worse ? There could scarce be *mental life* at all without incessant occasions of choice and preference, which imply all grades of objects for selection. A universe without what we call risk or evil or trial is comparable to a universe all light, shadowless—which would be for that reason invisible. On *whatever* lines any world may be framed, there would have to be distinction, difference a higher and a lower—and then the lower, relatively to the higher, must always be an evil (the scale makes no difference). In depicting Frederick of Prussia, Carlyle claimed not only that the struggle of the will with the encompassing world makes the interesting career and story, but is the substance of morals and manhood.

Even to-day, with its unresolved social and international evils, the world which many who are without robust faith secretly hanker after (and do not see) is a "just" world, where infraction of elementary moral laws is promptly vindicated, where the initiator of wrong is the victim and not the recipients of the wrong. But this world is not a disciplined nursery in which a parent or governess puts things to rights over the children's wills ; it is not a primary school, where a head or games master keeps a retaliatory eye on lawlessness ; it is not a club where communal reason settles issues without resort to suffering and destruction. A faint analogy is the playfield of some great school in which crazes, vices or tyrannies grow to an intolerable point, and are then drastically and roughly remedied by a revolt, a change of "boss," or the offender's departure ; meanwhile, Cowpers and Shelleys and others have suffered permanently and badly. It is no neat, tidy or "civilised" spectacle, granted ; there is an element of the dæmonic in life still. Yet if we saw evil-doers past and present suffering in the flesh penalties for evil, and obtaining rewards for good, the exact line of self-interest would be marked too glaringly. The evidence of *all* consequences would be like the evidence of legal consequences now, only infinitely more effective and infinitely more imperceptible. It would be a much easier and more calculable world to live in : agreed. But in it there could be no scope and no call for "heroic virtue," no clinging to the pure principle regardless of what happens to self, no belief in judgement though it tarry strangely, still more no belief

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in the glory of goodness though its rewards seem far away and problematic and its worldly inconveniences obvious enough. This tremendous enigma it was which exercised the sublime, independent and critical mind which wrote the book of Job; the same ethical stress challenged the Psalmist and certain of the Prophets. And Christ at his coming quoted and underlined their brave denials of an instant, partial providence—"Think ye that those on whom the tower of Siloam fell were sinners greater than you? I tell you, Nay." "He maketh the sun to shine on the evil and the good." Of his followers: "They shall hale you into the synagogues, and think they do God a service." It was a proclamation, once and for all, of the *disinterestedness* of virtue if there is to be virtue at all; of love alone as the acceptable motive for action and endurance—love of a God whose economy of compensation and requital is deliberately unseen and withdrawn. It was a blow, and intended to be a final blow, at the old Hebrew (and persistent modern) superstition that goodness is a worldly insurance and a passport to security, respect or happiness. This earth and the lives led upon it are as it were an extract from the universe of moral Law, but the light falls piecemeal and chequered. The indications are not coercive enough to be a strong motive to high action; only nobility of heart is that—a nobility innate or caught from a grander nature. Those indications are largely neutralised (for the intellect) by the immense non-moral context, the "indifferent" and multiform spectacle of human life. So, too, if all men's religious convictions were alike, the accumulated public opinion would veto our freedom of action and thinking, and consequently the bravery of our choice and the purity of virtue.

These considerations and others like them tend to show that a mixed life, in a variegated material theatre, life broken in upon suddenly in mid-career, a Providence which is not lavish in "signs" which most generations seek after, are not ultimately insuperable or final difficulties; but are helps, however unwelcome to the natural rational man—indispensable conditions of a *moral* life to a *subordinate* being. The conditions are hard; but inescapable. You *cannot* have heroism (that is, virtue at its most characteristic) without the sternest contradiction of the world to the soul and its finest desires and allegiances; a contradiction which reached its sharpest recorded height in the cry, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" in the consciousness of an Innocence greater than Job's suffering a dereliction worse than Job's.

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Perhaps in modern times a frequent and typical form of suffering is the thinking man's who would fain be a believer, the man who will shut his eyes to none of the hundred criticisms and disenchanting theories which abound, who is one of a society inhabited by a hundred minds and engrossed by a thousand non-religious interests; yet whose heart, constitutionally reverent and formed for good and God, feels after him if haply it may find a clue through the maze. The government of the visible universe is a problem so long as "justice" is not promptly done according to human standards of personal security. Only to rare and heroic *disinterestedness* is there practically no problem, and possibly this is not attainable by many, though many may be called to it; the controversy between the temperaments of the Marthas and the Marys still classifies even good men. Nevertheless Christianity, at its purest, proposes to elicit in men a self-abandonment to good, irrespective of suffering entailed on the doer. Shall revolutionaries, patriots, explorers or experimenting scientists show this "enthusiasm" and Christians be without it? They too are supposed to man the barricades, to tread dark continents of experience, and not know the issue: that eleventh chapter of Hebrews is a sufficiently impressive Charta of this sort of soldier of faith. Christianise Henley's "Invictus" and you have the marching song. It is not primarily pessimism, it is Christianity, which depicts life as we now know it as Tragedy; the attitude to it, militant; and the duty, Hope—

till Hope itself creates
From its own wrecks the thing it contemplates.

"Is it any wonder," asks Mr H. G. Wells, "that men were dazzled and blinded, and cried out against Christ? Even his disciples cried out when he would not spare them the light. For to take him seriously was to enter upon a strange and alarming life, to abandon habits, to control instincts and impulses, to essay an incredible happiness."

For the strange fact is that "happiness," if it may be called by that inexpressive word, is the result: a soul at peace in its vision of good. He taught and lived the Idea, had no limitation of it: faith was permanent confidence in the Idea: and the only bait he offered men is a cross—not a cross that chafes and is shirked, but carried knightly.

Redstead, Surrey.

W. J. BLYTON.

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SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT IN OLD MEXICO.

LEWIS SPENCE.

Author of *The Gods of Mexico*, *The Civilisation of Ancient Mexico*, etc.

WHEN Hernan Cortés and his paladins embarked upon their amazing and successful Mexican adventure Spanish chivalry could still look forward to nearly a century of immunity from parody. If the Conquistadores bore themselves very much as cavaliers in a romance, their exploits justified the attitude, and they are surely to be excused if their sentiments regarding the bizarre environment of old Mexico were what might have been expected from an Amadis, or even the knight of La Mancha himself. Indeed, the atmosphere of mysterious dread which overhung the strange white cities of Anahuac must have seemed more intense than any the Spaniards had encountered even in the wildest descriptions of haunted isles or frightful labyrinths in the romantic literature of their own country.

Almost on every page of Cortés's letters to his imperial master, Charles V, a superstitious horror of the abominations of Aztec religion and sorcery is revealed. A keen observer, with a marked gift for arriving speedily at essentials, Cortés at once divined that Mexico, like Dahomey at a much later period, was a pit of infamy and despair, that the wholesale human sacrifices which overshadowed its life had achieved almost an automatic acceptance by all classes, and that these barbarous conditions had nearly blotted out the more gracious spirit of the ancient culture which the Aztecs had inherited from older races.

His superstitions notwithstanding, the great Conquistador did not permit them to stand in the way of practical if drastic measures of reform. Mexico was Satan's dominion, but Satan could be defeated through his ministers and only a wholesale

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extirpation of these and their horrid customs would suffice. He speedily realised what only the last generation of modern students of Mexican history has re-discovered, that behind the infinite and complex ritual and symbolism of Aztec religion one very simple original idea existed, that of a compact with the gods, by which, in return for human hearts, the rain essential to the growth of the maize-plant was vouchsafed to mankind. The more blood shed in a land subject to severe drought the greater would be the rainfall. The one was intended to bring down the other according to the tenets of sympathetic magic. Rain, to the Aztec mind, as Cortés found through his interrogation of the Emperor Montezuma, was indeed blood magically transformed by the gods into fertilising moisture.

But if religion in old Mexico had a decidedly magical aspect, it was still, at the period of the Conquest, a thing apart from sorcery proper. Separate from the priesthood of Totecs was the caste of the naualli, or sorcerers, although there was certainly some overlapping in their functions. The early Spanish missionaries, Sahagun, Torquemada, Motolinia, Nicolas de Leon and Juan Bautista, among many others, have preserved for us a wealth of information concerning the rites and customs of these professional magicians. That the zealous fathers never for a moment doubted the occult powers of the sinister fraternity they strove so faithfully to defeat surely does not detract from the value and interest of their testimony.

Bautista summarises the activities, if not the philosophy, of the Aztec brotherhood of magic in a credulous paragraph.

"These are magicians" [he writes] "who conjure the clouds when there is danger of hail so that the crops may not be injured. They can also make a rod look like a serpent, a mat like a centipede, a piece of stone like a scorpion, and engage in similar deceptions. Others among them will transform themselves into a tiger, a dog, or a weasel. Others again will take the form of an owl or a cock."

Nicolas de Leon, in the execution of his ecclesiastical duties, drew up a careful questionnaire for the use of Spanish priests so that they might the more easily identify those natives who practised the black arts.

"Art thou a soothsayer?" [asks the inquisitor], "dost thou foretell events by reading signs, or by

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interpreting dreams, or by water, making circles or figures on its surface? Dost thou suck the blood of others, or dost thou wander about at night, calling upon the Demon to help thee? Hast thou drunk peyotl, or given it to others to drink, in order to find out secrets? Dost thou know how to speak to serpents in such words that they obey thee?"

These queries, if they do not embrace the entire gamut of Mexican sorcery, touch upon some of its more outstanding practices such as reading by divination the signs caused by the ripples on the surface of water, the dreadful habit of vampirism sometimes cultivated by the wizard, the application of drugs to extract secrets when the patient was in an almost comatose condition and the art of snake-charming. The intoxicant known as peyotl was distilled from a species of vinagrilla which has a white tuberous root, the part made use of, and seems to have induced a dreamy state in those who partook of it. But other and more noxious drugs were at the disposal of the naualli, the most effective of which was that known as ololiuhqui, or datura, a sacred plant taken to induce visions, in which the god who presided over the plant appeared to answer questions of importance much in the same oracular manner as did some of the deities of Greece and Egypt. A different kind of narcotic was teopatli, "the divine remedy," compounded from the seeds of certain plants, among them tobacco, to which was added the ashes of spiders, scorpions and other insects. The whole was pounded into a paste or unguent, which was smeared on the body in the same manner as the "witch-butter" of European sorcery, in the belief that it would bring about magical flight or levitation.

The Aztec magician had to undergo a long and severe initiation in his art. As in the case of certain African magical cults, he was supposed to die and return after some months to the world of men, full of the wisdom of the supernatural spheres in which he had sojourned. By degrees he could reach higher grades, the Teopixque, or "masters of divine things," the Teotecuhtli, the "sacred companions," or the Nauahualtin, "those who know." Only by very vigorous and prolonged ordeals could he gain entrance to these select and exclusive orders, and even then not until he had attained an advanced age.

Perhaps the most revered and certainly the most conventional among these grades was that associated with

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augury or divination, which was in the hands of the Teopixque, who formed a college of augurs like the Auspices of ancient Rome, which had its headquarters in the Calmecac, or training college of the Mexican priesthood. The members of this body studied the flight and listened to the song of birds with pious care and by the omens they drew from these legal and diplomatic officials arrived at many of their decisions. The forms assumed by smoke and portents seen in the entrails of victims were also regarded as ominous and were anxiously observed by the augurs.

The higher prophetic powers vouchsafed by dreams and visions were also cultivated by the Teopixque, some of whose methods recall those of Eastern mystics. Before passing into a state of unconsciousness induced by drugs, they fasted for many days, fixing their thoughts exclusively upon the subject concerning which they wished to be enlightened. A simpler if more drastic manner of bringing about prophetic delirium was to wind the skin of a newly killed animal round the neck until pressure on the veins brought about unconsciousness and the blood-gorged brain became the seat of hallucinations.

But the cruder forms of divination were naturally the more popular, and among these was the throwing of maize. The naualli placed four grains of maize in each corner of a mat and then cast nine in the centre. If most of them fell face upward, good fortune in any enterprise was to be expected. If the reverse happened, the omen was evil. Sometimes maize was thrown into a jug of water, and if it sank the signs were lucky, but should it float, then death or misfortune might be expected.

As in the Old World, night was the Mexican sorcerer's holiday, and certain hours of darkness, especially the second, third and seventh, were traditionally regarded as favourable for the performance of magical rites and acts. At the sinister hour of midnight, it was supposed, the lower order of magicians took the forms of wer-animals in which to terrify solitary such defenceless folk as they might meet with in lonely places. They sought to contrive this transformation into beast-shape by means a little more advanced than those adopted by the wer-folk of old France or Bohemia, who either a belt made from the hide of a wolf whose form they wished to assume, or the entire skin of the animal. The naualli possessed a regular wardrobe of mantles or skins shaped and skilfully painted like the jaguar, bat, wolf or coyote whose outward shape he believed himself

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to take for the time being and in more than one Aztec painting quite a number of these animal disguises are depicted, the pattern and details being not only most life-like, but sufficiently horrifying to justify the tales of terror in which the missionary priests occasionally indulged concerning the deeds of these haunting wizards. Indeed, the disguises in question could vie in cleverness and artistry with the most advanced productions of the theatrical costumier of to-day.

The naualli of the lower orders, those medicine-men who catered for popular superstition, were usually to be found far from the dwellings of men, living in huts made of wooden boards painted with the symbols of their craft, which seem to have been a development of the similarly decorated tepee of the medicine-man of the Plains. People who wished to consult them visited them by night. Extraordinary as were the efforts of the Spanish missionary friars, they found it impossible to root out popular magic and its practitioners. In every Mexican town and village minor sorcery flourished exceedingly. Sahagun, in his great work, the *Historia General de Nueva España*, vies with the native Aztec chroniclers in credulous stories concerning the powers of these magical outcasts. He tells us that they could roast maize in a cloth without fire, produce from nowhere a spring or well filled with fishes, and restore a house or hut which had been burned to its original condition. The naualli, he assures his readers, could dismember themselves, or even die, and later achieve the miracle of self-resurrection.

Old Mexico, alone among the countries of North America, was a centre of that species of female sorcery usually described as witchcraft. The whole episode of witchcraft in Mexico bears such a close and startling resemblance to its European equivalent as to make it self-evident that time-honoured ideas concerning the exclusively Old World origin of the cult stand in need of revision—unless we chose to believe that this survival of nature-worship found its way from Europe to America in the days before Columbus. At the very time Cortés sailed from Cuba on his Mexican adventure, the religious authorities in Spain were beginning to exercise themselves concerning the notorious scandal of the Witch Sabbat which disturbed its northern provinces. This reflected the abominations of that Vaulderie of Southern France, which may possibly have given its name to the later Voudoux or Voodoo of the West Indies. Doubtless some of the missionary brothers who arrived in Mexico soon after

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the Conquest were well acquainted with the cult in Castile and Aragon. Judge of their surprise on discovering that its entire apparatus had been transported by the enemy of mankind across the Western Ocean! For there they found it complete with the broomstick, the witch's palfrey, the peaked hat characteristic of the sisterhood, the rendezvous at the crossroads and even the "great black man," the male priest of the witch-ritual, who discoursed music on his pipe to the dancers at their Sabbats.

The astounding thing is not that the monks from Spain immediately recognised it for what it was, and found no difficulty in accepting the theory of its local plantation by Satan, its prime deity, but that it possessed many more features in common with the witchcraft of England and Scotland than with the hag-beliefs of the Spanish peninsula and France. For Latin witchcraft was more "clubbable" and less exclusive than that of Britain, it frequently embraced the whole population of a village or district in its observance, men and children as well as women and girls. The student of British witchcraft will almost feel that a native copyright in folk-custom has been violated when he comes to examine the extraordinary correspondences between the practices of the witches of Anahuac and those of Ayr or Devonshire, Lancashire or Caithness. To claim a common source of kinship betwixt forms so geographically remote as those of Britain and Mexico would certainly offend the prudent guardians of the Science of Folklore, and the writer does not choose to step into the whirling dust of an arena so easily provoked to controversy. But the "parallel" is there, nor will it be gainsaid. There is, however, one weak link in the general resemblance, as we shall find.

"These women," writes one of the Spanish fathers, "are such as we in Spain call witches." For the Mexican hags rode the witch's broom of dried grass, which they employed as a primitive "airplane," and they were frequently accompanied by owls, snakes and other creatures of ill-omen, precisely as were their European sisters, with whom they also shared the art of smiting with the elf-bolt and smearing the body with the unguent which aided levitation. And, like the witches of Europe, they made use of mummified human flesh in their sorceries. One of the most trustworthy observers says of them:

"They vented their wrath on people and bewitched them. When anyone is possessed by the demon with

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a wry mouth and disturbed eyes, they say that the Haunting Mothers, housed by the cross-ways, have taken his form."

The patroness of these Mexican witches was Tlazolteotl, the earth-goddess. The broom was her personal symbol and device, and in one of the native paintings she is revealed as the traditional witch, naked, wearing a peaked hat made of bark and mounted upon a broomstick. Elsewhere she is depicted standing at the door of a house, accompanied by an owl, the whole representing the witch's dwelling, with medicinal herbs hung up to dry beneath the eaves.

The vivid if laconic Acosta well summarises the nature and activities of these Mexican witches. He tells us that they were in the habit of intoxicating themselves with some potent drug in order that they might be transported to distant lands and that they prophesied coming events.

> "To practise this art" [he says] "the witches, usually old women, shut themselves in a house and intoxicate themselves to the verge of losing their reason. The next day they are ready to reply to questions. Some of them take any shape they choose, and fly through the air with wonderful rapidity and for long distances. They can tell what is taking place in remote localities long before the news could possibly arrive. The Spaniards have known them to report mutinies, battles, revolts, and deaths, occurring two hundred or three hundred leagues distant, on the very day they took place, or the day after."

The demon who in Mexico took the place of "Satan," or the officiating priest of the European cult, was the god Tezcatlipoca, who presided over the Sabbat at the crossroads and discoursed dance music for the sport of his devotees on a pipe made from the arm-bone of a dead woman. But, as has been suggested, there was one outstanding circumstance which distinguished Mexican witchcraft from the European system and brought it more into line with Asiatic tradition.

This was the association of the witches with the dead, not a merely necromantic association with the departed such as the European witches cultivated, but one which provided for the active participation of dead women in their nightly revels. The Ciuateteô, or "Noble Women," were those deceased mothers who had died in childbed, and who consequently, were thought of as being malevolently inclined

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toward children. They were supposed to wander through the air and revisit the earth at certain seasons for the purpose of afflicting infants as well as adults with epileptic and other diseases.

These dead women were dressed like the court ladies of Mexico, their faces were heavily powdered with chalk, their gilded ears were pierced and filled with the unspun cotton symbolical of the spinning female, the upper part of their bodies were nude and round the hips they wore a skirt on which cross-bones were painted. At night they left the Cuitlampa, or Paradise of Women in the West, and descended to earth to haunt the crossroads. To them repaired the living witches. The interpreter of one of the native manuscripts, *The Codex Vaticanus*, says of them :

"They come through the air in the figures of women, such as we designate witches, who usually went to the highways, where they met in the form of a cross, and to solitary places, and when any bad woman wished to absolve herself of her sins she went alone by night to these places and took off her garments and sacrificed there with her tongue (that is, drew blood from her tongue), and left the clothes which she had carried and returned naked as the sign of the confession of her sins."

At least one Asiatic analogy exists with these dead Mexican hags in the witches of Burma, who are likewise deceased and malignant mothers, and this may possibly indicate an eastern origin for Mexican witchcraft. But the Aztec Ciuateteô have a certain resemblance to European fairies which can scarcely be overlooked, for, like them they come from a place in the west, are malevolently inclined toward children, take the butterfly for their symbol, and are connected with the moon.

These comparisons bring us to the question of Mexican demonology, in which we will find numerous resemblances to European and Asiatic shapes and superstitions. Chief among the demon hordes of Mexico were the dreaded Tzitzimime, "the monsters descending from above," who were indeed the spirits animating the stars and planets. Indeed, the stars were known by their names and Mexican myth recounted that they were those spirits or "angels" who had fallen from grace and from heaven. They are described by native chroniclers who wrote in Spanish as "angels of the air, holding up the sky," and "the gods of

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the air, who draw down the rains, waters, clouds, thunders and lightnings," and who had once dwelt in Paradise but had been expelled from its delights. It is not unlikely, however, that the notion of their celestial origin may have been borrowed from Biblical sources. They may be regarded as powers who supported the vault of the sky, and who arranged the phenomena of rain, thunder and weather. But that they had a noxious and demoniac significance in the popular mind is plain, for they were invariably represented in repellent insect or reptile forms, as spiders, scorpions or serpents.

At certain seasons of the year the natives were in the habit of sealing every possible loophole in their houses, doors, windows, and chimneys, lest the baleful influence of these stellar demons should penetrate their dwellings and injure them or their children. The beams of the stars were dreaded perhaps more than anything else, and even the gods themselves were not immune from baneful astrological influences.

Perhaps most active and malevolent among these demons was the god Tezcatlipoca in his form of "The Affrighter of the People," and master of the sorcerers, who took upon himself many terrible and grisly disguises. "These," says Sahagun, "were masks which he took to terrify the folk, to have his sport with them." His most familiar apparition was that of the Uactli bird, a species of hawk, whose cry of "yeccan, yeccan," boded a speedy death to those who heard it. In another shape he haunted desert places as "the axe of night," in which, by opening and shutting two little doors in his breast, he mimicked the sound of a hatchet being laid to the roots of a tree. Should a valiant man succeed in plunging his hand into the opening and seize the heart within, he could demand any boon he chose from the demon. But the risk was a dire one, and any display of cowardice would certainly be punished with instant death. In still another horrid form Tezcatlipoca rolled along the ground, headless and footless, scattering maladies and diseases in his course. But if grappled by a hero, he would pay ransom with a thorn of the maguey plant, which would endow its owner with lifelong good fortune.

A spirit closely resembling the Irish banshee haunted remote places, and to see her, as in the case of the "white fairy" of Ireland, meant death, or great misfortune at the least. This was the Cuitlapanton, who, says Sahagun, "resembled a little fairy," by which he means a fay in the

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Spanish sense, a spirit of the goblin type. Her long matted hair fell to her middle and she sported a short tail. Like the banshee, too, she had a duck-like waddle, and her piercing dolorous cry could affright the boldest. It was impossible to seize her, as, if pounced upon, she would instantly vanish, reappearing again at a distance.

There is in some respects a strong general similarity between Mexican and European fairy lore. The Mexican goddess Xochiquetzal, or "Flower-feather," strikingly resembles the somewhat protean Morgan le Fay, Urganda or "Venus" of the Celtic or Teutonic Otherworlds, who, in one or other of her forms decoyed heroes like Ogier the Dane, Merlin or Tannhäuser into her subterranean paradise. In her Mexican form, however, she dwelt on a mountain-top, surrounded by musicians, goblins and dancing-maidens and boasted that no man was proof against her seductions. Once entrapped, none might hope to escape this Aztec Circe. Indeed, quite in the tradition of the Indian Apsaras, she overcame the virtue of a famous ascetic, whom she later transformed into a scorpion. To return briefly to the subject of Mexican witchcraft, and the resemblance of the dead witches to European fairies, it is perhaps worthy of mention that many English and Scottish witches had a positive association with fairies and with the dead who were thought of as having been spirited away to Fairyland, so that the resemblance between the cults may not be so infringed by the appearance of deceased women among the Mexican witches as at first might seem to be the case.

Like the swarming little fairies of some European countries, the Mexican Tepictoton aided the farmer in his labours, actively helping him by elfin alchemy to bring the maize and agave crops to full growth. As in the case of the Celtic fays, to behold them was to lose the sight of the offending eye. There still circulates in Guatemala an extraordinary mass of beast-fairy lore regarding the deeds and adventures of such enchanted animals as the rabbit, the wild and the jaguar, which recall the charming nature stories of Rudyard Kipling.

If we pass for a moment from Mexican to South American superstition we can even trace the origin of Shakespeare's debt to American folk-lore. Indeed, the whole of *The Tempest* is impregnated with American folk-lore, and it seems probable that Shakespeare was obliged for some of its incidents to contemporary books of travel. D'Orbigny states that the Yurucares of Brazil fabled that, at the beginning of

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things, men were pegged Ariel-like in the knotty entrails of an enormous bole until the god Tiri, like Prospero, released them by cleaving it in twain. Nor does the American influence in Shakespeare's fairy play end here. The name Caliban is undoubtedly derived from the word "Carib," often spelt "Caribani" and "Calibani" in older writers, while his "dam's god Setebos" was the supreme divinity of the Patagonians when first visited by Magellan, according to the Italian author Pigafetta.

It was chiefly in their curious system of astrology, however, that the occult arts of the Aztecs and their neighbours centred, and it had all the more sanction because it governed the affairs of everyday down to the smallest circumstance. Only in a distant sense, however, can it be described as "astrology," as its stellar origin was remote, and in its practice it bore little similarity to the astrological science of Asia or Europe. It was based on what was known as the tonalamatl, the so-called Aztec "calendar," the "Book of the Good and Bad Days," from which the destiny of those born on such and such a day or the result of any course to be taken might be forecasted.

This "calendar," which had no relation to chronology except that it might be applied to the actual calendar of the solar year, was really a table of fate and fortune, and was composed of twenty day-signs or symbols, derived from the attributes of the gods. These were repeated thirteen times, so that it embraced 260 signs in all, which were distinguished from each other by the numbers one to thirteen, in continual rotation. Thus the first sign in the second batch took the number eight, and so on, with the result that none of these symbols was attached to the same numeral and each was distinguished by its name, plus that of the number which fell to it, as "ce acatl," "one reed," "ome tochtli," "two rabbit," and so on.

These various day-signs were significant of good or evil according to the nature of the gods who presided over the actual hour in which any event occurred, or by the occurrence of the sign in a particular division of the "calendar." The signs were represented by pictures, mostly of the heads of the animals or of the objects which typified the various gods. In the balance and effect of these signs with and on each other lay the whole art of Mexican "astrology," just as by the consideration of the evil or good influence of the planets at a certain hour or conjunction the astrologers of Europe and Asia were able to predict certain occurrences and issues.

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Sahagun describes the significance which many of the signs held for the Mexicans. For example, the symbol of "one water," taken along with that of its incidence in the list, gave the astrologer an idea of the nearest auspicious date upon which a child born under it should be baptised. The sign "one cane" was auspicious, as being that of the good god Quetzalcoatl, as was that of "grass," presided over by the drink-god Patecatl. Those born under the sign "crocodile" were certain of being rogues and vagabonds, while those under the sign of "wind" would be rich and prudent. A man whose nativity came under the influence of the "eagle" sign in its seventh place would suffer from heart disease, but if he saw the light under the same symbol in its thirteenth place in the "calendar," he would live to be a famous warrior.

Each sign was held as applying to a certain part of the body and as having dominance over it.

> "the sign of the wind was assigned to the liver, the rose to the breast, the earthquake to the tongue, the eagle to the right arm, the vulture to the right ear, the rabbit to the left ear, the flint to the teeth, the air to the breath, the monkey to the left arm, and the cane to the heart."

It seems not improbable that those twenty day-signs had originally been associated with certain planets, and that the system was first a stellar one, like Old World astrology.

Almost immediately after the conquest of Mexico by Cortés, a widespread native secret society known as the Nagualists arose, based on a belief in personal beast-guardians, and formed with the intention of counteracting European influence. This had its origin among the lower orders, and its rites were associated with the most debased forms of magic. It still widely prevails in the more remote districts of Mexico and Central America. Children baptised by Christian priests are "rebaptised" by Nagualist medicine-men, and the most extraordinary tales are circulated concerning the magical potencies of these sorcerers, their change-shiftings, serpent-charming and ability to conjure up prophetic visions.

EDINBURGH.

LEWIS SPENCE.

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HAS PHILOSOPHY ANY MESSAGE FOR THE WORLD?

DR F. C. S. SCHILLER.

ONE sometimes wonders whether in these days privileged persons like capitalists, theologians, and philosophers do not feel that they ought to do something to justify their status in the eyes of the world. Accordingly we get plenty of attempts to show that the economic or the moral order would dissolve if the world tried to get on without capitalism or theology. But the philosophers would appear to be much less sensitive to social criticism, either because they are naturally callous to it, or because they do not see how it can be met. At any rate they scarcely ever attempt to show that philosophy performs a valuable social service or contributes anything to the enlightenment of mankind.

Now it is charitable to suppose that the reason for this apparent indifference lies in the very real and great difficulty of assigning to philosophy an independent function in the realm of knowledge; and the consequent confusion of most philosophers concerning the vital question of what philosophy is about. This difficulty may best be illustrated by considering the conceptions of philosophy most prevalent at Oxford, Cambridge and Moscow, and exhibiting their weaknesses.

At Oxford the function of philosophy is conceived of as "reflection"; but it is left vague what philosophy is to reflect about and how it is to do it.[1] As it is not supposed

[1] As *Mind* said a generation ago,

"To deepen our consciousness Green
At Oxford appeared on the scene:
'Oh thinker obscure,
Why don't you make sure
That you know what you think that you mean?'"

In philosophy the great tradition does not change!

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to have any vital or necessary connection with the sciences, it can at most reflect on itself—that is, on its own past history. But the history of philosophy reveals at best a succession of more or less ingenious guesses, all of which have undergone, or are in process of undergoing, refutation. So it is not reflection upon any stable or progressive truths, but only reflection upon errors. According to this view, reflection can start anywhere, but it leads nowhere. Philosophy therefore begins when we realise that we are in a bit of a muddle about some things, and it culminates when we realise that we are in no end of a muddle about all things. It is however difficult to see how this view should commend philosophy to the rest of the world.

At Cambridge, philosophy is not thought to aim at an independence of the sciences which really renders them irrelevant to philosophic truth, but it seems to lapse into the opposite extreme of subservience to the sciences. It emulates science and aspires to the "exactness" of the abstruser aspects of mathematics. By rivalling them in technicality it hopes to raise itself to an equality of scientific rank, and so to escape accusations of being pseudo-science. It remains, however, difficult to say how philosophy differs from science, what additions it can make, and why it should be needed at all. For the "analysis" on which it prides itself seems to be a wholly verbal and ephemeral thing, liable to be superseded at any moment by the discoveries of the sciences.

At Moscow, finally, philosophy is regulated by the State, like everything else. Its sole function is to advocate the truth of the Dialectical Materialism which is part of the State religion, and its sanction is a trip to Siberia at the public expense. In other words it is treated by the authorities very much as by the Church of Rome, and ordered to arrive at a foregone conclusion acceptable to them. But the Soviet philosophers cannot fairly complain that they are treated differently from other scientists, and discriminated against. For they are *all* told what topics they may, nay must, inquire into, and what conclusions it is socially imperative that they should reach. This mode of guiding research may look like an exaggeration of the pragmatic, but it cannot be denied that the Moscow authorities are exploiting a genuine gap in the academic theory of pure research for its own sake. For it cannot be gainsaid that even the purest scientist is confronted by a theoretic problem he has not hitherto attempted to solve. He encounters far more

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subjects for research than he can possibly undertake, and has to select out of them those which he actually takes up. He should be grateful therefore for the help which social authority offers, which prescribes for him the subjects he is to investigate, and correlates them with his society's whole mode of life. Actually he is perhaps more disposed to be resentful of any restrictions upon his liberty to do as he pleases; but that does not enable him to answer the question "why should society endow the philosopher (or the scientist) or even tolerate him?"

Where Oxford, Cambridge and Moscow have failed to justify the pursuit of philosophy, it seems unlikely that any other intellectual centre will be more successful. Yet the question whether philosophy has any message for the world remains a good one. Like other questions it has both a theoretic and a practical aspect. Theoretically, it concerns the co-ordination of human activities; practically, it concerns the problem whether useful employment can be found for philosophers, whether they must be ranked among unemployables, and whether they should be given institutional care. In short, the question is evidently a burning one, and will have to be discussed.

Moreover if the question whether philosophy has any message for the world is to be discussed in any sober and matter of fact way, it will, I fear, have to be admitted that its message is neither very audible, nor very intelligible, nor very cogent. This is to say that the world has to listen to many louder, more imperious and more seductive voices than those of the philosophers. It would therefore seem to be unreasonable to expect the still small voice of reason not to be drowned by the clamour of the passions, the harsh clangour of the machine, and the sweet enticements of the radio. Nor can it be maintained that philosophy is easily intelligible: it usually prides itself rather on being the fruit of a long, painful and arduous initiation, not to be attained by the busy or the vulgar. Nor again can the world fairly be expected to yield to the cogency of arguments that notoriously fail to impress their own authors. There is no agreement among philosophers, and no one who can speak with authority on its behalf. So soon as a philosopher comes forward with pontifical pretensions to be possessed of final and absolute truth, all the others set upon him and pull him to pieces.

Nor, lastly, can it be seriously contended that philosophy can vie with the sciences in progressiveness. The latter keep

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as breathless with the novelty and importance of their theories, and are continually transforming the life of man by their discoveries. But in philosophy progress is hard to discern: to the naked eye, philosophers appear to be discussing, interminably and without prospect of advance, essentially the same questions they discussed two and three thousand years ago. Such progress as there seems to have been, has been only verbal; philosophic disputes grow steadily more technical and less popular, until finally the inventor of a technical dialect so involved that no one else dares flatter himself that he understands it enough to criticise it, is raised to so inaccessible an eminence, so impregnable a position, that the discussion has perforce to stop; after which its lessons, if any, are promptly forgotten, and either new issues must be raised, or at any rate a new terminology must be devised.

Now of course I am very well aware that it is very easy to evade the force of this realistic and matter of fact estimate of the value of philosophy by pointing to the aspirations and ideals of philosophy, and gushing about their loftiness: in fact this practice yields one of the many meanings of "idealism." But I greatly doubt whether this procedure is really effective in the long run, and conducive to the prosperity of philosophy. It certainly tends to disgust the honest and hard-headed, and to encourage sloppy-mindedness and deception.

If philosophy is to be rescued from the fate of becoming a somewhat fœtid and insalubrious factory of hot air, or of sinking into an abstruse amusement for little coteries of pedants, it would seem to be incumbent on philosophers to do something about the situation. If nothing is done to galvanise philosophy into some sort of meaningful activity and to bring it into relation with the problems of life, I do not see how it can support its pretensions to have a message for the world, or how it can maintain itself, even as an instrument of discipline or torture in the crowded curriculum of a modern college.

On the other hand, I can see no difficulty in making out a perfectly good case for philosophy, if the philosophers so choose, and in assuring to it an intelligible and indefeasible position in the realm of knowledge. I still hope and pray that the professional expounders of philosophy may realise what it would be to the advantage, alike of themselves and of the world, to make philosophy socially useful. But I am

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becoming more and more sceptical. However I will try one more argument, though I have found few philosophers pervious to argument.

Let me begin by observing that to save the reputation of philosophy, a place must be found for it alongside of the sciences, distinct from them, but *not* incompatible with them. Philosophy must vindicate for itself a definite place in the field of knowledge, and must do so without either coming into conflict with the sciences, or duplicating their work more feebly or more vaguely. Now the sciences are all without exception special sciences, that is, devoted to the special study of some aspect of the real, or to some special way of regarding it. Thus geometry, as its very etymology implies, is the collective term for a number of hypothetical ways of treating the *spatial* aspect of the real; while biology means the consideration of its *living* aspect. Psychology, on the other hand, is not thus restricted to a selected aspect of reality: it rests on a special attitude towards its objects, and is concerned with an all-pervasive feature of the real. It may claim to handle *all* events in so far as they are experienced or are objects of awareness.

Now what inferences may we draw from this easily observable character of the sciences? If the objects of every science are products of a *selection* from the totality of reality, it clearly follows that every science must be based upon an *abstraction*. No science will attempt to treat all about everything, every science will restrict itself to its own chosen field, and will keep trespassers out of it. Its objects will be for it the only things that exist, and it will ignore all else. Moreover, its autonomy demands that in making its selections and abstractions it should be free and unhampered; it should consider, primarily or exclusively, its own interest and its own field, and not that of any other science (except in so far as it is conceived as subsidiary to another science), and still less that of the whole. Hence the special sciences as they grow out of the main trunk of the tree of knowledge, will in general develop, like branches, in *divergent* directions and there will not be anything to guarantee, either that the deliverances of the different sciences will agree with each other, or even that they will appear to be relevant to each other. *E.g.* a colour, say red, is for physics a matter of wave-lengths or "frequencies" of vibrations; for physiology, it is a matter of processes of the decompositions and recompositions of the living tissue in the eye, called the visual purple; while all along psychology stoutly declares that red

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is just a "simple sensation." It is not easy at first sight to discern what these definitions have in common.

The greater therefore the liberty accorded to each special science to develop on its own lines, the more urgent becomes the need for something more than science, namely for a comprehensive or synoptic treatment that will combine the partial views of the various sciences and will instruct us how to think of reality as a whole, and how we can read a single coherent sense into the whole of our experience. Here then is an important task, an indisputable domain, to which philosophy might devote itself. It has always claimed to be somehow concerned with the whole; and the further the sciences progress, the greater the need for some attempt at their synthesis and unification.

But this idea, however sound, would remain pretty sterile, if it could not be supported by a more explicit conception of the *manner* in which philosophy is to set about synthesising the sciences. So we ought to consider more in detail (1) what expedients philosophy can use to combine the results of the sciences into a concordant account, and (2) what *additions* it is entitled to make to the scientific data for this purpose.

(1) When two sciences have severally employed principles which, taken as descriptive of scientific fact, are divergent and incompatible, it is often open to a philosopher to reconcile them by recommending a simple change of logical attitude. He can take one, or other, or both, of the conflicting principles as merely *methodological assumptions*, or perhaps even as fictions. For example, when a physical science, desirous of dealing with a predictable course of events, has postulated determinism (as *primâ facie* every science is disposed to do) and a social science, say ethics, has insisted on indeterminism enough to render man a responsible agent, it is philosophically legitimate to trace out the underlying motives for these assumptions, and to point out that neither assumption need be understood metaphysically as descriptive of ultimate fact. If therefore the scientist is content to understand determinism as a postulate of scientific method, he is in no way interfering with the ethical postulate of freedom. Or again, if a question has arisen as to why no "figure" in nature ever comes up to Euclid's specifications, it is quite in order to point out that all the mathematical "ideals" are strictly "fictions," and have meaning and value only in so far as they prove themselves conveniently applicable to our real physical world.

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In this way nearly all the sharp conflicts between the principles of different sciences can probably be assuaged. It would therefore be unwise to seek to limit *à priori* the interpretations of scientific principles undertaken by philosophers, much as it is nowadays admitted to be unwise to limit the freedom of the scientists in framing their hypotheses. The latter are no longer terrified even by abstractly logical objections based on the so-called laws of contradiction and excluded middle. Rightly, for the sciences are becoming aware that these principles are primarily conventions about the use of *words*, and that all the "contradictions" and exclusive alternatives alleged, rest only on verbal definitions, and that these can always be amended when the facts render it expedient. The philosopher is surely entitled to claim a similar licence. Knowing that the sciences are progressive and are continually adding to their stores of knowledge, he need not be arrested by their present limitations; he may postulate suitable filling for their gaps, and thereby suggest to them lines of research. But of course he should always remain acutely conscious of the difference between speculation and knowledge: he should not get conceited or dogmatic, and should always remain willing to accept from the sciences whatever corrections his speculations may require.

If philosophers consent to adopt this attitude towards the sciences, there is no reason why the relation of philosophy and the sciences should not become one of amicable co-operation. Nor is there any reason why philosophy should not become as progressive as science, and be logically on a par with it. For both philosophy and science will be subject to the same great law of selection and abstraction from the irrelevant, which is exemplified in all human activities. Only, philosophy will exhibit its selectiveness by abstracting from the, for it, irrelevant details of the sciences; while the sciences abstract from the problems of the interconnections and inter-relations which they leave to philosophy. The false ideal of all-inclusiveness will be disowned by both alike, and will cease to haunt and confuse the discussion.

(2) Once it is admitted that the data passed on by the sciences to the philosopher are necessarily incomplete, because if they were not, the sciences would have ceased to add to the sum of knowledge, it follows that the philosopher has a right to fill in gaps hypothetically, and to supply missing links and re-interpretations. But this will not exhaust his functions. It will also be his duty to take into account any material that is deliberately excluded from the scientific

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view of reality. Now there appears to be such material, though its existence has been very generally overlooked. Yet the method of science is such that some very important matters *are* systematically ignored and excluded from scientific consideration, and the consequent omissions should, of course, be made good by philosophy. But at present neither the sciences nor philosophy recognise their duties in this respect.

I will mention three such victims of neglect. In the first place the sciences are plainly *purposive* structures. But they are not aware of this for the most part, because they take their purposiveness for granted, and regard it as extraneous and unrelated to their contents. Also, because few of them at present use teleological methods of explanation *within* their subject-matter, they are inclined to condemn all teleology as unscientific, and overlook their own teleological basis. Hence they all tend (and this remark applies to the philosophic sciences as strongly as to any) to lose any definite aim and to wander off into the unmeaning and unprofitable, or in other words to become pseudo-sciences. They would all be revolutionised if they always kept in mind the purposes for which they are cultivated.

My next two cases have suffered from the real exigencies of scientific method in the one case, and from supposed exigencies of this method and the real prejudices of philosophers, in the other.

It is a curious fact which is rarely observed that the sciences all seem to abstract from the personal context in which all scientific data are acquired. Actually all scientific facts and observations are in the first instance personal data. They arise from the personal observations of those who attest them and have experienced them under particular conditions at particular times and places. But before they are admitted to the status of scientific data this item in their history is always ignored. They are feigned to be relations of objective reality, and they figure as independent entities, which owe nothing to anybody. Why are they thus transformed? Because the sciences shrink from occupying themselves with infinite masses of personal detail, and prefer to take each person as representative of an indefinitely numerous but uniform class. So the personal aspect of events is simply abstracted from; and for the scientific observer who actually experiences his actual objects in a personal way, there is substituted a standard observer contemplating the universal object as it is supposed to be

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always and everywhere for all observers. But both such observers and objects are fictions constructed for the purposes of science.

Now as a scientific fiction, found useful and helpful in all the sciences, this procedure is legitimate enough. It is certainly the procedure which yields us all the "objective" and "independent" realities we talk about so much. They are fabricated out of an infinite chaos of personal experiences, and scientifically no one need scruple to approve of the process. But philosophically it seems indefensible. It falsifies and ignores an enormous number of facts, and substitutes outrageous fictions. No philosophy therefore which accepts the scientific abstraction from personality, can possibly be complete. No philosophy which rests upon fictions can claim to reproduce facts. The undoing of this scientific abstraction from personality, therefore, ought to be recognised as one of the first duties of philosophy as such. At least philosophers might have shown themselves to be as much enlightened as the astronomers who were the first to detect and evaluate the "personal equation" of observers.

The third omission which the philosophers may properly be summoned to make good, does not seem to be rooted in the actual procedure of the sciences so much as in the erroneous conception thereof which the philosophers have formed. They have failed to observe that the sciences are mostly desirous of arguing from one particular case to another, and that they use "laws" and "universals" merely for the purpose of mediating this transition. In this procedure the vital risk lies in the assumption that both cases are examples of *the same* universal, and that the individual differences between them may safely be ignored. In actual reasoning this assumption is always a hypothesis to be verified, and not infrequently observation gives the lie to theory and disappoints expectation. The scientist thereupon corrects his formula or his estimate of the cases, or both, and no harm is done.

But in the philosopher this situation engenders a hoary superstition and a fatal misapprehension. He interprets it as meaning that science is concerned only with the universal and disdains the particular case. This error was launched upon the philosophic world by Plato (in the *Theætetos* 209) and has haunted and vitiated philosophic accounts of the relations of particulars and universals ever since, and turned them into pernicious and profoundly irrational nonsense.

But the actual procedure of the sciences has never given

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countenance to this doctrine. The astronomer has never, as Plato wanted him, studied the abstract laws of celestial motions without recourse to empirical observations. The doctor has not usually succeeded in forgetting that his patient is, not a mere case of a universal "disease," but a suffering individual. Even the mathematician has sometimes remembered that his ideal fictions must be exemplified in fact, and that pure mathematics cannot be wholly severed from applied. It is only the benighted philosopher who has imagined that science *cannot* take cognisance of the individual case. The truth is rather that the whole apparatus of classifications, definitions, universals, laws, and principles, is at bottom one vast mass of fictions which aim at coping with particulars and controlling and predicting their behaviour.

Philosophy then should emancipate both itself and the sciences from subservience to the mechanisms and manipulations which have been found serviceable in the discovery of truth. It should keep us mindful of the essential human purposes we aim at in the pursuit of truth. And if it thus recovers contact with the problems of human life, it need no longer fear to meet its enemies in the gate!

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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MISS E. SYLVIA PANKHURST AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

THE REV. FATHER W. DEMPSEY, S.J.

Professor of Dogmatic Theology in Heythrop College.

[As this article, replying to that of Miss Pankhurst published in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of last January, anticipates, in its writer's opinion, the production of evidence which Miss Pankhurst made in the April number, no change has been made in it as a result of her April article, apart from a few additions to the footnotes.]

I.

MISS E. SYLVIA PANKHURST has for so long been connected with the defence of women's rights that it is the greater pity that she has recently rendered true Feminism a disservice. I speak of the disservice done to a good cause by proposing unworthy arguments for it, or by attempting to promote its claims by misstatements of fact. This is what Miss Pankhurst has done in the course of an article entitled "Women under Fascism," in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for last January. The article purports to show that "Fascism and the emancipation of women are inherently opposed." Perhaps they are. But it will not be unreasonable if intelligent readers suspend their judgment in suspicion of Miss Pankhurst's evidence when they read in her article such a passage as the following:

> "The law [*i.e.* in Fascist Italy], in fact, does not seriously contemplate punishing any husband for adultery; indeed, by the accommodation of the Church, arrangements are actually made to lend the odour of sanctity to concubinage. The Roman Catholic Church theoretically regards marriage as indissoluble and prohibits divorce, except in the case of important personages, who obtain it by special dispensation of the Church, a costly business! Nevertheless, since the

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Concordat with Fascism, the Church in Italy may, and actually does, authorise a religious marriage, carrying no civil rights, between persons one or other of whom is already married to someone else." (At this point Miss Pankhurst gives the following reference: "Instructions of the Sacred Congregation, Article 18, *vide La Femme et Dieu*, by Giorgio Quartara, the notable Italian lawyer and author of several important books, Paris, *Sans Pareil*, 1930, p. 209.")[1]

I quote the passage with distaste, not only because it must surely diminish its author's reputation, but also because its distance from the truth is painfully evident to anyone properly acquainted with the subject which Miss Pankhurst so confidently mishandles. Feminism, unless it be a special brand of that lady's own, does not require such misrepresentation of a Church in which, in the opinion of those familiar with it, sound Feminism lives and thrives as in its native element. Hence, while the present writer holds no brief for fascists, he considers it will be no disservice to the Emancipation of Women if he defends their true champion, the Catholic Church, against Miss Sylvia Pankhurst.

II.

Of the two major errors quoted from Miss Pankhurst I take first that about divorce. She states that while in theory the Catholic Church prohibits divorce, important personages obtain divorces by special dispensation and at great cost. Certainly, everybody knows that in Catholic teaching marriage is indissoluble, and divorce is prohibited, and anyone may learn, by consulting the ordinary textbooks of Catholic moral or dogmatic theology, that there is no exception at all to the law that validly contracted, consummated, Christian marriages are absolutely indissoluble. However, Miss Pankhurst has an original contribution to make to the threadbare subject. She knows something which, we are bound to conclude, Catholic theologians and canonists have hitherto either been ignorant of, or have not been honest enough to disclose. It is that divorce is granted by the Catholic Church, but only to "important personages," and for money, "a costly business!"

Unfortunately, no instances, no figures, no documents.[2]

[1] Hibbert Journal, January, 1936, pp. 224–225.

[2] Not even in Miss Pankhurst's April article, which afforded an opportunity either for proof or retractation.

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Let every allowance be made for Miss Pankhurst. Let it be presumed that she has in mind some instance, or instances, of Roman matrimonial judgments, declaring alleged marriages non-existent. Now, among such judgments, as Miss Pankhurst would admit did she clearly recall them, not one purports to be a decree of divorce, though there are numerous enough decrees of nullity. The distinction is a simple one, and both known and applied in our own English courts of law. A decree of divorce declares dissolved by law a marriage which is recognised to have existed before; (such decrees are given by the thousand in English divorce courts after legal reasons, such as adultery, have been proved); a decree of nullity, or of non-existence, declares that what seemed to be a properly-made contract of matrimony was not properly made at all, and that the parties were never truly married; (such a decree could be given, in the English courts, declaring an alleged marriage to be *null*, because, *e.g.* at the time of the marriage one of the parties was not of the legal age to contract marriage).

Either Miss Pankhurst knows of this valid legal difference or she does not. If not, her hardihood in rushing into print is incomprehensible; if she does know of it, then we must suppose that she has no confidence in the Roman judgments, and believes them to be faked from beginning to end. In that case, why is an instance not given? After all, the acts of the judgments are accessible, and those most likely to challenge comments from writers like Miss Pankhurst have received the widest publicity.[1] I have no doubt that she is aware of the distinction between a decree of divorce and a decree of nullity, and that she has made a statement against Roman Catholic practice, for which no authority or instance can be produced.

The reader who is naturally loath to believe that charges of such magnitude can, in these enlightened days, be made without any foundation, might easily imagine that at least in speaking of the "important personages," and the "costly business," Miss Pankhurst has something to say for herself. She has not. The best reply to her already refuted jibe is no doubt, the statistical list of cases heard by the Roman Rota, the supreme court where final decisions in nullity cases are given. These figures, also, are easily accessible. It is usual to find them published, year by year, in Catholic periodicals; and a large and representative section of them

[1] *Cf.* for the Marlborough-Vanderbilt case, the text of the judgment in the *Tablet*, 1926 (2), p. 851.

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has been in print for some years in Mr. F. J. Sheed's book, *Nullity of Marriage*.[1] From that work, on account of the ease with which it may be consulted, I reproduce the following figures :

In the four years ending 1930 :	
Number of cases heard . . .	207
Number in which applicants paid their own expenses	111
Number in which applicants could not pay	96
Number of cases in which paying applicants were successful . .	39 (35% of " paid " cases).
Number of cases in which non-paying applicants were successful . .	40 (41% of " free " cases).

No doubt, the occasional presence, among so many, of a titled litigant, has tempted Miss Pankhurst to attribute importance and success in court to the litigant's paying power. The figures above cited prove that importance and success are not measured by wealth in the dealings of the Roman Rota with matrimonial cases. It is, however, known that, in the case most widely advertised by anti-Catholic writers, namely the Marlborough-Vanderbilt case, the expenses were very moderate. Information on this point also was accessible to Miss Pankhurst.

"The poor pay nothing. In all cases the expenses are comparatively small. The ethics of the court are similar to that of the medical profession where the rich are charged a larger fee so that the poor can be treated for nothing. In the Vanderbilt-Marlborough case, the judgment bears the revenue stamp of 5,000 lire, or a little more than £30 at the then rate of exchange." [2]

This quotation is taken from a writer who, like Miss Pankhurst, is not a Roman Catholic. The difference between her and Mr. Seldes is that the latter, before writing about the Vatican and its works, took some trouble to study his subject.

III.

The other accusation against the Catholic Church which calls for correction takes this form : " by the accommodation of the Church, arrangements are actually made to lend the

[1] *Nullity of Marriage*, by F. J. Sheed, B.A., LL.B., p. 72. Sheed and Ward. London, 2s. 6d.

[2] *The Vatican. Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow*, by George Seldes, p. 61. London : Kegan Paul, 1934.

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odour of sanctity to concubinage." [1] This amazing charge, surely unexpected in these days, when the Church consistently and unfashionably refuses encouragement to any of the contemporary movements against sexual restraint, is backed by Miss Pankhurst by the assertion that

> "since the Concordat with Fascism, the Church in Italy may, and actually does, authorise a religious marriage, carrying no civil rights, between persons one or other of whom is already married to someone else. This extraordinary procedure is authorised and explained by the Government circulars, and the instructions of the Church to its officers." [2]

Extraordinary, indeed, the procedure may appear, when unexplained and imperfectly stated by Miss Pankhurst. The instruction to which she refers, and with which she is acquainted through a book written by a Parisian anti-fascist propagandist,[3] requires some little more attention than her article enables the reader to give it.

It relates to the way in which bishops, in their pastoral work, are to conform to certain parts of the Concordat, concluded in 1929 between the Holy See and the Italian Government.

A wrong impression may be avoided if it is noted that although it is laid down in the Lateran Treaty that Italy recognises the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion as the only religion of the State [4] and although the annexed Concordat declares that Italy desires to restore to the institution of matrimony a dignity in keeping with the Catholic tradition of the people,[5] the only appreciable gain, regarding the contracting of marriage, that has accrued to the Church's cause is that ordinarily Catholics need no longer submit to a civil "function" in order to be considered by the State to

[1] HIBBERT JOURNAL, January, 1936, p. 224.

[2] HIBBERT JOURNAL, January, 1936, pp. 224–225.

[3] However, this "notable Italian lawyer," who was invoked in Miss Pankhurst's original article, rightly makes way in her April article for a publication of a respectable Italian publishing house.

[4] *Trattato fra la Santa Sede e l'Italia*, Art. 1: "L'Italia riconosce e riafferma il principio consacrato nell' articolo 1 dello Statuto del Regno 4 marzo 1848, pel quale la religione cattolica, apostolica e romana è la sola religione dello Stato."

[5] *Concordato fra la Santa Sede e l'Italia*, Art. 34: "Lo Stato Italiano, volendo ridonare all'istituto del matrimonio, che è base della famiglia, dignità conforme alle tradizioni cattoliche del suo populo, riconosce al sacramento del matrimonio, disciplinato dal diritto canonico, gli effetti civili. . . ."

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be truly married; henceforth, the duly celebrated religious marriage of Catholics is recognised as deserving all civil effects, on condition that it is reported by the parish priest to the civil registrar within five days.[1]

The State continues, however, to recognise as lawful marriages, contracts entered into by Catholics, not in due canonical form to which, as Catholics, they are in conscience bound, but merely before the civil officer.

To avoid a mistaken view of the Church's attitude to the Italian State's position in this matter—such a view as Miss Pankhurst has taken—it should be remembered that the civil ceremony, considered as a marriage, has for Catholics and in the Church's law no value at all, when the parties concerned are Catholics. And this is not a new stand that the Church has taken up since the Concordat, nor in Italy alone. It is the common law of the Church, binding Roman Catholics everywhere. Apparently it is a position which non-Catholics require us to defend and justify. Its justification is the fact that Catholics continue to regard Christian marriage as their Christian forbears regarded it, viz. as a sacrament, in which the natural institution has received the sacramental dignity by the will of Christ. Hence, the conditions of its valid and honest celebration among Catholics is held to be the business, not primarily of the civil, but of the ecclesiastical authority. Civil authority, indeed, may have its just claims in the matter, but they will always be secondary and subordinate, *e.g.* in regard to the registration of marriages in the registers of the State, to facilitate civil business. To such claims the Church makes no opposition, and in England, for instance, Catholics have no grounds for objecting against the civil registrar knowing of their marriage, so long as they can contract the marriage itself, in peace with their Christian conscience, in the due form of the Church. That attitude to marriage cannot be set aside once a person

[1] *Ibid.*, Art. 34. On this point Miss Pankhurst says (p. 225) that "the civil official who neglects to register it is liable to a penalty, not so the priest—if the husband advised the priest after the ceremony that he does not wish it registered, is he not the head of his house, and is not Fascism the man-made State *in excelsis?*" On the contrary, the priest, whose conduct is guided, neither by the local registrar nor by the "advice" of husbands, but by the laws of the Church, is subject, if negligent, to the penalties, according to canon 2383, of the Code of Canon Law; as is clearly stated in the Instruction from which Miss Pankhurst has quoted snippets. Istruzione ai Revmi. Ordinari d'Italia, etc.: "43. Il Parroco negligente nella notificazione dei matrimoni all'ufficio di stato civile, soggiace alla sanzione penale comminata nel can. 2383, oltre alla responsibilità di cui al n. 30."

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has begun to look upon the contract by which a Christian man and woman give themselves to each other in a lifelong bond, as altogether outside and above the sphere of contracts by which a citizen, *e.g.* receives or buys from the appropriate State official permission to keep a dog or a wireless set. Matrimony being, for the Catholic, a Sacrament, it is the Church's business to regulate its valid celebration by her own children. And this is what the Church insists on doing, both in England and in Italy.

This consideration will enable the reader to appreciate both the Concordat and the Instruction. One can see, for instance, the inconsistency of the Italian Government in declaring, in the Treaty, that Catholicism is the State religion, and yet providing, in the civil code, that Catholics may contract a civil "marriage" that will be granted the civil effects due to real marriage, although it is known that a Catholic, by such a civil ceremony, is not married at all before God, the Church, or his own conscience.

This is an inconsistency that belongs to the State alone. For, again, it must be realised that that state of the law is not to the Church's liking. Consistently with her Christian principles, the Church, at the drawing up of the Concordat, did her best to have it laid down that, Italy having been recognised as a Catholic country, that form of marriage should be the only civilly legal form for Italian Catholics which is the only form valid and honest for them before God and their conscience. The State refused this reasonable and just demand, the Church's efforts failed, and she has accepted the meagre advance towards a just arrangement which the Concordat embodies. But she has not abandoned her claims, either in theory or in practice; on the contrary, here, as in the question of the right of the Church and of parents to educate their children, or of the right of Catholics to form associations for religious purposes, the Church has lived since the advent of Fascism and even since the Lateran Treaty,[1] in a state, as it were, of beleaguered resistance.

For all of which, such an opponent of Fascism and reputed champion of rights as is Miss Pankhurst, might consistently have praised and encouraged the often hard pressed leaders of the Church in Italy. Instead, she tells the

[1] *Cf. e.g.* the allocution of Pius XI reported in *Osservatore Romano*, May 16, 1929, in reply to Mussolini; also the Pope's letter to Cardinal Gasparri of May 30, 1929, published in the same journal, and reproduced in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 1929, p. 297; also the condemnation of Marc Missiroli's Fascist book, *Date a Cesare*, January 25, 1930.

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readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL that the Church has granted an "accommodation" to the Government, and that thereby "the odour of sanctity is lent to concubinage." On what grounds? On none other than a document in which the established Catholic theory of marriage outlined above is fearlessly reduced to a practical application. I quote the portion of the Instruction to which Miss Pankhurst refers, and the reader is again reminded that the topic is not marriages in general, but the marriages of Catholics in a Catholic country:

"18. Whenever the objection [to a proposed marriage] arises from the fact of a previous civil marriage—an hypothesis which ought not to arise under the Concordat (cf. nn. 1, 2) [1]—contracted by the same parties, the parish priest shall proceed to the celebration of the marriage, and although it cannot be registered for the civil effects, which already exist, it shall be reported, nevertheless, to the civil official, in order that he may take note of it, according to the instructions which will be given by the competent civil authorities." [2]

So far, the Instruction merely regulates the procedure to be followed, if a couple, who have decided not to be content with their civil marriage, unrecognised by the Church, apply to the priest to be religiously and truly married. It proceeds:

"Whenever, on the other hand, the objection arises from the fact of a previous civil marriage contracted by one of the two parties with another person, the parish priest shall refer the matter to the Ordinary. If he judges it well to permit the religious marriage, the said marriage will be incapable of being registered for the civil effects, and any report of it to the civil official is therefore useless (art. 12, nn. 1 and 2 of the Law)." [3]

[1] The two sections of the Instruction referred to at this point enunciate the Catholic law, viz. that Catholics are bound to celebrate only religious marriage, and that Catholics in Italy have no excuse for doing otherwise, since the Church has seen to it that civil effects be recognised for such a marriage; and further, that Catholics presuming to contract a civil marriage shall be treated as public sinners.

[2] "Qualora l'opposizione sia fatta a causa d'un precedente matrimonio (ipotesi che non dovrebbe realizzarsi in regime concordatario nn. 1, 2)—contratto tra gli stessi sposi, il parroco procederà alla celebrazione del matrimonio, e benchè questo non possa essere trascritto negli effetti civili che già esistono, verrà denunziato egualmente all'ufficiale dello stato civile, perchè possa prenderne nota, secondo le istruzioni che saranno impartite dalle competenti autorità civili."

[3] "Qualora invece l'opposizione sia fatta a causa di un precedente

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This section considers the different case of a couple, one of whom has previously contracted with a third party a marriage, valid in the eyes of the State, but unrecognised by the Church or by the Catholic conscience. Procedure is provided, by which the important step of permitting the religious marriage is taken out of the priest's power, and committed to the responsibility of the bishop. The possibility is envisaged of the bishop's thinking it right to proceed with that marriage, for which the couple present themselves, and it is arranged that then, since the State will not allow registration of the marriage for the civil effects, such registration need not be attempted.

Now it is, apparently, in the possibility, envisaged in the Instruction, that the bishop in some possible circumstances may allow the proposed religious marriage, that Miss Pankhurst finds cause for indignation, in the warmth of which she accuses the Church of encouraging concubinage. Obviously, there are a few points in the case which she has not considered.

Firstly, concubinage is the cohabitation of a man and a woman without proper marriage. But the religious marriage in question, which is the only one approved by the Church, is a true and valid marriage, both binding and satisfying the consciences of the parties concerned.[1] It is, in fact, for them the only form of marriage that will prevent a state of concubinage. On the other hand, in the moral order, the civil marriage in question is nothing more than legalised concubinage for the Catholic persons involved. That the Fascist Government endows it, against all the social and religious traditions of the nation, with civil rights, does not change the fact. The Catholic Church, far from blessing concubinage, declares, in this very Instruction, that those who enter upon it by a bogus marriage, however respectable in Fascist circles, are to be treated as public sinners.[2]

Secondly, the possibility of the Church's permitting the religious marriage signifies the minimum that must be safeguarded unless the Fascist Government is to have sole control

matrimonio civile contratto da uno dei due sposi con altra persona, il parroco deferirà il caso all'Ordinario. Se questi crederà di permettere il matrimonio religioso, detto matrimonio non si potrà trascrivere agli affetti civili e diventa perciò inutile ogni denunzia (art. 12, nn. 1 e 2 della Legge)." The English version of foreign documents used in this article is my own. Miss Pankhurst is mistaken in referring to her translation of one of them in her April article as "literal."

[1] The same is true, of course, of all the religious marriages mentioned in either of Miss Pankhurst's articles.

[2] *Cf.* nn. 1 and 2 of the Instruction, referred to above.

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of an institution which it rightly admits to be sacred and sacramental.[1] The Church's contention that primarily she herself and not the State should regulate the administration of the Sacraments is the principle which is at stake. The possibility we are considering is but an application to practice of that principle.

Thirdly, that circumstances may arise—of course, by the misdemeanours of individuals—in which the bishop might have to consider the advisability of permitting the religious marriage, is the fault, not of the Church, but of the State, in refusing to set its marriage laws for Catholics into harmony with the laws of Catholic consciences and of the Catholic Church. Nor has the State any grounds for complaint against, or dissatisfaction with, the Catholic procedure in the marriages of her children, since no code of law could be more careful than the Canon Law in exacting due advertisement and notification of marriages.[2]

Lastly, Miss Pankhurst's view of this document has almost taken for granted that its legal provisions are being put into execution day after day. It is not likely that she is aware of a single instance of such an event. However, as the provisions refer to a really possible issue, it may further the reader's just appreciation of the Church's position, if concrete circumstances are tentatively supposed, in which the execution of the provisions might be judged by the bishop to be opportune. A Catholic man and woman, for the moment neglectful, though conscious, of their religious obligations, might contract a civil marriage knowing it to be for them a mere pretence at honest matrimony. Let us suppose that their relations so develop as to produce a situation in which, in the judgment of most Englishmen, the woman would well deserve a divorce. The civil divorce is impossible, let it be supposed, for want of proof, or of money, or for some other quite possible reason. Will the reader of the HIBBERT JOURNAL agree with Miss Pankhurst's indignant rejection of the possibility that this woman, come to a better religious frame of mind, and under pressure of certain conceivable motives—*e.g.* to find a guardian for her children, or to have them rightly legitimised—might justly be allowed to contract a new and valid religious marriage? I do not take it upon myself to say that in the case I have supposed, any Italian bishop would authorise a marriage, but I do suggest that the possibility of such authorisation might be in some set of

[1] *Cf.* Concordato, art. 34.
[2] *Cf.* Codex Juris Canonici, cc. 1012–1141.

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circumstances, according to our English standards, no ethical enormity or obvious infringement of justice or charity.

Now, the Catholic Church is recognised, among all the Christian bodies, to have consistently preserved a severe matrimonial *régime*; in the light of that truth—to say nothing of the fact that Catholic bishops are not necessarily inferior in Christian prudence and plain common-sense—any reasonable reader of the above Instruction would naturally have supposed that the provisions laid down for a merely possible eventuality, if not meant to remain in the realm of mere possibility as the statement of an inalienable right, were destined for execution only in some such equitable and humane case, as I have vaguely but not unreasonably suggested.[1]

I conclude by drawing attention to an illustrative instance of Miss Pankhurst's argumentative method. On page 224 of her article, she reports a provision of the Fascist Penal Code: "the husband, on the other hand, incurs no penalty unless he keep a mistress, and the fact be a matter of public notoriety," and she dismisses it with the added comment: "which no Fascist Court would ever admit against a Fascist!" On the same page she refers to the legal provision of this Papal Instruction by which a bishop may, if he judge fit, authorise a certain religious marriage, but her gloss of this provision is that "the Church in Italy may, *and actually does*, [italics mine] authorise a religious marriage . . ." Of the provision in law which does not suit her case, she decides that it *never would* be executed; of the second provision in law, which will not suit her case unless executed, she decides that it not *only may but actually does* receive execution. Is such a method likely to yield the truth?

W. DEMPSEY, S.J.

HEYTHROP COLLEGE.

[1] What Miss Pankhurst, in her April article, quotes from the Instruction in regard to the marriages of Catholic diplomats, soldiers and pensioned widows does anything but support her assertion of an accommodation between Church and State, whether to promote concubinage or anything else. This is obvious, in the light of what has been said above, since the Instruction declares in effect that in all such cases, where marriages are so controlled by State officials that an obstacle is placed to the registration of religious marriages for the civil effects, such persons may nevertheless enter into a valid religious marriage, "where grave reasons of conscience advise the bishop to permit it," and that such a religious marriage shall be registered for the civil effects when the obstacle placed by the State has been removed.

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THE LIBERAL-MODERNIST VIEW OF JESUS.[1]

I.

E. H. BLAKENEY, M.A.

The discussion between Dr Cadoux and the Rev. R. A. Edwards is of such vital importance in its implications that it should be carefully considered. While sympathetic with all that is best in "Modernism," I have long had an uneasy feeling that, argue as we may, the Liberal-Modernist programme is not really consistent with the plain teaching of the Gospel *as we have it set forth in the pages of the Evangelists.* It is not right to pretend that "Christianity" can be taught "without miracles," because the whole Gospel narrative, from start to finish, is saturated with the miraculous. Take away the miraculous element from it, and the residuum is unnatural. It is not fair to deny the doctrine of Eternal punishment on the one hand, and yet claim loyalty to the teaching of Jesus on the other, for the simple reason that He taught that doctrine not obliquely but directly. It is there, in the Gospel, and as much a part of His teaching as the forgiveness of sins or the fatherhood of God. More than this: the words of Jesus imply that the number of the lost will greatly exceed that of the saved. "Heaven going cheap!" is not part of the message enounced to the world. We may admit that this sounds, and is, harsh doctrine; but it is there (see some quotations from Father Godts' rare book in Dr Coulton's "Five Centuries of Religion" (vol. iii). Is it right to dismiss, lightly or contemptuously, the belief in demon-possession, for the Gospels are full of instances showing, beyond the reach of doubt, that Jesus believed in it: else why the miracles of "exorcism"

[1] Concluding notes.—EDITOR.

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which meet us everywhere in the Gospel? It is customary nowadays to deny the personality of Satan, and we may do so; but do not let us imagine for a moment that Jesus did not assert it. Again: to reject apocalyptic seems a strange attitude to take up, at least on the part of those who profess and call themselves Christians, and—presumably—base their Christianity on the Gospel records. Why, the whole object of the Gospels is to stress the fact of a literal "coming again" (the so-called Parousia) of the crucified Christ, and of a literal *bodily* resurrection for all mankind. To deny these things may be justifiable, but do not let us suppose for a moment that they are not part and parcel of the teaching of Jesus. They are there, open, palpable, in the pages of the New Testament. And for fifteen hundred years the Church was practically unanimous on the matter.

It is open to religious men to eviscerate the Gospel records, and defecate their teaching to a pure transparency; it is *not* open to them to designate their new doctrine as *Christian*, in any proper sense of the term. Nor is it honest. The only possible way to get rid of the old teaching is to show that we cannot any longer rely on the Gospel narratives at all; and if Christianity be *not* founded on those narratives, on what basis, pray, *is* it to be founded?

I am not, for a moment, asserting that some form of "Christian" Theism may not, ultimately, establish itself as "the religion of all good men"; what I do protest against is in allowing ourselves to be deluded into supposing that it is the Gospel of Jesus or the Christianity of the Apostolic Church. It is not straightforward on anybody's part to pretend that it is so. The fact is we shall have to make that great decision, either to accept the plain unvarnished, unaccommodating Gospel, or to become frank Modernists. And Modernist Christianity is not the Christianity of Christ at all. To that impasse are we brought.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

WINCHESTER.

II.

C. J. CADOUX, D.D.

My main contention is that, when dealing with a theological problem which by its very nature defies precise solution, Mr Edwards over-simplifies the issue, and thereby vitiates his judgement of the opinions of others.

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He insists that there is a great and impassable gulf fixed
tween "orthodoxy" and Liberal-Modernism. On the
rthodox" side he puts belief in the Virgin Birth, the
Escales, the physical Resurrection, the Incarnation (with
declaration that Jesus is Very God of Very God, and is to
worshipped as such), and finally His death as an atoning
crifice for sin. On the Liberal-Modernist or Peasant-
eory side (for he equates the two, and does not allow that
odifications make any essential difference), he puts the
ial of the Incarnation, and the contention that Jesus was
ost" a man, erroneously deified by the early Church.

He has successfully shown that *what he describes* as the
easant-Theory is untenable. Let me state why "ortho-
ry," *as he envisages it*, seems to me also open to criticism.

This latter view is closely linked up with the doctrine of
sus's Person settled at Chalcedon in A.D. 451. The Formula
Chalcedon taught that in Jesus there was one Divine
rson, and two Natures, a human and a divine. As theo-
ians saw from the first, this statement implies that His
manity was not personal, *i.e.* that He was not a human
rson; and this conclusion is strenuously maintained as
thodox by Roman and Anglo-Catholic thinkers to-day.
surely we must regard it as an erroneous conclusion, when
bear in mind that the Synoptic Gospel-record was a chief
t of the data which the Chalcedonian Formula aimed
ynthetizing.

It was, therefore, with good reason that the Chalcedonian
rmula was rejected by Dr H. R. Mackintosh, and was
scribed by Dr W. Temple as "a confession of the bank-
cy of Greek Patristic Theology" (*Foundations*, p. 230),
that Dr W. B. Selbie told us that all modern con-
ctive Christology starts with the rejection of it.

Mr Edwards may perhaps reply that he is not concerned
defend Chalcedon; but that he stands by the simple and
minous Christian conviction that Jesus was truly divine.
a Christian I share that conviction; but I do not share
Edwards's view as to the best way of expressing it
logically; and it is with theological definition, not with
dential confession, that this discussion is concerned. I
the words "Divine Saviour" quite seriously, and I
r to the contention that I ought not to have used
unless I mean by them precisely what "orthodoxy"
t.

The simple traditionalism which Mr Edwards defends is
gically unsatisfying to many to-day, because:

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(1) as Dr Gore once frankly admitted, it has obscured, if not concealed, the real humanity of Jesus :

(2) in its customary unqualified declaration "Jesus is God," it ignores the fact that Jesus clearly differentiated between Himself and God.

(3) In making all to rest on the bare acceptance or otherwise of "the Incarnation," as taught in John i. 14, it leaves unsettled the question of God's part in the lives of His other sons.

Nor is it possible to appeal for a final *theological* formulation to the general consensus of the New Testament writers. For while all these writers are at one in exalting Jesus as Messiah, Lord, and Son of God, they do not agree in their theological statements about Him. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the Lucan writings entirely ignore His pre-existence. And I do not agree that Paul would have so readily accepted the Nicene Creed : an eminent and trusted Christian scholar told me recently that Athanasius would probably have condemned Paul's Christology for its subordinationism, had it been presented to him as the work of a contemporary.

If then what Mr Edwards puts on the "orthodox" side of his gulf is thus unsatisfying, it cannot rightly be insisted on as orthodox, for the only orthodoxy worth the name is Truth itself ; and experience ought to have taught us that Truth and traditional doctrines do not always coincide. There was a time not long since when the doctrines of Eternal Punishment and of the literal inerrancy of Scripture were fiercely defended as essential items of "orthodoxy." Are they so defended now ? And if not, by what authority have they been dropped ? They have been dropped because they were felt to be not true ; and the question of their truth was settled by asking, not how many or how good were those who believed them, but whether or no, when subjected to honest examination, they seemed reasonable and consistent with other truth.

Over against both extreme positions, with their respective negations, we need a Christology which, instead of denying or ignoring our Lord's human personality, will recover for us, and make some use of, the actual history of His life and teaching and the character of His own personal religion. We should do well to recall Moberly's healthy maxim in *Lux Mundi* : "Councils, we admit, and Creeds, cannot go behind, but must wholly rest upon the history of our Lord Jesus Christ." Now it is scientific historical criticism, and

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that alone, which has made such a recovery of history possible. Mr Edwards's complaint that Jesus has been reduced to a "faintly discernible figure" is laid at the wrong door, for "orthodoxy," not Liberal-Modernism, is responsible for the reduction. Moreover, his attempt to discredit Liberal-Modernism by saying that it has its roots in the sceptical scientific spirit of the nineteenth century is beside the point. Biblical criticism, which apparently he accepts, is just as much indebted to that nineteenth-century spirit as Modernism is. But in any case the question of "roots" is irrelevant; what we want to know is, whether or not this view or that is true; and Liberal-Modernism has arisen from the attempt to reconstruct and interpret the Gospel-story in a spirit of loyalty to historical truth.

The problem of the religious interpretation of the history of course remains over. Mr Edwards would draw a sharp line between historical criticism on the one hand, and Liberal-Modernism plus Peasant-Theory with all its negations on the other. As I understand Liberal-Modernism, it is bound up with biblical and historical criticism and by no means involves the Peasant-Theory as described by Mr Edwards. Conservative Christians far too readily and quite wrongly assume that, because Liberal-Modernists insist on dealing candidly with the testimony of the Gospels to our Lord's full and genuine humanity, they are therefore removing God from His Person and denying His divinity except in a sense in which the assertion of it means nothing. Perhaps this assumption arises from an unduly narrow idea of God. If we could agree upon a sufficiently wide view of the being and activity of God, we might be able to do better justice to the genuine humanity of Jesus, and to the genuine presence and power of God in the lives of other men, without losing sight of that divine uniqueness and supremacy of Jesus, which lies at the basis of the Church's creeds, but which Paul expresses more simply by calling Him "the firstborn among many brothers," while at the same time adoring Him as the unique Son of God.

OXFORD.

C. J. CADOUX.

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SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

IT is a sign of the times that, for the rising generation of those who are seriously interested in theology as the interpretation of religion, the study of Calvin is becoming a major concern. This is due to several causes. One is the uneasy realisation that of ten who talk and write about Calvinism seldom more than two or three appear to have read Calvin at first hand. Then the Barth-Brunner controversy has helped to foster interest in the distinctive tenets of Calvinism, particularly in his conceptions of natural theology, of the Word, and of the inherent rights of the Church. These and other factors are making for a keener appreciation of his teaching, which is long overdue. It is therefore fortunate that the present year is not only the two hundredth anniversary of Butler's *Analogy*, but the four hundredth anniversary of the *Institutes*, which Calvin sent to the press at Basel in the spring of 1536. Even though the first edition of this powerful treatise was afterwards enlarged, it marks an epoch in theology; it is a comparatively short book, of only six chapters, but it is the last of the great classics of systematic theology, the first being Origen's "De Principiis," the second John of Damascus's volume on the Orthodox Faith, and the third the "Summa" of Thomas Aquinas. In *Evangelische Theologie* (March, p. 100f) Dr August Lang discusses the sources which Calvin probably used for the first draft of his work, including Zwingli's Commentary on True and False Religion as well as other contemporary writings on non-Roman theologians. Professor H. Clavier, in *Etudes Théologiques et Religieuses* (April, p. 67ff), analyses the conception of the Word in Calvin's teaching; Scripture or the Word of God which it contains—for Calvin did not believe in literal or plenary inspiration—is in a broad sense sacramental, revealing a God of whom men possess some knowledge already through a general revelation. The latter point is crucial in the modern renaissance of Calvinism, and Professor Clavier's acute study is as timely as the two articles by Professor Wencelius and Dr Victor in the January number of *The Evangelical Quarterly*, the former writing on "L'Idée Modération dans la pensée de Calvin," and the latter on

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the new surge of attention to Calvinism among younger thinkers of to-day.

From an angle of his own Dom Bede Frost approaches the problem of the knowledge of God in a pungent book upon *The Place of Understanding* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 5*s.*). He is among those who believe in a primitive monontheism, and also in the validity of the three classical proofs for the being of God, which he restates emphatically. It is the breath of Aquinas rather than of Calvin which is to be felt in Dom Frost's pages. The constructive side of his book is not less incisive, however, than its exposure of some contemporary efforts in propaganda by philosophers and other persons who either attack or depreciate the possibility of the human mind reasoning itself into any knowledge of God at all. Dr Maldwyn Hughes, in *The Christian Idea of God* (London: Duckworth, 5*s.*), deals faithfully with what he considers to be the exaggerations of the Barthian position.[1] For Dom Bede God is "the First Cause of all that is, without whom nothing would be, the Necessary Being without whom nothing can be accounted for, the Supreme Being, the maximum Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, the Creative Artist and Designer who creates and orders all things in view of their final end, which He Himself is, the Good to which all things tend." Dr Hughes allows more for *à priori* arguments, and lays less emphasis on the *à posteriori*, though these are not overlooked in his thoughtful pages. Questions like those of the Trinity and Revelation are handled with profound knowledge of their historical interpretations. It is so in Professor H. H. Farmer's equally important volume on *The World and God* (London: Nisbet, 10*s.* 6*d.*), which includes an analysis of "revelation" in Christianity as a category of personal relationship, involving repeatedly a tension or crisis at which the soul is made aware of a divine challenge. This distinctiveness of revelation means more than an impersonal medium of ideas or of gifted individuals revealing some new aspect of truth. The sub-title of the book is "a study of Christian experience in prayer, providence, and miracle," and all these subjects are viewed from the central standpoint of revelation as the personal disclosure of God in and through the historical life of men, *i.e.* from the conviction that in the knowledge of God there is not simply mental apprehension or insight but fundamentally an awareness of the divine purpose which is beyond the reach of generalisations and abstractions. If "the essence of religion in all its forms is a response to the Ultimate as personal," then human personality must be in a real sense teleological. It is the teleological implications of the human scene which occupy Dean W. R. Matthews' lectures on *The Purpose of God* (London: Nisbet, 7*s.* 6*d.*); not unlike Dom Frost's books, these reassert the argument from design, discussing the objections taken to it and bringing out its abiding significance. Both

[1] Just before his death, M. Philippe Bridel wrote some pages in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1936, p. 87f), indicating the saner views of Vinet against Barth's position on this point, and comparing Vinet with Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's bête-noire in Denmark.

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Dean Matthews and Dr Hughes present Christian theism in view of contemporary philosophical criticism, the former paying special attention to the difficulties raised by historical considerations for a reasonable belief in providence and purpose. All these four books in various ways uphold an essential Christian philosophy as against pluralism and phenomenalism, with a reminder to Christians that deference to current philosophy may be carried too far, by limiting the divine action in matters such as prayer and guidance, or by propounding that "God is growth of meaning," although the last-named cross-wind is ignored severely by Professor Farmer.

The coherence of the knowledge of God with history, in the Christian faith, happens to be emphasised in several recent volumes. There has been a remarkable output of literature on the development of the early Church. Dr James Mackinnon has followed up his treatises on Jesus and on the Gospel in the early Church with a book of nearly six hundred pages entitled *From Christ to Constantine* (London: Longmans, 18*s*.), which sketches vigorously the changes and advances in Christian faith and order during these three centuries. Much space is naturally given in his comprehensive pages to the relationship between the Church and the Empire. At this point Dr Mackinnon's brisk survey overlaps the treatment of the same problem by a classical scholar, Mr H. M. D. Parker, in his valuable *History of the Roman World from A.D.* 138 *to* 337 (London: Methuen, 15*s*.). Mr Parker takes a rather more sympathetic view of the emperor's religious interest than some of his recent predecessors. He thinks that Constantine felt genuinely attracted to Christianity before he came down into Italy, although his "belief in Christ was essentially a conviction of His power in the world. That, and not the ethical or the doctrinal teaching of Christianity, of which till his death he had no understanding, was the reason for his faith. But his conversion was none the less real." The historical estimate of the imperial policy and background which Mr Parker provides will form an admirable supplement not only to Dr Mackinnon's pages, but to those of Professor Lietzmann's *Ecclesia Catholica* (Berlin, W. de Gruyter, M.4.80), the second volume of his early church history. Professor Lietzmann does not reach Constantine, however. His volume stops near the end of the third century, with its serious persecutions. In spite of the variety of topics raised, the book is even more suggestive and impressive than its predecessor; there are chapters on the New Testament literature as it started a new literary activity, on the apologists, on the formation of the primitive creed —which by the way is not referred to any anti-Marcionite tendency —and on the organisation. An outline of Origen's services, which Dr Mackinnon also treats with critical sympathy, closes the book. Some of the difficult problems of the next century are discussed by Dr E. Schwartz in a long essay contributed to the *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (xxxiv., pp. 129–212), notably the fortunes of Athanasius, the friction between East and West over a "modus vivendi," the ecclesiastical policy of the emperors in the

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Nicene phase, and the troubles at Antioch. In this intricate period, Mr Telfer seeks to show, against an earlier article of Dr Schwartz, that Arius did not seek refuge in Nicomedia, as Epiphanius asserts (*Journal of Theological Studies*, January, p. 60f), while Dr Montgomery Hitchcock in *Theology* (February, p. 98f) dates the satirical treatise of Hermias in this century, as a skit on the self-contradictory efforts of Greek philosophers to reach any true knowledge of God or man; the treatise, it is thought, may have been provoked by Julian's attempt to galvanise Greek philosophy in order to supplant the Christian faith. The most remarkable pendant, however, to Professor Lietzmann's book is to be found in the researches of Father Henry, who has followed up his *Plotin et L'Occident* with a technical, original study of *Recherches sur la Préparation Évangélique d'Eusebe* (Paris : Leroux, 40 francs), in which he adduces evidence to prove that Eusebius drew upon the edition of Plotinus prepared by his physician Eustochius, not on the better edition of Porphyry. The Belgian scholar further supplies data which are held to disprove the notion that Augustine was ever converted to Neoplatonism, pure and simple. "Morally and intellectually, it was to the Gospel that he was converted. . . . In his life there was but one conversion, definite and supernatural." This point is driven home by Father F. Jansen in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* (pp. 113–138), who reflects that Augustine's admiration for the Neoplatonists, especially for Plotinus, illustrates the perennial Christian need of some philosophy, though not one like "the superb rationalism" or dynamic pantheism of the Neoplatonic leader. The diffusion of the ideas of Plotinus is traced especially to the work done by Victorinus Afer and Macrobius, but Father Henry's chief concern is with its bearing on Augustine. In this connection we may notice an attractive book of extracts by Erich Przywara, *An Augustine Synopsis* (London : Sheed and Ward, 12s. 6d.). Here over nine hundred salient passages from the great African father are chosen and translated into English, to illustrate his cardinal conceptions of God, man, and the world. There are fourteen sections. In the case of so voluminous a writer as the great African father, an introduction of this kind is a true aid to the student. It would be helpful if someone compiled a similar source-book for the first-hand study of Calvin, some of whose writings are either badly translated into English, or not translated at all, the result being a one-sided acquaintance with his full mind on the theological issues. The impression which such a Calvin source-book would make would be that, while no one could well be further from Origen than Calvin, the latter's dislike of Aristotle was due to the same interest as that which controlled Origen, namely, in the personal God of Christians ; the task of theology, as Father Jansen, Professor Farmer, and Dr Hughes agree, is definitely considered to be the interpretation of the living faith of the Church, and recourse is made even by Origen to philosophy merely for appropriate conceptions. It is at this point that Calvin is in the general Augustinian tradition, though his thesis, which Dr Hughes handles so fairly, had nothing corre-

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sponding to the influence of Plotinus upon Augustine. It is true that a delightful anthology of *Pensées sur la foi* has been issued by the authorities at Geneva for six francs (Geneva, 11 Rue de Beaumont), and others are to follow on topics like the Cross and Prayer. No one who reads these extracts from Calvin will be likely to speak of his "nightmare theology"; but the passages naturally do not present the distinctively theological mind of the reformer, and none seems to be taken from his letters.

The coherence of the knowledge of God with history is also important, as Dr Major indicates in a timely paper on "The Significance of History" (*Modern Churchman*, pp. 48–54). It may be said that if history makes cowards of some and prophets of others, in a real sense it makes philosophers of Christians who realise what belief in the Incarnation means for a religion which takes this distinctive truth of its being with any seriousness. In other words—and this is Dr Major's point—the knowledge of God for Christians cannot be detached either from Nature or from consideration of the person and mission of Jesus as Lord, as reflected in the classical witness of the writings called the New Testament. So far as the gospels are concerned we have to chronicle Canon F. W. Green's stimulating edition of *St Matthew's Gospel* in the Clarendon Bible (4*s*. 6*d*.), a new edition of the *Gospel according to St Luke*, edited by Mr H. K. Luce in the Cambridge Bible (6*s*.), which also presents the modern attitude on this book; furthermore, a useful introduction to the setting of Christianity in its first phase, social and religious, by Dr B. L. Wolf in *The Background and Beginnings of the Gospel Story* (London: Nicholson and Watson, 4*s*. 6*d*.). Canon Redlich's work in *The Student's Introduction to the Synoptic Gospels* (London: Longmans, 7*s*. 6*d*.) is devoted to an extremely suggestive explication of the strata and sources, taking into account the recent textual discoveries. He ignores the Form-criticism theories and posits four main documents, which are conveniently printed in full, to explain what lies behind the canonical gospels. These include one from Antioch about A.D. 50, a Jerusalem source used by Matthew, which viewed the Church as Jewish Christian with an open door for Gentiles, and another source, used by Luke, which dwelt on the human sympathies of Jesus. These four contributions are "popular" in the good sense of the term. More technical is Professor C. H. Dodd's interpretation of *The Parables of the Kingdom* (London: Nisbet, 7*s*. 6*d*.). He recognises frankly that from the first the parables were preached, and that in the course of this they may have acquired, and certainly did at several points acquire, a shape, which was not that of the original. One special modification, he urges, lay in the eschatological interests of the primitive church. A parable which Jesus intended to urge immediate decision became modified later into a plea for hope or conduct in view of the Second Coming. Jesus spoke parables often in view of the crisis which he pressed upon the conscience. But as they lie before us in the gospels, which reflect the preaching interests of the church, they are often directed towards the final

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crisis. To this noteworthy volume may be added by way of pendant the essay of M. Raymond Pautrel on "Les Canons du Mashal rabbinique" (*Recherches de Science Religieuse*, pp. 5–45), an examination of rabbinic parables, in which, like Professor Dodd, he considers that too much attention has been paid to the allegorical interpretation of the parables of Jesus, but insists on the oral transmission as important for the literary question, and deduces from a comparison of the structure and aims of the contemporary mashal some indications in favour of the authenticity of the gospel parables.

Dr Emanuel Hirsch has interpreted the Fourth Gospel afresh, as a document which has been edited by a redactor. In *Das Vierte Evangelium* (Tübingen: Mohr, M.6) an exposition of the book is offered in German, not unlike the critical, sympathetic exposition to be found in Dr L. A. Muirhead's *Message of the Fourth Gospel*, but his *Studien zum vierten Evangelium* (same publisher) prints the Greek text with scholarly notes and essays, which really cover the whole of the Johannine literature. Thus the Apocalypse is held to have been compiled by adherents of the Ephesian John out of two separate writings, one (iv.–xxii. in the main) composed by him about A.D. 68, and the other (i.–iii.) under Domitian. The editor of the gospel was probably the author, or connected with the author, of the First Epistle. As for the gospel itself, the apostolic authorship is set aside, since the two witnesses of Rev. xi. are taken to be James and John who were murdered by the Jews in A.D. 62. The original gospel, which rests on an anti-Jewish source, includes non-synoptic material, and betrays disarrangement here and there, especially in the farewell discourses. Its editor must have done his work later than the Bar-Kochbar rebellion in A.D. 135, to which v. 43 alludes. The author was probably a Christian of Antioch, who had visited Palestine, and wrote his book towards the end of the first century, after which it was edited in order to identify the beloved disciple with the apostle John. Dr Hirsch notes the desire to distinguish Christianity from Judaism, and also to counteract a gnostic syncretism already spreading in Asia Minor. He feels that the book recalls Greek tragedy rather than any Hebrew conception, so far as literary form goes. The latter point is not original, but it is interesting that simultaneously, in the *Anglican Theological Review* (April, p. 74f), Mr. R. R. Brewer finds that the choruses, lyric solos, dramatic setting, and figurative details of the Apocalypse betray a fusion of Jewish apocalyptic with an interest in contemporary Greek drama. As for the Fourth Gospel, on its literary side, the strophic element is discussed by Father Paul Winter in the *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* (pp. 99–120), with special reference to the prologue and the speech in v. 19–47. He argues that in the former the rhythmical structure necessitates the reading "without him nothing was made that was made"—a point noted incidentally by Dr Hirsch, who excludes "that was made" as a prosaic editorial supplement, and places 6–8 before 19. In the Ninth, English edition of Huck's invaluable *Synopsis of the First Three Gospels* (Tübingen: Mohr, M.3.60), which Mr F. L. Cross has

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prepared on the basis of Lietzmann's revision, the Johannine parallels are not printed, but references are added; the book may be fairly reckoned in this form among the indispensable aids to a critical study of the gospels.

The possible sources of the apostle Paul's belief in the divinity of Christ, as expressed in the term "Son of God," are examined by Father Lagrange in the *Revue Biblique* (January, pp. 5–33), who declines to find in this any apotheosis even of Wisdom, though the latter tendency may have been operative in Hellenistic Judaism; the ultimate source is sought in the primitive belief of the Church. The identification of Jesus Christ with the heavenly Wisdom is often held, however, to be early, even to be prior to Paul. This theory involves a careful appreciation of Hellenistic Judaism, particularly as it was shaped in Alexandria. It is, therefore, welcome to have the materials for a balanced estimate, as gathered in Dr. O. S. Rankin's fresh survey of *Israel's Wisdom Literature* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 10*s.*). This sound volume provides an up-to-date study of this remarkable development, remarkable in itself and in its contribution to the religious interpretation of Christ in the New Testament, a contribution not to be overlooked in the more popular appreciation of the apocalyptic interpretation. Dr Rankin brings out the variety of elements in the heritage of Hebrew wisdom, its tendency to look beyond narrow limits and at the same time to maintain revelation as essential to the knowledge of God, its preparation for personal revelation instead of abstract, and its combination of ethical and religious interests. Professor Bewer's paper on "The Authority of the Old Testament" (*Journal of Religion*, pp. 1–9) deals with this, not historically as Professor G. A. van Eysinga does in "Het Oude Testament als christlijke Geschrift" (*Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift*, pp. 111–128), but intensively. The Dutch scholar shows how the instinct of the Church in repudiating Marcion enabled Christians to appropriate a sacred book which afterwards suited the realist, historical view of revelation, and also the theocratic claims of the Church. Dr Bewer argues that for Christians it is authoritative as it moves them to assent, obey, and adore. Only those who already believe in self-revelation on the part of God can find in the Old Testament values for their religious life; he mentions its moral teaching at the best, its power of stirring deep religious experience, and its witness to the human heart seeking God no less than to God approaching human life.

These qualities are brought out in Dr W. L. Wardle's succinct volume on *The History and Religion of Israel* (Clarendon Bible, 4*s.* 6*d.*), intended for the student of the Old Testament. Here the unique contribution of Israel to belief in revelation as essential to an apprehension of God is vindicated.

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REVIEWS.

In Praise of Idleness, and Other Essays. By Bertrand Russell. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935.—Pp. 231.—7s. 6d. net.

Lord Russell is always provocative and always diverting; not least so in the *ballons d'essai* he is constantly throwing off, by way of casual journalism, for the enlightenment of the reading public. Fifteen of these are here gathered into a volume, all of them designed, as he tells us, to illustrate "such aspects of social questions as tend to be ignored in the clash of politics." He opens *in praise of idleness* and ends by asking *what is the soul?* The unifying link in the miscellany is the growing menace to civilisation of excessive organisation in the realm of thought and excessive energy in that of action. More positively, the book is a plea for the life of reflective contemplation. If it contains no philosophy, in the technical sense, and but little science, it is full of suggestive speculation on human nature and its welfare, mingled with the trenchant criticism of traditional institutions and values that we are accustomed to expect from the author. The criticism is often slapdash and one-sided, especially in the field of economics; the view, for instance, that all that men need could be produced if twice the number of workmen were employed for half the time is put forward unattended by any hint as to how the doubled cost in wages is to be met. Doubtless there would be no unemployment and plenty of leisure for all, and this is what Lord Russell is out to advocate; the obvious economic difficulties do not interest him. But even in his wildest moments there are flashes of intellectual brilliance, and his style in this book, always, is lucid, incisive and delightful.

The Essays form four consecutive groups. The first three are a theory of idleness. Men should work less and have more leisure. These terms need some elucidation; by work, Lord Russell means manual labour, and by leisure, rational enjoyment of things of the world. Work, he tells us (p. 12), is of two kinds: "First, altering the position of matter at or near the earth's surface relatively to other such matter; second, telling other people to do so. The second kind is capable of infinite extension; there are not only those who give orders, but those who give advice as to what orders should be given. Usually two opposite kinds of advice are given simultaneously

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by two organised bodies of men; this is called politics. The skill required for this kind of work is not knowledge of the subjects as to which advice is given, but knowledge of the art of persuasive speaking and writing, *i.e.* of advertising." As a socialist, Lord Russell has no objection in principle to this last-mentioned sort of workers; only, like Socrates of old, he would replace the existing politicians by scientifically trained experts. Leisure, on the other hand, is interpreted in the Greek sense as σχολή, in terms of what most people would regard as strenuous activity. It means, in fact, work that is worth doing for its own sake, enlisting the wholehearted devotion of the worker. The contemplative labour of the philosopher, in the pursuit of what Lord Russell would stigmatise—and commend—as "useless knowledge," would come under the head of leisure, alongside of the activity of the artist. Lord Russell, like the great mathematician that he is, reeks more of speculative thought than of art. At the close of his second essay he points to it, in the spirit of Spinoza, as the *consolatio philosophiae* in the sorrows of human life.

The second group (Essays IV to VII) brings us closer to contemporary politics. It is introduced by an exposure of post-war international finance (*The Modern Midas*), which, despite the arbitrary selection of data, is highly entertaining for the reader. Two essays follow, entitled respectively *The Ancestry of Fascism* and *Scylla and Charybdis*. In tracing the lineage of Fascism back through Nietzsche and Carlyle to Fichte, the author is not seen at his best. One would have thought that Sorel in recent days and Machiavelli in times gone by had much more to do with the rise of Fascism than the writers just mentioned. The cursory references to the philosophies of Kant and Fichte are grotesque misrepresentations; Lord Russell, for example, charges Kant with inventing a distinction between "pure" reason and "practical," as though the "purity" of the practical reason were not beyond question. "Fichte," we are told, "needed a doctrine which would make him feel superior to Napoleon" (p. 99). This is, indeed, a travesty of Fichte's motives in the struggle for German liberation; and we find Lord Russell himself, in a later essay, admitting that the cause he championed was worthy of the passionate adherence of the best minds (p. 180). And to group Bergson, merely on the score of his anti-intellectualism, with Treitschke, Kipling, and Houston Chamberlain, as a supporter of the ethics of domination (p. 89), is to throw dust in the eyes of the public. The irrationality of German Nationalism can surely be made obvious without such perversion of the truth. In the second of the two essays, Lord Russell summarises his objections alike to Fascism and to Communism. Though only ten pages in length, it is perhaps the best thing in the volume. The arguments against both political gospels are stated with the utmost clearness and with a cogency that is most convincing. Of the two, Communism receives gentler treatment; for the author's criticism is directed solely to the means it employs, while in the case of Fascism he disapproves both of its

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means and of its end. Here, as elsewhere, his appeal is to rational persuasion as opposed to force and hatred. "The preaching of the class-war is likely to cause it to break out at a moment when the opposing forces are more or less evenly balanced, or even when the preponderance is on the side of the capitalists. If the capitalist forces preponderate, the result is an era of reaction. If the forces on both sides are roughly equal, the result, given modern methods of warfare, is likely to be the destruction of civilisation, involving the disappearance of both capitalism and Communism" (p. 112). And with equal insight, he adds: "There is so much of hate in Marx and in Communism that Communists can hardly be expected, when victorious, to establish a régime affording no outlet for malevolence. . . . Marxists are too apt to forget that war has its own psychology, which is the result of fear, and is independent of the original cause of contention." The socialism which Lord Russell champions with great ability in the seventh essay (the longest in the book), combines State ownership of economic power, *i.e. at least* "land and minerals, capital, banking, credit and foreign trade," with political democracy and an appeal, save in the last resort against a dissident minority, to intellectual argument rather than to force.

We may treat the last two groups of essays more lightly. The three on *Western Civilisation* (VIII), *Youthful Cynicism* (IX) and *Modern Homogeneity* (X) discuss post-war tendencies less directly associated with politics. With the increased rapidity of change, due to scientific invention, there are bound to come changes in traditional morality and standards of value. "If Peter the Great could have had a conversation with Hammurabi they would have understood each other fairly well; but neither of them could have understood a modern financial or industrial magnate. It is a curious fact that the new ideas of modern times have almost all been technical or scientific. Science has only lately begun to foster the growth of new moral ideas, through the liberation of benevolence from the shackles of superstitious ethical beliefs" (p. 167). Lord Russell is here on ground familiarised by his popular writings. The result, he thinks, will be a great increase in human happiness. Yet a little later he admits certain ominous reservations. What about intelligence and posterity? "Many modern inventions," he writes, "tend to make people silly. I might instance the radio, the talkies, and poison gas. Shakespeare measured the excellence of an age by its style in poetry (Sonnet XXXII), but this mode of measurement is out of date" (p. 161). He gives a vivid picture of the contrast between the Sicilian orange groves and the mechanised culture of oranges in California. "The orange groves in Sicily are remote from trains and ships; the trees are old and gnarled and beautiful; the methods are those of classical antiquity. The men are ignorant and semi-savage, mongrel descendants of Roman slaves and Arab invaders; what they lack in intelligence towards trees they make up for by cruelty to animals" (p. 169). It should surely be added for fairness: "by kindness towards little children." As for the Californian oranges, "the

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machine stamps the word 'Sunkist' upon them, but otherwise there is nothing to suggest that nature has any part in their production. Even the climate is artificial, for when there would otherwise be frost, the orange grove is kept artificially warm by a pall of smoke." Mechanisation and standardisation hang like a thunder-cloud over the modern landscape, threatening mankind with intellectual immobility and degeneration. Lord Russell sees "no reason for undue pessimism," but the scene he foretells is hardly encouraging. He evinces a curious propensity to hold out in one hand a promise of Utopia and to withdraw it with the other.

Of the last five essays (XI–XV), those entitled *Education and Discipline* and *Stoicism and Mental Health* are sensible, if rather commonplace; the rest are slight and add little of interest to the volume. The half-dozen closing pages on *What is the Soul?* show how modern physics has rendered obsolete the traditional dualism of mind and body and the rival philosophies, Idealistic and Materialistic, that were founded on that opposition. He concludes that "although metaphysical materialism cannot be considered true, yet emotionally the world is pretty much the same as it would be if the materialists were in the right" (p. 230). For we are not entitled to hold that mind is immortal, or that "the ultimate power in the world is mental rather than physical." "Both mind and matter are merely convenient ways of organising events." Science, however, while greatly limiting our pretensions to control the universe, "enormously increases our material comfort. That is why, in spite of the horror of the theologian, science has on the whole been tolerated" (p. 231).

The sceptical note struck in this closing essay provokes the question that has tantalised us throughout the volume as to Lord Russell's theory of truth and knowledge. He comes forward as the whole-hearted champion of the life of intellectual contemplation in face of the present-day gospel of hustling for hustling's sake. But the theoretic life is that of devotion to truth, and fades in unsubstantial vision unless truth can be attained. Civilisation is defined as "a manner of life due to the combination of knowledge and forethought" (p. 159); knowledge, then, must be possible if civilisation is to have any meaning. Where are the saving truth and knowledge to be found? There can be no doubt as to Lord Russell's answer to this question; they are to be found, not in religion, not in metaphysics, not in any objects of man's emotional aspiration, but in science. It is when we go on to inquire into the nature and validity of scientific knowledge that we find Lord Russell elusive and ambiguous. On the one hand, his whole appeal is to rationality, "to a universal and impersonal standard of truth" as "of supreme importance to the well-being of the human species" (pp. 107–8). Reason, he says (pp. 86–7), "seeks to persuade by arguments which the man who uses them believes to be completely valid." What, however, we want to know from him is whether the arguments of science do in fact possess complete validity? Is science true? And in what sense?

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Russell tells us that "in old days truth was absolute, eternal, and superhuman," and adds: "Myself when young accepted this view and devoted a misspent youth to the search for truth" (pp. 182–183). There is here no contradiction, if he only means that he has come to reject an other-worldly religious standard in favour of that of science. Yet he means much more than this; for he goes on to expose the relativity of scientific knowledge and to say that the difference between Galileo and the Inquisition was "only one of words." "It is difficult," as he himself puts it, "to worship a merely human and relative truth. The law of gravitation, according to Eddington, is only a convenient convention of measurement. It is not truer than other views, any more than the metric system is truer than feet and yards.

Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;
God said, 'Let Newton be,' and measurement was facilitated."

(p. 183.)

This extract might be paralleled by many in Lord Russell's recent writings. Now, what, if this be his reasoned view, is left of the diatribes, with which we are in entire sympathy, against Herr Hitler's mutilation of truth for purposes of political propaganda? What meaning can any longer be attached to the distinction between truth and superstition? Science is true because it works practically in one direction; Joshua's cosmology and Aryan racial mythology are equally true, because they work practically in another. Has Lord Russell nothing better than this to offer the hungry and unfed public? Can it be that science, as well as religion and philosophy, devours its own children? That Lord Russell is animated by a generous desire to enlighten the public mind is beyond question; also that he is merely convinced that the needed illumination comes only by following the path of science. If he would but grapple seriously with this problem of scientific truth, and, speaking no longer with two voices, justify the claim of science to yield knowledge, which, for all its relativity, is yet objective and entitled to the name, he would be rendering fitting service to his generation, service worthy of his great powers of mind.

READING.

W. G. DE BURGH.

Bernard of Clairvaux. By Watkin Williams. Manchester: University Press.—Pp. 423 + xx.—25*s*. net.

This volume should earn fresh distinction for its author. His labours in this field have already put students under an ample debt of gratitude now made heavier by the wide and minute researches embodied in this work. There has been some prodigality in its publication. It is furnished with a portrait of St Bernard from a Clairvaux altar-piece of the fifteenth century; six reproductions of original paintings by Mrs Watkin Williams of places associated with

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the saint; folding maps and sketches and three loose plans—two of mediæval Rome—in the pocket of the cover. An eager reception is assured to what is obviously the gift of a devoted heart and a scholarly mind—a gift that does honour to the University of Manchester in whose Historical Series it appears.

St Bernard, by birth an aristocrat, was a mystic of rare purity and radiant emotional energy. Before the helplessness and simplicity of his unworldliness and his utter fearlessness of "them which kill the body," kings cowered and popes came craving for assistance. He is one of the small band of personalities who ride the centuries as makers of Western civilisation. More than anyone, not excepting Hildebrand himself, he was the saviour of the papacy, and thereby of the Roman Church, from formal and acknowledged subjection to the authority of secular powers before whom the Vatican to-day cuts so sorrowful and feeble a figure. Most of the high interests of men—ethical, spiritual, doctrinal, ecclesiastical and political—centre in the mind and work of this faithful monk who loved best the solitude of his cell and was empty of every ambition except the one ambition of holiness which annihilates ambition. The present work is simply written with no effort after effect. It gives a restrained objective estimate and presents St Bernard on a large stage, not too glaringly lit, on which we see the historical forces of the times being played out.

St Bernard of Clairvaux was not the only St Bernard. There are others who account for the common error that associates him chiefly with a breed of dogs or with hymns which he never wrote. He has never quite captured the popular imagination as some of the more picturesque saints have done. In the general English attitude there is some coolness of response. This arises not so much from the ordinary Protestant incapacity to give admiration to a creative ecclesiastical power in a rival church as from resentment against St Bernard's treatment of Abelard. Secularism favours every solvent of clerical and ecclesiastical influence. Natural sympathies draw warmly toward Abelard not only because of his defiant and superb intellect, but also because of the guilty splendour of his love for Heloise and of Heloise for him, a love so gloriously expiated by both in their voluntary parting and monastic consecration. Never can the wonder of that story be dimmed nor the immortal beauty of their letters cease to move mankind not dead to the pity of "the expense of spirit in a waste of shame."

Boethius has been styled the last of the classics and the first of the scholastics, but Abelard could more plausibly be regarded as the real founder of Scholasticism. Certainly his place as a conceptualist reconciler in the Nominalist and Realist controversy is high. But chief of all he has obtained important rank as a champion of critical thought on the main Christian dogmas and especially as the exponent of what has come to be known as the "moral theory" of the Atone-ment. All this approves him to the modern mind which is a little chilled by the harshness which he met from St Bernard and the

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orthodox battalions he was able to marshal against him. St Bernard was entirely sincere though not blameless in giving a ready ear to the worst rumours. Abelard, moreover, by being the most dazzling intellect of his day, challenged the ascendancy of St Bernard over the age, but it is unworthy to suggest that the conflict was exacerbated by personal jealousy. Something was involved more deadly than petty rivalry. We must be careful to discriminate. There is a heresy which is no mere matter of opinion or of formulated doctrine, but rather of temper and disposition. These run down to the undiscoverable recesses of human character. St Augustine stated the issue with precision: "Though the doctrine which men hold be false and perverse, if they do not maintain it with passionate obstinacy, especially when they have not devised it by the rashness of their own presumption . . . and if they are with anxiety seeking the truth, and are prepared to be set right when they have found it, such men are not to be counted heretics" (*Letter* 43. Ed. Marcus Dods, Vol. I, p. 139). This view of heresy is quoted with approval by St Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.* ii–ii *æ. q.* 11, art. 2), and may be taken as the official Roman Catholic teaching. Abelard was passionately obstinate and may fairly be said to have been a heretic in disposition even when orthodox in statement. St Bernard felt this "in his bones," and therefore deliberately brought about the downfall of Abelard. Nearly twenty years before the ignorant and disreputable Council of Soissons had condemned him. Yet this had thrown the sympathy of many learned and just men on the side of Abelard. Now, however, in 1140 there was another face on things. The arena at Sens had been magnificently set for a verbal tournament in the presence of one of the most glittering audiences that antagonists could desire. It resulted in a sensational "curtain." Abelard, now forty-one, accompanied by enthusiastic followers, strode in proudly with head scornfully erect. Bernard, now forty-nine, entered alone, meek, almost timorous, with downcast eyes. The comments on Abelard's heretical statements had not been completely read when suddenly to the consternation of all he interrupted the recital and said he was going to Rome to present his cause direct to the Pope. It was a surprising but not inexplicable anti-climax. Abelard was entirely loyal to Rome and was no rationalist rebel. Nevertheless, he was outwitted and outpaced. Before he could reach Rome he was condemned *ex parte* and unheard. Of his monastic imprisonment, sufferings and death this is not the occasion to write. One may, however, cherish the hope that the comforting tale of a reconciliation which enabled Abelard to speak of St Bernard as his friend is well attested.

The justification for dwelling on this is that neither St Bernard nor Abelard can be understood except in the light of this controversy. These two personalities represent two indestructible forces in the history of religion. It were a cheap summary to say that St Bernard stands for the religion of the mystical heart and Abelard for that of the rationalist mind. Abelard was never a pure rationalist. Both

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were men of heart. Who can read Abelard's writings, or even that one incandescent prayer which he composed for Heloise and her nuns (Morison, p. 288) without feeling that he had a mystical passion for holiness? Both were sincere in their devotional life. Both recognised the place of inward religious experience and the need for its intellectual formulation. It was not even that Abelard overstressed the capacity of reason beyond the sphere of its competency. Who, with St Thomas's *Summa* before him, can say, on the other hand, that Catholicism fails to recognise the necessity of using the reason up to its highest reach? Yet St Bernard, in his vehement and even abusive letter to Innocent II, could with some fairness denounce Abelard for the manner if not for the matter of his teaching. "He is presumptuously prepared to give a reason for everything, even of those things which are above reason: he presumes against reason and against faith. For what is more against reason than by reason to attempt to transcend reason? And what is more against faith than to be unwilling to believe what reason cannot attain?" (*Letters*, Eales-Gasquet, p. 260).

But there is something still more elemental. It would be grave error to underrate St Bernard as a theologian as many writers persist in doing. Indeed, it was the theologian and even the philosopher in him as well as the mystic and the saint that Abelard offended. The whole man in St Bernard felt confronted by something alien and sinister. The old tag *Pectus est quod facit theologum* goes deeper than the commonplace interpretation. The heart makes the theologian only because "the greatest of these is love,"—not just any love but love such as the saints in their ecstatic moments of supreme vision know beyond knowledge. Genuine orthodoxy is inherent in this love, and issues, whenever it is thoroughly intellectualised, into a logically predestinate and unnegotiable doctrine. This gives such love its only skeletal structure and contact with earth. As a complete geometry of physics already exists in solution to manifest itself, when set, in the crystal's architecture, so the theology of St Bernard, spite of flaws when compared with the perfect truth, observed a law of doctrinal form which had to be that and no other. St Bernard's entire religious consciousness felt itself attacked by the celestial Lucifer in Abelard. War to a finish, war as between the armies of heaven, had become an inexorable necessity if the Faith was to be saved.

This clash which remains for us moderns a theme of portentous meaning was but an incident in the life and work of St Bernard. It occupies in most biographies of the saint but a single chapter. In Mr Watkin Williams's book it forms one chapter out of fifteen. Others describe with fullness and minuteness the founding of Clairvaux and the astounding expansion of Cistercianism with interesting detailed notices which include descriptions of the direct daughter-houses in the British Isles—Rievaulx, Fountains, Whitland, Mellifont, Boxley and Margam. Among these chapters we have three dealing with the Schism in the Papacy and its healing,

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whereby, thanks almost alone to St Bernard's miraculous influence and courage, Innocent II was finally triumphant. Here again the uncanny genius of St Bernard shines forth. Innocent's election was far more flagrantly unconstitutional than even Mr Williams's candour allows. Like most mystics St Bernard was a ruthless realist. He cut his way through the tangle of legal technicalities to put on the throne of St Peter the man who by character was the best morally fitted to occupy it. Not least among the saint's heroic labours were those on behalf of episcopal ideals and authority. Here he was able to work through his own devoted pupil and fellow-monk of Clairvaux, who, still sighing for the paradise of Clairvaux, reluctantly became Pope Eugenius III. St Bernard had become, in fact, a pope behind the Pope, and in the end he achieved in large measure the authoritative recognition of episcopal theory and discipline. He was hardly less successful in the realm of monastic ideals, though he recognised that his own stark puritanism had no chance of being generally enforced. His life's greatest disaster was the Second Crusade, with all its defects of *morale* and its attendant cynical betrayals. Among his failures should also be reckoned his estimate of Arnald of Brescia and of the Rhineland sectaries who had some affinities with him. St Bernard's language in denunciation of these, even when measured by the standards of the period, is inexcusably violent. They were horribly persecuted. Their excesses seemed more the extravagances of a fanatical idealism than of moral perversion. This Mr Williams fails to analyse with his customary fairness, and he seems too eager to defend St Bernard's reputation for tolerance and charity. This reputation was well founded but not immaculate. We see both its high and low levels in one passage where the saint repudiates the atrocities of the persecutors. "We commend the zeal, but we do not recommend what was done; for faith comes by persuasion; it was not imposed by force. Although it is undoubtedly better that men should be coerced by authority which does not bear the sword in vain—than that they should be allowed to lead many into error" (p. 235).

Dr G. G. Coulton has pointed out how Mr Williams has softened the severity of the original by substituting the word "authority" for the word "sword," and that what St Bernard said was that men should be coerced by the sword; his to wit, who beareth not the sword in vain."

St Bernard's prevailing large-heartedness is greater and more characteristic than his moods of irritableness and severity. His character can afford to be scrutinised in all its aspects and yet remain overawing nobility. When we read of his extreme mortifications of his emaciated physical frame rendered almost translucent through suffering, we are amazed at the fiery energy of his invincible mind. We can say of him what he wrote of his beloved friend Malachy, "the first miracle and the greatest miracle that he ever did was himself."

To steep oneself to-day in the life of St Bernard is to be inspired

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with a needed hope for our demoralised world. We recall that he was born only five years after Hildebrand had died at Salerno in 1085, uttering almost as his last words, "I have loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore I die in exile." To see the passing of the panorama of these crude centuries is to realise for our present courage that humanity has a deathless capacity for moral resurgence. Its saving health is still the ministry of its saints throughout the ages. The despairing lean on them and seek to provide themselves with the armament of their patience and serenity. The better monks (in and out of the cloistered life) who renounce the world may still prove to be among the finer forces to redeem the world. They stand away from the world to subdue it to a pattern seen on the mount. Certainly after reading this great study of St Bernard and his times we shall concur with what the learned author of Vol. III of *Five Centuries of Religion*, just published, has declared: "If we take the monk not only as he should have been in theory, but as he was in fact, we may see that he added even here to the sum of beneficent world-activities."

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Llanarth, Cardiganshire.

The Old Testament: A Reinterpretation. By Stanley A. Cook, Litt.D., F.B.A. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936.—Pp. ix + 264.—7*s.* 6*d.* net.

In 1934 Professor Cook wrote "the Renaissance and Reformation will not have borne their fruits until modern research has placed Biblical history and religion within the framework of our increasing knowledge of our Universe" (*The Modern Churchman*, November, 1934, p. 484). It is to this task that he addresses himself in this book. To attempt an interpretation of the Bible, one that will satisfy modern knowledge and modern needs, is a task that might well deter any but the most courageous. Yet the attempt must be made, if it is to be shown that the Bible, whose influence in the past has been incalculable, has any meaning for the present and the future. And that attempt has to be made in the light of the modern approach to the Bible, which is a very different one from that which was possible in time past. What may be called the secularisation of the Bible—that is to say, the use of it in all branches of secular research, for example, in the study of archæology, comparative religion, folk-lore, psychology, and so on, and the consequence of this, viz. that the Bible cannot be held apart any longer as a purely sacred book, have been treated already by Professor Cook (in *The Place of the O.T. in Modern Research*, 1932). This is the first factor which an interpreter of the Bible to-day must take into account. The other is the modern critical study of the contents of the Bible, which has laid once and for all the foundation of an intelligent understanding of the development of Biblical history and religion.

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The co-ordination and evaluation of all the results obtained by this double line of approach represents a formidable task, and in any but skilled hands the attempt might well prove worthless. The name of the author of this book, however, should allay all fears in this respect.

The earlier chapters of the book—on the English Bible, the Hebrew Text and Canon, Tradition and Criticism, Land and People, Israel and the Nations—contain a great deal of information that the Biblical student will find valuable, well-known though much of it is. The remaining chapters have as their subjects the Religion of the Old Testament, the God, the People and the Land, the Unseen World, the Struggle for Ethical Monotheism, the Prophets, the Post-Exilic Age, the Old Israel and the New. It will be evident at once that the book covers a very wide field, and it will be possible to refer only to some matters which have especially interested the present writer. One notes, for example, how much there is in the history of the English translation of the Bible which is instructive for the study of the growth of a Sacred Book (p. 7 f.), and how the author emphasises, as do other modern scholars, the importance of the extra-canonical books for Biblical study (pp. 27–8, 50, etc.). Again, Professor Cook brings prominently before the reader the three main interests which have gone to shape the historical writings of the Old Testament, viz. the priestly interest, the relationship between North and South, and the anti-Canaanite feeling (p. 53 f.). On archæological study in its relation to the Bible the author has some salutary remarks to make: "the co-ordination of archæological and Biblical evidence is always a delicate task" (p. 78); "the picture represented to us by archæology is at present imperfect and disproportionate" (p. 79); and he reminds us further of the fact, so rarely appreciated, that archæological evidence lies open to very different interpretation (p. 79). What "Israel" may mean in any particular case is a problem all students of the Old Testament must feel as keenly as does Professor Cook (pp. 56, 70 f.).

The chapter on monotheism illustrates how the author can usefully be relied upon to emphasise what is the question of primary significance—it is not the appearance of a monotheistic tendency that is of the first importance, but its persistence, its development and its meaning (p. 142). On the realistic and practical type of Semitic thought Professor Cook has much of interest to say, and he shows how it accounts for much in the Old Testament that is not at first sight explicable. The Israelite attitude towards the unseen world, for example, becomes altogether more intelligible when once the characteristic of the Semitic mentality has been firmly grasped—in the Semite the world of the seen and the unseen interpenetrate to a degree hardly attainable by the Western mind, and he is able, in consequence, to feel in the most lively fashion what the author calls the "naturalness of the supernatural" (p. 132). Very interesting, too, in this connection are the author's remarks on the potentialities of anthropism (p. 110 f.), which is shown to be in itself far from

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That the essence of prophecy lies in prediction would hardly be maintained by any scholar to-day, and Professor Cook shows very clearly how much is to be gained by the departure from the traditional view and the acceptance of a historical view of prophecy. On the latter view, the primary function of the prophets was to interpret history in the light of their exceptional knowledge of the character of God. God for them was a God who works in history, a Personal Saviour. It is hardly too much to say that this prophetic conception of God as a Personal Saviour, moulding history in accordance with his known moral character, is the greatest thought the Old Testament has to offer. Not only as interpreters of history does Professor Cook bring the prophets before us, but as great creative figures who made history (p. 167). He further shows how their realistic and rationalistic way of thinking takes them out of the company of the mystics and puts them among the ordinary run of people, even though they were admittedly exceptional men—"it was the sanity of the prophets and not their manticism that made them such tremendous factors in human history" (p. 188 f.).

The inquiry into the progressive development of life and thought in Israel round about the sixth century B.C. has been described on a previous occasion by Professor Cook as "the pivot upon which all the great problems of the Old Testament ultimately turn" (*Cambridge Ancient History*, iii., p. 499); and so it is but natural that there is in this volume a renewed emphasis upon the importance of this century and thereabouts, marked as it is by a quite astonishing outburst of religious teaching, both within and outside Palestine (p. 192). In this century Israel "rediscovered her God," and Professor Cook gives just place to Deutero-Isaiah in the creation of a new Israel (p. 180). His description of this prophet as "the watershed between two great stages of history and religion" (p. vii) is a happy one; all students of the post-exilic period will have experienced how, in their attempt to follow out the development of religious thought in this period, they are continually being forced back to the monotheistic teaching of Deutero-Isaiah, which necessitated a reorientation of the Israelite mind to many of the problems of religion and life. The suggestion, though admittedly conjectural, that behind the figure of the Servant of Yahweh lies some reforming movement (pp. 184, 210) is of the greatest interest. The author follows out the historical development until the New Testament period is reached, when a new prophetic movement is inaugurated, and a fresh interpretation of older ideas comes on the scene. In the place of the mediating Torah is a Person, and Jew and Christian go their respective ways. A new Israel has been born. The old Israel and the new is, in the author's view, the keynote to the reinterpretation of the Bible (p. 214), and in his concluding pages he sketches the lines along which a reinterpretation might run (p. 215 f.).

Apart from the matters already referred to, there is, of course, much else in the book that deserves mention, but room must be found to refer briefly to two considerations which make this volume

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specially valuable. First, there is the conception of Israel as an idea." The Bible contains a reinterpretation of older ideas. Some the fundamental ideas in the Old Testament can, as every student comparative religion is aware, be paralleled in the religious ideas other peoples; but in Israel the best minds took up these ideas and so completely remoulded them that they have taken on a degree uniqueness which they did not originally possess. These ideas of God, man and the world are no longer the special possession of any one people—they belong to the world " and the progressive development of the fundamental idea (of Israel and her God) by whomsoever it may be furthered will mark the further development of Religion itself" (p. 191). In the first century of this era the Israel " idea " took a new turn and was shaped afresh in Christianity, " and such is the power of the 'Israel' idea that there might be a further development historically as unsuspected as the passage nineteen centuries ago from Palestine to the West " (p. 224). These are suggestive words. The idea has been recovered. Modern conditions and problems make its reinterpretation imperative. One cannot but feel that Professor Cook has here embarked upon a line of thought the full significance of which it is difficult at the present time to envisage. He must have a great deal more to say on this Israel idea and its implications, and it is profoundly to be hoped that he may be able in due course to give it the fuller working out which it deserves.

The second consideration, which makes this volume of more than temporary significance at the present time, is a more general one. The lines along which the author has sketched out his reinterpretation are clearly revealed more than ever wherein the essential truth of the Bible lies. It is instructive to look back, as Professor Cook does, to the time when the burning question was the sanctity of the vowel-points (p. 21 f.). To-day we are concerned with a far different aspect of Biblical truth. There has of late been much written about the "truth" of the Bible. For some writers the " truth " of the Bible is in its conformity with facts of contemporary history, of comparative religion or of archæology. Truth of a kind this may be; but much has been the influence of the Bible in the world that we are interested in believing that its real truth is to be sought in realms more profound than those of secular study. The author of this book has provided a powerful corrective to much of the unhappy writing on Biblical " truth " that is met with to-day. In demonstrating that the essential truth of the Bible lies not in " facts," but in ideas of permanent human value, and that this truth will be revealed and developed only in so far as men bring it into relation with the history and religion of their own time, Professor Cook has rendered a valuable service to those who are concerned to put first things first—" What we value is not Israel or Yahwism, as such, but what Israel made of her inheritance when the occasions arose "

The book shows a fine grasp of Old Testament material in all its

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aspects, and this material is handled in such a way that the book may be read with profit not only by those interested in Biblical and Oriental studies, but by every thoughtful person who would know more about God, man, the world and himself.

D. Winton Thomas.

University of Durham.

Adversus Judaeos (A Bird's-eye View of Christian Apologiæ until the Renaissance). By A. Lukyn Williams, D.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1935.—Pp. xviii + 428.—25*s.* net.

The scope and intention of this book are carefully set out in the introduction. The relations between Jews and Christians cover almost every field of life, but Canon Williams confines himself to Christian Apologiæ against the Jews until the Renaissance. In particular, only such treatises as are available in print are dealt with, for there are manuscripts in libraries to which access has not been possible. Further, there may be published treatises in languages of which the author has no knowledge. The Renaissance is undoubtedly a good limiting point, since thereafter new orientations in knowledge were taken, and a real knowledge of Hebrew spread more widely among Christian scholars. This book had its origin in lectures prepared for those who were to work as Christian missionaries among the Jews, and for whom a knowledge of the methods of the past, with their possibilities, limitations and mistakes, was essential. The contents of the book are well set out at the beginning, making, together with the index, quick reference possible.

The Apologiæ are marshalled into five divisions, according to language, period and place of origin; thus, there are the Ante-Nicene Fathers, Syriac, Greek, Spanish and Latin Writers. While it would be too much to say that in treatises stretching over more than 1000 years there is uniformity of treatment, yet these divisions do mark a certain affinity between the writings comprising them, especially in the case of the Spanish. Canon Williams deals with six or more documents, and he has observed a fair balance in the treatment of his material, giving some of the interesting ones almost in full, indicating the contents of all, and always emphasising points which are of special interest in individual writers. Christian controversy with the Jews was widespread, whether individual writers had encountered Jews and Judaism at first hand or not; for the apologetic attitude towards the Synagogue seems inherent in Christianity, in virtue of its claim to be the fulfilment of Old Testament promises, and to have the Messiah which Israel awaited. Controversy is most commonly based upon proof-texts; indeed, in the early Church there grew up bodies of such suitable texts showing how Christianity had fulfilled Jewish expectation, these texts being known as Testimonies. It was the method, rather than any actual books of Testimonies, which survived down the ages, to prove

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writer after writer with his arguments. The doctrines most commonly desired to be proved against the Jews are that Christ is the Son of God, that He is the Messiah, that He was born of a Virgin, that the Trinity is a Unity, that God had rejected the Jews and chosen the Christians, that the Torah is not eternal and does not regulate Christian practice; all these repose upon texts of the Old Testament, accepted, but misunderstood, by the Jews. An index of texts makes it possible to trace the use of these by a number of writers. Canon Williams does not himself accept the force of these arguments, and he shows how they have been used sometimes wrongly and with complete misunderstanding. On the whole, it may be said that the Apologists were unable to make any references to the original Hebrew, relying upon the Septuagint and Vulgate versions, and that they were often verbally misled. Thus the original of Isa. xlv. 1: "The Lord said to my anointed, Cyrus (κύρῳ)" had come to be read as "The Lord said unto my Christ the Lord (κυρίῳ)," and provided an astonishing, but erroneous, testimony (pp. 26–7). The name of Jesus is discovered in that of Joshua—no verbal mistake here, but only an excess of zeal. It was an established principle that the Scripture contained more that the plain meaning, and Canon Williams has a truth in that when he writes: "He to whom past, present and future are all equally known may have seen fit to indicate certain truths concealed under present information. They are certainly often visible to the studious eye" (pp. 373–4). Thus, of "Abraham circumcised of his household eighteen males and three hundred" (Gen. xvii. 23, 27, with xiv. 14), the *Epistle of Barnabas* remarks that 318 may be written in three letters IH (18) for IHΣOYΣ, Jesus, and T (300), which is a cross (p. 24). The wood and the water of Christ are prefigured in the Ark and the flood of Noah (*The Dialogue with Trypho*, p. 40). The Trinity is discovered in the Tetragrammaton, the three names JaH, Hu, VaH, making but one name JeHoVaH (*Dialogi Alphonsi*, p. 235, and again Peter of Blois, p. 402). And, although it would be unfair to quote this as representing the general intellectual level of the Apologists, it is worth noting an explanation of "Emmanuel" "the half of which (we are told) is Syriac, for *Emma* means with us, and the other half in Hebrew, for *nuel* means God" (*The Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*, p. 74). One of the most interesting and ingenious of proofs adduced is from Gen. i. 1, where "In the beginning" is interpreted as "In the Son" (p. 29, and see also under Gen. i. 1). Baruch iii. 35–7, esp. v. 37: "Afterward Wisdom (Wisdom) appear upon earth, and was conversant with men" frequently cited as a proof of the Incarnation of God.

The Testimonies are not the only weapons in the hands of the Apologists. The Jew is so much in mind for some writers that a dialogue form is employed, and then, frequently, a wider survey is lost. Thus a vision of Jesus is vouchsafed to Jews at the end of a dialogue, by Archbishop Gregentius (p. 148). Origen insists against Celsus that the moral teaching of Jesus does not fit in with calling a mere charlatan (p. 82). Philo urges upon Papiscus that

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the very ubiquity of Christ and his symbolism, when Judaism and heathenism are silent, demonstrates the succession of Christ to Moses (p. 173). But the modern method of leading the Jews to the winning personality of Christ (see p. 134) is not too well understood by the mediæval writers, is the comment of Canon Williams.

What must we think of these Apologiæ? We know what Canon Williams thinks of the authors, namely, that they were misguided but sincere lovers of Christ, desiring to extend his salvation to the Jews. The book is graced with a Frontispiece, depicting two statues of female figures from the Museum (and the Cathedral) of Strassburg: the one representing the Church, "standing upright with cross in one hand and chalice in the other," the other representing the Synagogue "in a dejected attitude with bandaged eyes, broken staff and the tables of the law falling from her left hand." Canon Williams supports and endorses the modern Church Missions to the Jews. But the presuppositions of such Missions is that Judaism is not a religion standing firmly upon its own grounds, and with every power to satisfy the longings of its adherents. The Apologists, as the modern missions, appeal, in the main, to the poor, depressed, often outcast Jew, ignorant of his own religion, overcome by the insistence of the Christian polemic. The Jew presented by the mediæval controversialist often existed no more really than in his own imagination, the butt of his ill-aimed arguments. And that their "Jews" merely submitted a series of objections, which were successfully met by their Christian protagonists, and that they finally accepted baptism, weakens the impression made by the writers of such dialogues. Many of the Spanish Apologists were renegade Jews (sometimes Rabbis), and but for this fact the writers would show an almost uniform ignorance of Judaism as a life to be lived. The Talmud suffers some scurrilous attacks (pp. 388 ff.), but it must be admitted, in ignorance, by Peter of Cluny. In the discussions between the Church and the Synagogue (pp. 327–9, 381–3) the Synagogue is dramatically displayed as a defeated Woman. Canon Williams drops some curious asides, which bring out an attitude to the Synagogue which Judaism can never accept: "We Christians, who believe that our religion is the One Religion for Jews, Mohammedans and all the world . . ." (p. xv), and "it was only natural that he (Peter Alphonsi) should also endeavour to win his former co-religionists to the true faith by explaining to them the reasons for his own action" (p. 233). And in these days, when German Gentiles are waging a war of attrition against the Jews, one may reasonably be asked whether Christian polemics against, and Christian missions to, the Jews, are not the most refined form of anti-Semitism, and the most hard-dying. For the true Christian attitude to Judaism one should consult G. F. Moore's article entitled "Christian Writers on Judaism" in the *Harvard Theological Review*, 1921 (pp. 197–254), and with this one hopes that Canon Williams agrees.

J. C. G. Burton.

Rotherham.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D., D.Litt.

AND

R. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.

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

LEXANDER HAMILTON[1] AND THE REFORM OF THE LEAGUE.

AN HISTORICAL PARALLEL

L. P. JACKS.

s a marked peculiarity of the Covenant of the League of ons, which sharply distinguishes it from other alliances een sovereign states, that it assumes the possibility d faith in the contracting parties and takes precautions ist its occurrence by a threat of coercive measures

Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) was born in the island of Nevis e West Indies. His father was of Scottish descent, his mother ed from a family of French protestants. He began life as an ce in a sugar merchant's store, afterwards went to college in York, became Washington's chief aide-de-camp during the War pendence and Secretary of the Treasury in Washington's adminis- . At the age of thirty he played a leading part in framing the tion and securing its acceptance by the states. He was mortally in a duel with Aaron Burr. A masterly study of the life and this remarkable man, and of the great events he helped to shape, found in *Alexander Hamilton*, by Frederick Scott Oliver, 1906 sion 1931, Macmillan, 39th thousand).

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against the defaulting member. Article 16 opens with the words "Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15": here is the assumption of possible bad faith. The Article then goes on to recite the coercive measures, economic and military, to be taken against the defaulter: here is the threat of coercion. It is this peculiarity which justifies the description of the Covenant as a coercive instrument. We name it a peculiarity because both the assumption of possible bad faith and the accompanying threat of punishment on its occurrence are a most unusual feature to make appearance in a Covenant of Peace between sovereign political states. We are not aware of another instance in which it can be found.

Whenever a proposal is made that the League should be reformed on non-coercive lines, the proposers are likely to find themselves confronted by the following question: "How, if you omit coercion from your programme, can you ensure that your reformed agreement will be kept by the contracting parties?" It is a question which may fairly be turned on the questioner: "How, if you insert coercion in *your* programme, can you ensure that the contracting parties will keep their pledge to coerce a delinquent as and when required?" Quite recently some fifty nations under covenant to apply coercion on the occurrence of a certain event, failed, after a partial and reluctant effort, to employ the coercive measures to which they had bound themselves. How then can you ensure that any future pledge the nations may give to act coercively, by collective force against one of their fellow covenanters, will not come to grief in like manner?

When once the assumption of bad faith between the parties has been introduced into a contract it is clearly impossible to ensure against delinquency by further contractual devices. The assumption, once made, cuts the ground from under the feet of the contract makers, just as the assumption that all men are liars renders worthless any oath they may take to speak the truth, a difficulty not to be surmounted by increased verbal stringency in the drafting of the oath. Here the coercionist is in the same position as the non-coercionist. Whatever his contrivances to ensure against bad faith may be they will be exposed to the bad faith they are intended to ensure against. Both sides will find they have nothing to depend upon in the last resort but the mutual good faith of the contracting parties.

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The method of checkmating an aggressor by retaliating upon him with the whole weight of the alliance to which he is unfaithful conceals beneath its deceitful simplicity an absolutely insoluble problem. It was the high merit of the statesmen who framed the constitution of the United States that when this same method was urged upon them they were undeceived by its apparent simplicity and saw clearly the insoluble problem that lies beneath it. In language which reads almost like a prophecy of our present troubles they warned the coercionists of the dangerous imbroglio that would inevitably arise if the attempt were made to apply their method to the sovereign states of the Union, and happily for the future of America their warnings were not in vain. Even if we suppose the American example to have been completely forgotten by the statesmen who gave the League its constitution—and with President Wilson among them that seems improbable—it is difficult to understand why the coercive clause (Article 16) was introduced into the Covenant. Consideration of the obvious should have been enough. How can Article 16 protect Articles 12, 13 and 15 from bad faith when it has no more good faith to depend on than they have, the member-states responsible for carrying it out being identically the same with those whose possible bad faith it assumes ? If Articles 12, 13 and 15 need fortifying by a coercive clause, is Article 16 less in need of fortification than they ? All the articles row together in the same boat. All stand together in the same jeopardy. All hang together on the same peg.

If the framers of the Covenant had been endowed with the gift of prescience they would have foreseen that, of all the Articles, Article 16 was the most precarious, and this, as we have said, through the very bad faith it was intended to guard against. In recent happenings the bad faith of many in breaking Articles 12, 13 and 15 has certainly been conspicuous. But equally conspicuous and far more extensive has been the bad faith of the rest, some fifty in number, in not fulfilling their obligations to take the coercive measures against Italy to which they were all pledged under Article 16. Their pledge to apply military coercion they have disregarded *en masse*. As to their good faith in the matter of economic coercion let M. Litvinoff bare witness. We quote from his speech at Geneva on the raising of sanctions.

"It is a fact that not only was the whole admirable mechanism of Article 16 not brought into play, but

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from the outset there was a manifest striving to confine the action taken to the barest minimum.

"Four members had not applied sanctions at all. One, a State bordering on Italy, had refused to apply the most effective sanction—namely, the prohibition of imports from Italy—seven had not applied the embargo on arms, ten had not applied the prohibition of exports to Italy, and thirteen had not applied the prohibition of imports from Italy."

These remarks of M. Litvinoff raise some interesting questions. If coercion is to be applied to those who "disregard their covenants," who is to coerce those who disregard the particular covenant binding them to apply coercion? On what principle is Italy to be coerced for breaking her pledges under Articles 12, 13 and 15 and the fifty others not coerced for breaking theirs under Article 16? *Quis custodiet custodes?* Were all the nations represented in the League organised as a single democracy with a single Parliament, and an election held on the issue, the electorate would then have the power to dismiss or impeach the whole body of their representatives at Geneva for disregarding their obligations under Article 16 of the League constitution, and appoint others in their stead. In that way *quis custodiet custodes* would be answered, so far as democracy can answer it. But since no such power exists, or is likely to exist, a coercive covenant is at least as insecure as it would be if the coercive clause were absent. That the difficulty is not merely academic recent events have abundantly proved.

The lesson of these events seems to be that, among the many forms of collective action open to the League, the coercion of defaulting member-states by a "collective preponderance of strength," in spite of the eminent support it has received, is not only unpromising but highly dangerous. This conclusion will be confirmed by the historical parallel we have indicated, a parallel sufficiently near the present to be considered modern and sufficiently far to be studied without prejudice.

When the American statesmen of 1787 were engaged in the very difficult task of combining the thirteen American states into a Federal Union or League, they were confronted with a proposal to introduce into the constitution a mandatory clause closely analogous to Article 16 of the Covenant,

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clause assuming possible bad faith on the part of a sig-
tory state and threatening the delinquent with coercion
the armed combination of the many against the one.
This proposal was hotly debated and, in the upshot, deci-
ively rejected. It was described by Alexander Hamilton
s "one of the maddest projects that was ever devised,"
nd by others in similar terms. He argued that the Union,
it were to last, must be *non-coercive* as between itself and
he individual states composing it; that conflict and dis-
ution would inevitably follow if the coercive basis were
dopted. The subsequent history of the United States
eems to prove the wisdom of that policy.

The reasons which led to the triumph of the anti-
oercionist policy at that critical moment in history
re so pertinent to the international conditions of the
resent day that the matter seems worthy of further
laboration.

In a letter to *The Times* of July 8, 1936, Dr Nicholas
urray Butler appealed for a close study of the problem
ow confronting the League of Nations in the light of the
arallel problem successfully solved by the statesmen who
ew up the constitution of the United States. We say
ccessfully, for not only did the measures taken succeed
combining the original thirteen states, by no means on
od terms with one another at the time, into a Federal
ion, but they made possible the entry into the Union
a succession of others, thirty-five in number, whose
istence at the time was not dreamed of, and to the gradual
owth of the whole into the vast totality of the present
ited States. It is true that seventy-four years later the
ion was rent by civil war—a danger, it should ever be
membered, from which no form of World Federation would
exempt—but, thanks to the principle on which the
ion was founded, the shock was survived. To the British
erver who has travelled through the length and breadth
ose vast territories and taken note of their endless
rieties and heterogeneous interests—highly dangerous in
other setting—the unity of the United States must seem
litical phenomenon not less impressive than the unity
the British Commonwealth of Nations. Attentively
ed it can hardly fail to be highly instructive to those
would combine the states of the world, or of some part
, in following Dr Butler's advice.

e parallel between the American problem of 1787 and

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the League problem of to-day is, of course, not complete. It may be well therefore to note the differences before stressing the resemblance.

(1) The thirteen states to be united into a political league shared in varying degree the same political traditions; the inhabitants were largely of one race and spoke the same language.

(2) They had recently been united, though sometimes half-heartedly and not without loyalist opposition, in resistance to the British Crown; and they had all shared in the victory. There was no question therefore of bringing defeated states into the Union.

(3) Whatever their mutual animosities may have been, they lacked the bitterness and tenacity of the age-long feuds of Europe and were of lesser intensity than the ill will engendered by the Treaty of Versailles.

(4) Unlike the great states of the modern world they were not armed or arming to the teeth for unknown purposes and, in consequence, the fear of war as a psychological factor in the negotiations, though present in a degree, had not acquired the dominating influence to which it has been brought by the enormous armaments of to-day and by modern methods of warfare. Exhausted by their recent struggle with the British not even the strongest of them was very formidable.

(5) The question at issue did not take the form of putting a final end to war in the world at large, nor even of finding an *infallible* method of preventing war as between the thirteen negotiating states. "If they want to fight," said Ellsworth, "they may do it, and no frame of government can possibly prevent it."

(6) In forming the American Union two objects were aimed at and successfully accomplished, of which only the first is attempted by the League of Nations: (1) the union of the thirteen independent states into a political League, (2) the fusion of the inhabitants of those states into a single nation with a single government and electoral control over its machinery. By attaining the second of these objects along with the first the people of the United States were given the power of dismissal and impeachment over elected public servants who might "disregard their obligations" under the constitution. In this way the whole was brought under the sovereignty of a united people and the question *quis custodiet custodes* was, to that extent, answered. As we have already noted there is no united people behind the

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League of Nations who could dismiss or impeach its executive for a breach of the constitution.[1]

Other differences might be named, but the above are sufficient to warn us against stressing the parallel too hard. Nevertheless there were quarrelsome forces at work in these states which would certainly have led to internecine war had they been allowed to develop, and were only with difficulty restrained from breaking out. On the whole the relationships of the states one to another were sufficiently hostile and dangerous to make the problem of their political union exceedingly difficult. There was open rebellion in Massachusetts, where Washington was mobbed; Virginia was hated by the northern states; New York and Connecticut were almost at daggers drawn; tariff walls were erected between the two and between others; new sources of discord were developing with the migration of the people towards the West. Each state had its own Constitution and Legislature; each had its own militia; each insisted on its rights as free and sovereign within its own borders, and any attempt to impair this sovereignty, or to establish the domination of the stronger states over the weaker, and the inequalities were great, would have been the signal for defiant strife. To British observers at the time, though they were doubtless prejudiced, it seemed impossible to make order out of such a chaos, and the break-up of the Union was freely predicted both then and for a long time afterwards. In a Memorandum submitted to the Paris Conference of 1919 by the American Peace Society the situation is thus described:

> "The thirteen free sovereign independent States of that day were confronted with debt, commercial rivalries, inefficiencies, inequalities, separate treaties,

[1] Two rival plans were brought forward for discussion at the Philadelphia Convention, "the New Jersey Plan" and "the Virginia Plan." The New Jersey, or "Federalist," Plan would have united the states into a political league, but failed to unite their inhabitants into a single people or a single government. The Virginia, or "Nationalist," Plan would have united the inhabitants of the states into a single people but destroyed the independence of the separate states, or impaired it to such a degree as to make a political league impossible. As originally drafted both plans retained the principle of collective coercion of the parts by the whole. This was eliminated, and the result was a compromise between the two plans. The Virginia Plan as the basis. Hamilton produced a third plan which was rejected. After the adoption of the Constitution he became an enthusiastic supporter.

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violations of contracts, depreciated currency, varieties of opinion and practice, rebellion; in short international anarchy. . . . The American States set themselves the task of overcoming these difficulties."

Mr F. S. Oliver in his admirable study of Hamilton, after describing the refusal of the individual states to part with "one shred" of their sovereignty continues as follows[1]:

> "The thirteen States proceeded to indulge themselves in the costly luxury of an internecine tariff war. The States with seaports preyed upon their landlocked brethren and provoked a boycott in return. Pennsylvania attacked Delaware. Connecticut was oppressed by Rhode Island and New York. New Jersey, lying between New York and Pennsylvania, was compared to a 'cask tapped at both ends'; North Carolina, between South Carolina and Virginia, to 'a patient bleeding at both stumps.' It was a dangerous game, ruinous in itself, and, behind the custom house officers men were beginning to furbish up the locks of their muskets. . . . At one time war between Vermont, New Hampshire and New York seemed all but inevitable."

It is not surprising that the American leaders were by no means of one mind in their efforts to evoke an ordered government out of the prevailing anarchy. There was ardent controversy, sustained on both sides by well equipped protagonists. To the one side it seemed obvious that without coercion, implemented by what would now be called "a collective preponderance of strength," the anarchic elements would never be permanently kept in order. To the other side, which ultimately triumphed, it seemed equally obvious that armed coercion or the threat of it, as applied by the Union to any particular state, would be fatal to the end in view.

Here it is that we may find, in spite of the differences named above, an illuminating parallel to the problem now confronting the League of Nations, and perhaps an object lesson. A closer examination of the controversy, in which Hamilton showed a far-sighted statesmanship, will make this apparent.

Then, precisely as now, the problem was to form a League

[1] *Alexander Hamilton*, pp. 134–5.

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r Union on lines that would render it unlikely to break up through the default or rebellion of particular states, all of them equally hard set in the assertion of its individual sovereignty as "free and independent." Was this object to be attained by *force*, that is, by the armed combination of loyal states against any particular state which might break its pledge to abide by the terms of the Union? Or could it be attained otherwise? Then, as now, controversy centred on the word "force" or, as we say, "sanctions." What part was forcible coercion to play in maintaining the Union and ensuring the loyalty of member-states to their obligations under the Constitution? On the one side were those who maintained, just as many supporters of the League maintain to-day, that the Union would be powerless unless it commanded a collective preponderance of strength and were constitutionally empowered to use it for the coercion of a defaulter or a breaker of the peace. Had their counsels prevailed the Constitution of the United States would have contained a provision identical in principle with Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant. "The Virginia Plan," laid before the Philadelphia Convention on May 29, 1787, contained, as originally drafted, the following provision: "To call forth the forces of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles thereof."[1] This proposal was met by the argument that sovereign political states (and this it must be remembered is what the American states claimed to be) were not coercible except by actual war, and that any coercive provision introduced into the Constitution would inevitably provoke the very strife it was intended to prevent. Force, it was admitted, is indispensable to civil government for the preservation of law and order, but only as employed by the state *against individuals*. As an instrument of coercion applied to sovereign states it is only another name for war, no matter whether the application of it be collective or otherwise, while the threat of it is nothing else than a declaration of war made in advance of the contingency it was intended to prevent. Against such a provision (here we should think of Articles 10 and 16) all "free, sovereign and independent States" are antecedently in rebellion and certain to rebel, if they are powerful enough, the moment

[1] For this and for most of the quotations which follow we are indebted to an admirable article by Arthur D. Call on "Force and World Government" in *World Affairs*, June 1936, since reprinted by the American Peace Society, Washington, D.C.

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coercion is applied or even threatened, the maintenance of their independence requiring nothing less, while, at the same time, they acquire a new justification for their rebellious conduct. And not only is the sovereign state non-coercible (except by defeat in war), but, further, it will refuse when called upon to take part in coercing another state, whenever such coercion would involve the surrender of sovereign control over its own forces into the hands of collective authority. Such were Alexander Hamilton's objections to the principle of coercion. "It is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised," he writes in the *Federalist*. "Can we believe," he goes on, "that a [sovereign] State will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream. It is impossible."

Further statements by Hamilton to the same effect are as follows. Addressing the Convention on June 18, 1787, he said:

> "A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities . . . but how can this force be exerted on the State? It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties."

In the following year he writes in the *Federalist*:

> "Whoever considers the populousness and strength of the States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. . . . Even in those Confederacies composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. . . . In most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient [States] have been the signals of bloody war, in which one half of the Confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half."

James Madison expresses himself in similar terms. In the Session [1] of May 31, 1787, he said:

[1] Of the Philadelphia Convention.

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"A Union of States containing such an ingredient provides for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound."

Oliver Ellsworth, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, takes up the same point in his address to the Convention of Connecticut.

"A necessary consequence of the principle of coercion by arms is a war of the States one against the other. . . . This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, States, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force. I am for that coercion which acts only on delinquent individuals."

From these quotations it is clear that the problem facing the American statesmen of 1787 was that of combining a number of sovereign states into a Union, Confederation or League, but in such a way as to leave intact the sovereignty claimed by each. To achieve this double and apparently paradoxical object it was resolved that no coercive provisions, no sanctions, nothing that would have corresponded to Articles 10 and 16 in the Covenant, should have place in the Compact. And this for two reasons: (1) that such provisions would inevitably become a source of conflict between the covenanting states, (2) that in any case they would be futile since, as Ellsworth said, "if the United States and the individual States will quarrel, if they want to fight, no frame of government can possibly prevent it." From the nature of the case the threat would fail to materialise whenever an occasion arose for putting it into operation. The best that could be done therefore to ensure continued peace within the group was so to frame the Union as to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of their wanting to quarrel." The introduction of coercive provisions, far from reducing the likelihood of conflict to a minimum, would have the contrary effect of raising it to a maximum. As constabulary business the coercion of a delinquent state by the Union was impossible; nothing short of war could make it effective. For these reasons

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it would be "one of the maddest projects that was ever devised."

The fact that, in spite of these principles, civil war actually broke out in the Union three-quarters of a century later, should be viewed in the light of Ellsworth's saying, "If these States want to fight, no frame of government can possibly stop it." The saying is equally applicable to a League of Nations of any conceivable form or constitution. There is no infallible method of preventing armed and sovereign states from rebelling against the League of which they are members, or from fighting one another—*if they want to*.[1] But there are methods of reducing the risk. A League of European or other nations so devised that it would last three-quarters of a century without a disruptive quarrel, as the United States lasted, would certainly do well, and would probably last longer, with promise of yet further continuance. The coercive League of 1919 lasted sixteen years (with notable secessions meanwhile) and broke down, as Hamilton would have predicted, on the first attempt to apply coercion to a powerful rebel. To avert a European war, coercion had to be abandoned.

At this point there comes into view a further difference, in addition to those named above, between the American problem of 1787 and the League problem of to-day. Controversy between the coercionists and the non-coercionists of 1787 was not confused, as it now is, by the distinction between economic and military coercion under the name of sanctions.[2] How Hamilton would have viewed the distinction is not open to doubt. He would have pointed out that the resort to economic sanctions would only serve to delay the discovery, by the Union imposing them, that a sovereign state can be coerced only in the one way named above—by defeating it on the battle-field: a discovery which has now in fact been made and acted upon, on the ground that such sanctions, if pressed beyond the point where they are merely harassing, would inevitably end in the bloodshed for which their pacifist supporters believe them a substitute. They point towards war and lead to

[1] It would be well if those who advocate an "International Police Force" would be more precise in stating what kind of policemen they have in mind. Are they thinking by any chance of our excellent "bobbies"? The phrase is misleading.

[2] One might add further that the word "sanctions" (a wolf in sheep's clothing) had not yet come into diplomatic use as a means of giving a moral colour, or at least a politer sound, to "coercion."

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like the first acts of a tragedy which reveal their tendencies in the death and destruction of the final act. They point also to a coming split in the ranks of the coercionists or, as Hamilton would say, to "one half of the Confederacy displaying its banners against the other half." Of all the forms that international co-operation might take co-operative coercion is the least promising. Fortunately for the League there are now many others, with which Hamilton, in his day, was not concerned.

From first to last of the long and bitter controversy over the form of the American Constitution Hamilton, while changing his opinion at other points, never lost sight of the essential fact, which the coercionist statesmen of our day seem to have overlooked, that the threat of coercion, collective or otherwise, when addressed to a sovereign state, is *a threat to its sovereignty*, to its right to be sole master in its own house. He saw that the effect of coercion on a sovereign state, armed for the maintenance of its sovereignty, could be nothing else than to challenge and provoke it to armed resistance to the uttermost of its power. He saw further that each of the coercing states would realise that in thus threatening the sovereignty of another it was exposing its own sovereignty to similar encroachment on occasion to arise. Of this the effect would be to make the process of coercion lukewarm, dilatory, reluctant and, in the upshot, to ensure its breakdown—the point of Hamilton's question, "Can we believe that a sovereign State will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument of coercion?" Applying the argument to present conditions, it evidently requires that each European state, before embarking on the policy of collective coercion, should consider the effect of it *if applied to itself*. Can there be a doubt, for example, that Great Britain, if threatened with coercion from any source, would resist it to the uttermost? Can there be a doubt that her armaments would then be used, not for "contracting" to collective coercion, but for resisting it? What reason have we to believe that the reaction of other states would be more submissive?

In all this it will be observed Hamilton does not deny the necessity of coercion for the regulation of human affairs. To what was he engaged, after the manner of modern pacifists, in a crusade for the abolition of war. He was not opposed to war-making as such. What Hamilton opposed and disbelieved as impossible was a *coercive union* of states endowed, under the terms of the union, with the right to make war

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on one or any of its own members, and armed with a collective preponderance of strength for that purpose. Such a union, he argued, would be a contradiction not only in logic but in fact. It would contain the seed of internal conflict and therefore no union at all.

In keeping with this, and indeed another aspect of it, were Hamilton's views on the right of a government to engage the nation it ruled over in altruistic war on behalf of interests not its own—a question now in the forefront of controversy. A government, he argued, has no such right and would place itself in the position of a defaulting trustee by embarking upon such warfare. His views on this matter are summarised by Mr Oliver as follows :

> "It was impossible, in Hamilton's view, for a nation to act towards other nations as a man of warm feelings would act towards his neighbours. A nation cannot afford to indulge itself in hatred or affection, magnanimity or revenge. In deciding upon its course of action, sentiment is as irrelevant a consideration as malice, and wars of chivalry are as iniquitous as wars of religion. The statesman who bends to an emotional outburst of public opinion as richly deserves to be shot as a general who surrenders a city out of compassion for the inhabitants. The stern test of the righteousness of a war is the permanent security of the State. A government which goes knight-erranting out of sympathy for foreign nations is like a trustee who subscribes to charities out of the property he has undertaken to administer.[1] A government, like a trustee, is responsible for the estate. Its business is sound investment, not the encouragement of deserving institutions or the succour of honest, poor men overwhelmed by adversity. Pity and prejudice are equally out of place when ministers, in whom King or people has placed the serious confidence of decision, come to determine the tremendous issues of alliances and wars."[2]

Such were the principles that triumphed in forming the union of thirteen weak, quarrelsome and disordered states

[1] With this we may compare Gladstone's words in 1869 (quoted more fully in our previous article on "a demilitarised League"), "Is England so uplifted in strength that she can with prudence advertise herself as ready to undertake the general redress of wrongs?"

[2] *Alexander Hamilton*, p. 351.

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in 1787, a union which has survived and promises to survive on the scale and with the results we now see. Are these principles applicable to the questions confronting us to-day? If coercion was a mad project then, has it become a sane project now? Is the principle of national sovereignty less deeply rooted among the nations of the modern world than it was among those thirteen states? And does the fact that most of these nations are armed to the teeth, each in the determination to be sole master of its own destiny and none more determined than the British), render them more or less amenable to coercion? Is it less true to-day than it was then that "if these States will quarrel and want to fight no frame of government can possibly prevent it." To be sure, the vast armaments now existing, if thrown into a common pool, would be so formidable that no dog would dare to bark in its presence. But where is the sovereign political state, determined to be master of its own destiny,[1] which shows the slightest disposition to let the control of its armed forces pass out of its own hands by throwing them into a pool at the disposal of a central authority? Would not such an arrangement involve the surrender, by each of the contributing states, wholly or in part, of the power intended to make it master of its own destiny? Imagine the British Fleet taking its orders from Geneva!

These questions may all be summed into one. Are the difficulties of union among the European states to-day, mad set in the assertion of national sovereignty, and armed to the teeth for asserting it, greater on the whole than those successfully overcome by the American statesmen of 1787? The answer is—*they are immensely greater for those who would use the League of Nations on coercion.* What was a mad project for the American states in 1787 is a far madder project for the European states in 1936. "It is a dream. It is impossible." But for those who would embark the League on more profitable forms of co-operation, with a view to reducing the likelihood that these nations will want to fight," the difficulties are less. Forms of international co-operation, and the means for achieving it, unknown and undreamed of in 1787, are now awaiting a statesmanship wise enough to make the most of them. It will be a tragedy if they are neglected, and the attempt

[1] "France," said M. Laval in his last speech to the Chamber, "will be mistress of her own destiny." Mr Baldwin might have replied, "So will the British Empire."

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made to restore the principle of coercion into a League of sovereign states each armed and still arming in the determination not to be coerced in any form or from any source. Even if we assume—and the assumption would be rash—that all are willing to contribute to collective coercion, how many are willing to *submit* to it? Is the British Empire? The doom of collective coercion, as applied to sovereign states, is written in the answers to these questions. National sovereignty and collective coercion cannot co-exist. If either is to stand the other must go. Which is it to be?

If further support for these contentions be needed we can find it near at hand. The United States is not the only instance extant in the world of a number of self-governing communities united into a League which admits of no coercion as between the body corporate and the member-states. The British Commonwealth of Nations is another and, in some respects, even more impressive. British statesmen who believe that a League of Nations is impossible without collective coercion may well be asked to consider what the reaction of the self-governing Dominions would be if the attempt were made to give the Commonwealth a constitution embodying a threat similar to that of Article 16? Would not that be a "mad project"? Have we forgotten that the only split which has ever occurred in the British Empire, the American Revolution, was brought about by the attempt to apply coercion? It has been said that the loss of their American Colonies taught the British how not to lose the others. Equally true is it—and this should not be forgotten either—that it taught these Colonies how to become the United States. It taught both parties to avoid the same "mad project" in their internal organisation. The result is that the British Commonwealth of Nations on the one hand, and the United States on the other, stand before the world to-day as object lessons revealing the only principle on which an enduring League of Nations can ever be founded. Both have solved the problem which the League of Nations has yet to solve on a greater scale. Both are non-coercive Leagues of Nations. How, we may well ask, can either of these free Commonwealths be permanently at home in a League founded on a principle opposite to that on which they are founded themselves? How can either ever submit willingly to coercion by a "collective preponderance of strength" or consent "to be used as an instrument" for

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imposing such coercion on other nations? Were it possible to summon Alexander Hamilton to the deliberations now proceeding for the reform of the Covenant we cannot doubt what answers he would give to these questions. Conceivably he might persuade the reformers to take a line which would bring the United States into the League, or at least considerably reduce the obstacles which have hitherto kept them out of it.

Since an analogy to the Covenant of the League, with its disastrous assumption of possible bad faith, would be hard to find among political alliances between sovereign states, it may be permissible to construct an imaginary case. Let us, then, imagine that a group of quarrelsome gunmen, weakened by feuds and vendettas among themselves, were to enter upon a compact of perpetual peace, binding each of them never again to draw his gun on a fellow covenanter. Such an arrangement would be eminently reasonable, at least from the gunmen's point of view, though the retention by each of his death-dealing weapons, if the compact allowed of that, would expose it to certain risks. But, leaving that aside, let us further suppose that our gunmen, not being over confident in each other's good faith, and by way of ensuring their compact against treachery, proceed to fortify it by a supplementary oath, to the effect that in the event of any member breaking his pledge not to shoot at a fellow covenanter, or showing signs of so doing, the rest of the covenanters would immediately line themselves up into a firing party and overwhelm the delinquent with a collective volley—a coercive procedure corresponding in principle to Article 16. What would be our comment now? Should we not be reminded of certain stories about the Wise Men of Gotham? Should we not say that the fortifying oath, being no less vulnerable to bad faith than the oath it was intended to fortify, adds nothing to the security of the compact, but serves rather to extend the area of possible delinquency? Should we not point out that a new danger is now added to those previously existing, the danger namely that the members of the collective firing party might "disregard their obligation" to line with guns loaded, as and when required, for the pleasant duty of annihilating their former colleague, or threatening him with annihilation. Clearly our gunmen are no safer under the supplementary oath than they would have been without it. Indeed they are less safe. For

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should it turn out, as is not unlikely, that all of them are inclined to invent excuses for not joining the firing party, some reluctant to point their guns at an old friend, some unwilling to expend ammunition needed for other purposes, some afraid that the traitor will shoot first, with one of themselves as his target, and determined for that reason not to arrive on the scene of action till the others are there—what will be the result? Assuredly there will be an outbreak of bad feeling and mutual recrimination among the covenanters, and a considerable likelihood that the whole arrangement will end, not in an overwhelming volley at the traitor, but in shooting right and left between the members of the firing party, while the offender walks off with a discourteous gesture at his would-be disciplinarians. In this way the last state of our gunmen under the supplementary oath will be more insecure than the first. And if it be said that all this has no application to the Covenant of the League, since that document was signed not by Chicago gangsters but by gentlemen of high worth and consideration, as doubtless they were, why then, we must ask, did these honourable men find it necessary openly to make the dishonouring assumption of possible bad faith among themselves? Such a proceeding is unusual in a gentlemen's agreement. Had these gentlemen been signing a contract as between themselves most assuredly they would have acted otherwise. They signed on behalf of certain "High Contracting Parties" whose good faith in their mutual relations is not as high as the name they give themselves might suggest. And the whole trouble lies precisely there.

Our study has thus brought us back to the proposition with which we began. In covenants between sovereign states there is and can be nothing to depend upon save the good faith of the contracting parties. If that is insecure nothing can be made safe. All coercive measures intended to circumvent bad faith are exposed to the bad faith they would circumvent. They are indeed more vulnerable to it than the engagements they are intended to protect. Whatever bad faith exists is by their means emphasised, advertised, deepened, inflamed and given new opportunities to become active. They destroy confidence by the very means they take to establish it. They are self-defeating, and their defeat is calamitous. *Mutual mistrust*—the chief enemy of peace has no other name, and is nowhere more dangerously active than in the fabric of coercion itself. It is a depressing

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thought, and especially so when we observe how obstinately the coercive policy, to which some evil genius seems to have committed the League in the hour of its birth, still holds its ground. But, over against that depressing thought, the hope rises up that wiser counsels may yet prevail, as they prevailed in 1787. Of all the measures that might be taken to counter the mutual mistrust between nations which now poisons the efforts of good men to establish peace, none would be more promising than the elimination of the coercive element, to the last trace, together with the fatal assumption on which it rests, from the Covenant. The psychological effect would be immense and salutary. And in the better atmosphere thus created, the League of Nations, with energies no longer preoccupied in the vain attempt to protect itself from the treachery of its own members, would turn to the achievement of its proper destiny—that of promoting human betterment by international co-operation on positive lines.

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

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IS THIS A MORAL WORLD?

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ENDEAVOURS have been made to prove, by inquiry into history, that wrongdoing in the long run is always punished —" in the long run " meaning in this world—and that right always wins in the end. Browning's definition of the hero as

> One who never turned his back but marched breast-forward,
> Never doubted clouds would break,
> Never held, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph—

expresses this view. Such a view, as Browning had it, was more than a matter of faith, a belief about the future, an assertion of the inevitableness of progress. It was all this, but also, as Dr Inge has pointed out, something more:

> " The belief in Progress, not as an ideal but as an indisputable fact, not as a task for humanity but as a law of Nature, has been the working faith of the West for about a hundred and fifty years." [1]

Now the idea of Progress " as an indisputable fact " involves that of the inevitable and continuous triumph of right; for the idea of Progress is essentially moral. And if it is " inevitable " the process will be seen at work in the past as well as in the future. To-day there must be very few people who can confidently embrace any such conviction. In fact, it is because people's faith in progress—that is, in the certain and present or at any rate speedy triumph of right—is shaken that there is prevalent mental, moral and political bewilderment.

A restoration of the idea of Progress would be a com-

[1] Inge, *The Idea of Progress* (The Romanes Lecture, 1920. Oxford: The Clarendon Press), p. 3.

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forting thing to the Western peoples hovering between pessimism, which is one of the diseases of freedom, and fatalism, which is the consequence of servitude. It would comfort them for the spectacle of a disorderly present generation with the assurance of an increasingly harmonious future one. And many people, undoubtedly, try to persuade themselves—probably do succeed in persuading themselves—that history confirms this assurance. Nevertheless, it may be that this is only a superficial view of history, not justified by strict examination of the facts. And if the facts do not justify this view, it must be given up, and the valid reason—if there is one—for believing in Progress should be sought.

In any such examination of history there is an initial difficulty, because the historian—like everybody else—tends to find the thing that he looks for; also, like other people, he loses his critical power in the face of success. "The historian," writes Dr Inge in the essay already quoted, "is a natural snob; he sides with the gods against Cato, and approves the winning side." Thus the writing of history becomes a kind of special pleading: what confirms the pre-conceived view is emphasised; what detracts from it is ignored. The truth is that it is extremely difficult to draw a line between right and wrong in past history. To examine, for instance, whether the Roman Empire, which was based almost entirely upon conquest, was morally right or wrong, would involve the investigator in endless casuistry.

Nevertheless, there *is* a definite line between right and wrong or, to express this more accurately, between justice and injustice, which is ascertainable by everybody. Few people, perhaps, can define justice; Plato took ten books of the *Republic* to do so, and scarcely succeeded in the end. Nevertheless, though unable to define justice, everybody recognises it quite clearly and knows when one thing is just and another not. How the conception first came to grow up in men's minds it is impossible to say, for it has been there throughout thousands of years, as far back as history and tradition, which is continuous with history, go; and the distinction between "fair" and "not fair" is the first moral judgment which any child makes. It is recognised as soon as it is mentioned: "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God."

Applying, then, this *norm*, which is at everybody's disposal, to history, it may be asked whether we are entitled to

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assert with confidence that justice always triumphs. The answer must be in the negative. History proves neither one thing nor the other. It is quite impossible on a survey of the facts to assert that the cause of the victors was just when the Romans and the Carthaginians contested the control of the Mediterranean and the Carthaginian empire was destroyed; or when the British and Dutch contested the command of the sea in the seventeenth century, and in the long run the Dutch lost. It is true that Romans and English believed and proved to themselves that their cause was just, but the Carthaginians and Dutch did not agree with them; and if the Carthaginians and Dutch had won, their opinion would be more highly considered now than it is. There are some cases which clearly prove that injustice may triumph, as mankind conceives triumph. The invasion and annexation of Silesia, for instance, by Frederick II. of Prussia in 1740, was obviously clearly against justice, and was recognised to be so then and ever since. Frederick himself admitted the injustice when he wrote in his *Histoire de mon Temps* that his motive was the desire to make himself known. It has been argued that the collapse of the German Empire in the World War was the nemesis for the annexation of Silesia, but it is quite absurd to assert this: first, because the statement ignores the plurality of causes; second, because the World War was a far greater blow to Austria, Prussia's innocent victim of 1740, than it was to Prussia (as well as being a calamity to all the world); and thirdly, because common sense knows that the nature of things imposes a "statute of limitations." A people is not paid out in 1918 for what it, or its autocrats, did in 1740. This searching for the judgments of the high God in history is futile for the simple reason that it would be possible, at any moment of any nation's history, to find a misfortune or miscarriage which could be regarded as a "judgment" for some previous misdeed. This is not to say that acts done in one age do not influence the course of events and the characters of peoples in subsequent ages as they, naturally, do. It is only to say that there is no ground for saying that unjust acts are always subsequently recompensed in this world by what mankind can recognise as punishment.

History gives no support to such a view. Unjust individuals have certainly prospered. Not all swindlers are discovered. Nations may, in a similar way, profit by misdoing; they may not be able to conceal the fact of their misdeeds, but they may be powerful enough to avoid incur-

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ring any obvious penalty at the hands of their neighbours. In calculating the future policy of their state, governors and legislators have no assurance, warranted by study of the past, that their country will be safer, its "interests" more surely promoted, by strictly following the ways of justice. Bismarck told Bülow that he had "made" three wars—1864, 1866, 1870. The first two were certainly unjust wars on the part of Prussia; nevertheless the fall of the Bismarckian empire in 1918 cannot be regarded as a consequence of Bismarck's injustices, but only of the fact that lesser men than he were in control of German affairs. Germany flourished in Bismarck's time, and he with it.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, like the "law of the land" in every country, represents an effort to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest shall not trespass beyond the strict limits of justice, and that injustice in international, as in national, affairs, shall never pay. The Italo-Abyssinian War, however, has proved that the Covenant does not ensure this. Injustice has paid a handsome return to the Italians in the sense that they have achieved what they set out to do with, without or against Geneva," as their leader frankly put it. Nobody, naturally, can say what the future has in store for Italy, but there is no doubt that the Italian Government has obtained what it wants, without much cost or risk.

When all this has been said, there remains something still to be said and emphasised: that justice, even if it is defeated, is not for that reason any the less just. Military victories in Silesia or Abyssinia do not alter the principle of right and wrong, or eliminate the line that absolutely marks off justice from injustice. And the duty which the conscience of civilised mankind recognise of undeviatingly following justice remains the same whether success or failure attend the effort. Robert Louis Stevenson has a poem on this subject, about the Viking who voluntarily sails into what he knows to be a losing battle against the powers of darkness.

Nevertheless, although the cause of justice may, in certain circumstances, lose and the cause of injustice win, it would seem wise and natural for civilised man to ensure that such circumstances shall not occur. Within the State, or rather within most States, a known and equal law, a recognised practice of jurisprudence, reinforced by the power of government, ensures on the whole that injustice does not triumph, and that disputes are settled according to the law,

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and not according to the relative physical strength of the disputing parties. For any reasonable individual there is no escape from the conclusion that the same *régime* of justice should be established between States. Certainly it is in the general interest of States that law should reign without exception. The Sophist says in the *Republic* that from the point of view of self-interest, the most desirable thing is to be able to be completely unjust, without any restriction; and that the most miserable thing is to be continually afflicted by injustice, without any possibility of escape. And so, he explains, as all men obviously could not enjoy the first, and wished to avoid the second, condition, they established justice, the mean between the two. The League of Nations offers the obvious practical means for preventing on the one hand the unlimited injustice of the sovereign Great Power and, on the other, the unlimited misery of its victims. The League (to adapt another of Plato's phrases) is designed to ensure that "the worse cause shall not be the stronger." But the worse cause as such has no inherent defect making failure certain, nor has the good cause an inherent quality which commands success. The ability of the League of Nations to ensure the triumph of the good cause depends, like every other agency managed by men, on the number and zeal and resources of its supporters. Perhaps, as Dr Jacks has suggested in the last issue of this JOURNAL, the public has tended too much to regard the League as a "war-preventing" agency, and not sufficiently as a peace-promoting agency; for the two things are not quite the same.

It may be, however, that twentieth-century mankind is not capable of making the effort. As a whole, the Western peoples seem to have lost the faculty of decision since they engaged in the World War. They lost confidence in themselves and in their power to control the march of events. This explains the emergence and supremacy of those strong-minded men called dictators, whose outstanding qualities are self-confidence and decisiveness. For the moment, at any rate, the peoples seem to have lost faith in democracy, that is, in government by persuasion, within the nation or between the nations. The Italo-Abyssinian question, the Spanish Civil War, are symptoms of this general pessimism.

Are we then entering upon another "Dark" or "Iron" Age, when the distinction between justice and injustice will be ignored, when there will be no Law of Nations, and only force will count, the law of the wolf-pack and of the jungle? It may be so, because society consists of men and is what

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they make it. There is nothing so convincing as victory; few heads are steady enough to withstand the charms of it. If force and decision and the naked pursuit of national self-interest succeed and achieve brilliant results, more and more people will see their latent prejudices and passions confirmed and will adopt the philosophy of force and decision and the naked pursuit of self-interest. Already we are living in what Dr Jacks, in the article already mentioned, rightly calls a "war-saturated atmosphere."

Nothing in all this, however, makes any difference to justice, which remains the same—immutable, timeless, independent of circumstance. If the time-factor be ignored, if we envisage a timeless world, then all men's faith is that such a world is just. Probably every statesman would agree with this view, but might pertinently answer that it will not necessarily fill the stomachs of his people, nor provide them with room for farming: and to say this is to say what is certainly true. Yet, though true, it does not alter the barrier which separates justice from injustice; that is something which the decision of no government can influence, no battalions surmount, no shell destroy.

This, however, offers no ground for maintaining that the world is either moral or immoral, just or unjust, but only that men, by conforming their actions to the standard of justice, are contributing to make a just world, without any certainty that their side will win. On the whole an examination of history seems to show that though injustice often and for long periods prevails, yet gradually the injustices are suppressed because among all its dross there is a certain stability in the soul of the common man and woman which corresponds to the prophet; and no century, even few generations, have been without their prophet. The present age has for years been awaiting its prophet and has not found him. The trumpet-call of a Rousseau has not been sounded. Faith in the cause of justice has grown weak, surrendering to the "logic of facts"—a wholly irrelevant factor in assessing the eternal values of right or wrong.

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THE SUPREME SPIRITUAL IDEAL: THE HINDU VIEW.

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When we enter the world of ideals, the differences among religions become negligible and the agreements striking. There is only one ideal for man, to make himself profoundly human, perfectly human. "Be ye perfect." The whole man, the complete man, is the ideal man, the divine man. "You are complete in the godhead," said St Paul. The seeking for our highest and inmost self is the seeking for God. Self-discovery, self-knowledge, self-fulfilment is man's destiny.

From the beginning of her history India has adored and idealised, not soldiers and statesmen, not men of science and leaders of industry, not even poets and philosophers, who influence the world by their deeds or by their words, but those rarer and more chastened spirits, whose greatness lies in what they are and not in what they do; men who have stamped infinity on the thought and life of the country, men who have added to the invisible forces of goodness in the world. To a world given over to the pursuit of power and pleasure, wealth and glory, they declare the reality of the unseen world and the call of the spiritual life. Their self-possession and self-command, their strange deep wisdom, their exquisite courtesy, their humility and gentleness of soul, their abounding humanity proclaim that the destiny of man is to know himself and thereby further the universal life of which he is an integral element.

This ideal has dominated the Indian religious landscape for over forty centuries. If we wish to know the spirit of a religion which has had a long and continuous evolution, we

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cannot get at it by taking a cross-section of it at any one stage. It is not to be found either in its earlier phases or in its later developments. Any historical process can be understood only by surveying the whole growth and grasping that inner meaning which is struggling for expression at every stage though never expressed perfectly at any stage. This is the spirit which binds together the different stages of its history, which is present in the earliest as well as in the latest. What is this meaning, this spiritual core of the Hindu religion ?

If we turn to the Indus valley civilisation which archæologists have unfolded for us in recent times, we see that among the relics of a religious character found at Mohenjo-daro are not only figurines of the mother goddess but also figures of a male God, who is the prototype of the historic Śiva. Obviously many of the features of modern Hinduism are derived from very early primitive sources. Sir John Marshall tells us that the god who is three-faced, is seated on a low Indian throne in a typical attitude of Yoga, with legs bent double beneath him heel to heel, with toes turned downwards and hands extended above the knees. He has a deer throne and has the elephant, the tiger, the rhinoceros and the buffalo grouped round him.[1] This figure of Śiva, the great Yogi, has been there from nearly 3250 B.C. (if not earlier), the date which archæologists give to the Indus valley civilisation, calling upon all those who have ears to hear, the inhabitants of the native land as well as the invaders from outside who subsequently pass and repass, to be kings not over others, but over themselves. Perfection can be achieved only through self-conquest, through courage and austerity, through unity and brotherhood in life.

We hear nowadays a good deal about Yoga even in the West. It means the process, as well as the result, of balancing the different sides of our nature, body, mind and spirit, the objective and the subjective, the individual and the social, the finite and the infinite. A passage in the *Bhagavadgītā* points out that this world has its roots above in heaven and its branches spread out earthward.[2] The human being has his roots in the invisible though his life belongs to the flowing stream of the visible. While he moves in the order of things visible, tangible, measurable in reference to time and space, while his life is subject to succession and change,

[1] *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilisation*, by Sir John Marshall, I, pp. 52–53 (1931).

[2] *Ūrdhwamūlam adhaḥśākham*, XV., 1.

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corruption and death, he is also a spirit belonging to the invisible and intangible world, which we can in no way comprehend, though we think and speak of it in symbols and metaphors drawn from the things of our world. If we think that our nature is limited by the little wave of our being which is our conscious waking self, we are ignorant of our true being. The relation of our life to a larger spiritual world betrays itself even in the waking consciousness through our intellectual ideals, our moral aspirations, our cravings for beauty and our longing for perfection. Behind our conscious self is our secret being without which the superficial consciousness cannot exist or act. Consciousness in us is partly manifest and partly hidden. We can enlarge the waking part of it by bringing into play ranges of our being which are now hidden. It is our duty to become aware of ourselves as spiritual beings instead of falsely identifying ourselves with the body, life, or mind. While we start with the immediate and the actual, our limited self-consciousness, we can constantly increase and enrich it, gathering into it all that we can realise of the seen and the unseen, of the world around us and above us. This is the goal of man. His evolution is a constant self-transcending until he reaches his potential and ultimate nature which the appearances of life conceal or inadequately express. We are not, through this process, abolishing our individuality but transforming it into a conscious term of the universal being, an utterance of the transcendent divine. The instinctive and the intellectual both attain their fruition in the spiritual personality. The flesh is sanctified and harmonised with the spirit; the intellect is illumined and harnessed to the realm of ends. Body and mind, instinct and intellect become the willing servants of spirit and not its tyrannical masters.

The uniqueness of man among all the products of nature lies in this, that in him nature seeks to exceed itself consciously, no longer by an automatic or unconscious activity, but by a mental and spiritual effort. Man is not a plant or an animal, but a thinking and spiritual being set to shape his nature for higher purposes. He seeks to establish order and harmony among the different parts of his nature and strives after an integrated life. He is unhappy so long as he does not succeed in his attempt at reaching an organic wholeness of life. There is always a mental and moral ferment in him, a tension between what he is and what he wishes to become, between the matter which offers the possibility of existence and the spirit which moulds it into significant being.

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II.

The present crisis in human affairs is due to a profound crisis in human consciousness, a lapse from the organic wholeness of life. There is a tendency to overlook the spiritual and exalt the intellectual. It can be traced chiefly to the influence of the Greeks who determined the bent of the western mind towards science and the pursuit of truth for its own sake. Greek civilisation was a magnificent achievement of the human reason and it was by no means one-sided. The Greek inheritance has enabled the West to remake the world. Earth, sea and air have been made to yield to the service of man. Though the triumphs of intellect are great, its failures are not less great. Some of the finest things of life have escaped its meshes, which the uncouth and unlettered peasants, who lived more naturally and professed animistic conceptions of life, had possessed. Painful and sordid as had been their estate, they had a hope in their hearts, a spark of poetry in their lives and a feeling of exaltation in their human relationships. Ignorant and superstitious they might have been, but wholly forsaken they were not. Their lives were not empty and devoid of content. They had their deep affections, a sense of the great value of the little things of life, love, companionship and family attachments, an element of mystery in their make-up, a faith in the unseen which is the consolation of their dreams. The business of intellect is to dispel the mystery, put an end to the dreams, strip life of its illusions and reduce the great play of human life to a dull show, comic on occasions and tragic more frequently. The primitive cults which helped their adherents to live healthily and happily on their own plane are dismissed as crude superstitions. Everything is stripped of soul, of inner life. This world is all, and we must rest content with it.

Religion, however, cannot be so lightly disposed of. When man gets a feeling or a fear that after all life means nothing, leads nowhere, and at bottom no one and nothing is really necessary or worthwhile, he cannot live. Even if life be aimless, man must pursue some dream. To deny hope is to take away his interest in life. Religions without this need, this fundamental insufficiency of an all-existing positivism, this primitive hunger for fellowship. The fugitive character of life makes man fondly hope that life is not at an end with the death of the body, that it cannot be true that the suffering of the innocent meets with

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no reward and the triumph of the wicked with no requital. It must be that man does count. Religions attempt to satisfy this fundamental need of man by giving him a faith and a way of life, a creed and a community, and thus restore the broken relationship between him and the spiritual world above and the human world around. While the prophet founders of religions declare that the community is world-wide and make no distinctions between the Jew and the Gentile, the Greek and the barbarian, the traders in religion declare that the greatness of one's own creed and group is the end and coercion and violence are the ways to it. They develop group loyalties at the expense of world loyalty. Such a bellicose condition is the only one in which life becomes worthwhile for a large number of people. There is not much to choose between these religions which exalt belief, bigotry and preservation of group loyalties and vested interests and the older, cruder, primitive cults. The later, which are the more sophisticated, are the more dangerous, for they are constructions of intellect interfering with the natural relations of man.

Left to himself, man feels kinship with the whole universe, especially with living things and human beings. The sense of community is latent in the hearts of men. Even in this artificial world where intellect has imposed on us the restrictions of tribe, race and nation, the fundamental humanity of man rushes up on occasions. When there is an earthquake in Japan or a famine in India, an explosion in a mine in Great Britain or a crash of an airship on the Atlantic, our hearts go out to the victims. When there is an act of heroism or daring, an achievement of genius in science or art, we feel elated and do not pause to ask the religion or the race to which the author belongs. We salute spontaneously the great ones of the world and do not wait to know whether a Ranji or a Robeson is of our group or race. One touch of nature makes the whole world kin. The feeling of fellowship with the whole of humanity is implanted in our nature. We are members of a world community. It is our intellectual consciousness that breeds in us the feeling of separatist individuality, and this unnatural development is checked by artificial devices to bring men back into communal relations. Unfortunately, instead of strengthening the invisible bonds which bind man to man, irrespective of colour or race, the natural feeling of the oneness of humanity, these attempts keep men in separate camps hostile to one another. We are educated into the mystic worship of race and nation

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By force and fraud, by politics and pseudo-religions, diplomats and priests exploit the baser passions of fear and greed and impose on us the deadly restraints of blood, race and nation and thus accentuate the division in man's soul. Political dictatorships and religious dogmatisms have no understanding of the profound identity of human beings, their passions and reactions, their ideals and aspirations in all ages and in all places. Religions, by propagating illusions such as the fear of hell, damnation and arrogant assumptions of inviolable authority and exclusive monopolies of the divine word and politics, by intoxicating whole peoples with dreams of their messianic missions, by engendering in them false memories, by keeping the old wounds open, by developing in them megalomania or persecution complex, destroy the sense of oneness with the world and divide humanity into narrow groups which are vain and ambitious, bitter and intolerant. By getting mixed up with politics, religion becomes degraded into a species of materialism.

We believe that we have conquered nature, simply because science has pushed the boundaries of the unknown further from us, yet we are as far as ever from having conquered our own nature. The problems of outer organisation are not so pressing in some respects, but so long as our passions of greed and selfishness are unconquered, our outer conquests will only be the material for the exercise of our greater barbarisms. Thanks to centuries of one-sided training, the barbarous occupies a large place in our nature, ready to prostrate itself before all representations of power that are external. Brute force attracts it, not moral law or spiritual ideal. It compels our respect, on account of our fear and greed, our selfish passions and crudity of mind. The tragedy of the world, individual and national, are due, in the last resort, to the fact that we are gripped by ruinous and explosive passions, the burden of which could not be easily shaken off, and they take us inevitably to our doom.

Life to-day, in spite of our material possessions and intellectual acquisitions, in spite of our moral codes and religious doctrines, has not given us happiness. If we know the deepest thoughts of men to-day, we find that there are millions who are dissatisfied with themselves and with the conflicts that absorb their energies. They have done with the radiance and gladness of life, they have no hopes to realise, no ambitions to realise, no happiness to which they look forward, no faith to live by. Their minds are distracted and so their action is fragmentary and futile.

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Let us take, for illustration, the one problem which is now demanding all our attention and effort, how to make the world safe for peace and humanity. This great country is in two minds about that question. It is unable to decide between power politics and peace politics, between binding secret agreements and the League Covenant, between international anarchy and international order and justice. We are thoroughly convinced of the futility, the horror of war and its dreadful consequences for civilisation, and yet we are drifting towards it, overpowered by the machine which we have built up, as if we were not reasonable human beings but mere victims of forces blind and deep, slow and irresistible, bearing all things away. The condition of the world to-day reminds one of Joseph Conrad's *Typhoon*, the story of the adventure of a vessel carrying Chinese coolies who begin to murder each other in the midst of a terrific storm on account of some missing money. We are prepared to pay the price, run the risk of collective suicide, for the sake of national glory and honour which are "fictional abstractions," idols of the market-place, but are not prepared to pay the price for world peace by way of surrender of control over subject nations, a submission of national sovereignty to international control, the transformation of backward areas into mandates. Nations, like individuals, are made, not only by what they acquire, but by what they resign. We are on the eve of gigantic changes and are witnessing a struggle between clashing sets of ideas. Why should nations which have the moral leadership of the world continue to serve discredited ideals? Is it necessary to wade through war, to pass through hell, before we can settle down and adjust in a spirit of reasonableness and equity, the conflicting claims of the different nations? A peace concluded at the end of a war, when passions run high, is bound to be of an unjust character, a source of bitterness and humiliation to the vanquished, like the treaty of Versailles. It is possible to take a just view of the whole situation, and work for a constructive peace when, as yet, there is no war to disturb and distract. Will humanity declare itself to be bankrupt of all statesmanship and wisdom and transfer the future to the decision of war? Are we, after ages of enlightenment, to admit the defeat of reason and produce a reversion to the dark ages, a relapse into barbarism?

We live on the surface and are afraid of thinking because it is all so confused and disordered; we suffer from conflicts. We are divided from our real nature, cut off from the universal

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in us by our egoistic impulses and separatist tendencies. When Rodin created that wonderful statue called *The Thinker*, the colossal figure of a man sitting with his head bent, his eyes staring out into space, his brows wrinkled with thought, his face furrowed with suffering and tense with concentration and looking at . . . What? Looking down the ages, age after age, world after world, he finds man advancing along the corridors of time, trying to control his difficult, discordant, divided self and asking, Shall we never escape from this division? Must we go on for ever aiming at the high and doing the low? Is it our fate to be for ever split selves, with bewildered outlooks, aspiring after ideals of universal human decency and practising policies which lead us to universal barbarism? Why, why cannot we have the courage and the selflessness, the vision and the generosity to regulate our affairs on principles of equity and justice? Life is a supreme good and offers the possibility of happiness to everyone. No generation has ever had so much opportunity. Yet the blessings of the earth have turned into curses on account of the maladies which afflict us, envy and hatred, pride and lust, stupidity and selfishness. Man, as he exists to-day, is not capable of survival. He must change or perish. Man, as he is, is not the last word of creation. If he does not, if he cannot adapt himself and his institutions to the new world, he will yield his place to a species more sensitive and less gross in its nature. If man cannot do the work demanded of him, another creature who can, will arise.

We need not lose hope of changing our ideals and re-ordering our life. We are not by nature savage and violent; we are highly suggestible and sensitive. We must endeavour to preserve our natural characteristics, and use our intellect to confirm, not cripple them; we must consciously recover and retain the sense of reality and kinship with the universe, the essential solidarity of the human race. When the Hindu thinkers ask us to free ourselves from *māyā*, they are asking us to shake off our bondage to the unreal values which are dominating us. They do not ask us to treat life as an illusion or be indifferent to the world's welfare. They are asking us to get out of the illusion which holds us by the throat and makes us pursue physical satisfaction or corporate well-being as the highest end. It is the function of religion to reaffirm the intuitive loyalty to life and solidarity of human nature, to lift us out of the illusion of isolation and bring us back to reality. The religious soul does not seek for escape from suffering in the present life or a place in paradise

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in the next life. His prayer, in the words of the *Upaniṣad*, is "Lead me from the unreal to the real, lead me from darkness to light, lead me from death to immortality."[1] The resurrection is not the rise of the dead from their tombs but the passage from the death of self-absorption to the life of unselfish love, the transition from the darkness of selfish individualism to the light of universal spirit, from falsehood to truth, from the slavery of the world to the liberty of the eternal. Creation "groaneth and travaileth in pain" "to be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."

III.

How can we rise above the present vision of the world with its anarchic individualism, its economic interpretations of history and materialist views of life? This world of *māyā* has thrown our consciousness out of focus. We must shift the focus of consciousness and see better and more. The way to growth lies through an increasing impersonality, through the unifying of the self with a greater than the self. Prayer, worship, meditation as well as philosophy, art and literature, help to revive and purify the inner being and predispose it to the contact with the divine. The discipline has different stages which are not clearly marked off from one another. Speaking roughly, three stages may be distinguished: purification, concentration and identification. The aim of the first is to rid the mind of its impurities, make it a clear mirror in which the divine can be reflected. This inner purification involves a clean moral life. The real nature of man can never be completely obliterated. We try to get at the depths of our nature by bursting through the outer strata. Deep down in his own self, can man discover the secret of his nature. All the forms, superficial and alien, imposed and forced upon it from without are secondary and the spirit in him which affirms its oneness with the whole universe the primary fact. The process of getting at the spirit in us is, in Plato's expression, an act of remembrance for it is there already, and we have only to recollect it in a sense. He hath "written wisdom in our inward parts" and by purification we recognise it. Concentration turns the whole mind and will away from the pursuit of worldly thoughts and desires and fixes them on the eternal. While

[1] Asato mā sad gamaya, tamaso mā jyotir gamaya, mṛtyor mā amṛtam gamaya.

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outer knowledge can be easily acquired, inner truth demands an absolute concentration of the mind on its object. So the next stage of identification is necessary in order to break down entirely that division and separation of ourselves from the divine being which is the normal condition of unregenerate humanity. The methods adopted by religions such as contemplation and service, are intended to stabilise our nature and aid the systematic purification of our whole being essential for an integral reflection and taking in of the divine reality. That vision, that spark, that supreme moment of unification, sets the whole being ablaze with perfect purpose. When it occurs, our stiffness breaks, we flow again, and are aware, as at no other time, of a continuity in ourselves and know more than the little section of it that is our life in this world. Our conflicts are resolved, and we are set back in the current of life and society. Nothing human is alien to us. We are no more members of this or that particular group, but belong to humanity as a whole. We have the primary patriotism which is the love of humanity. We have respect for the diversity which is natural to the constitution of things and understand the unity underlying it all. We feel in our deeper selves our oneness with our fellows and unity with life. We realise the idea in the mind of God of what each individual is meant to be. The unity of all life, which is the intellectual assumption of science, becomes the consuming conviction of the sage. He feels and acts as he knows. By his self-mastery and purity he attains that contentment in the depths, that serenity in the soul, that profound peace which is not mere emotion, what the Hindus call *śānti*, which enables its possessor to say: "I have overcome the world." However wicked the world may be, whatever pain and misery it may contain, he is not ruffled, for he hath seen that at rock bottom things are good, and there is a power which is ceaselessly overcoming evil and transforming it into good. He is aware of the central drive of the universe. It drives through him and he has a vision of what it is driving at, the transformation of the indwelling of God into a conscious fact, the possibility or hope of God for every man into a realisation. He has the sense of power by which he creates meaning and beauty out of the conflicts of human desires and passions. For the sake of his sanctities he would embrace poverty and die and would much rather have his tongue plucked out than shape it to a lie. He does not remain proudly on the mountain top apart from the world but devotes his energies

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to its spiritualisation and raising it to its highest levels. No one, not at any rate he who has perfected himself, can be at ease when the world cries for help. The well-being of others becomes his deepest concern. He loves his fellows with a tenderness and depth that are unknown to us. He can no more help loving humanity than a sunflower can help pointing to the sun. To be saved is not to enter a region of blissful ease and unending rest. The saved one becomes an elemental force of nature, a dynamo of spirit, working at a stupendously high velocity. The renunciation he has practised does not require him to flee from the world of works but only to slay the ego sense. Eternal life is here and now. It is the life of the eternal part of us, of the light within us, of intelligence and love whose objects are incorruptible.

IV.

Now and again criticisms are urged against the Hindu ideal that it is not sufficiently ethical in character. It is difficult to know what exactly this criticism means. An ideal which requires us to integrate ourselves, to maintain a constant fight with the passions which impede the growth of the soul, to wage war on lust, anger and worry cannot but be deeply ethical. The power to perceive reality, to absorb it and be absorbed by it is the reward of a severe and sustained process of self-purification.

Nor can it be said that the ideal did not believe in the efficacy of human action, in the power of suffering and sacrifice to redeem the world. Those who realise that every soul belongs to God cannot help working for the divinisation of the world. The great march of humanity towards the far-off divine ideal is directed and held together in the central lines by the effort and example of the saints who are the natural leaders of mankind. Religion is not for them a refuge from reality. They do not escape to a world of fantasy and thus evade the responsibilities of life. The Hindu ideal affirms that man can attain his immortal destiny, here and now. The Kingdom of God is within us and we need not wait for its attainment till some undated future or look for an apocalyptic display in the sky. It is true that the deepest secret of spiritual life is hidden from the common view and can be attained only with an effort. This effort is a lonely one, a flight of the alone to the alone. It is also true that when the world tires us we get back to ourselves, plunge into the deep wells of our spiritual being and return from it

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refreshed, serene, satisfied and happy. On that account, we cannot say that life has become individualistic. As a matter of fact it is an escape from individualism. When the perfected individual works for the world, he is the channel through which the divine influence flows. He is only the instrument (nimittamātram). He works in the spirit of the passage "I, yet not I" (kartāram akartāram).

The criticism has obvious reference to the political failure of India despite her profession of exalted spiritual ideals. Her leaders dwelt in prayer and let the legions pass by. Solitude and isolation were the roots of their existence. At best they fed the deer and held converse at night with the stars, healed the sick and preached the word of God.

The criticism, which is partly justified, amounts to this, that India did not till recently take to the cult of the nation. We did not make our country a national goddess, with a historic destiny, a sacred mission and a right of expansion. We did not worship mother India (bhāratmātā) as others do "Britannia," "La France," "The Fatherland." We did not tell the people that the enemy of India is the enemy of God and if the enemy said he, too, had a god, he could only be a false god. Our leaders disdained to become leaders of hosts, proclaiming to the people that we are the finest people on earth, the chosen race of the universe.

Secondly, let us remember that conquests and empires do not result from the exercise of religious virtues. It will do good to be reminded of William Watson's lines :

> "Best by remembering God, say some,
> We keep our high imperial lot
> Fortune, I fear, hath oftenest come
> When we forgot—when we forgot."

Eternal success and frightfulness did not attract the Indian temperament at its best.

While independence for every country is its legitimate right, there is something vulgar and philistine about aggressive nationalism which lapses into imperialism. When it overpowers us, it spoils our sight, torments our rest, confuses our values and makes the transitory seem more important than the permanent. In the present crisis, Great Britain is not able to see clearly or act honestly on account of her Imperial interests and ambitions. The world of independent sovereign nations with a mystic significance is in dissolution and will soon be a past chapter in man's history, like the world of feudalism. Let us prefer to be human.

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All the same, Indian culture has failed to give political expression to its ideals. The importance of wealth and power to give expression to spirit, though theoretically recognised, was not practically realised. India has suffered for this negligence. Though she affected deeply even the strangers who came to conquer but stayed behind, politically she has failed. Thanks to the contact with the West, her people are to-day infected with the nationalistic passion, and some of them feel justified in adopting the methods of organised violence sanctified in the history of the world, for gaining political freedom, if it is not conceded to the demands of justice. The arguments which are employed the world over to justify militarism that war is the nursery of heroic virtues like fidelity and restraint, courage and cohesiveness, health and vigour, are not unfamiliar in India. But her religious leader, who is, happily, also her leader in politics, has evolved a method to free India from political domination, which is in consonance with the religious traditions and mental background of the country. This method, which has not yet been tried on a large scale, can well serve as the moral equivalent for war in William James' words. It gives us the virtues of war without its horrors. In a famous article on *The Doctrine of the Sword*, Gandhi says :

> "I do believe that when there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. . . . I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless victim to her own dishonour. But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness more manly than punishment. Kṣamā vīrasya bhūshaṇam. . . . Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute. The spirit lies dormant in the brute and he knows no law but that of physical might. The dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law, to the strength of the spirit. The *rishis* who discovered the law of non-violence in the midst of violence, were greater geniuses than Newton. They were themselves greater warriors than Wellington. Having themselves known the use of arms, they realised their uselessness and taught a weary world that its salvation lay not through violence but through non-violence. Non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering. It does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil

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doer, but it means the putting of one's whole self against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being, it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire, to save his honour, his religion, his soul and lay the foundation for that empire's fall or regeneration. . . . And so I am not pleading for India to practise non-violence because she is weak. I want her to practise non-violence being conscious of her strength and power. I want India to recognise that she has a soul that cannot perish and that can rise triumphant above any physical weakness and defy the physical combination of a whole empire."

With all her poverty and degradation, her suffering and dejection, India still bears witness to the cult of the spirit. It is not right to complain that India has failed because she has followed after things spiritual. She has failed because she has not followed after them sufficiently. She has not learned how to make spirit entirely the master of life, but has created in recent times a gulf between spirit and life and has rested in a compromise. Some of our holy men are inclined to become creatures set apart, beings who take flight from the temporal in order to cling to the heart of the eternal. If, in our eagerness to seek after God, we ignore the interests of humanity, we may produce a few high individuals but we will not elevate the race. We have shown how the race can fall by its onesidedness. To master life, to accept and improve it is a difficult task for the individual and more difficult for the race. Harmony of the social order is the essential aim of the spiritual man.

To be inspired in our thoughts by divine knowledge, to be moved in our will by the divine purpose, to mould our actions into harmony with divine bliss, to get at the great ideal of truth, goodness and beauty to which we give the name God as a spiritual presence, to raise our whole being and life to the divine status is the ultimate purpose and meaning of human living. Some exceptional individuals have achieved this status and harmony. They are the highest type of humanity yet reached and indicate the final shape which humanity has to assume. They are the forerunners of the new race.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

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PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY.

PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH.

I.

WHAT I am going to say will, I think, be of more interest to philosophers than to students of history. I shall be treating of history, indeed, but from the angle of the problems that it raises for philosophy. With these the historian has no need to concern himself; it is safer for him to leave them severely on one side, as more likely to confuse historical thinking than to clarify it. Few can emulate Croce and win distinction in both fields. We shall see that what Plato said of the mathematical sciences holds also of history, that it takes certain assumptions for granted, and never questions their validity. It is just these assumptions that call for critical inquiry from the philosopher. Most historians will think that the philosopher is wasting his time. Perhaps he is; but it is not the historian's place to say so. That is an affair to be threshed out on the *terrain* of metaphysics.

But does the philosopher, on his side, need to concern himself with history? There is a sense in which he needs not to know anything; anything, that is, in the way of particular information about empirical fact. The greatest thinkers have often been very oblivious of their speculative antecedents. Take Kant, for instance; Kant knew a great deal outside his own subject—he was competent to give University courses in anthropology and physical geography and was more thoroughly abreast of science than any philosopher of his day; but he would have failed disreditably in an Honours examination in the history of philosophy. He would doubtless have failed also in his other papers, owing to the examiners' inability to grasp his meaning. The philosophy he cared about was his own; he studied that of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors and little else. His favourite company was that of

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men of affairs, and he never talked metaphysics in leisure hours. What he learnt from converse with men and books was transformed into philosophy in his own mind.

I have a special reason for referring to Kant, directly relevant to the main point of this paper. Assuredly Kant's knowledge of science served as grist to his metaphysical mill. Too much so, in fact; had he been less enslaved to Newtonian physics, his conception of the phenomenal world would have been more fruitful. If only he had asked earlier the question he began to ask when writing the third Critique: how is biology possible? Or, better still, if he had pondered, as his successors in Germany have been doing for well nigh a century, on the concepts requisite for *Geisteswissenschaften*, and, above all, for history. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has been overmuch hypnotised by mathematics and physics. If it is true—and I am not denying it—that Aristotle's physics, as our Cambridge friends are constantly reminding us, set back the clock for some two thousand years; did not Descartes do the same for his immediate successors? If the severance of the superlunary from the sublunary worlds proved a stumbling-block to metaphysics, what about the severance of soul from body, motived by the desire to interpret the latter wholly in terms amenable to quantitative measurement? Are not all naturalistic doctrines—those dead bones of Victorian dogmatism, on which Behaviourists and Logical Positivists are breathing, in the hope that they may yet live—the offspring begotten by science of an overawed philosophy? If this be so, might it not be well for the philosopher, in his work of metaphysical construction, to turn his thoughts away from science to other kinds of knowledge?

The issue, like all issues in metaphysics, is, at root, that of the nature of universals. Universals are the life-blood of science—be they species or class-concepts or laws of nature or mathematical formulæ—; the purpose of science is to generalise and to interpret nature in terms of its generalisations. Certainly individual facts are its data, setting its problems and controlling every step to their solution. But its aim is to explain them by universals, and a fact recalcitrant to such explanation remains for science an enigma. What, then, about philosophy? For philosophy, too, works with universals and interprets the world of experience conceptually. But recognising that reality, be it one or many, is individual, and that individuality means the fusion of what thought distinguishes as universal and particular,

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philosophy refuses to rest in either of these abstractions. It can neither, with science, subordinate the particular to the universal, nor set the one over against the other, the law over against the fact, as alien factors within the real. Its aim is to restore the broken unity by grasping what has been miscalled the "concrete universal"; more properly, by an intellectual intuition that transcends the abstractions of discursive thinking. Of course, the aim is unattainable by the human mind; it is what Kant called a "regulative" ideal, guarding philosophy against the temptation to rest satisfied in the shadowland of universality. My point is that philosophers need to be recalled to the straight path by studying the concrete knowledge that is forthcoming in fields other than that of science, in art, in religion, and in history. For these, too, achieve a rational coherence within their several borders. That is why it befits the philosopher, not to be a historian—for this is to ask too much—but to reflect on the nature of historical knowledge and, particularly, on the uncriticised assumptions that condition the historian's inquiry.

II.

Before developing this suggestion, however, I must rule out of court two doctrines, either of which, could it be maintained, would render our counsel unmeaning. They are those (1) of a philosophy of history, and (2) that philosophy and history are identical. The former of these doctrines was championed by Hegel, who held that the course of history reveals the self-development of the Absolute Idea, not, indeed, in its super-temporal reality, but as manifesting itself in time. It is to be interpreted, therefore, as exemplifying the eternal dialectic movement of the Absolute. This is obviously a task for the philosopher. The historian has merely to gather in the empirical material and to hand it over to the philosopher for explanation. Little wonder that such a view is anathema to the historian! If he be denied the right of judging his own data, he ceases to be a historian and becomes a diarist, recording a miscellany of isolated facts, with no bond of coherence save his personal interest. But if, on the other hand, the right be granted, what limit can be set to its exercise? In effect, the historian judges his material from the outset right through to the end of his inquiry. His initial data are never atomic given facts—none such exist—but facts related in a more or less determinate context, largely of his own selection; he sets himself

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to explore a definite site with remains of a certain epoch, or the workings of an institution among a certain group of people at a certain time. The facts are not presented to him by the Absolute ready-made, to be taken at their face value; they must be submitted to critical examination and accepted or discarded according to what the evidence, in his reasoned judgement, requires him to believe. Further, his aim as a historian is to interpret them in coherent patterns, and the coherence is discovered empirically in the facts, not imposed by metaphysics *a priori*, from above. The attempt to explain the Greek genius or the Totalitarian State by reference to the dialectic process of the Absolute is as irrelevant to history as the appeal to supernatural intervention or a divine theodicy. I recall how, more than forty years ago, after lecturing in the Tower Hamlets on Columbus, I was challenged by a member of the audience with the question: Did I know who really discovered America? On my reply that I had been trying to show the part played by Columbus in the achievement, he broke in brusquely with the assertion: "God discovered America." This may well be true, but it is true only in the sense in which God does everything; the pious ascription brings us no nearer to a historical explanation. Let me be precise. A supernatural intrusion into history, if there be such, is doubtless a historical *fact*; but, though the historian may have much to say that is relevant as to its authentication, such a fact—*e.g.* the Virgin Birth or the Resurrection—if true, is not amenable to historical *explanation*. Now the same is the case with the Absolute Idea. The assertion of its agency may be justifiable metaphysically, but it is irrelevant as a basis for deduction of historical events. Once more, the Hegelian conception leads to a false distinction within the field of history. Those facts only which can be shown to exemplify the dialectic process are admitted as historically significant. The rest are dismissed as contingent aberrations, unamenable to rational treatment. I need not labour the point, which once has so convincingly argued, that no event can be ruled out as intrinsically unimportant for the historian. I do not, however, agree with him when he goes on to deny that events can be graded on a scale of historical importance. For the historian's measure of importance is that of a purely humanistic culture. With any metaphysical or theological criterion he is unconcerned. It is not the business of history, or of a philosophy of history, to justify the ways of God, or of the Absolute, to man.

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In place of this untenable conception of a philosophy of history, Croce maintains that philosophy and history are identical. His early studies in the history of Italian culture caused him to reflect on the nature of history; and the thinkers who most influenced his philosophical development, Hegel and, especially, Vico, were those who had most fully realised the significance of history for metaphysics. His deep mistrust of dualism and of any doctrine that implies a reality transcendent of the historical process led him to react against Hegel's system at every point where it admitted a severance of the eternal from the temporal, and therefore against the whole theory of a philosophy of history. For Croce, the course of history does not manifest the dialectic movement of the Absolute; it *is* that movement itself, the common object of thought for the philosopher and the historian. The knowledge of both alike finds expression in the individual judgement, wherein the concept—*i.e.* the concrete universal—is affirmed of the individual subject. Thus a philosopher is *quâ* philosopher a historian, and the historian *quâ* historian is a philosopher. Of course, Croce recognises that in actual practice there must be division of labour, that actual philosophers and actual historians proceed by different methods towards the common goal. But in essence, and for philosophical reflection, the two inquiries are one and the same. A view thus metaphysically grounded cannot lightly be dismissed on the score of paradox. But it is surely open to grave objections. We may grant that, with perfect knowledge, reality would be grasped in an intellectual intuition, wherein the distinction of universal and particular would be resolved in unbroken synthesis. In that consummation, not only philosophy and history, but these and all other kinds of knowledge would cease to be distinguishable. But such apprehension is, as we have said, a regulative ideal beyond the reach of the human mind. Croce's position rests on the assumption, which has been made fully explicit by Gentile, that when I, the human individual, really think, my thinking is the act of the Absolute, immanent in my intellect. If this be so, what is the fate of the empirical individual, Croce or Gentile, I or you? To be swallowed up in Mind Universal or to be left, homeless and unbefriended, in a limbo of unreality. And, with the empirical individual vanishes also the empirical course of history. They all go the same way home. Thus historical knowledge, when identified with metaphysics, finds therein not its apotheosis, but its euthanasia. That they both affirm an individual

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judgement is a highly abstract groundwork of identity. In history, the moment of universality is kept in strict subordination. The point is rather that history stops short of thinking out what either individuality or universality means. As we shall see presently, it takes over its individuals, be they persons or events, from common-sense, without much refinement of discrimination. Moreover, its concepts are empirical universals, expressing groups of particular facts, and differ widely from those utilised by the philosopher in his construction. The coherence achieved by the historian, again, is not that of a system of general concepts, but of a series of related temporal facts. We might compare the coherence realised in an individual work of art—and there was a time when Croce subsumed history under æsthetic—, were it not that the artist's meaning is coloured by unique emotion, and remains embodied in the sensible particular. History is more intellectual than art, less intellectual than philosophy. Where it differs most from philosophy is in its speculative refusals. It refuses to follow thought into any region beyond that of events in time. It refuses, further, to question its own presuppositions. This is what is meant by saying that it is less purely intellectual than philosophy. In these refusals, the historian, like the scientist, takes his stand on his own rights. Were he to do otherwise, history would cease to be history and would become philosophy.

III.

Of these uncriticised presuppositions of history I select two for illustration, the one for the light it throws on the nature of history, the other as bearing directly on the problem of the individual and the universal. In the first place, the historian never questions that events really happened in the past. The plain man makes the same assumption and needs no argument from the historian to convince him of its truth. How for the philosopher what a swarm of problems here rise! History is provocative to the philosopher in ways of which the historian hardly dreams. "Events really happened in the past." What is an event? I suppose that a historical event, Cæsar's murder, for instance, or the taking of the Bastille, is discriminated, as regards its beginning and end, by a qualitative change in the continuous chain of events engaging the historian's interest. He will not worry much over the degree of discontinuity which justifies him in distinguishing this from that event in the changing

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continuum. He takes continuity and discreteness for granted, and concerns himself with the way in which divers strands of continuity, within the whole known past, may, by their intersection, give rise to breaks of a decisive character, for example, the intrusion of the Huns into the provinces of the decaying Roman Empire. I shall return to this question, of what constitutes an individual event, in connection with my second illustration. What, again, is meant by "what really happened?" The phrase raises problems both in theory of knowledge and in metaphysics. A fact cannot be taken into account by the historian unless it is known; does his knowing affect what the fact is, or does it not? Of course, he will answer, it does not; but how can he be sure, unless he has occult access to what the fact is without knowing it? This is a problem for theory of knowledge. Can an event happen in time, unless there be, in some mode of being, non-temporal objects which are, in Dr Whitehead's phrase, "ingredient" in events, giving them their quality and character? And, if so, what is the status in the universe of these timeless objects? This is a problem for metaphysics. Above all, what about "the past"? The historian records in their own order and relationships events which are doubtless continuous with the present, but in themselves belong not to the present, but to the past. Yet the past can only be known, in so far as it enters into his present experience. He must have before his eyes, here and now, as present fact the potsherd or the charter to which he assigns a date centuries ago, or, at any rate, the treatise recording what another observer had before his eyes. What is this past to which he relegates an object of his living personal experience? I am not cavilling at his procedure: no, not for a moment; I am merely pointing out that the whole problem of Time is on our hands. The possibility of change, its implication of permanence, the distinction of past, present and future, in what sense the past can be said, as past, to *be*, the relativity of this distinction to the experiencing subject and its difference from the seemingly more objective relation of before and after; all these are questions which the philosopher, when confronted with the historian's claim to knowledge, is compelled to set himself to think out. Moreover, the historian not only takes the past for granted, but studies it as past for its own sake. As a human being he quite legitimately feels an interest in its effects on the world around him, and he may even—though this is most precarious—turn to it for practical guidance; but, as a

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historian, his sole motive is disinterested curiosity to know what in fact took place. The Fathers of history in ancient days—Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy—were interested primarily, though not exclusively, in the relevance of past events for their own time and country; and a like interest still prompts research into the past of the beloved community, be it family or township, nation or church. But in history, as understood by modern scholars, this motive is ancillary and unessential. The belief, widespread even among intelligent persons, that the value of historical knowledge lies in its bearings on the present, misconceives the proper function of the historian, the discovery of the truth about the past.

Not being a historian, I add here a corollary of the pragmatic order which has just been ruled out of court. It concerns the uses of history as an educational discipline. Truth, and especially the truth of history, is suffering much violence at the present time. Governments on all sides are striving, with the aid of the potent instruments of mass-suggestion that science has made available, to teach their young citizens a mutilated and falsified history, in the interests of the great Leviathan, the Totalitarian State. It makes little difference whether the gospel be Dialectical Materialism or Aryan mythology. The point is that historical truth goes by the board. This menace is the more serious in that history, more than any other branch of study, can train the mind to regard for truth of fact. More so, I think, than science; for the interest of science in facts is for the sake of law, while that of history is for the sake of the facts themselves. Moreover, we find in contemporary scientific teaching a distressing uncertainty as to its own validity, and a tendency, in certain influential quarters, to rest satisfied with a Pragmatic theory of truth. The historian shows no such hesitation. Assuredly history provides no firm basis for optimism, but the knowledge of evil that it brings with it is a light price to pay for the discipline in reverence for truth. That is why the attempts to tamper with its integrity cause me so much concern. Propaganda may make good religion or good politics: it makes bad history, or, rather, it makes what is not history at all. The value of history, alike for the historian and in secular education, lies in the discovery, in detachment from practical interests, of what really happened in the past.

IV.

From this not quite unseasonable digression I pass to my second illustration. Let us consider wherein science, in the

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narrower sense of the term, canonised by physics, differs from history. The answer is clear: while the scientist lives and moves in the atmosphere of generality, the attention of the historian is focussed on the individual.

"Political science," said Maitland, "is either history or humbug." Few, if any, historians to-day would tolerate the view, prevalent in the mid-nineteenth century and voiced by Comte, Buckle and Herbert Spencer, that the main business of history is to follow the method of science and establish sociological generalisations. Nor have the recent changes in scientific outlook, which have led scientists to speak of statistical uniformities where once they spoke of Laws of Nature, brought any closer rapprochement. In history there is no repetition; every incident is unique and individual. Of course, the historian notes the common characters of events and persons, and uses concepts—empirical concepts—to express them; like any other observer, he talks of cities and nations, soldiers and statesmen; but these are provisional aids to an understanding of individuals in their individuality. He takes the fact of individuality for granted. He pierces through resemblances to differences with a glance as swift and unerring as that with which a mother discriminates between her new-born twins. When he frames an apparently general proposition, such as "All French ministries under the Second Republic have been short-lived," the generality is enumerative, in sharp contrast to the universality of the scientific law. His concern is not with what might be, but solely with what has been. To inquire what would have happened, if what did happen hadn't happened—if, for instance, Hannibal had marched on Rome after Cannæ or Napoleon had won the battle of Waterloo—is, in his eyes, to trifle with the subject. He may amuse himself by playing with such possibilities in his leisure moments; but his serious business is with the actual and with nothing else. The significant concepts of history, such as the Feudal System or the Russian Revolution, are not universal, but individual; like the miscalled "concrete universals" alluded to earlier, they express neither the common character in a plurality of instances nor a mere aggregation of separate particulars, but a system or pattern of events. Each of these systems or patterns is as unique and unrepeatable as the events that constitute its structure. Nor is the historian content with the discovery of these patterns; he presses forward to display their relevance and their limitations in the light of the ever-varying facts. What

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really excites his interest is not the Reformation as a group-label, but Luther, in his controversy with Zwingli at Marburg, chalking the words *Hoc est Corpus meum* on the table at which he sat. Nor, again, is history concerned, as is science, with prediction, for prediction implies repeatability. And with the possibility of prediction vanishes the supposed claim of history to give practical guidance. History may enlighten and enlarge our views of men and things, but has no call to play the part of Providence in the affairs of men.

Now, if the historian were asked by a philosopher to define an individual, he would probably be perplexed for an answer. Like the man in the street, he knows an individual when he sees one, but he feels no need to think out wherein individuality consists.

He cuts the Gordian knot by appealing now to differences of time and place, now to marked breaks in continuity, now to qualitative differences in the changing happenings; most frequently, to all these in combination. The limits of personal individuality, for instance, are fixed by bodily birth and death. In the case of events the distinction is more arbitrary. The Marquis of Anglesey had his leg shot off at Waterloo; that, I suppose, was a unique event; but it implies the larger event of the battle, which in its turn is but a phase in the Napoleonic struggle, and we are carried forward indefinitely till the original fact expands into the still expanding fact of the whole universe of actuality. Where are we to draw the line? Neither the events of history, nor the periods, nor the peoples, nor the institutions, nor the persons, are self-contained individuals. Where, again, are we to look within the series of the individual's changes for a permanent subject of change? Or can we dispense with a permanent subject altogether? The difficulty is most obvious in the case of events and their patterns. Where is the element of identity in the battle of Salamis or King Charles' execution, in the British Constitution or the Industrial Revolution? The historian, in determining individuality as suits his purpose, is entirely within his rights as a historian. But the philosopher, who cannot be satisfied with a rough-and-ready designation, seeks to know the *principium individuationis*.

The same problem, as to the nature and limits of the individual, arises in the historian's use of the causal principle. He has to distinguish antecedents from consequents within the temporal continuum, and also the several threads of causal connection from one another within the wider content

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of events. But the causes he is concerned with are very different from those of science. For the scientist, causes are, in fact, general laws; they are common natures or properties, taken in abstraction from the phenomena that exemplify them, and such that, whenever any exemplifying phenomenon occurs, another phenomenon, exemplifying a different nature or property, occurs also. Historical causes, on the other hand, are always individual. To say that a universal proposition, of the form "if *x*, then always *y*," is logically implicit in these individual connections is irrelevant, for the historian has no interest in hypothetical recurrences: his concern is solely with the actual, and the actual is unique. That jealousy excites suspicion in a lover may be a valuable generalisation in psychology, but it is a very jejune aid to an understanding of the suspicion of Monmouth provoked in the future James the Second by his rival's triumph in an *affaire du cœur*. The terms of the causal relation are not abstract characteristics, but the unique personalities of James and Monmouth. What is significant for the philosopher is that, while thus subordinating the factor of universality, the historian is yet enabled to construct a body of reasoned knowledge. Though he starts, as regards his data, on the level of common-sense, he does not remain there. His inferences "from particulars to particulars" are on a very different plane from that of Mill's village matron. In drawing them the historian makes explicit not an indeterminate universal, but a definite unique pattern. His interpretations display a rationality and a coherence that equals, if it does not surpass, the very different type of rationality and coherence achieved by science. Let no one be misled into questioning this by the historians' frequent appeal to contingency and chance. There is here no denial of causality; all that he means is that the particular train of events engaging his interest is broken by the sudden intrusion of a cause that belongs to another series. The concept of chance merely illustrates the necessity for provisional isolation of a selected causal thread. Thus the introduction of a bacillus into Alexander's organism at Babylon in 323 B.C. may be regarded as a contingent intrusion into the course of his political and military designs. But what thus strikes the historian, viewing events from a certain angle, as accidental is from another standpoint, say that of the biologist, entirely intelligible. A competent modern doctor, trained in a school of tropical medicine, would probably have been able to save Alexander's life. Of course, the historian is

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perfectly aware of this. It is only when he lapses into language that implies objective contingency, and speaks, as Bury, for instance, does, of chance as having "power over the course of events," that, transgressing the limits of history, he delivers himself over into the hands of the philosopher. To refer events to chance as a real ground of explanation is as illegitimate in history as to refer them to supernatural intervention.

V.

The speculative problems I have referred to, of Time and Change, Individuation, and Causality, are, of course, not peculiar to history. They are provoked, sooner or later, by reflection upon science and upon practical life. But they are presented by history in an acute form, and, as showing what the historian takes for granted, they point the difference between history and philosophy. Why these arrests of thought arise in the way they do is a metaphysical question that presses urgently for consideration. How is it that reason, once started on its course, is driven—apparently with rational justification—to stop short at the halting-place of science, content with generalisation and quantitative measurement, or at that of history, content with knowledge of the past as past? Does not thought do the like even in philosophy? Or is Mr Oakeshott right in claiming in *Modes of Experience* that the philosopher, and he alone, is able to realise the full scope of reason and to pass judgement from "the standpoint of the Absolute"? The fact that historical knowledge raises this issue is ground enough for the philosopher to feel grateful. But he stands in the historian's debt for a further, and a more constructive, service. History, by its emphasis on the individual, offers a new type of rational synthesis, which is at once the complement and the corrective of that achieved by science. For all its unchallenged assumptions, historical thinking is as logical as is thinking in science or even in philosophy itself. It is none the less logical for being largely a matter of intuitive insight into individuals in their individual relationships. The historian's processes of reasoning indeed resist subsumption under the rubrics of deduction and induction, as these are commonly understood. The nearest approach to a treatment is Newman's masterly study of Informal Inference in the Illative Sense in the *Grammar of Assent*, a work which, after the neglect of more than half a century, is at last winning the recognition that it deserves. We have

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said that in historical inference what is elicited is not a universal, but a pattern, and that each pattern is unrepeatable and unique. Such inference is, in Bosanquet's phrase, systematic rather than linear; in this at least it is analogous to the process by which the judge in a criminal trial reaches a conclusion as to the prisoner's innocence or guilt. If we speak of it as deductive or inductive, it is in the loose sense in which we find these words are used as equivalents in the works of Mrs Agatha Christie and Miss Dorothy Sayers. Yet by its firm grasp on concrete fact, to the exclusion of all that savours of the formal and the abstract, history exhibits an even richer intelligibility than can be found in mathematics and the sciences. I suggested above that it holds a place midway in the scale of knowledge between philosophy and art. Like philosophy, it is expressed in propositions and infers conclusions from explicit premisses, though both the premisses and the conclusions are normally singular. Art, on the other hand, is wholly non-inferential; the moment of universality persists in unbroken fusion with that of particularity. Yet the product of the artist's work—I am not thinking of the æsthetic judgement, still less of æsthetic theory—is rational; it displays an immanent coherence and a meaning. Moreover, the artist claims to reveal truth. His activity implies and imparts knowledge, which, like the historian's, is of the individual, but which, unlike the historian's, lies beyond logic. I cannot dwell on this point; I refer to art only to show that knowledge of the individual can be reached in other ways than that of history. It behoves the philosopher to follow reason along every avenue that leads to truth. Above all, for his purpose, along the avenue opened out by history; for history, we have seen, is more akin to philosophy than is art.

To sum up: philosophy and history are different branches of knowledge, different alike in their problems, their interests and their methods. Though the historian can learn little from philosophy, the philosopher has much, very much, to learn from history. The historian, on his side, will not grudge him the chance of gathering honey for his speculative hive. Only when the philosopher mistakes his own vocation for that of the historian and claims to fashion the historian's materials into a Philosophy of History does he expose himself to the scornful rejoinder, *Que faites-vous dans cette galère?*

W. G. DE BURGH.

READING UNIVERSITY.

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RAISING FUNDS FOR "GOOD CAUSES" DURING THE REFORMATION.

LILIAN G. PING.

READERS of an article in this Review last April illustrating the raising of funds for "Good Causes" by the system of Indulgences, may be interested in a selection of documents derived from the State Papers preserved at the Public Record Office, which exemplify the means adopted after the severance from Rome.

When Henry VIII. became the supreme ecclesiastical authority, it was made unlawful by statute[1] for either the King or his subjects "to sue to the seid Bishop of Rome called the Pope . . . for licences dispensacions composicions . . . or any other instruments or wrytynges of what kynde . . . so ever they be of. . . ." And, that none might go in ignorance of the law, the Council decreed:

"that Order be taken that such as shall preach at Paul's Cross from henceforth, shall continually from Sunday to Sunday, preach there, and also teach and declare to the people that he that now calleth himself Pope, ne any of his Predecessors, is and were but only the Bishops of *Rome* and hath no more Authority and Jurisdiction by God's Laws within this Realm then any other foreign Bishop hath, which is nothing at all: And that such Authority as he hath claimed heretofore, hath been only by Usurpation, and Sufference of Princes of this Realm. . . . That all the Bishops within this Realm be bound and ordered in the same wise, and to cause the same to be preached throughout all their Dioceses."

Later, it was enacted[2] "That all bulls breves faculties and dispensacions" obtained from the Pope should be

[1] 25 Henry VIII. cap. 21.
[2] 28 Henry VIII. cap. 16.

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" clerely voide and of no value force strength nor vertue," and that the present Act was " sufficient warrant to the Chancellor or Keper of the great Seale for the thensealing and delyverye of such licences . . . which shall be made graunted and sealed under the King's great seale by vertue of this Acte."

Under the new dispensation the chief instrument by which appeals for funds to the general public were launched was the Brief, sometimes called the " King's Brief," " Church Brief " and " King's Letter." It was actually the " breve " of the foregoing statute, which was a simpler, more summary form of the bull. From now on, Briefs were Letters Patent issued by the sovereign authorising collections for a specified object. The name was also applied to printed copies of such Letters Patent. Other methods of seeking contributions were also employed, such as direct appeal by the Sovereign to Parliament, the Nobility and Gentry, and by Bishops to the clergy of their diocese. These, however, were often wholly or in part in the nature of levies or demands, and the response was then actually an " enforced contribution " rather than a free-will offering, except that, sometimes, as will be seen, the amount given might be voluntary. Briefs were granted for the building, re-building and repair of churches, and for many benevolent purposes such as losses by fire, flood and storm, and for aid to the sick and impoverished through plague. They were usually initiated by the local authority which sent a petition to King or Parliament with proof of the circumstances in which the state of emergency had arisen. On the occasion of a national calamity such as the burning of St Paul's Cathedral in 1561 and the Great Fire of London the sovereign took the initiative. The Brief issued, it was read in the churches and the collection was made. It was sometimes ordered that in addition a house-to-house collection should be made, and then printed copies of the Brief were carried round by specially appointed officials who recorded on the back of the sheet the sums subscribed.

The system of raising funds by Brief can best be illustrated by those which relate to sacred edifices—especially those which constitute national monuments—for naturally documents relating to these exist in fuller detail. This enquiry is therefore directed chiefly to this category. And since St Paul's was *the* " Good Cause " of the period—it seems indeed to haunt the State Papers as it certainly enlivens them—it may justly claim a somewhat large proportion of

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the space. It often crowds out the claims of other crumbling or stricken fanes. These even decay *because* all the Briefs are for "the Cathedral in London." Once at least the worm turns, and a collection is withstood because the inhabitants desperately need their small contributions for their own local good cause.

The first great nation-wide appeal was made by Queen Elizabeth in 1561 for rebuilding St Paul's, which in June of that year had been struck by lightning during a terrific storm which burst over London. Its tower of wood covered with lead, the roofs and all timber parts were burnt, and the bells melted—a supernatural event, it was generally believed, a sign of the Divine wrath, Protestant and Papist interpreting it each as in his own favour. On June 24 the Queen appointed a Commission "to examine concerning the best means of re-edifying the Cathedral and procuring funds for that purpose." On the same day she informed the Lord Mayor that she had deputed certain of her Council to confer with him as to the best means of raising contributions for the repair of St Paul's. She wrote to Archbishop Parker recommending a collection among the clergy of his province. The Archbishop wrote to Bishop Grindall to set on foot a contribution among the clergy of his diocese and to communicate his letters to all other bishops in the province of Canterbury. The "appeal" to the clergy was in fact the levy of an enforced contribution. Records show the results of these efforts. The Queen herself gave 100 marks (£66 13*s.* 4*d.*) in gold and 1,000 marks (£666 13*s.* 4*d.*) in timber. The City of London gave at once a generous "benevolence" and undertook to contribute three-fifteenths very shortly. The clergy of the wide-flung province of Canterbury granted a fortieth part of the income of their benefices charged with first-fruits and the thirtieth of those not so charged; this resulted in a total of £1,460 10*s.* 11*d.* from the clergy alone. The Bishop of London gave £284 12*s.* 11*d.*, and further for timber £720. The Dean and Chapter of St Paul's £20 13*s.* 4*d.* The two Chief Justices and Officers of the Court of Common Pleas £34 5*s.*; the Queen's Bench £16 8*s.* 8*d.* All this, with some gifts from the nobility and the Ecclesiastic Lord Mayor the work of restoration began at once, and went forward rapidly.

The wars of religion in France, the Inquisition in the Netherlands, and Queen Elizabeth's protection of Protestant refugees are reflected in petitions asking for Letters Patent

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authorising "collections for relief of those persons who have fled out of France and Flanders to avoid persecution for religion," and in documents responding to these.

The same warmth of sympathy for this cause was manifested by James I. Here is a Brief in the form of a letter from the Council to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1621:

> "It cannot be unknowne to your Lordship that by reason of the present troubles in France many strangers of that nation professing the same religion wth us have for their conscience sake retired themselves unto this Kingdome. In contemplation of whose distressed estate as his Ma^ts^ pleasure is they should in the generall receive all kind and favourable usage. Soe in his princely and pious commiseration of the necessities of a great number of them who living in a strange Countrie wanting both means and employment are likely to suffer much miserie w^th^out the assistance and reliefe of other good Christians His Matie is pleased that their wants should be recommended unto the Charitie of all his subjects generally throughout the kingdom. These are therefore to pray and require your Lordship to direct wch letters to the seuerall Bishops w^th^in your Province to take order that in the seueral Parish churches of euery diocese his Ma^ts^ louing subjects may be moued to contribut towards the reliefe of the poore French Protestants refuged hither for their conscience. And that the monies collected be sent unto the Bishopp of the Diocesse or unto such persons as he shall appoint to receiue the same W^ch^ shalbe afterwards returned hither to be distributed by the direction of the Ministers and Elders of the French church according to the necessities of the persons. . . ."

Among many Briefs for that very popular cause—the redemption of captives from slavery under the Turks is one granted by James I. in 1624 in response to a petition from the House of Lords. The cause was made known by Proclamation whose sixteen hundred words preclude it from full reproduction here, but enough may be quoted to illustrate the circumstances and the procedure to be followed in carrying out the Brief:

> "James, By the Grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith,

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etc. To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting. Whereas We haue been informed, aswel by a lamentable Petition on the behalfe of fifteene hundred of our louing Subjects, English men, remaining in miserable seruitude and subjection in Argier, Tunis, Sally, Tituane . . . pittifully crauing some good meane be taken for their reliefe and redemption . . . they are solde from party to party, and kept in chaines of Iron . . . most of the youthfuller sort are of late forced and compelled by intolerable and insufferable punishments and torments, to deny their Sauiour and turn to their Mahumetan Religion, and to deny their owne King and Country . . . their poore wiues and children are likely through extremity and want miserably to perish. . . . The said Letters Patent, with printed Briefes to be sent to the Lords Bishops in their seuerall Diocesses, within each Prouince, and their Lordships to send the Briefes to all the Ministers of euery Parish within their Diocesse: which Ministers by especiall exhortation, are to stirre up the charity of their Parishioners for a liberal contribution towards this so charitable a worke: The money in euery Parish to be collected by the Churchwardens and Ouerseers of the Poore; who presently after the Collection shall declare publiquely in the Church what is collected and the same summe to be put on the backside of the Briefe, with their and the Ministers hands to it. . . ."

The collection was to be delivered to a minister in each rural Deanery, who in his turn was to hand it on to his Metropolitan, for ultimate transmission to the Archbishop of Canterbury. The work was to continue for a whole year. So much for the part relating to the appeal to the people in general. The document now makes provision for what is in fact not free-will offering but an enforced contribution, even though disguised, from "the Lords of Parliament, who are now ready to leade the way by giuing in their seuerall rankes: euery number above the degree of a Baron, 40*s*., Barons 20*s*.;" present Lords were not to be exempted but to contribute by proxy. "This," it is declared, they "will haue freely of themselves payed downe." Lastly, this good example of "our said Lords" is held up before "all other Our louing subiects of quality" who are exhorted to "follow in this behalfe according to their degrees." It is then ordered that there "bee printed so many Briefes of these Our Letters

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Patent, as may suffice for the accomplishing and performance of this good worke."

St Paul's, neglected during the reign of James I., had fallen into decay and partial ruin. Charles I., stung in his pride, writes in June 1631 to Sir Robert Ducie, Lord Mayor of London that :

> "Adversaries slander these times as neglecting good works, yet it will be found that greater works of charity have been done since the Reformation than when Popery was at its height. It has been the King's care not only to defend the true faith but to maintain the church and clergy in their proper jurisdictions, dignities and professions, and to encourage his subjects to re-edify their churches, that respect being a clear evidence of true zeal. He has cast his eye on St Paul's, the mother church of the diocese, to be matched with few churches in Europe; for the repair thereof he has by his own example desired to provoke the generosity of the Lord Mayor and his brethren the Aldermen and Sheriffs. He recommends to them to assign out of the public Treasury of the City, and out of their own purses, a plentiful collection before he sends briefs to the inferior citizens."

An entry in the State Papers shows that the said "inferior citizens" were appealed to by Brief in November, following the letter of which the above is a summary : "Request to the Lord Keeper Coventry to issue briefs for collections for the repair of St Paul's, to be made within the City of London and the liberties thereof." In response to many appeals, quickened by stimulating letters, money poured in and was prodigally spent on Inigo Jones's restoration, a beginning being made in 1633. As an example of a gracious response, here is one from John, Lord Poulet (or Poulett) who offers to his liege, through the Council, with charming courtesy—and just a hint of self-sacrifice ?—a contribution of £100 "towards the repair of St Paul's Church in London" to be paid in instalments of £10 per annum.

> "And now," he adds, "I beseeche your Lordshipe let this my myte be made acceptable to His Ma^{ste} by your favour—cominge from one who flotts [floats] in the world wth more sayles than balaste, but will be ready alwayes to lay the little fortune he hath at His Ma^{stys} feete to be disposed of accordinge to his good pleasure."

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In contrast to this there is evidence that response was sometimes checked by failure in duty on the part of officials, and at times by incitement to resistance: the Justices of the Peace for Berkshire complain that they have done their best "but have found much remissness" in certain High Constables, and "pray that a course may be taken for reformation"; the Commissioners for County Lincoln "regret that the collection was not answerable to their expectations, being much hindered through the disuasions of Bartholemew Garwell of Great Hale, yeoman, who not only refused to contribute himself, but also disuaded others." The Mayor of Chester writes that they found "much backwardness," that they are bound to beg for further time and will make another trial. A due sense of social inferiority and of the behaviour proper in the circumstances, is believed by Archbishop Laud to have had a reducing effect upon the results of an appeal, and in a letter to the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London, he desires them to make an addition to their former gifts, on the plea that "Many well-minded citizens would have given a greater sum if they had thought it fit to give more than their superiors"!

As in our day, the public of Charles I.'s reign could grow restive at the granting of too many "flag days," as is to be seen in the following summary of a petition, with its fate recorded and appended to it:

"Sept. 24th 1633. Petition of John Neesing, once a councillor of Magdeburg, for himself and 33 of his kindred, to the King. At Tilly's taking of Magdeburg, he with his kindred to the number of 33 persons, escaped from that bloody slaughter, but lost all their goods and estates. Prays a licence for a collection of charity."

Beneath is written: "Reference to the Lord Keeper, Whitehall, 24th Sept., 1633." Annexed to it is the

"Report of the Lord Keeper to the King: There have been so many petitions of late for collections for redemption of captives, for the repair of St Paul's, and in several shires for particular men's losses, that he conceives that it would be unreasonable to grant the petitioners' suit. 14th Oct. 1633."

The clergy were constantly and urgently enjoined to contribute to the repair of St Paul's, and more than one frequent appeal broadcast to them by letter and from the pulpit is extant. In 1633 Bishop Montague of Chichester, in

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a letter to the clergy of his diocese, reminds them that formerly they were included with laymen in appeals by Brief, but that now they were "exempted in the Letters Patent and left to the Ordinaries." He points out that the amount required of them might be exacted both by the laws of the land and the canons of the Church, but that, instead, "it is solicited as a free-will offering and is therefore more acceptable to God and man"; moreover "a little with a good mind is better than a mutchity with grudging."

A very spirited and seductive appeal is that of Bishop Corbet of Norwich at a Synod in 1634. Its length forbids reproduction in full. He begins:

> "My worthy Freinds and Brethren of the Cleargy, I did not send for you beefore though I had a Commission, chusing rather to meete you at a time when you could not bee absent; then to force you to a Journey in a business of good will: Had I called on purpose for this Arrand I knew the charge of comming might have aequalled that of Giving. And soe I had punishd the cause in hand, and you for a Benevolence might have given mee an Excuse. Whereas now if you give but that it would have cost some other time, it would halfe pass for a Benevolence: And I pray bee it one Motive toward the opening of your harts, that I have not clogd your Offerings with the expence of a Journey."

In a long and eloquent exhortation he commends the beauty of the Cathedral to them, ending one of his periods:

> "Your Eie yet never saw such an object; it ware worth the reparation, if it were but for a land marke. But beeloved 'tis a Church to, and consecrated to God. . . . Shee hath beene the Joy of Kings. . . ."

He reminds them of the benefits—even the convenience—the edifice has afforded each one of them:

> "Think: ar you not beehoulding toot? every man heere, to Paules? To the body, or to the chancell I dare pronounce you Debtors. It hath saved *you* from a showr, give you something to the Middle Ile, it hath helped *you* to a prayer, give you something to the Chancell? *You* have walked there and hard news, give you something ffor the walkes sacke. *You* have sate and hard the organs, give you something for stall-wages; some waye or other, ther's a Topick may make a Roome ffor your Benevolence."

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Then follows an excursion into ancient history, embellished by allegory, which ends :

"The first way of Building Churches was by way of Benevolence, but then there needed noe peticion, men came on soe fast that they ware commanded to keepe back; but Repareing needs Petition, and for gods sacke we beeseeche you, Supplication and Petition els no Benevolence: Benevolence was a Fier once, 'tis a sparke now and looks for blowing: I and Gentle blowing or wee mar all; blow it hard and put it out."

In a long and fiery peroration he digresses a moment to aim a shaft at those who have provided too carefully for their ease in church : "Pues have become Tabernacles with rings and curtains to them, there wants nothing but beds to heare the word of God on. . . .;" and then he makes a final appeal :

"In all other Contributions Justice preceds charity; for the King, or for the poore, as you are rated, you must pay; it is not soe in a Benevolence, here Charity rates her selfe, her gift is Arbitrary and her law is the Conscience, he that stays till I *perswade* him, gives not *all* his own money. I give halfe that have procur'd it; he that comes perswaded gives his owne, but takes off more that he brought, God paying use [1] for nothing but good will. Now your turne comes to speake, or god in you by your hand. . . ."

A "Benevolence" was in fact a levy, but as this and other exhortations show, the "Charity" was sometimes allowed to "rate herself." Benevolences had already been rendered illegal by the Petition of Right in 1628, and were to be so again by the Bill of Rights in 1689.

Here the tale of collections from clergy and laity may profitably be interrupted for the introduction of certain curiously interesting records which show that the system of "relaxation of penance," so characteristic of Papal times, was still in operation under Charles I. In 1636, the King, thinking about for further methods of obtaining funds for the use so dear to his heart, issues a warrant to the Officers of the Exchequer "whereby His Majesty, for the repair of the west end of St Paul's, London, assigns all obligations and acts for causes ecclesiastical . . . for the next ten years coming, to be paid to the Chamberlain of London." Not all

[1] Interest.

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offences, however, might be commuted. Such cases were tried in the High Commission Court, and Charles, like the Popes before him, was careful to enjoin vigilance against abuse: "No discharges are to be given nor pardons for any crime of ecclesiastical cognizance without the approbation of the Archbishop of Canterbury." In the Acts of the Court of High Commission in the same year appears this précis, under the name [1] of the accused:

> "Defendant appeared personally. Guilty of incest. Court enjoined him to do public penance in a white sheet, in his parish church of Whalley, in the Cathedral Church of Chester, and in the next market town adjoining the parish of Whalley; but upon his alleging he was a gentleman descended of an ancient family, and had a virtuous lady to his wife, and ten children, and that if he were enforced to perform this penance it would tend to the disparagement of his wife and children, especially divers of the latter, standing upon their preferment in marriage, the court in consideration thereof commuted his penance into a payment of 300*l.*, by 50*l.* a year, towards the repair of the west end of St Paul's, and [he] was enjoined to give bond in 600*l.* to His Majesty's use, for payment of the said 300*l.* to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord Mayor of London for the purpose aforesaid. . . . also judicially admonished for avoiding future scandal, not to come into the company of the persons with whom his offences had been committed. . . ."

Another order of the same court reads:

> "In the cause against John Belasyse and Jane his wife, for solemnising a clandestine marriage between them. Upon submission and bond for payment of 15*l.* for the repair of St Paul's, the parties were discharged."

The next year brings an entertaining summary of the case of Edward Ashton

> "charged in the High Commission with defiling the vestry and riding into the church of Edwardstone, Suffolk. In the matter of the vestry he has lawfully purged himself. For the other charge, it was in a great shower of rain and without his command that his horse was brought into the church; but he got up upon him

[1] I have suppressed it here.

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in the church and used some indiscreet words to the sexton. Therefore it is thought fit that he acknowledge his fault in the church; but being an ancient gentleman he desires to redeem his penance and offers 20 marks (£13 6s. 8d.) towards the repair of St Paul's, which Sir John [Lambe] accepts, and further orders him to pay 6l. 13s. 4d. costs."

Picturesque details as to doing penance, taken from a trial for the violation of a church monument, help to a realisation of the boon of commutation to an offender. The accused were ordered "to do penance in the Cathedral at Wells" and in two parish churches, "with white wands in their hands and papers on their heads declaring their offences."

A hint in a confidential letter, still open to all eyes, refers to a case to be heard in the Court of Star Chamber: "Something for St Paul's will get [him] excused by the Star Chamber but he must burn this letter!"

In 1638 Charles addresses one among other appeals, to the vanity of the Benchers and Gentlemen of the Middle Temple

"being unwilling that posterity should look over the catalogue of benefactors and find no mention of your so noble a society in the contributions to so glorious a work, to the which you have a more immediate relation, your whole society being twice a year, by the orders of your house, to repair to that church. . . ."

directs that a book containing the names and amounts contributed shall be kept at the Chamber of London "as a monument of your charitable dispositions."

With the accession of Charles II. appeals for the alleviation of many kinds of distress, decay and destruction—the wreck and ruin of the late civil wars—came thick and fast. He has "observed with compassion the ruin into which Chichester Cathedral was brought by the discords of the late times," and invites the nobility and gentry to contribute, not doubting the concurrence of the clergy." He calls for "repairing and beautifying" of St Paul's; requests that a chest be kept to receive voluntary contributions from the laity and clergy, and grants briefs for a general collection. In 1666, with no premonition of the coming disaster of the Great Fire, the work of restoration is energetically taken in

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hand. The date of this busy period of appeals prompts the question: Has not perchance our friend Samuel Pepys something to say on this matter? And, sure enough, here, in 1661, June 30, he and his wife "To church, where we observed the trade of briefs is come now up to so constant a source every Sunday that we resolve to give no more to them. A good sermon and then home to dinner." An examination of the Brief Book still extant at the church of St Olave, Hart Street, shows that Pepys's exasperation was legitimate, for collections had been made for fourteen weeks in succession before this particular one which was "for several inhabitants of the parish of St Dunstan in the West, towards their losse by fire." It should here be mentioned that not all Briefs recorded in Churchwardens' Accounts were Briefs in the strict sense, but licences or warrants to collect for relief, and granted by the local Justices. The Brief proper issued under the Great Seal involved heavy expenses: the fees for obtaining the Letters Patent, the cost of printing, signing and stamping the printed Briefs, solicitor's charges, the salary of the "undertaker" responsible for organising the collections, and many other costs might result in a total of some £300 to £500. When the area to be collected from was a wide one and the authorisation for several years it could be a great deal more. The net result for the "Cause" was often small, and not infrequently in times of depression, or if the cause were unpopular, there was actually a loss. The system, too, lent itself to abuse. From time to time attempts were made to regulate and reform it by statute. In 1828 it was brought to an end by "An Act to Abolish Church Briefs and to provide for the better Collection and application of voluntary Contributions for the purpose of enlarging and building Churches and Chapels." [1]

Two final, and related, documents must be found a place, justified by their human interest and because they are touched by a certain prevailing local colour of the Reformation period—practical sympathy towards foreign refugees. One of them relates to the collection of subscriptions by the Archbishop of Samos to build a church for the Greek community in London, while the other affords a captivating glimpse of one, Laurence Georgerini who "hath an Art to Pikle Makerill" and who craves permission to practise it for the good of the cause. The first reads:

"Upon the Petition of the Archbishop of Same and

[1] 9 George IV. cap. xlii.

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Father Daniell [1] Bulgari and other Grecians praying that His Majty having granted them a Patent to enjoy the free exercise of their Religion here and they having procured a convenient piece of ground for that purpose and having obtained Subscriptions of the Right Reverend the Archbishops and other the Bishops towards the building of a little church, that His Majty would bestow something upon them towards the perfecting of it. His Majty for the charitable encouragement of this work is pleased that the sum of one hundred pounds be subscribed as of His Royall Bounty. Whitehall the 19th of March 1677. He refers to the right honble Lord High Treasurer of England to take care for the furnishing of the said summe accordingly."

The second is as follows :

"Patent for Art of Pickling of Mackril. Whereas Laurence Georgerini late of Milo an Island in the ArchiPelago now belonging to the Grecian Church planted in this our Kingdome hath by his humble Peticion represented unto Us that he hath an Art to Pickle Makerill so as they shall continue for the space of 2 yeares without decaying or perishing which may be beneficiall to the Nation, the said Mackerill being thereby fitted he said for Victuall by Land or Sea or to make Merchandize of, and the said Grecian Church having as yet no maintenance settled upon it, he hath humbly besought Us to grant him Our licence for the sole exercising and enjoying the said Art for the terme of 14 yeares according to the Statute in this case provided for and towards the better Support and Maintenance of the said Church. We are graciously pleased to condescend to the Peticrs request. Our will and pleasure therefore is that you forthwith prepare a Bill for Our Royall Signature to passe Our Great Seale containing Our Grant unto him the said Laurence Georgerini his Executors Administrators and Asiegnes of the Sole Licence and privilidge to use exercise and Enjoy the said Art and all profitts and advantages arising thereby in any place in Our Kingdome of Eng-

[1] A priest who, before the coming of the Archbishop, "had earnestly procured to get one builded and in order thereunto had obtained His Majties gracious grant for the same." Report of the Archbishop of the Island of Samos in Greece. In *British Museum Tracts Relating to London*, 1700-1760, No. 118 (1682).

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land, Dominion of Wales and Towne of Berwick upon Tweed for the space or terme of 14 yeares (according to the said Statute) to Commence from the date of such Our Grant for and towards the better support and maintenance of the said Grecian Church. . . . Given the 14th day of December 1677. To Our Trusty and Wellbeloved Our Attorney Generall."

This was the first Greek Church in London. After a few years, being inconveniently situated for most of the Greek settlers, it passed into the possession of the French Protestants; in 1822 it was taken over by a Nonconformist body, and in 1850 was purchased by St Anne's, Soho. As St Mary's, Soho, in Charing Cross Road, it was demolished last year. The site has been purchased for two buildings, the new St Martin's School of Art and an L.C.C. School of Retail Distribution.

LILIAN G. PING.

LONDON.

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The documents quoted in full or in part in this article are derived from the State Papers in the Public Record Office, whose hospitable doors stand invitingly open to the seeker at the sources of history. When summaries only have been reproduced they are drawn from the series entitled *Calendar of State Papers—Domestic* (volumes for the years 1547–80, 1619–23, 1623–25, 1629–31, 1633–34, 1635, 1636–37, 1637–38, 1663–64, 1677–78) by the kind permission of His Majesty's Stationery Office.

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SELVES.

PROFESSOR JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

Comparatively little in the way of a detailed and comprehensive study of *selves*, as such, and of their varied and subtle relations to one another, has yet been made—relatively, *i.e.* to the scope and possibilities of the subject. In general, philosophy, psychology and ethics have all been engaged, in one way or another, with this task, but it has not yet become sufficiently specific and concentrated. Yet such a study lies close to the heart of life and is full of promise. In spite of its elusiveness and subjectivity it deals with the most vital and intimate of all realities, selfhood, as it is disclosed in consciousness.

In probing into the nature of selfhood one is confronted at once by the problem of method. Scientific method makes much use, for example, of *classification*. Is this germane to the realm of personality? Manifestly not, if it is based upon mere external resemblances in selves, or if it magnifies distinguishing characteristics or traits of character above the bearers of them.[1] But if selves may be classified in such a way as to bring out genuine common traits together with important differences the result can hardly be other than edifying and contributive.

The following tentative tabulation of selves, including types of selves not hitherto recognised as such, may serve to promote further study in this field:

Incarnate Selves
Discarnate Selves
Historic Selves
Fictional Selves
Fictitious Selves

[1] This is a frequent error of psychology. Nor is it absent from ethics, as Nicolai Hartmann's notable work on ethics illustrates.

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I.

Nothing is more significant about *living* selves than their being "in the flesh." This is at once advantage and disadvantage, asset and liability. Plotinus was constantly aware, with a deepening sense of dismay and shame, that he dragged about what he considered to be the encumbrance of a dying body. On the other hand, Browning exclaims in familiar lines:

> "Let us not always say,
> 'Spite of this flesh to-day
> I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!'
> As the bird wings and sings,
> Let us cry, 'All good things
> Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul!'"

Similarly a talented young poet of our own day has sung:

> "Here are beautiful things:
> Know them well, O my senses,
> Find a way to God." [1]

Are "these fleshly lendings" of earth hostile, or helpful, to the "restless winnower of heaven"? [2] Without going into this paradoxical problem, the significant thing for our present purpose is the fact that we are *aware* that we are enfleshed. The datum that we know that we are in a body, or have a body, or are in some way associated with a body, is full of meaning. Herein lies at once the epic possibility, as well as the tragedy and comedy, of life. For our awareness that we are more than our bodies is sufficient evidence of our transcendence of Nature. If we were mere creatures of Nature, animal organisms, this *self-and-body-consciousness* would be strange indeed. The most intelligent dog or chimpanzee does not have this awareness—not even a glimmer of it. How did it come about in man that he distinguishes his soul from his body and values the former more highly than the latter? What does this mean? How does it bear upon our knowledge of ourselves and of others, and how does it affect our character and conduct as selves?

II.

No sufficient answer to these questions can be made without taking into account the second class of selves

[1] Helen Underwood Hoyt, *Bramble-Fruit*.

[2] Phrases of Francis Thompson. Bergson has spoken with deep suggestiveness on this subject, as when he writes: "The body is indeed for us a means of action, but it is also an obstacle to perception." *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 363.

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indicated, *i.e. discarnate selves*. Whether or not such selves exist consciously, the very *idea* we have of them is in itself full of meaning and gives them a certain kind of reality. It is true that—far more than most ideas—this one involves the question of existence in *propria persona*. *Are there such selves?* Is their continued conscious perdurance merely an insubstantial inference—a product of "wish-thinking," arising out of the desire to project ourselves and others into a life beyond the present and thus continue what to many seems a meaningless existence? Or have such selves a veritable conscious reality?

Leaving unsolved this age-long question, the point I would emphasise here is that whether "the dead"—as we smugly and unfeelingly call them—continue to exist consciously or not, *they continue to exist for us, i.e.* they continue to be real spiritually and often influence our lives as much, or more, than those about us. As a typical illustration of the continued presence and potency of the discarnate, the following from Harriet Beecher Stowe (which might be paralleled innumerably) may be cited:

"Although mother's bodily presence had disappeared from our circle, I think her memory and example had more influence in moulding her family, in deterring from evil and exciting to good, than the living presence of many mothers. It was a memory that met us everywhere, for every person in the town, from the highest to the lowest, seemed to have been so impressed by her character and life that they constantly reflected some portion of it back upon us." [1]

is altogether incommensurate with the *realness* of this periential relationship, to regard it, as is commonly done, merely the *recollection* or continued influence of those who are no more." Conventionality has made us victims of de and superficial notions which fail to interpret experi- and thus tend to limit and restrict experience itself and us of much of its meaning and value.

Discarnate selves constitute a real and vital factor in the al impacts of selves upon one another. So much is certain. h selves consequently hold a distinct and vital place in Personal Order, whether they continue a conscious sonal existence or not.

[1] *Saints, Sinners and Beechers*, by Lyman Beecher Stowe, p. 156, napolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1934.

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III.

Among discarnate selves certain constitute a definite class by themselves to which the term *historic* is attached. These selves, for one cause or another, have taken their places in the general mind of successive generations as permanent and influential personages in what we call "history."

History is too generally regarded as merely a static record of past events and persons, with no vital relation to the present and the future. On the contrary, it is a living thing, with a potent and ever-increasing effect upon contemporary life. Without it there would be no civilisation. If the past were a blank, the present and future would be meaningless. History is a stream whose fertilising waters flow through the valley in which we now dwell. Without the past the present would be barren and the future blank.

Into this rich historic heritage of formative forces certain effulgent personalities are so incorporated that they constitute very much of its meaning and effect. What were Christendom without Jesus, Paul, Augustine, St Francis, Luther, Wesley? What were England without St Thomas More and Hampden, Shakespeare and Browning? What were America, were not Washington and Lincoln, Emerson and Mark Twain, still with us? These are not only "household names" but virtual compatriots, fellow citizens. It does not detract from their reality that the members of this "choir invisible" are *idealised* and thus live on "in lives made better by their presence." Idealisation, instead of distorting, tends to normalise selfhood, bringing out the finer qualities which, after all, constitute its essence. A portrait that erases from the countenance blemishes and brings out its best expression is not a false portrait but a true one. Idealisation serves to make perduring persons more real, more *themselves*, and thus more potent in the life of humanity. Berdyaev has well termed Christ "our eternal contemporary."

IV.

Fictional selves, our fourth class, would seem at first thought to be nothing *but* fictional, *i.e.* to have no genuine existence whatever. Yet looked at from the point of view of influence they are far from being unreal. A certain kind of reality must clearly be assigned to "characters" in fiction who have taken their places as familiar personages in the society of the "well-read," even though they themselves are

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quite unaware of the fact. Hamlet, Lear, Portia, Prospero, Faust, Don Quixote, Colonel Newcome, David Copperfield, Adam Bede, Jean Valjean, Old Black Joe, Alice of Wonderland, Huckleberry Finn, Soames Forsyte, and many others of like renown, have become world citizens and play no little part in the fashioning of contemporary life and its ideals. Not to know them is a mark of provincialism ; it is personal impoverishment. To be sure, they are not self-existent. Although they have like Topsy " just growed " in the minds of their creators, they are fashioned out of actual men and women by a process of selection and synthesis. The result is an ever-enlarging company of self-perpetuating individuals of a very definite sort whom age cannot wither nor custom stale.

Although we keep such fictional selves in a compartment by themselves in our minds, never confusing them with either incarnate, discarnate, or historical selves, still they are consequential members of the personal order. Instead of being wholly vaporous and imponderable they have a certain standing of their own in the hierarchy of selves.

V.

Quite distinct from the preceding is another class of selves who are manifest interlopers in the personal realm, *i.e.* *factitious selves*. Here is a company of masqueraders, indeed ! And they have exerted an enormous influence in human life, and in that regard are not to be ignored. It is one of the most disastrous potencies of the human imagination that it can conjure up out of the vasty deep of nothingness, spirits, ghosts, shades, spooks, and mythical and superstitious shapes of all kinds, investing them with form and endowing them with a false reality, so that they become peculiarly potent entities, objects, generally, of dread and fear. It is a striking evidence of man's power to deceive, afflict and terrorise himself that most of these imaginary beings are repulsive and inimical. In so far as this reflects a bad conscience, it is an indirect evidence of the reality of our moral nature, yet how abnormal self-affliction has probably been far more blighting than reformative.

The highest, or rather lowest, of this terrifying assemblage is that universalised arch-enemy, Satan, whom man has self created and into whose shadow-hand he has thrust a sceptre beneath which he bows, servile and self-shorn. In so far as this personification of evil offers an effective *pièce*

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de résistance, it may perhaps have served a good purpose, but it has also served Satan's (granting him the status of personified evil) own ends to an extraordinary degree.

The creation of these subject-objects of dread and dismay is evidence of man's self-apostasy, his failure to use his reason, above all his perversion of the gift of imagination which, when rightly and normally directed, is his joy and crown, but when misdirected works him untold wretchedness and woe. The worst of it is that this fateful phantasmagoria of fictitious selves has been passed on from generation to generation, thus bringing distress to the innocent and unreasoning who have not the strength of mind and heart to refuse to the awful nightmare host the claim to reality.

VI.

Surveying these diverse kinds of personalised beings, it may seem that we have assembled an assortment, rather than formulated a classification, of selves. And yet the distinctness and variety of these conceptual forms of self-hood, with the distinctions between them, is an evidence of the reality and meaning of the self as such. The mere fact that there may be conceived to be not only incarnate but discarnate selves, not only historic selves but fictional selves, not simply genuine and worthful selves but counterfeit and inimical selves, is testimony to the inherent significance and potency of the concept of selfhood and evidence of the need of a closer examination of what it stands for.

What, then, is distinctive in *selfhood per se?* What is common to all of these selves—whatever their dissimilarities and contrasts? Manifestly it is not their material, or physical, nature. Only one of the classes named has a physical nature, *i.e.* incarnate selves. It is, of course, competent to hold, as is often done, that incarnate selves are the only real selves, the rest being either merely pathological, or entirely negligible, and thus having no place in good (*i.e.* sensible) society. There is much to support this contention. Certainly incarnate selves are the only ones known to exist through outward manifestation. But is this the only way by which selves can be known? In answer it should be noted that clearly it is not the body alone that serves to identify and express selfhood. For we are in constant intercourse with absent selves and with selves whom we have never seen. It requires only a coherent message, however brief, to establish a vital personal contact with one

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whom we have never looked upon or listened to. This is a fact of really astonishing import, showing as it does how very slight a medium, or instrument of interchange, serves to link one person to another.

Slight as it may be, it is true that if this link is wanting in relating us to one whom we love, the sense of separation is deep and desolating. *Yet this very sense of separation involves an intense feeling of the reality of the person from whom one is separated.* The pain is not that of loss, but of broken intercourse. Here lies the tragedy of the interposition of death. If there were only some uniting thread, some slightest sign of recognition, to afford assurance of continued contact, what reassurance would follow! And yet, in the nature of the case, this is an unreasonable requirement. The purely spiritual realm cannot have converse in kind with the physical. If any contact is to be had, it must be spiritual in nature. The question thus becomes whether communion may not be had *upon a purely spiritual level.* If so, it must be based upon the something within selves as such, whether incarnate or discarnate, which is inherently and essentially spiritual.

VII.

The implications and applications of the concept of self-hood thus suggested serve to emphasise the assertion with which we started—the imperative need of a truer understanding and evaluation of the nature and possibilities of selves as such. It is folly to suppose that experimental psychology, and the investigation of psychic phenomena, can deal adequately with the problem of what it is to be a self and to be related to other selves in all the profound meanings and potencies of these relationships. Such a study requires not only psychology, and the social sciences, but ethics and psychology. It takes one far into the philosophical realm, since it has to do with ultimate reality.

Chiefly, however, there is needed the realisation, slowly dawning upon the contemporary mind, that in Pope's familiar but pertinent line,

"The proper study of mankind is man,"

there is more truth than has yet been recognised. Natural science has held the Western mind spellbound ever since the middle of the last century. The fruits of this intense absorption in Science have been manifest and the pursuit of it will continue and bring other and richer fruitage. Yet at the

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same time it has led to a false perspective, both of interest and the sense of values. To correct this perspective is the first necessity.

Our confused and distracted time, "hell bent" (to use an old revivalistic Americanism) for material goods, yet "anxious and troubled about many things," is slowly becoming aware of the neglect and abuse to which personal and social values have been exposed. There are many indications that the age is ready for a restudy and a reappraisal of personal realities and values. The rapidity with which such a volume as Alexis Carrell's *Man the Unknown* has won a wide and eager response, with its challenging message that "humanity's attention must turn from machines and the world of inanimate matter to the body and soul of man," is extremely significant, the more so since the author, although himself engaged in physiological investigations, so freely recognises that personality is the major concern, declaring that "the development of personality is the ultimate purpose of civilisation."

"Man the Unknown" is the best known, yet least known, of all beings; because personality, which is the core of his being, is the best known, yet least known, of all realities.

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION,
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.

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ARCHIBALD ALLAN BOWMAN.

(1883—1936)

J. W. SCOTT,

Professor of Moral Philosophy in University College, Cardiff.

THE academic calling is not usually an eventful one; but the story of the late Professor Bowman, of the University of Glasgow, was something of an exception to this rule. His life was so full of delightful colour and incident, and at the time of his death he had become so much of a public force, that there is almost a temptation to devote the present article to the externals of his career only; to the detriment of what is really most memorable about him, and perhaps of most interest to readers of this JOURNAL. For however much his social influence counted, his vocation was to be a teacher of philosophy. And he had the full traditional conception of the office. He lived effectively. But a fabric of transparent philosophical truth had to underlie all that he was and did. In fact he united ethical constructiveness with intellectual integrity to a degree remarkable in an age which has almost ceased to believe in the possibility of the combination. What adds to the poignancy of his loss is that he had published nothing beyond occasional papers. No complete statement of his philosophical position was committed to print. He reserved this for the students who figured in their multitudes through his classes year by year. The nearest approach he made to an adequate presentation of his views was in the Vanuxem Lectures, delivered by invitation at Princeton in the spring of 1934, under the title *Sacramental Universe*. These he had partly prepared for publication when he died on June 12 last at the early age of sixty-three. It is possible that they may still appear. In any case, a body of thought, the ripe fruit of an unremitting effort to separate what is living from what is dead in con-

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temporary philosophy, sustained over many years by a thinker of speculative power, scholarly attainment and wide historical knowledge remains as yet largely unstudied and unassessed by technical philosophical opinion. Whether it will prove to have been sufficiently close-knit to hold the interest of philosophers or not, it is too soon as yet to say. But in so far as it does so, the fact should be of some interest to a generation grown sceptical of the very possibility of connecting any kind of social or ethical fruitfulness with general philosophical study.

Our present interest in this author, then, lies in what he had to teach. And we may begin with a glance at some of his earlier writings. There is no need here to delay over his early life. The biographical setting is not unlike many another, in middle-class Scotland. Born in a country manse, he had his future course determined for him by the accidental existence of a local scholarship which lay open to his budding abilities. Having obtained it, he duly appeared in the university classes at Glasgow, a fragile, inquiring, resistant youth of whom the more discerning of his teachers could not but take notice; and who after due honours gained, had the good fortune to be appointed a member of the junior philosophical staff. Having contrived to spend some summers in Germany, he was eventually called to America in 1912 to succeed the late President Hibben as Stuart Professor of Logic at Princeton. To complete this brief sketch, the war brought him home as a volunteer; he was taken prisoner at the battle of the Lys; endured great privations, wrote his *Sonnets from a Prison Camp*, was freed at the close of hostilities and after serving for a time with the army of occupation eventually arrived again in Princeton; from which period his influence there (hitherto chiefly felt by a select circle) grew steadily and rapidly, until Glasgow again secured his services for the university chair of Logic in 1926. The following year he was transferred to the cognate subject of Moral Philosophy; and although severe temptations to change again came his way, none of them could shake his purpose of giving the harvest of his life to his own university and country.

One paper written before the Princeton period, we may take to have sprung from profound necessities of his character; being apparently born of a long revolt against something in the atmosphere of his Neo-Hegelian philosophical upbringing which he had at length become able

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to define in the language of that day. It was read to the Scots Philosophical Club, appeared in *Mind* in 1910, and is perhaps the most perfectly expressed of all he ever wrote. Briefly, it records his conviction that the act of negation negates. Its title, *Difference as Ultimate and Dimensional.*

That utterance marked high tension. But the conviction which it expresses remained part of himself after the tension was over. "Differences," as one called them in those days, permanently intrigued him. In other words, he had a certain blithe interest in the sheer fulness and variety of the world all through his life. On the other hand he was characteristically a finder of "dimensional" differences—between one fact and another, one attitude and another, one way of life and another. A certain rage to study subjects for their own sakes and call things by their own names would seem to have pervaded his thought at this time; and to have led him, in the earlier years at Princeton, towards a theory of knowledge almost reducible to a species of intuitionism.[1]

Under what special influences he worked his way from this point into his eventual kingdom it is not perhaps easy to say. The war experience doubtless had its large share; especially the captivity with all that it entailed, of days and nights of enforced reflection, of hunger with its strange concomitant of preternatural clarity of spirit, the excursions into poetry, the lecturing to fellow-prisoners, the whole new discovery of himself and of human nature which it probably was. At any rate there came to be a philosophy; one reducible in its eventual form to two positions, which in their bare statement may not particularly stir the blood, though that will depend somewhat on the reader. (*a*) *It is impossible to conjure spirit out of physical nature.* Meanwhile (*b*) *spirit itself IS something.*

To pronounce upon either the mutual coherence or the general validity of these principles is not perhaps what the present occasion requires; and least of all do I wish to hazard a guess as to how far the teaching based on them may prove available in the present distractions of official philosophy. Rather than obtrude an assessment upon the reader I would fain assist his judgment by sketching into this bare outline enough of the author's detailed thought to reveal the point from which to regard some of the persistent problems of philosophy. In this I shall endeavour to be articulate, [1] The relevant writings for this are in the *Philosophical Review* for 1915 and *Mind* for 1916.

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even at the cost of much elision and perhaps some unintentional appearance of dogmatism.

There is, then, a spiritual world. I, like every other conscious being, am in it and of it. That palpable material environment which I see around me is real too—*and it is dimensionally different*. Here is being, just as it is also there. But here, in myself, being is taking "personal" form; and it is real, in the sense that it is a system—as a tree for example also is—of functionally related elements. Only, it is a subjective system, one composed of experiences as the tree is composed of physical events. And if it be asked what experience means in this context, the reply consists in pointing to its definitory feature, the fact that it includes the possibility of being conscious.

Such is the concept "personality," which this system seeks to make available for metaphysical investigation. It need not be embodied. But embodied or not, it is entirely of its own kind. Some analogy to its nature is found in the biological concept of organism, if we remember that the crux of biological organisation is, to use Whitehead's word, process. A piece of matter which is alive is a functional organisation of events, in a system which is temporal through and through. And an organised experience is precisely such a system, except that the space factor is left out. The identity of a spirit or person is thus not brought home to the visual imagination. There are the two sorts of entity; (*a*) persons, and (*b*) animal or vegetable organisms, or crystals, or any other kind of material thing. Both can be made to seem as if they were only streams of events. A mechanical—*e.g.* a behaviouristic—psychology can render the one delinquescent, as mathematical physics does the other. But entities of both sorts are really systems. And no event in a system belonging to the one mode of being can ever become an event in a system in the other mode of being, however much a psychical system and a physical may intertwine in the psycho-physical constitution of the higher animals, or however in some more shadowy way the two may glance at one another in the subsensitive forms of life. Matter is never mental, and mind is never material. Such, very barely expressed, is the metaphysical hypothesis here submitted on the ground of its methodological effectiveness.

I suppose that no one who has matured amid the storms of the philosophical schools will expect any principle to be methodologically effective in the naïve sense of stilling their

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clamour. But one could not be serious with a hypothesis if it had no relevance at all to the actual problems of the forum. Has this one thrown any light, then, on the thrice-familiar issues which concern us? What does it say universals are? What are appearances? Will it tell us if values are objective or not? Where, on this suggestion, are sense-data? What is truth?

It would take us too far afield to attempt to sketch our author's answer to these questions. Perhaps he did not answer them. It is possible that he did not want to answer them all as they are put. His aim is perhaps rather to present a positive structure of thought, from within which we may hope sooner or later to distinguish what is fruitful in current controversy from what is barren. And if it is true that we do not ask a philosophical principle to supply solutions to all our problems, but only a tolerably effective angle from which to view them, the one we are considering can at least make a *primâ facie* methodological claim.

That system of functionally related elements which we designate spirit, greets us at once as something apparently able to spread through time with its integrity inviolate. As spirit, I am to-day; was yesterday; and may hope to-morrow still to be. This appearance must be reality. The fundamental position is that spirit *is* something. Otherwise subjective being dissolves out of sight under the behaviour-istic formula; and incidentally there may be no possibility, in its absence, of saving the physical itself from disappearing into the great "as if" of the mathematical physicist; which, to say the least, would be a pity. For the common man will always want to know what matter is. He will insist on looking at the landscape and demanding to be told what in the last resort is "really there." And if perchance the psychologist has already told him that he himself is nothing, it will hardly do to add that out there too is—*nothing!* Better if both could have some kind of an honest existence. But then is it possible that spirit should be a substantial reality, though its sole constituents are those scatterings in time that we call experiences?

I must confine what I have to say on this cardinal point to mere reference or little more, to another occasional paper published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1932–33, under the title *Spirit Time*.

The power of time to dissolve reality is, of course, the central question. I do not think the theory offered in the

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above paper, of the nature of that time in which spirit exists, is fairly described as a mere reversion to the classical conception of eternity. Occasion is taken to relate the conception to that of Mr Alexander. Two of the three features which function in Alexander's account are rejected as not applying to all time, namely its transitiveness and its irreversible character. Alexander's third feature, successiveness, on the other hand, is the character of time as such, and time so characterised is real. But the integrity of the spirit is maintained throughout it, by the circumstance that the spirit's constituent events—namely experiences—are such that those already gone by in the succession can strike back, and those still to come can strike forward into those now passing, and all be modified in the process. There is no unreality about time. There is a far distant future as there is a far distant past. But neither is unmodifiable. The view is a departure from all views which presume an irrevocable physical past; and in an ethical context would be exactly antithetical to that of Nicolai Hartmann: "a deed, once done, belongs to reality and can never be undone." It is only with some such interpretation of time that a whole group of emotional attitudes, the most typical of them being repentance, remorse, and retrospective shame, are compatible, if they are not to be meaningless. But, of course, the otherwise meaninglessness of those attitudes is not the ground from which the nature of time is deduced.

This substantial though invisible time-conditioned reality which we call spirit, then, with its own laws of growth and its own conditions of well-being (and set as it is, in a physical body to which at first it is subject, but of which it is destined to take control), has its own orientation to the gamut of traditional epistemological problems. First in importance, here, is the line taken concerning the ideas of subject and object.

It was probably an important step in the process of defining his attitude to Kant, when his own construction of the term "objective" first defined itself clearly in our author's mind. It formed the theme of his Inaugural Address at Glasgow in 1926. The term denotes not a mode of being but a relation. Being is physical or it is spiritual. To say of anything that it is objective is only to say that it is knowable; as much as this may be said of any part of being whatever; and to say this of it determines nothing about its constitution. The teaching here has apparently become anti-Kantian on two sides. The spiritual is not opaque to our knowledge; on

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the contrary, it is the one thing that we know from within. In the second place, we know nothing of the material from the bare fact that we know it.

With this restriction of the objective to one of its current meanings, and replacement of another by the physical, the persistent problems emerge in a new alignment. Infinite fresh possibilities of being are involved in that mingling of the modes which we meet with in the psycho-physical human personality. Whenever this mixed mode, the human being, encounters the environing physical reality—for we presume that the physical world too *is* something—there arises the whole realm of that *mind-conditioned* which nevertheless is *not mental*. Then are revealed not only—in the first place—all the subjective mode of being itself and all the physical mode, but also, *as they exist*, such mind-conditioned entities as :

i. *Mathematical truths*, which exist in one way, in relation to mind ;
facts that so-and-so, which exist in another way, in relation to mind ; and thirdly
values, such as sensory qualities, charm, utility, beauty, sanctity, together with truth itself in its aspect as value ;
ii. all the sensory clothing of the physical which man looks upon, the physical in its garment of appearances which is properly called " Nature " ; and
iii. images and all the work of the imagination.

If this reflective reading of the Universe which man experiences did not bristle with difficulties it would hardly be a reading. And to force some of these to the front was part of the very design. Thus we may ask how nature's right clothing is supposed to be related to the sheer physical, which science reveals ; that all-but-featureless realm, which only " as if " it were even composed of undulations. The question is strenuously tackled in the author's notes of discourses to his students, in lecture after lecture. But in working out an answer no myopic pre-occupation with sense-data is allowed to develop. Rather we are taken to the physicist himself, and to the chemist, to scan their actual analyses and see whether any functional relation can be established between the two realms, such as may make the report of the senses and the scientists' account consist together as different sides of a possible single story. The

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ideas of system and of function are utilised to avoid the *cul de sac* of an atomising methodology.

Then, what shall we say of the physical itself, this last tremulous abstraction pirouetting on the verge of non-existence, to which the mathematical physicist reduces matter? There is not a trace in it of the only self-conservation we know, that by which spirit sustains itself through time. Is it then existent, if, as our author insists, it is in no way mind-constituted? Yes, we are told, but only if it may be conceived as having been created and as being constantly creatively sustained.

At the extreme opposite end of the scale, again, where values subsist, is there not something of a difficulty in getting goodness in? What is a value, generically? It is a feature developed when some part of the physical world is *brought into relation with* spiritual being. But this particular value, namely goodness, turns out to be the very being of that being. In other words, to describe moral goodness, to articulate it, to illuminate it, to become familiar with it, is to be in the literal presence of the spirit, to walk the very streets of the City of God. Such perambulation, one is tempted to say, was characteristic of this philosopher; rather an occupation of his. In fact, one of his great strengths lay just here. He was at home in the home of the moral spirit. He had a certain profundity of height.

The soul of this philosophy, is, I think, in two traits of its author, his force of ethical principle and the wideness and gladness of his world. That, too, is their order of importance. His problem was subjective reality *versus* the solvent time. But he had seen the last of the ultimate doubt. He had dwelt too long among the larger self-integrations of the spirit to be capable of accepting the possibility that a structureless string of data was all the reality there. "Spiritual conservation obviously is possible. How then is it possible?" That is his problem. And his solution leans over into the theological on all its verges. In the indefeasibility of that self-integration he saw a hint of immortality. Upon its universalisation he shaped a conception of God.

Thus, or somewhat thus, the teacher left the problem to his students looking on. Not, obviously enough, that he left them with a system closed; perhaps it would not close; but certainly, with the only possible honest "stimulus to further work" that there is; namely, the faith that at least the lines of investigation pursued are worth while—that

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something closes. It was a bold impression to leave. He intended to leave it. It is the note of his university lecturing. And it might even be said to have some high appropriateness in the contemporary holder of a chair of great names. Is a philosophical system of this ambitious type indeed possible in these present days ? To that question, in this context, an indirect answer is not perhaps inappropriate. It was at least the product of a mind eminently mature and balanced. Except in the sense in which the mean itself is an extreme, there was no extremist in that loved and familiar figure of the Glasgow University quadrangles, which will so hardly fade from memory ; him of the quick step and the instant courtesy, the far-seeing dauntless eye, and when unbent, that most reassuring of all his characteristics his quality of humour. It was in such a temperament that something always rare, and perhaps particularly rare in our own time, was generated ; a system of philosophic thought in which the religious hypothesis is called upon to furnish the clue to the labyrinth. That may be no argument for its validity. It is certainly, especially when one considers the net purport of the whole, no argument against it. For what is its ultimate purport except this : to recall spirit out of its dispersion and restore to it its ontological status. That is surely something that was becoming lost amongst us. And surely it is something that cannot be lost.

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THE MIRACLE OF LOURDES.

SYLVIA LEITH-ROSS

If the Roman Catholic speaks of the "miracles of Lourdes," the non-Roman Catholic is tempted to say the "miracle of Lourdes" and to find that enough. Whether the apparitions were real or not, whether the sick are supernaturally healed, whether unbelievers are suddenly converted, whether prayers are miraculously answered, is not, for the moment, of interest. What is of interest is that, in this age of reason, an average of fourteen thousand pilgrims a day from May to October enter Lourdes for the simple purpose of defying reason.

On February 11, 1858, Bernadette Soubirous, sent to gather wood on the further side of the Gave du Pau, leant against a rock and began to pull off her stockings. The stream ran icy cold and the rock of Massabielle rose huge and menacing on the other side. A great sound of wind made her look up. The poplars that border the stream stood straight and still. She bent down again to pull off her other stocking. The sound repeated itself. When she looked up this second time she saw, on the further side of the stream, luminous in the dark cavern hollowed in the rock of Massabielle, the figure of a woman. She fell on her knees and, not knowing what else to do, repeated her rosary. As she finished, the vision faded. Her two girl companions had seen nothing. On the way home, noticing Bernadette's agitation, they plied her with questions until she told them: "I have seen something dressed in white." They said quickly: "It may be something that will harm us. Do not let us go back there." Bernadette's mother was sceptical, but said also: "You must not go back." Bernadette, however, longed to see her "Lady" again. Next Sunday, a radiantly beautiful day, on the way back from mass, Bernadette begged her sister and two or three other children

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to ask her mother for permission to return to the rocks. Divided between terror and curiosity, they stood hesitating —after all, in spite of what Bernadette had said as to the sweet goodness of the "Lady's" face, the vision was much more likely to be that of an evil spirit than of a good one. They gasped and crowded together; even Bernadette began to lose her confidence. Then one of them remembered what the catechism said about spirits: you had but to throw holy water over them and say: "If thou comest from God, approach—if thou comest from Satan, depart." It was really all quite easy and they could come to no harm. Madame Soubirous gave reluctant consent and they started off, a trembling, valiant little band, clutching their rosaries and a half-litre bottle of holy water, going forth to meet the envoy of God or Satan. Down by the clear, ice-cold stream, opposite the cavern, they stopped and knelt. In a few moments her companions saw the light of joy on Bernadette's face. They put the bottle of holy water into her hands. She rose, shook the bottle carefully, and flung drops of the water at the luminous figure before her. Twice with strangled voice she repeated the formula: "If thou comest from God, approach . . . if thou comest from God, approach . . ." but her courage failed her when she tried to add: "If thou comest from Satan, depart." Once more she sank on her knees whispering her rosary and once more, as she finished, the vision faded.

Thoroughly frightened, all except Bernadette, the children ran home and the news of their adventure spread through the little town, coloured by faith or doubt, exaggerated or laughed at. To all questions Bernadette gave precise, unvarying answers. Her parents continued to say: "These are childish imaginations." Four days later Bernadette, with two other older women, returned to the grotto. The two women knew by Bernadette's face that the vision was before her. They told her to ask the figure who she was, what she a soul from purgatory? did she want prayers or "I do all that we can for her." Obediently, Bernadette without pen and paper and a bottle of ink. With the perfect courtesy of the Pyrenean peasant she asked the "Lady" to have the goodness to write down who she was and what she desired. With equal courtesy, smiling, the "Lady" replied: "I have no need to write down what I wish to tell you. Only do me the favour of coming here during fifteen days." "I promise," said Bernadette.

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Then followed a period which might well have turned the child's head. Lourdes and its countryside were in an uproar. Hundreds, soon a thousand or two, waited at the grotto for a sight of Bernadette in ecstasy. The clergy remained prudently aloof, but the authorities became alarmed. Hastily they turned over rules and regulations in the hopes of finding a bye-law which would have some bearing on the case, but, alas! the ground around the rock of Massabielle was common land and how prevent a child from kneeling on it? Crowds gathered, but without disorder. No money was asked or given. The apparition made no subversive nor anti-Government speeches. Nevertheless, Bernadette was taken to the police station and threatened with prison if she continued to go to the grotto. "Send me to prison if you like," said Bernadette, "but I must keep my promise to my Lady." One day, they thought they had caught her. She was seen to drag herself on her knees up the slight slope inside the cavern and, bending over, to scratch the bare ground with her hands. The poor girl had gone mad, of that there was no doubt. But in the cup formed by Bernadette's scraping fingers the earth became moist, then turned to mud, water rose over the edge and a tiny trickle spilt its way slowly down to the edge of the cave. A few days later, miraculous cures by the aid of this water were announced, the crowds grew denser, the excitement greater. Only Bernadette remained unperturbed. Every dawn she talked to her "Lady," and then, quietly, in her wooden shoes and white "capulet," went off to the convent school. There she was known as a poor scholar, but a great lover of games.

The civil authorities redoubled their efforts to find means to stop the "scandal." The Church still gave no outward sign. The gifts and *ex-votos* placed in the grotto were confiscated; a squadron of cavalry was in readiness to quell possible riots; Bernadette was medically examined in the hope that she might be certified as insane. Access to the grotto was forbidden, palisades were built round it and guarded by police night and day until an order from the Emperor himself set the grotto free.

On July the 18th, Bernadette had her eighteenth and final vision, and on the 28th, the Bishop of Tarbes at last broke silence and gave orders for an ecclesiastical commission of enquiry to be held. Witnesses of all sorts were called, evidence for and against was heard, Bernadette was examined again and again. The cases of miraculous cure were fully gone into by doctors and others, and a favourable report was

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sent in to the Bishop. The latter, however, would say nothing until time had proved the reality of these cures. He waited three years and then ordered another enquiry. The cures were maintained, no witness altered nor went back upon his first evidence. The Bishop was satisfied: the Blessed Virgin had appeared to Bernadette and miraculous cures had taken place. In 1864 the Church took possession, so to speak, of the sacred precincts of the grotto, and, amid immense rejoicing, a statue of the Virgin was placed in the hollow where she had appeared to Bernadette. A church, built up the slope and over the top of the rock of Massabielle, was under construction; pilgrimages increased in size and number; gifts came from all sides. When the crowd at the grotto was thinnest, a small figure, poorly clad, was sometimes seen. It was Bernadette, on her knees, remembering. ... Not long after she joined the Sisters of Charity of Nevers, nursed the sick, taught the children, and died in 1879, with the same gentle, if a little stubborn, discretion with which she had lived.

The church, or rather the basilica, in three tiers of white and gold, is now finished; the large grounds surrounding the grotto and the basilica are railed in; the miraculous water is turned on through taps; the basilica is flood-lit every night; round a gigantic statue of Our Lady of Lourdes darker jets of blue light. Outside the gates are the sellers of candles, of bouquets, and of sticks of smuggled vanilla. In the narrow streets are the crowded shops selling every variety of pseudo-pious trash, the hotels, the cafés, the tramcars. Vulgarity, ugliness, expense, discomfort and, on the other hand, as far as the pilgrim is concerned, less and less emotionalism, less and less of the dramatic, the sensational or whatever might appeal to the more childish or "popular" mind; moreover, an ever severer scrutiny of possible cures and less and less notoriety for the cured. Yet the number of pilgrims, French and foreign, increases, and also the number of the sick also. Why? How is it that Lourdes keeps its own?

I do not know. I can only describe what I saw during my visits, one in 1923, the other last year. In both cases, through the kindness of French friends, I was allowed to help with the sick members of the annual "Pélerinage du Nord," and thus saw Lourdes more intimately than it is often possible for a non-Catholic to do. We had 45,000 pilgrims from the industrial towns of Lille, Roubaix, etc. In our own train,

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on this last occasion, we had eighty-five sick. They were laid on rough mattresses on the wooden seats of third-class carriages, or propped up in odd corners. The heat was stifling and the journey lasted twenty-two hours. During the night, near Bordeaux, a train passed us with a glitter of light and a glad, clear cry. Then another and another, and always the same clear cry. It was the Pélerinage National, a hundred thousand strong, returning from Lourdes, greeting us.

On arrival at Lourdes, before dawn, the valid are drafted off into the numberless hostels, the sick are taken down to the wards attached to the convent of the Sisters of Nevers, actually within the grotto grounds. An hour's rest and already stretcher-bearers arrive to take them down to mass at the grotto. A quick breakfast and then begins the visit to the Piscine. Just before coming to the grotto there is a space railed off and shaded by trees. The sick lie there, on stretchers, in invalid chairs, on couches or benches, the men on one side, the women on the other, and one by one they are taken by the bearers through a curtained door into the bathing-rooms. From the Piscine the sick are taken back to the wards for their mid-day meal, and after a short time of rest are carried forth again to the Procession of the Holy Sacrament. Two or three rows of stretchers line the huge oval of the esplanade, then come the sick who are able to stand or sit, and behind them is gathered the crowd of ordinary pilgrims. There were about sixty-five thousand present the first time I was there, rather more the second time. Beneath the gold baldachin, the gold Monstrance moves slowly round the oval. The procession over, the sick go back to the wards, while the valid hasten back to the town to get an evening meal and to be ready to join in the torch-light procession. It forms at the grotto and pours in a dense river of light round the grounds and up and down the immense stairs curving on each side of the basilica, till the streams converge to form a lake of gold on the esplanade at its foot. Seen from above, this multitude of candles, carried by unseen hands, swaying slightly to the thundering "Ave! Ave! Ave Maria!" is a never to be forgotten sight, and for days after the roar of voices stays in one's ears like the roar of waves on a pebbly beach. But it is not this rather facile appeal, dignified and well-organised as it is, that is in any way the keynote of Lourdes. What is that keynote? That is what one searches for, in the crowds, in the churches, in the shadow of the grotto, in the silence of the wards.

Is it mass suggestion as one so often hears? It is true

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that during the Procession of the Holy Sacrament a certain amount of suggestion might be felt. A priest, standing in the centre of the open space or kneeling with outstretched arms, leads the continuous intercession. The oft-repeated "Je vous salue, Marie!" does perhaps induce a receptive mood. The sharp clamour of the invocations, "Lord, make me see!" "Lord, make me hear!" are potent suggestions. The touching "Lord, he whom Thou lovest is sick!" brings emotion near. But the shrillness of the voices steadies to "Thy will be done," and quiet faces wait for the coming of the Host.

Is it hysteria or blind superstition? During all the hours I stood in the enclosure of the Piscine, or knelt among the stretchers at the Procession, or talked to the sick in the quiet of the wards, whether in the individual or in the crowd, there was, as far as I could see, an amazing absence of tension, emotionalism or excitability, and an equally amazing absence of disappointment when the days passed and no miracles occurred. It was the heroic resignation of the wounded during the War coupled in many cases with fine faith—though not in all. For it must be remembered that quite a number of patients come to the grotto with no belief whatever, simply because a friend or a relation, a nun who has nursed them or a casual acquaintance, has suggested Lourdes as a last resource. There may be also some element of gambling. The chances are a thousand to one, but when all else has failed one might as well see what the Blessed Virgin can do. There is also doubtless a sense of importance. Although the pilgrimages count as many sick hearts as sick bodies, yet it is the latter which are necessarily the centre of the drama. But even among the cases where faith plays no conscious part, miracles, and even, perhaps, the most startling ones, occur. As to these miracles themselves, a *completely* unbiassed account of facts is hard to obtain. The "Bureau des Constatations," before which all "cures" must pass, is composed of experienced doctors of whose sincerity it is impossible to doubt, but the older ones especially do not seem to have got beyond Renan and Charcot as opponents of "the other side," and are perhaps ignorant of the more subtle forms of functional disease. They win their arguments more by exaggerating those of their opponents out of all recognition than by meeting them on any common and moderate ground. They do not allow that doubt can be as full meaning as belief, and that an enquirer is not necessarily an atheist. Any medical man—and all, of whatever race

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or creed, are welcome at the Bureau—would be received with perfect courtesy and frankness, yet I think perfect freedom of discussion would be rare. Apparently, from all one reads and hears, the examination of alleged cures by the Bureau doctors is as careful and as critical as it is possible to be. The only weak spot lies, perhaps, in the fact that the diagnosis of the disease is not always equally careful. Every patient brings a medical certificate from his own doctor, and in the case of a cure, every effort is made to verify or amplify these certificates, but it is not humanly possible to make sure of their accuracy, and yet it is on their accuracy that the nature of the cure depends. Nevertheless, when you have subtracted all the cases of mistaken diagnosis and all the unrecognised functional ones (the recognised ones are not counted as miracles nor are cases which relapse taken into consideration), there remains a residue, quite small perhaps, but very hard, surely, to explain away by any knowledge we have at present. And even were it explained away, what explains the miracle of Lourdes itself, the miracle of strength and sweetness which holds these vast crowds together in a sensible, orderly whole, which stills the bitterness of disappointment, and sends the sick away uncured, but reconciled? Again, what is the keynote of Lourdes?

I think I came nearest to finding it on my first visit. I used to take a number of very sick men down to the Piscine in the morning. It seemed crazy, this idea of plunging men in the last stages of tuberculosis, of cancer, into an icy pool. But everything in Lourdes was crazy or—and every now and then the strange thought lanced through one—preeminently sane. One moved with greater freedom in a world whose horizons had receded; one saw further, clearer, with a sense of exploration. . . . But down at the Piscine, one could only be conscious of a contrast too great, too monstrous to be borne. Could anything be more poignant than to look at the circle of quiet hills, the radiant light, the swift, clean river, and then at those rows of twisted, tortured, hideous bodies? And yet it was as one stood in that railed-off space watching the seemingly endless procession of bearers depositing one miserable burden after another, watching the crowd of pilgrims pressed against the railings, watching the staggering, coughing, limping figures, that one became aware of a transformation, of a new factor which was neither faith nor hope, nor superstition, nor hysteria, but sheer and overwhelming pity, pity stretched to an unimagined point, beyond all human experience, pity suddenly become a force,

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sweeping all before it. The sufferers saw the sum of suffering round them and forgot their own. Their every look and gesture was transfigured and compassion flooded through them. It was the blind who cried loudest that the lame might walk, and the lame who begged that the blind might see. They began by crying "Deliver *me!*" but before their prayer was finished, pity implored "Deliver *them!*" Their very life streamed out of them in a forgetfulness of self more utter than one would have thought possible, and another life streamed in. What might be the possibilities of this well-nigh incredible abolishment of self, even for a moment? We have come to regard pity as useless if she does not translate herself into "organised activity." At Lourdes, where all material aid is put aside, she can be herself. Can we apprehend what might come to pass within that trinity of pity, suffering, and the love of God?

S. LEITH-ROSS.

SINGLETON, SUSSEX.

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HESITATION.

LADY VYVYAN.

THOSE secrets underlying laws of balance were understood in diverse fashion by the inventor of the pendulum and by St Simon Stylites on his pillar, but there was a third character in history, or fiction, who understood them not at all, and his fate was to suffer the extreme penalty by reason of his very submission to their power, thus affording to posterity a sorry example of virtue exaggerated into fault or balance fallen into indecision. This was the philosophic quadruped whose self-restraint and prudence played him such a scurvy trick when he found himself standing between two bundles of hay; because he found in each of them exactly the same attraction he was unable to move, and so he stood there until he died of hunger.

Public opinion has always paid homage to the man of decision and treated with contempt the hesitating character, as if the power to see clearly, ignoring side-issues of value it may be, to walk straight, rough-shod over others if need be, to grasp firmly, pushing aside other claimants it might be, were qualities deserving only approval and admiration. The story of the philosophic ass has therefore always roused mirth rather than sympathy; while St Simon perched on his strange eminence will command respect although he may not gather followers, while the pendulum working steadily within appointed limits is model for all that is commonly deemed admirable in human beings. The breadwinner of the family, the hireling of a master, the employé in a business, the deputy for any potentate, all these acquire merit in so far as they attain the regularity of the pendulum. Public opinion has never credited hesitation with any value in the scheme of things and has embodied its opinion in the ancient proverb: "He who hesitates is lost." The wise old author of Ecclesiastes used a farmer's experience to express the same

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conviction that hesitation is fatal to success in practical life : "He that observeth the wind shall not sow ; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap."

If one begins lightly to scan the literature of the world one will find innumerable passages written in praise of daring and decision. It is, of course, possible to amass quotations in support of any point of view, and the advocate of hesitation might make a case for himself by citing famous writers ; yet one gains the impression that all through the ages the majority of thinkers looked upon decision as a quality of the highest value, and the majority of moralists considered it their duty to incite men in season and out of season to know their own minds and to act upon that knowledge with speed and energy. William of Orange was certainly voicing a popular sentiment when he declared that he would " die in the last ditch rather than see his country's ruin."

Long ago in the days of Xerxes one of the Persian generals buried some treasure on the field of Platæa, and Polycrates consulted the Delphic oracle about the best means for finding this treasure. This was the stern oracular reply :

πάντα λίθον κινει (Turn every stone).

A biblical parallel to this piece of advice may be found in Ecclesiastes, in the saying : " Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." It is interesting to note, in the second half of the verse, which is seldom quoted, the belief that inspired this morality : " For there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest."

Perhaps the most ardent pæan of self-confidence ever written was that little poem of Henley : " I thank whatever gods may be For my unconquerable soul . . . It matters how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate : I am the captain of my soul."

The same thought was expressed with less vigour by a Latin poet, who said : " Fabrum esse suae quemque fortunae." (Every man is the architect of his own fortune.) Once again, in the seventeenth century, in one of the most high-spirited love poems of the English language, by James Graham, Marquis of Montrose :

" He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch,
To gain or lose it all."

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The gambler's version of this attitude of mind has been pithily expressed by Hoyle, in his 12th rule of the game: "When in doubt, win the trick"; and the hunting man's version in the old saying: "Throw your heart over first and follow it." Emerson expresses the same thought in more transcendental fashion: "A man is to carry himself in the presence of all opposition as if everything were titular and ephemeral but he."

Some of the greatest religious teachers also have taught the virtue of decision. In the Bhagavad-Gita the true Yogi is described as "unwavering" or "rock-seated" and as "remaining in a secret place by himself with thought and self subdued, free from hope and greed . . . having made the mind one-pointed." Socrates, when preparing for death, declared to his friends: "There is no man who could make me consent to do wrong from the fear of death . . . I would perish at once rather than give way . . . throughout my whole life . . . you will find that I have never yielded a single point in a question of right and wrong to any man." And the greatest Teacher of all, the One Who preached with deeds more eloquently than with words, told His disciples: "He that is not with me is against me." Also He bade them "Ask and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you."

Thus all through the ages the quality of decision has won human admiration and approval. So universal and so deeply-rooted is this attitude that the orator, the poet, the biographer will not lightly take for theme a hesitating hero, and, if a sign of hesitation should be displayed midmost in the heroic career, the narrator will nearly always attempt to modify or excuse it, or else he will freely acknowledge the lapse and hasten to point therefrom a moral. To the Westerner in particular it is natural to dislike hesitation and regard it as an enemy, because often it will delay, prevent or interrupt by the unseen workings of the mind that projection outward of activity which to all Occidentals is the major part of life.

Yet there is another aspect of the question. There is an old saying with, apparently, a merely physical implication, that describes the action of one who will "reculer pour mieux sauter." In that same fashion may hesitation be the starting point for enterprise, acting like the touch of spurs on a horse. Possibly, in our craze for speed and action, in our refusal to find any place in our lives for a moment's honest hesitation, lies the root of many of our present troubles. In this age of

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machinery, one second's hesitation may send men hurtling into eternity while the engine takes control. In this age of Dictators the nations have lost power of self-direction and yet they will not face even the brief hesitation that would be prelude to new purpose in their journeying; therefore they seek outside themselves the decision that they lack and Hitler wins the plebiscite by millions and a Mussolini may command his people and his King.

Hesitation has become a bugbear, and yet it is an essential thing in the rhythm of life, playing shadow to the light of decisiveness and bringing the quietude of ebb after flood-tide of activity. A little thought will make us realise that although all through the ages, and to-day more loudly than ever, men have cried shame on hesitation as the foe to human success and human prosperity, it has nevertheless played an important part in great actions and great art and in the spiritual lives of men.

Leopardi, in one of those sketches that for quiet penetrating beauty are only comparable to the novels of Turgenev, has given us an imaginary conversation between Christopher Columbus and his trusty follower Gutierrez. It is a beautiful night at sea; their voyage of discovery has lasted far too long, and the two friends are both yearning for a sight of land. We are made familiar with all the hopes and fears of Columbus and with the geographical theories that had spurred him to this journey. He speaks of fallacies in general, he speaks of the test of experience, he speaks with calm philosophy of the gain that will accrue to them even if the object of their voyage is not attained. What enhanced joy the mere possession of life will give after all these risks at sea. "Who ever numbers among human blessings the having a little land to sustain one's feet?" He refers to their "great desire for the sight of a little corner of land; this is the first delight that presents itself when we awake, and with it we fall asleep; and if only sometime we discern afar the summit of a mountain or forest, or other landmark, we shall not contain ourselves for joy."

Gutierrez, playing the part of Greek chorus to the monologue, asks him now and then a question and Columbus lays out his reflections on the signs and portents of their voyage; on that strange deviation of the compass he has discovered; on the feeling in the air at the present time, more sweet and tepid than hitherto; on the shape of the clouds at sunset, different in form and colour during the last few days, and on the changeability of the wind which blew

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no longer steadily but as if interrupted by some obstacle; on a branch with rosy berries that went drifting by, and on the numberless birds round the ship, many of them in shape unlike sea-birds; all these things signs that land might at last be near. We see in his talk the whole wide outlook of a man concerned with great ideals and thoughts but careful of the smallest detail, of a lonely idealist searching for the undiscovered land of his own dreams.

Gutierrez assures him of loyal support, but adds:

> "By way of conversation, I should be glad if you would tell me precisely, in all sincerity, whether you still feel as sure as in the beginning of discovering land in this part of the world; or whether after so much time and so much experience to the contrary, you do not begin to doubt."

And then comes the confession that throws into high relief the greatness of the lonely explorer. So many prognostications, made before he put to sea, have already failed him, so many hopeful signs in bird-life and in other aspects of their journey have already proved delusive.

He replies to Gutierrez: "Parlando schiettamente e come si può con persona amica e segreta, confesso che sono entrato un poco in forse." ("Speaking plainly, and as one can with a confidential friend, I confess that I have begun to doubt a little.") Or, to translate the last phrase quite literally: "I confess that I have entered a little into perhaps."

Hesitation has played its part in the great epic of America's discovery, and the man seems far greater for that one moment of confession to his friend.

Leopardi, of course, has used the poet's imagination in this picture of Columbus, but how convincing a picture it is, leading one's thoughts on and on to other heroes in the world of action. If biographers were gifted with omniscience, what might we hear of the secret qualms of Attila, of Cæsar and Napoleon, the self-questionings of Alexander? In history the writing on the wall is clear for all to read, but the plain man will not now remember the tremors of the hand that wrote; only the poet and the thinker can recall those movements.

It is easier to trace the part that hesitation has played in great art, for the artist more than any other man is subject to the rhythm of moods.

What hopefulness and what despair, what aspiration,

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triumph and humility, what fervours and what hesitation come pouring from the soul of the artist into some form that will remain a thing of beauty, into sounds that will echo in the air, long after his departure. Artists have known the greatest joy and the deepest sorrow, they have experienced in their individual beings the vacillation of the weak and the confidence of the strong, the wavering of fear and the buoyancy of hope. A Leonardo, a Beethoven, a Michael Angelo were not men of iron who pursued undeviating, untroubled course to the achievement of their works. Hesitation troubled them and doubt and periods of darkness came swiftly alternating with their joy in mere existence, in work, in vision, and every mood in turn was but the ebb and flow of that great tide of creation which was their life. But the particular hesitation of the greatest artist, his attitude in the face of life's mystery, is a legacy of some far-off pre-natal condition when man was not thus imprisoned in the body. It is an inexpressible mood. Plato has come nearer than any other writer to expressing it. The words come from the mouth of Socrates who is describing a particular kind of ecstasy.

"The kind of madness which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and the highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man."

He goes on to describe the wanderings and transmigration the soul, using as a simile the figure of a charioteer driving horses. The whole passage gives a wonderful picture of hesitation which may be associated with the crowning of man's higher nature.

One modern poet has, in his most famous ode, recaptured ething of the vision of Socrates and has given to that est form of hesitation unhesitating tribute. He praises joy blessings, delight and liberty, childhood and hope, and adds:

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"Not for these I raise
The song of thanks and praise:
But for those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings;
Blank misgivings of a Creature
Moving about in worlds not realised,
High instincts before which our mortal Nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised:
But for those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain-light of all our day,
Are yet a master-light of all our seeing;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the Eternal Silence: truths that wake,
To perish never."

But it was not only in the work of those artists who were also seers that hesitation played a part. The great love poems of the world would never have been written but for that hesitation which was so vividly described by Dante in one of his short poems embodied in *La Vita Nuova*, that hesitation which has always made the unsatisfied lover like a blown leaf whirled about by the wind, or a cloud driven fitfully by tempest, or a wave storm-tossed on its career towards immeasurably distant shores.

"Tutti li miei pensier parlan d'Amore,
Ed hanno in lor sì gran varietate,
Ch' altro mi fa voler sua potestate,
Altro folle ragiona il suo valore;
Altro sperando m'apporta dolzore;
Altro pianger mi fa spesso fiate;
E sol s'accordano in chieder pietate,
Tremando di paura ch'è nel core,
Ond' io non so daqual materia prenda;
E vorrei dire, e non so ch' io mi dica;
Così mi trovo in amorosa erranza,
E se con tutti vo' fare accordanza,
Convenemi chiamar la mia nemica,
Madonna la pietà, che mi difenda."

(All my thoughts always speak to me of Love,
Yet have between themselves such difference
That while one bids me bow with mind and sense,
A second saith, "Go to: look thou above;"
The third one, hoping, yields me joy enough;
And with the last come tears, I scarce know whence:
All of them craving pity in sore suspense,
Trembling with fears that the heart knoweth of.
And thus, being all unsure which path to take,

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Wishing to speak I know not what to say,
And lose myself in amorous wanderings :
Until (my peace with all of them to make),
Unto mine enemy I needs must pray,
My Lady Pity, for the help she brings.)
(Translation by Dante Gabriel Rossetti.)

Dante was, of course, the prince of lovers, and hesitation, the bane of lovers through all ages, had him by the throat as it were, but in humble walks of life alike and proud, in homely proverb and in stately verse it has left its mark.

There is the country maid pulling dandelion seeds as she murmurs : " He loves me, he loves me not," and there is Petrarch's resounding line : " Nè si nè no nel cor dentro mi suona "; and between these two there has been every variety of hesitation among those who have found in the great gift of love not a haven but a veritable tempest of desire.

Hesitation, then, has played a not ignoble part in the lives of doughty men and in the development of artists it has been like a back-draught fanning flame, but the part that it has played in the spiritual growth of individuals is incalculable, and would be fit subject for a lifelong study. Tennyson went to the heart of the matter when he declared, in somewhat blunt fashion : " There lives more faith in honest doubt, Believe me, than in half the creeds." Cardinal Newman gave to his own personal hesitation heart-rending expression in the hymn : " Lead kindly Light amid the encircling gloom, Lead thou me on." Francis Thompson gave us in *The Hound of Heaven* a brilliant picture of the hesitant soul. The tale, however, is an unending one, and there is no doubt that all the saints and early Fathers, all anchorites and preachers, hermits and reformers, all those who have followed " religion " in one form or another, have known moments of hesitation when their lodestar would grow dim and their life would seem to be but dust and ashes, and their own deepest aspirations would evaporate at the very source. St Teresa and many of the mystics have dwelt at length in their writings on such periods of life, periods when hesitation would hold them in thrall and the soul would be dry, periods when " fear shall be in the way, and the almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail."

But the very prophet of hesitation, the man who not only understood that it was inevitable as the change in seasons, but who actually turned it, by precept and example, into an

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asset of the spiritual life, was George Fox, the Quaker. To sit still and wait; to dwell deep; to pause upon it; to wait in the light; not to proceed unless a way opens; never to disregard a "stop in one's mind"; such are some of the expressions by which he sought to inculcate among his followers the peculiarly Quaker form of hesitation that implied reliance on a higher power.

Yet long before the days of George Fox, in fact nearly two thousand years ago, there was living a deformed emancipated slave who discovered the value and meaning of hesitation in the relation of man to his God, and proclaimed by his words and life how human hesitation before a guiding power may attain the strength of perfect balance, leading finally to the capacity for progress or for conquest, just as certainly as that ass in the story proved how hesitation may end in helpless hopeless indecision and disaster. Here are the words of Epictetus, that enfranchised slave:

> "Even as the traveller asks his way of him that he meets, inclined in no wise to bear to the right rather than to the left (for he desires only the way leading whither he would go), so should we come unto God as to a guide."

C. C. VYVYAN.

TRELDWARREN, CORNWALL.

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WILLIAM TYNDALE: TRANSLATOR, SCHOLAR AND MARTYR.

LILIAN F. GRAY.

THE fourth centenary of the martyrdom of William Tyndale, translator of the New Testament into English, falls on October 6 of this year. There have been other translators before and after—Wyclif had written the Bible in English one hundred and forty years before Tyndale was born—but Tyndale was the first man to conceive the idea of having an English version *printed* for the masses. Early in life his indignation was aroused at the dogma-bound ignorance of the people, and if he barely lived to see the fulfilment of a vow once passed in righteous wrath to an antagonistic priest, "If God spare my life, ere many years I will cause a boy that driveth the plough shall know more of the scripture than thou doest," he was most certainly the pioneer who blazed the trail of which the Authorised Version of the Bible in 1611 was the first landmark.

As is often the case with those to whom we owe so much of our present freedom, comparatively little of his early history is known. Both his birthplace and date are relatively obscure. It is conjectured that he was born round about the year 1484 in Gloucestershire—either at Slymbridge near Stonehouse, Melksham Court in Stinchcombe parish, or Hunts' Court, North Nibley. According to Foxe he was "brought up from a child in the University of Oxford," but later records state that he entered Magdalen Hall in Easter Term 1510. Strangely enough he is entered in Boase and Clark's Register of the University of Oxford under the name of "Hychyns," either the assumed or real name of one of his grandparents. He took his B.A. in 1512 and M.A. in 1515, and we gather that in addition to his studies he

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> "read privily to certain students and fellows of Magdalen College, some parcel of divinity; instructing them in the knowledge and truth of the Scriptures. His manners also and conversation being correspondent to the same, were such, that all they that knew him, reputed and esteemed him to be a man of most virtuous disposition, and of life unspotted."

After taking his M.A. he moved to Cambridge University. Alluding to this, Foxe refers to him as "spying his time." This rather ambiguous passage can have two meanings—either that, having proceeded "in degrees of the schools" of Oxford he wished to absorb further learning at Cambridge, particularly in Greek and theology, or, equally as likely, his "parcel of divinity," aiming at truth of the Scriptures rather than what the Roman Church thought fit to give, was already being considered too heretical for Oxford. It is certain that Cambridge was already years ahead in its religious outlook, more particularly as Erasmus, with his new learning, was installed there as a lecturer in Greek. Whatever the reason for Tyndale's going to Cambridge, it was there that this earnest, questioning student, although probably already rebellious against the imperialism of the Roman Catholic Church, was ordained.

Somewhere about 1521 he entered the household of Sir John Walsh, of Old Sodbury, Gloucestershire, as domestic tutor and chaplain. He appears to have been liked there, but his zeal made him exceed his duties, and he went out preaching what was considered almost "heresy" in the neighbouring villages; thereby arousing, not unreasonably, the antagonism of the local clergy. Foxe gives us a very subtle picture of him at this time:

> "Then Master Tyndale, as he was learned and well practised in God's matters, so he spared not to show unto them simply and plainly his judgment in matters, as he thought; and when they at any time did vary from Tyndale in opinions and judgment, he would show them in the book, and lay plainly before them the open and manifest places of the Scriptures, to confute their errors, and confirm his sayings."

As a fairly natural consequence of all this, he fell under suspicion of heresy, and stern warnings were issued to him from the Chancellor of the Worcester diocese. Undaunted, however, he declared his intention of translating the Scrip-

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tures into English for all to read. In the preface to his translated edition of the Pentateuch he gives his reason :

"Because I had perceived by experience, how that it was impossible to establish the lay people in any truth, except the Scripture were plainly laid before their eyes in their mother tongue, that they might see the process, order, and meaning of the text."

By the end of a two years' stay in Sir John Walsh's household his mind was made up. Being a brilliant scholar in Greek, Latin and Hebrew, he knew his own ability. Fired with enthusiasm, he hastened to the Bishop of London, Cuthbert Tunstall, in the summer of 1523. He confidently believed that the bishop would approve and uphold the rightness of his cause, but in this he was disappointed. He found indeed that "not only that there was no room in my lord of London's palace to translate the New Testament, but also that there was no place to do it in all England." However, he had not yet despaired of producing his work in his own country, and for a time became a preacher at St Dunstan's in the West. By good chance a wealthy London alderman, Humfrey Monmouth, heard him preach and learnt something of his ambition. At last Tyndale was to receive some practical encouragement and sympathy. For six months he was a guest at the alderman's home, and was able to continue his studies and work without interruption. By this time he had realised that publication of his translation in England was impossible, and his alderman friend gave him "ten pounds" to help him on his search abroad. He left England in May, 1524, destined never again to return to his native land.

His first visit was to Wittenberg, then the home of Luther, and the goal of all the rebellious young priests of Europe. Although England was laggard in stirring from her sluggard sleep, and slow to overthrow the shackles of theological ignorance, other countries were not so backward, and the seed of Protestantism was already vigorously germinating in many lands. Wittenberg represented the Rome of this new movement, and to quote one of them :

"Students from all nations came to Wittenberg to hear Luther and Melancthon. As they came in sight of the town they returned thanks to God with clasped hands ; for from Wittenberg, as heretofore from Jerusalem, proceeded the light of evangelical truth, to spread thence to the utmost parts of the earth."

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While here, Tyndale finished translating the Gospels and Epistles, and afterwards, with a loyal band of English helpers, settled down in Cologne, where the printing of the first quarto edition of the New Testament was commenced. But even in this comparatively free minded city they were not safe—they were "heretics" and liable to be condemned to governmental authorities. Through the hostility of a John Cochlæus, they were soon obliged to flee with their already printed sheets to yet another city—Worms. Here the quarto edition was finished, and an octavo edition also published—both of 3,000 copies—by early in 1526.

Some idea of the ruling ecclesiastical spirit of this time can be discerned from a letter written to Henry VIII. by Edward Lee, afterwards Archbishop of York, then on his way through France to Spain:

> "Please your Highness to understand that I am certainly informed as I passed in this country, that an Englishman, your subject, at the solicitation and instance of Luther, with whom he is, hath translated the New Testament into English; and within few days intendeth to return with the same imprinted into England. I need not to advertise your Grace what infection and danger may ensue hereby if it be not withstanded. This is the next way to fulfil your realm with Lutherians. . . . All our forefathers, governors of the Church of England, hath with all diligence forbid and eschewed publication of English Bibles, as appeareth in constitutions provincial of the Church of England. Nowe, sire, as God hath endued your Grace with Christian courage to sett forth the standard against these Philistines and to vanquish them, so I doubt not but that he will assist your Grace to prosecute and perform the same—that is, to undertread them that they shall not now lift up their heads; which they endeavour by means of English Bibles."

This same New Testament was quickly denounced by the very bishop, Tunstall, of whom Tyndale had had early hopes, and after a passionate oration at St Paul's Cross, all the traceable copies were publicly burned. This brings to mind a story, vouched for by the chronicler, Hall, which gives us a light on another side of Tyndale's character, and one not always to be found in zealots—a sense of balance and humour.

A merchant named Packington told the Bishop of

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London that he thought he could get hold of a large number of copies for him to destroy. Hall says :

"The Bishop, thinking he had God by the toe, when indeed he had the Devil by the fist, said 'Gentle Mr Packington, do your diligence and get them ; and with all my heart I will pay for them whatever they cost you, for the books are erroneous and nought, and I intend surely to destroy them all, and to burn them at Paul's Cross.' Packington came to William Tyndale and said, 'William, I know that thou art a poor man, and hast a heap of New Testaments and books by thee, for the which thou hast both endangered thy friends and beggared thyself, and I have now gotten thee a merchant which, with ready money, shall despatch thee of all that thou hast, if you think it so profitable for yourself.' 'Who is the merchant ? ' said Tyndale. 'The Bishop of London,' said Packington. 'Oh, that is because he will burn them,' said Tyndale. 'Yea, marry,' said Packington. 'I am the gladder,' said Tyndale, 'for these two benefits shall come thereof : I shall get money to bring myself out of debt, and the whole world shall cry out against the burning of God's Word ; and the overplus of the money that shall remain to me shall make me more studious to correct the said New Testament, and so newly to imprint the same once again, and I trust the second will much better like you than ever did the first.' And so forward went the bargain, the Bishop had the books, Packington had the thanks, and Tyndale had the money."

Within a short time the sale of all foreign books was forbidden in England, but copies were smuggled over in kegs and bales of merchandise, and stealthily distributed by a band of brave men called "Christian Brethren." Even enough to possess a Tyndale-printed Bible might mean punishment or even death, they were eagerly sought after by the many who wished to read the Bible for themselves.

From now on, the life of Tyndale was in constant danger. Perhaps not so much at first because, strangely enough, the King had a surreptitious respect for him and his helpers, and, for reasons of his own, really wanted to encourage the spirit of the New Reformation. But not in Tyndale's Orthodox way—not by the publishing of the New Testament in the vernacular without the authority of King or Church. Later on tolerance was replaced by intolerance, and

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the lives of these early printing reformers, particularly that of Tyndale, became of little worth.

Of his journeyings, adventures, and trials, we have but bare mention. Many times he only escaped arrest by the strategy of his faithful friends. Once, in 1529, he was shipwrecked off the Dutch coast and lost his newly-completed translation of Deuteronomy. While at Worms, in 1530, he translated and published the whole of the Pentateuch. Later on he had to leave Worms, and found refuge at Marburg, under the Landgrave of Hesse. It was at Marburg that he published his "Practyse of Prelates," a strong indictment of the Roman Church.

From here he went to Antwerp, where he entered into a lengthy controversy with Sir Thomas More without in any way converting the latter to his views, or changing his own. His life became a series of involuntary movements, ever seeking opportunities for further printing of the Bible and various translated theological works, all the result of his own linguistic study and enterprise.

Nor was he immune from publishing troubles. In 1534 he had to contend with a proof-reader named George Joye, who exceeded his authority by making changes in Tyndale's original text immediately before publication during the month of August. In November of the same year Tyndale rejoined by publishing a revised New Testament, with a preface commencing "William Tyndale yet once more the Christian reader" and in which he expressed his opinion of George Joye's conduct in no uncertain terms.

For ten years from the time that he left England did he labour in the sacred cause of truth, encouraging his ever increasing band of helpers and followers by his selfless and brave example. The shadow of death hovered always near him, and he knew it. Eight years before he died he wrote:

> "If they shall burn me, they shall do no other thing than that I look for. . . . There is none other way into the Kingdom of Life than through persecution and suffering of pain, and of very death, after the example of Christ."

The last two years of his life were spent at the house of Thomas Poyntz, an English merchant at Antwerp, where he was relatively safe. During May, 1535, however, through the agency of Henry VIII., he was lured outside the city boundaries and arrested by officials of Charles V., Emperor of the Netherlands, and a zealous champion of Roman

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Catholicism. He was imprisoned in the State prison of Vilvorde, near Brussels, and in spite of impassioned appeals from all classes of people, was finally found guilty of heresy and condemned to death. The end came on October 6, 1536, when one of the most noble and brilliant English scholars of the day was first strangled and then burnt at the stake. So ended a life of high endeavour. Even in the moments of direst extremity, his thoughts were of his compatriots, priest-ridden subjects of a corrupt Church, for whom he had ever been working, his last words being, "Lord, open the King of England's eyes."

It would almost seem that his prayer was answered before it was uttered, because in 1535—after his arrest—a complete English Bible was compiled and published by one of his former assistants, Miles Coverdale. It is true that it was not circulated for use among the churches, but it was patronised by Thomas Cromwell, and openly dedicated to Henry VIII. Ironically enough, most of this translation was the work of Tyndale himself. Herein lies the whole crux of Tyndale's persecution by the King. Henry VIII. had no objection to a Bible in the vernacular. What he objected to was someone not only making translations without his authority, but persisting, year after year, in this heinous offence. The King's ego could not thus be so openly defied, and his net about Tyndale grew tighter and tighter until he was caught in the end.

The chief excuse for his persecution was that his translations were considered "erroneous" and, in some cases, "a mischievous perversion . . . intended to advance heretical opinions." In spite of certain rather controversial marginal notes, the latter was certainly never his intention—his desire to spread the knowledge of God's Word was singularly pure-minded and innocent of designing—while time proved the injustice of the former. A few insignificant mistakes there may be, but as he translated from the original, Professor Pollard is right when he says that "no Greek scholar would dispute the fact that Tyndale's expressions were less of a perversion of the truth than those they displaced." In any case, the fallacy of this "perversion" accusation is finally proved by the publication in 1611 of the Authorised Version, most of which was Tyndale's original and unaltered work.

In honour of his memory, one cannot do better than echo Froude's words: "A man whose history is lost in his work, and whose epitaph is the Reformation."

LILIAN F. GRAY.

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HOPE IN THE SLUMS.

HORACE THOROGOOD.

It says a good deal for the energy and efficiency of the various social reconditioning movements that have been at work in London during the present century that the improvement in the standard of living can be seen even in the slums. Many places that we should call slums to-day would have been thought "not bad" thirty-six years ago. This is not because the slums themselves have improved—one can only improve a slum by destroying it; the improvement is in the slum-dwellers. They are more sober; they are better educated, fed, clothed, and doctored; they are better mannered and more law-abiding. The squalor of the slums, which is to a certain extent made by the slum-dweller, has accordingly diminished, and the slum itself is less apparent to the passing eye.

It is not common in the East End now, as it was at the beginning of the century, to be assailed by fetid smells emanating from doorways more like the mouths of dark and evil caverns than the entrances to human homes. Public-house precincts are no longer the habitual scenes of brutal fights, and the midnight pavements are not made hideous with bawling, drunken women. People do not now die of starvation in the streets. There are not many places left where it is unsafe to walk alone at any hour of the day or night.

Then, of course, the area of the slums has been reduced. If you look at the large map of London on the wall of the Housing Centre in Suffolk Street, Pall Mall, the coloured spots marked on it to indicate where slum clearances and rehousing have occurred seem very small compared with the dark and dreary stretches in which they are isolated. But the realities for which they stand mean a lot more than the map hints at. For the block of Council or Association

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flats, although covering a small area in a dark district, is an outpost of civilisation. It shows an example of a better way of living. It stirs ambition in the surrounding slums to get out of them. Instead of a whole population in that inhabited patch being sunk in one monotonous squalor, here is a place where the people have been lifted above it in the sight of all, free from dirt and damp and overcrowding and ugliness: and those who are left in the slums around see that this state is not only superior, but accessible to people like themselves.

Ideals will grow quickly when they are nourished by good hope.

Moreover, the flats open up communication with a superior social culture. There is the estate manager, constantly in and out, not merely as rent collector, but as adviser and friend. Very often, the manager is a woman, and excellent as are the men employed in that capacity, the women estate managers of London are splendid. They carry on the Octavia Hill tradition. Some of them, in their youth, worked with that noble pioneer. Miss M. M. Jeffery, her girl secretary, for instance, after working in the slums of Shadwell and St George's-in-the-East in the days when they were among the most sinister in London, became manager of the Crown Estate in Columbia Market. They work extraordinarily hard, engrossed all day with correspondence, workmen, inspectors, gas, water and electric companies, lettings and leavings, applications and complaints; and necessarily involved in the domestic affairs of their tenants —the baby's ailments, the difficult boy, the girl's lost job, the husband's accident, a thousand-and-one things with which they have no official concern, but which, being perfect monsters of sympathy, they cannot keep out of. Their sympathy and tact, and their instinctive understanding of a poor woman's problems, are part of their wonderful efficiency. Then there are the Council members and officials, and the members of the Housing Associations, whose duties bring them to the flats, men and women of a high type. Interested visitors from other parts of London, and from other cities with similar problems, come to get ideas. These are all contacts that benefit the neighbourhood. They make valuable breaches in the solid lumps of the slum areas, letting the light that disintegrates some of their worst features. But although the slum area in London has diminished, and the human element in the slums has improved, slums are still there to an appalling extent. The question: What is a

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slum? arises at this point. It is a place, lived in, which is unfit for human habitation by reason of insanitation, dilapidation, insufficient space and light and air, and lack of the elementary facilities for cleanliness and health—one, or several, or all of these together. It need not be overcrowded, or verminous, or dirty, in order to be a slum, but it generally is. Poverty and lack of other accommodation compel the poor to herd together in whatever shelter they can find, and the overcrowding develops the other evils almost inevitably.

There is a house in the Victoria Dock Road district known to the Housing Centre as "the worst house in London." Its eleven rooms are occupied by sixty-five people, including negroes. Scarcely anything that could be physically or morally wrong with a human abode is absent from that house.

I was in a Bethnal Green slum the other day which would need the brush of Hogarth and the pen of Dickens to describe. It was called a "Square," but it was no bigger than an ordinary back-yard. One could almost spit across it. To find it, one has to take a side turning off the main road, dive out of that into a maze of smaller streets, and go through an archway between two houses. There it lies, as secretly as a maggot in an apple.

There are eleven cottages round this "Square," one with three rooms, the others with two; and fifty-three persons were living in them when I saw them. The two rooms, one above the other, are about 11 feet square; height, 8 feet below and 7 feet 6 inches upstairs. Except four, which have the street on the other side of them, the cottages are built against a blank wall. They are infested with bugs.

In one of the cottages live a widow, her daughter and son-in-law, and five grandchildren—eight people. The couple have known no other home since they were married. Another small cottage has been lived in by a couple and their four boys for nine years; another holds a couple and their two sons (twenty-eight and twenty-one) and two daughters (twenty and eighteen); another, a couple and their son (fourteen) and four daughters (twelve to six).

Any attempt to imagine the discomfort and impropriety that must attend the huddling together in two small, verminous rooms of so many people of various ages and sexes, must fail. The heat in summer is often so stifling that the people leave their cottages at night and sleep outside in the "Square." One unventilated cupboard next to the

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range in the living room is the only provision for storing food. Water comes from one tap in the "Square." The single dustbin close to it (it stands under bedroom windows) overflows with the refuse of the eleven cottages, and breeds a pestilence of flies. In two corners of the "Square" a low archway gives access to a little alley with a row of four w.c.'s, their state too dreadful to describe here. They are unlit, and after dark the children are afraid to go there. In this abominable alley the eleven households do their clothes-washing.

Here, then, is a modern slum, amply fulfilling the requirements of our definition—overcrowded, insanitary, verminous, filthy, malodorous and short of all the elementary necessities. People pay twelve shillings a week for the privilege of living there.

There are hundreds of such places in London. The map in the Housing Centre office showed thick clusters of them in Southwark, Bermondsey, Bow, Paddington, St George's-in-the-East, St Pancras and Hoxton. They reminded me of brief glimpses I had had into some London interiors. I remembered the hovel close to Paddington station where a sick child lay in bed with beads of damp trickling down the wall beside it, and the wallpaper flapping soddenly; the mother had so little on that she was ashamed to go out until it was dark. I recalled another basement, in Walworth, where an ill woman lay in an atmosphere so fouled by bad drains that it required a violent effort of the will to enter. In a tenement in Southwark, I found a family of five distributed about a small room where a corpse lay on the bed. I have waited outside a house in Whitechapel in the doctor's car while he delivered a woman of a child as she lay on a bed of old newspapers on the floor. I have seen slugs on the floor in a Bermondsey basement dwelling. I was in a house in Bethnal Green where the children were slept upstairs in the summer to avoid the rats and downstairs in the winter to avoid the bugs; and in another close by, in hot summer weather, where the woman told me she dared not open the window because the sparks from the trains passing just above would run in and set the curtains alight. I know a crowded tenement in Hackney where the girls who "go to business" in the City have to keep their day clothes, at night, wrapped in paper to protect them against vermin.

Single glimpses, but they revealed samples of a kind of life lived by hundreds of thousands of the poor in London. A woman estate manager said to me: "All social reform

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work is work for posterity. The people who do it ought not to expect to see the fruits of it. That will be for another generation."

The hard dictum seems true of housing reform work in London. Success is too slow and too piecemeal to be noticed, even with the acceleration of pace and the multiplication of reformed spots which the last ten years have produced. Its very progress creates fresh obstacles, like a broom moving across a cluttered space, clearing here and piling the muck up higher there. While you are clearing a slum, the dishoused people have to be put up somewhere—in a city where there is already no room to move. If the county council builds a new estate for them on the fringe of London, like Becontree and Morden, it is too far from where they work; also, it is dull, and the new neighbourhood looks down on them, and the local authority upon whom they are planked resents the expense of having to provide and maintain services for them —schools, doctors, hospitals, roads, drains, and so on. Slowly, on the cleared spaces, the nice new flats go up, but how are people paying with difficulty twelve shillings a week for their old slum dwelling to pay the fourteen shillings to twenty-one shillings weekly rental which the cost of land purchase, labour, the superior appurtenances, and management charges make necessary? It is true that a family paying twelve shillings a week in a slum are often better off paying eighteen shillings in a council or association flat, because their health improves, reducing doctors' bills; they are relieved of the expense of patching up the worst dilapidations which, in the slum, they had to do themselves or nobody would; they need spend less on cleaning, which often, in the slum, includes one shilling a week on vermin powder; and the men, being fitter for work in the healthier conditions, lose less in unemployment spells.

But these savings are "invisible." What the slum-dweller sees is only the increase in the rent.

The improvement in the standard of living which has been noted also creates its new economic problems. The old-time "choker" round the neck of the East End labourer has given place to collar and tie, and he keeps his boots polished when off duty. The women and girls have to have silk, or imitation silk, stockings, and like to keep their hair "dressed." Everyone reads some sort of paper, if only for the betting news. All these things force up the domestic expenses, so that the general advance in wages often leaves the family with no more money to spare than they had before.

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This is a very baffling problem for the housing reformers. It is not practical politics to lift people up and give them tastes for better things than they have been accustomed to, without at the same time providing them with the extra means necessary to realise their improved ambitions. Yet that is what is happening on a large scale, and it is the innocent, even commendable, reason for much of the impatience of bus-workers, dockers, waiters, cleaners, builders' labourers and other low-waged men with their terms of employment. They want what they have been taught to wish for. Who can justly complain ? One borough is trying to solve the problem by scaling rents according to means—applying a sort of Means Test to applicants—in such a way that the *total* rental brings in the economic minimum. This plan obviously opens the way to discontent and jealousy, and imposition too ; but the experiment will be useful.

It is impossible for any one who knew the slums thirty years ago to survey the London scene to-day without pleasure at the improvement wrought and proceeding. Many of the slum-workers themselves are too young to remember what used to be, and they often get unduly downcast at the mass of wretchedness constantly under their eyes. We older ones can take a more historical view. We see in memory what has vanished, and, by comparison with that, the present aspect is full of encouragement. We believe that the age of well-intentioned fumbling with the problem is definitely passing. Mistakes of the past have taught their lessons. The new methods show a clearer comprehension of the task, with a consequent greater confidence in handling it. They are following the right clues, and they have got into the hands of the right people. The end of the slums may be still distant, but it is faintly in sight.

LONDON. HORACE THOROGOOD.

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A VOICE FROM BATTERSEA.[1]

A. H. EYRE.

THE place where I was born is a dark place. It has no little window where the sun comes peeping in at dawn. Heaven has been shut out from its affairs. If one man had planned this thing, his name would be execrated; but collective crime meets with no punishment—yet.

Battersea is an insult to the people who must live there. It was marshland, then market gardens, then an Industrial Neighbourhood. Gentlemen came to Battersea Fields to settle Affairs of Honour! Hooligans fought with bare fists. Gentlemen and Hooligans, working together in perfect understanding, ran a railway through Battersea from Nine Elms. The railway and the riverside attracted Industrialists. The riverside attracted Turner and Whistler. The Industrialists won. Factories and wharves sprang up; shoddy workmen's dwellings also: Dirty smoke; Factory fumes.

New churches sprang up; brick boxes of little distinction. The children of Battersea ceased their dropping of curtseys to the Vicar's wife. *Their* children did not know the Vicar; they went to Socialist Sunday Schools (if they went anywhere), not to church. I heard no cleric preaching against the Crime which is Battersea.

Battersea Fields became Battersea Park. The Wilderness blossomed as the rose. The London County Council looked after it. And the poor of Battersea were pushed back

[1] Many articles written in the vein of what follows are offered to the Editor. They come from many places and most of them seem to have been prompted by some religious or philosophical article found by the writers in these pages. Individually they are outside the province of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, but collectively they represent a social phenomenon of no little significance. "A Voice from Battersea" strikes the prevailing keynote.—EDITOR.

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further into slums. Land values went up. High flats sprang up round the park. From the windows of the flats, Journalists, Authors, Artists, and at least one Magician, looked over the blossoming wilderness. Gilbert Chesterton was among those prophets before he went to Beaconsfield and Rome.

Cambridge discovered Battersea. (*Slumming* was fashionable in those days.) Cambridge sent Preachers of the Gospel into Battersea. But the people sat tight—at home. The Preachers could get away from Battersea when they would, and Battersea folk thought this made rather a big difference. Cambridge sent scientists, doctors, lecturers and undergraduates to live in the Settlement. Battersea preferred the Washington Music Hall and the "Prince's Head."

Battersea was declared a Republic—by some. Even this made no visible difference! John Burns worked for the people for many years—and retired to his library when the Great War began. Superior people (from Streatham) did what they could, but Battersea wasn't having any—or not much. A certain Canon built most of the churches; he also invented Parish Magazines. Indirectly, he helped the poor to be quiet in their slums. Battersea put the Parish Magazines in the fire, used them for pipe-lights and curl-papers. They did not contain the sort of dynamite that would blow Battersea up.

Men went forth to their work and to their labour at six o'clock in the morning (I heard them tramping by) and returned not again until six in the evening, or later. Then they wanted a drink; some of them wanted many drinks. Cambridge and the Parish Churches, Nonconformists *and* the Salvation Army tried to convert them, but they went on just the same. Streatham said they "weren't quite nice"—and Streatham was right. *You* wouldn't be "quite nice" if you went to work at six in the morning and thirst got the better of you in the evening. The mean little streets were full of poisonous fumes and smoke from the factories. Beer seemed the only refuge.

The Cambridge Preachers did not tell the labourers how very wrong it was to do so much work, they only told them how wrong it was to drink so much beer and to do what was wrong in other directions. Yet, surely, some kind of excitement was necessary. The "Prince's Head" and Pony Moore's "Washington" were better than nothing. Few found excitement in Mission Services and Cambridge Men a-talking. And some who did enjoy those mild excitements really only came for the free milk. One household received a pint of

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milk daily and other helps from a dozen different religious denominations. Poor old Grandmother must be fed and kept warm; and what are the Churches for anyway? The smoke came fast and furious; the fumes made the mean streets stink. Yet Batterseans would receive neither culture nor the Gospel!

Chelsea, that home of artists, decided upon a clean-up, and abolished its slums. The Chelsea slum-dwellers came to Battersea. Long ago, Wilberforce and others (who lived on Clapham Common) abolished slavery—but not in Battersea. Battersea adopted the Public Libraries Act, and certain readers began to suspect they were not getting a square deal. Most certainly they were not. That's the worst of books; they put ideas in people's heads. How inconvenient! John Burns told his constituents to think more and drink less, and lost no popularity thereby. They knew John was right. However, they went on drinking. The thinking minority went on thinking.

Families of enlightened ones went to live in outer suburbs. And Battersea went from bad to worse. There were wild doings on Wandsworth Common, and Clapham Common (in spite of Wilberforce memories) was no better. Bushes and declivities in the soil were removed from Clapham Common. Open playing fields were made; yet still, after dark, Batterseans (and Claphamites too, perhaps) conducted themselves unseemly. Churches arose which were *Very High*, and large congregations came thereto, mostly from outside Battersea. Streatham almost adopted its poorer neighbour, but admitted no equality. One could feel cultured and well-to-do in Battersea while it was impossible to feel at all superior in Streatham. The Streathamites, indeed, were all very fine and large—until they were found out.

Slumming went out of fashion. The Settlement went to pieces. Cambridge lost interest. Before that, Cambridge Preachers worked and prayed amongst the poor with a fervour almost apostolic; but each in his season married a lady from Streatham or elsewhere, became respectable, and moved away. A celibate Missionary from Zanzibar also failed to make an impression upon the multitude. He went back to Christian Africa, preferring that to Heathen England. Free milk, coals, blankets and country excursions ceased and the people lost their faith. Can these things be?

The War came upon us all, and Battersea lost the (rather weedy) flower of its youth. The London County Council looked and saw that many young men were C.3. Cannon-

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fodder was of poor quality. So half the park was turned into playing fields and athletic grounds, that Battersea boys might run, jump, and be strong for the next war. Hell!

The old village High Street is crowded with costermongers' barrows. The riverside church gets more dilapidated every day. Hope is equally faded and out of date. Battersea struggles on. No one lives there unless he must. Give the people a country holiday, I say; and while they are in the woods, blow Battersea up and let it be started again.

Blake first learned about "Dark Satanic Mills," I reckon, in Battersea. Mrs Blake was the daughter of a Battersea market gardener—as innocent as Eve before the fall. She could neither read nor write at first and was (therefore ?) a happy woman.

I don't know why my parents lived in Battersea; I suspect that the only reason was unreason—pure cussedness. I did not choose to be born there.

Things are better in Battersea to-day—it is much easier to get away. Why do the Heathen so curiously live together in Battersea? Because "The Faithful" imagine a vain thing. They imagine that what is taught on Sundays can be flatly contradicted (for business reasons) all the week. An underpaid, overworked servant cannot possibly believe in his master's piety. (Even the free treats, milk, coal, and blankets, have been knocked off!) They don't start work now so early in the morning. Thousands don't start work at all. They are "on the dole," half starving in a world of plenty.

Battersea hears of 5,000 New Zealand lambs driven into the sea—to keep prices up; of coffee burnt in Brazil—to keep prices up; of wheat destroyed in Canada—to keep prices up. At their Sunday Schools they were told of One who fed 5,000 people and thought not at all about prices. That Shepherd cried "Feed my Sheep." The modern Shepherd (having killed his sheep) cries "Feed ME—contribute to the Diocesan Quota!"

Battersea (always Victorian at heart) is not amused; at half amused enough. Battersea, and a thousand places like it, may grow grim, savage, quarrelsome. There's going to be a row in someone's house; in someone's house that night!

Can anything be done about it? Or, as the Battersea boys would say, "What hopes?"

The key to all the possibilities will be found amongst the

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débris of what has happened. NOTHING can be done for Battersea's bricks and mortar. There's no cure for such "architecture" but destruction. Necessary changes here, as in a thousand other places, must come gradually. House by house, street by street, the old things must go, that the new City may be built. The blowing up of undesirable places is, of course, too drastic. We don't do that sort of thing in England. But strong feelings must be expressed, or we shall blow up ourselves.

There has been much talk. Wise things have been said—and foolish things too. The Master Industrialists would not listen; they did not like the wise things that were said. (They are beginning now to learn that discontented servants cannot be good servants. They even appoint "Welfare Officers" and hope for an increase of dividends thereby.) The Industrial Workers listened, but felt for years that they could do nothing. And that's what they did. They went to pub, club and cinema. Sometimes they talked things over; yet Battersea did not change.

There's little hope for the older people; they are too set in their ways. And they have decided to make the best of things—so far as there is any decision amongst them. Hope lies with the younger generation, which has already shown initiative, when possible, in moving away from Battersea. The young people watched their parents being kind to their even poorer neighbours, their patience, their real goodness of heart with nearly everything against them. (I have kept the good wine until now.) There's a great unwritten tradition amongst the poor; we should thank God for that.

The best young Batterseans value education and seek it. But there's education *and* education. Schools there are—and places where the light shines. Teachers there are (professionals)—and men with something to give. What Battersea needs is more teaching by men and women with a sense of vocation and no teaching at all by men and women who value only *vacations*. Many a teacher tells me that he (or she) entered the profession for the sake of regular (if small) pay, security and long holidays. Does the average teacher *love* his pupils? I only want to know.

Missions have failed (when they have failed) because most of the missionaries lacked staying power. They didn't stay in Battersea. A "better job" took them off. There is only one valid missionary method. It needs no funds to speak of, no organisation, no patronage, and no advertisement. This method is far from easy, but it is very simple

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The true Missionary just lives the life he believes in amongst the people he desires to help. And he goes on living that life. He endures to the end. He does not "marry a wife" unless he is quite certain that the lady will be willing to share his sufferings. Can any bridegroom be so certain? The true Missionary does not look for "a better job" or take one if it is offered. He sticks to his post.

Battersea, of course, is exceedingly stupid. It cannot be persuaded to believe in the importance of work which can be dropped for the sake of a larger salary. Culture will come to Battersea when leisure is no longer a polite name for unemployment and when enforced leisure is paid for as enforced work is paid for. Teachers have done very little towards teaching the poor the right use of leisure. Even people who have been servants themselves are troubled by the question, "Where shall we get our servants?"—to which the only straight answer is another question: "Why not do your own dirty work?" What's the world coming to? Shall the poor have leisure and other advantages of wealth? "The poor ye have always with you" was probably not a mere statement of fact, but *an accusation*.

They were more honest in ancient times. They called their servants *slaves*, and slaves were obtained anyhow. But Wilberforce abolished slavery. So we really must not ask, "Where shall we get our servants?" A willingness to serve would attract to ourselves all due and deserved assistance.

O most quaint Theologian! You talk much of *sin*; I prefer the word *Ugliness* and so do most wayfaring men. Battersea is ugly. Righteousness would make it beautiful. One key is with the old people of Battersea. They are not nice to look at, but they possess a divine gift—Neighbourly kindness. And their tolerance and patience are wonderful. Those are seeds of beauty.

Another key is with the young people who go away to better places—making an opportunity for rebuilding Battersea. It is really a good site for an attractive, partly industrial, garden suburb. It has already the Thames, a Park—and two Wide Commons. When Battersea can keep only a few residents, the landlords won't be able to charge unjust rents and will have to make the place more attractive. The young people of Battersea who go away from it have youthful idealism, and youthful idealism is a promising seed of beauty. Ugliness, I say, is sin; and Beauty is holiness, righteousness, the Way of Life. An ugly place is a sinful place. Citizenship is nothing if it is not Love in action. Good

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citizens love the place they live in; they love one another and desire beauty. Who could love Battersea or Manchester, or Gateshead-on-Tyne, or the mining villages, as they are?

The people are not "hopeless" while neighbourly kindness is with them. The people are not hopeless while they possess youthful idealism. I know some whose idealism has kept them in Battersea. They are missionaries to their own people. When Missionaries, Teachers, Preachers, Merchants, Manufacturers, Lawyers and the rest cease altogether to be men doing a paid job of work for the pay's sake, and begin to desire *for all* the best things they desire for themselves, there will be no more Battersea—and no more ugliness.

A. H. EYRE.

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TENNESSEE AFTER ELEVEN YEARS.

SAMUEL H. THOMPSON,

Formerly State Superintendent of Public Instruction for Tennessee.

It is now a little more than a decade since the trial, famous the world over, took place in the hamlet of Dayton, county of Rhea, State of Tennessee, United States of America. It grew out of what is frequently referred to, in the parlance of the street, as the "Monkey Law." The State legislature of 1925 enacted a law whereby teachers using text-books in any way denying the story of divine creation or that man descended from a lower order of animals are guilty of a misdemeanor. It put so-called Darwinism on the black list. The text of the law is as follows :

"CODE of Tennessee, 1932 : Paragraph 2344, page 290 :

"UNLAWFUL TO TEACH IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ANY THEORY THAT DENIES THE DIVINE CREATION OF MAN— It shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the universities, teachers' colleges, normal schools or other public schools of the State which are supported, in whole or in part, by the public school funds of the State, to teach any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man descended from a lower order of animals. (Acts of 1925, chapter 27, section 1.)"

Later this Act was declared constitutional by the State Supreme Court, one of the five justices dissenting. The violation is counted a misdemeanor and the fine, when conviction is obtained, not less than $100.

Applying to all schools of the State supported in any way by public funds, high schools with courses in biology would naturally come in for close inspection and legal action or public censure.

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Dayton is just a village, but supports a high school with the required curriculum. No one took the law very seriously at first. One evening in the village drug store a local civil engineer said to the high school teacher, John T. Scopes: "Do you teach biology?" The reply was in the affirmative. The civil engineer said he would swear out a warrant against Teacher Scopes for the violation of a State statute. This remark was evidently regarded as a joke by all present. However, the next day or soon thereafter, the warrant was obtained and in due time legally served. Then the affair began.

The name of that small village has quickly found its way into every nook and corner of the civilised world. It and the trial have been mentioned more than once in the pages of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Rather recently the writer was in a middle-western State far removed from Tennessee. On being introduced to a public school official as being from Tennessee, he was met with the remark: "Oh, you are a Fundamentalist!" There is nothing disgraceful in a man being either a Fundamentalist or a Materialist, for that matter, but that one incident shows how Tennesseans are looked upon away from home. References to the same effect have appeared in THE HIBBERT JOURNAL.

Lincoln Steffens, author and world-wide traveller, in his autobiography published in 1931, page 247, says: "New York in the 'nineties was about what Tennessee is nowadays, a provincial, moral community with a conscience." No doubt he had in mind our so-called "Monkey Law," and the Scopes trial at Dayton in the summer of 1925.

To understand why a law like this could be passed in Tennessee and remain on the statute books one must know something of the general background of the citizens of the State.

In the first place the Western District of the Colony of North Carolina, out of which the sovereign State of Tennessee was finally created, had its first white settler home established in the year 1769, and the region was settled largely by descendants of Puritan stock, noted for their piety and for their belief in a Hereafter of the John Calvin and John Wesley faiths. This Western District became the territory south of the River Ohio by Act of Congress in 1790, when the Republic was very much in its swaddling clothes. In 1796 it became the State of Tennessee, the first State to be carved out of a territory of the new Republic. And it had

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above 66,000 free inhabitants and about 10,000 slaves at that time.

A State Constitution was adopted in 1796. To show that the Convention framing that instrument was made up of piously minded people or of bigots—depending upon one's viewpoint—Article IX., Section 1 of that Constitution reads as follows :

> "Whereas, ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions ; therefore, no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either house of the legislature."

Section 2 of the same Article reads :

> "No person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this State."

So far as my information goes, and considerable search has been made, no other of the forty-eight States comprising the American Federal Union contains such provisions in its Constitution.

Garrett and Goodpasture's *History of Tennessee*, perhaps the most widely quoted State history to-day, says, on page 194, in speaking of the Constitution of 1796 :

> "Thomas Jefferson pronounced it the 'least imperfect and most republican' system of government that had been adopted by any of the American states."

It should be remembered that Tennessee is the sixteenth State of the Union, or rather was the sixteenth to come in. Two subsequent Constitutional Conventions have been held, one in 1834 and the other in 1870, and each retained in full the above-named Sections of Article IX.

Within the past quarter of a century the Tennessee legislature has enacted a law requiring Bible reading once each day in all public schools, and the same selection shall not be read more than twice in any one month ! Some intellectuals, so I am reliably informed, refer to this as the South as of the Bible Belt.

The above paragraph brings one to remark that the entire South is said to be the emotionally religious section of the United States. Concerning prohibition, it was said by some, in many, to "vote dry and drink wet." Tennessee is of South. In the recent repeal legislation fostered by the

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1932 platform of the national political part now in power in this country, North Carolina and South Carolina failed of repeal, and Tennessee accepted repeal by a meagre majority only.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century certain portions of Tennessee witnessed the appearance of a religious wave known as the "Jerks," to be followed by a peculiar religious sect known as the "Holy Rollers," who show their enjoyment of religion by working themselves into a frenzy resulting in rolling on the floor of the church or wherever they happen to be. They are active in several places to this day. True, the "Jerks" affected a relatively small proportion of the population, but the effect was considerable nevertheless.

It is well to consider that in the early days of the State, and, indeed, of the Republic, and even before, certain religious enthusiasts felt called of themselves to defend the Faith against the teachings of such men as Thomas Paine and his AGE OF REASON, and later the spreading influence of GIRARD COLLEGE in which by the will of its founder, who left the school about six million dollars, now grown to almost 100 million dollars, no clergyman would be allowed to teach.

These self-appointed defenders of the Faith multiplied in certain parts of the country when Charles Darwin announced his scientific findings, which were garbled in almost every conceivable way by men who knew not the scope of the findings of Darwin or understood his writings. The writer has heard Darwin denounced from the pulpit in words that no one should use.

These self-perpetuating defenders continue to exist, and when a well-meaning member of the Tennessee legislature proposed an Act to forbid the teaching in the public schools of the State from any text-book, the subject-matter of which was not in full accord with the Bible story of the Creation of man, the stage was set. The Governor of the State, at that time, was a high-class man and member of a leading evangelical denomination. However, it will be shown later in this article that the Governor, perhaps, had some misgivings.

The law stands on the statute books of the State. Since its enactment in 1925 no Governor has had the courage to advocate its repeal. During the sitting of the 1935 session of the State legislature a member introduced a Bill seeking to repeal this law. The repeal bill was introduced in the

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House by a young man, a student in the Law Department of Vanderbilt University. It was debated for two hours, and turned down by a vote of 67 to 20. This was in February, 1935.

That the Dayton trial brought the State of Tennessee world-wide fame or notoriety, again depending upon the point of view, is conceded by all. Clarence Darrow was the chief defence attorney, while William Jennings Bryan, twice the nominee of one of the two dominant political parties of the nation for the Presidency, fought for conviction and, as is well known, passed on at the close of the trial. One of the defenders of young Scopes was the able jurist Judge John R. Neal, who had been Dean of the State University Law Department, and is said to have been forced out of that position, along with other professors in that University, as a result of his liberal views. Others more or less famous were engaged on one side or the other during the trial, thus bringing the hamlet and the State into much publicity.

Out of this, and the death of Colonel Bryan, grew the William Jennings Bryan University at Dayton which at its second commencement, June, 1935, graduated six young people, two from Pennsylvania and four from Tennessee. It is Fundamentalist in its teachings, of course. So some good came out of the agitation—one more school cannot hurt!

But even with the constitutional provision relative to ministers serving in the Legislature, the qualifications for holding positions in the civil department, the agitation over the AGE OF REASON, GIRARD COLLEGE and Darwinism or evolution, the State elected William Gannaway Brownlow, famous Methodist preacher, governor, and later sent him to the United States Senate. However, this was largely the result of his Union sentiments and activities prior to and during our war between the States, 1861–1865, all of which took place in and during our reconstruction period and prior to 1870.

It should also be borne in mind that Tennessee is a people with more than 2,600,000 human beings with about 16 per centum of African descent, and, according to the last Federal census, 1930, only 13,066 of the entire population were foreign born, and they were white. Of this latter number 1,783 were born in Germany, 1,351 in England, 1,651 in Ireland. The remainder were greatly scattered. The total native white of foreign or mixed parentage was 38,170.

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So it becomes very interesting to know the general effect of the law, after a little more than a decade of existence on the statute books of the State. Has it made any appreciable contribution to the study of evolution, biology or the sciences in general? Have the young people in high schools and colleges been influenced toward a more religious life in the sense meant by Fundamentalism, or has cold science, so to speak, caused them to drift in their thinking to more modern views with the thought that life may have begun with one cell? What has been the attitude of the general public in Tennessee on this Act, the main features of which are known in every hamlet of the State as well as abroad?

With the above in view letters were sent to outstanding people in the State, including university, college and high school heads; ministers, lawyers and others. Frank replies were received, and, broadly speaking, neither the Act nor its enforcement, or the lack thereof have been taken very seriously. It would appear that soon after the law was passed many books on evolution were read, but that the enthusiasm for it was of short duration.

One prominent educator states that not more than 500 to 600 teachers out of about 16,000 teach biology, and that fewer than fifty feel cramped in their teaching. The presidents of two leading universities agree that it has had little or no effect and that the same scientific truths are taught as before, but perhaps without so much emphasis on evolution. State college presidents, for the most part, think the Act is not taken seriously and that it is regarded more seriously without the State, and that it is often misinterpreted by people who are not familiar with Tennessee folk. A State public school official says high school people take the Act as a matter of fact and do nothing to violate it. An educational leader in the State who travels extensively over the South thinks the law has caused many people to read books on evolution, but that little has been done about enforcement, and he regards it as just another useless law. An educator in the State of national and even international prominence says that one good friend of his refers to evolution within the meaning of this Act as "organic development," which serves him as well as the word evolution. This man of prominence adds that it is the kind of law many feel they may safely disregard without any compunctions of conscience.

A member of the staff of the leading Fundamentalist school in the State does not think the law is proving effective but that "it prevents the teaching of blatant evolution it

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the county schools." Leading ministers and heads of church schools say it is regarded more of a joke than otherwise, and that it has had little or no effect on the lives of the young people, one church school president saying the Scopes trial was just a question of accepting the doctrines of Darrow or Bryan.

A prominent lawyer who has long held important official positions in the State thinks "it is probably true that the enactment of the evolution statute and the Dayton trial have engendered in the minds of some of our young people . . a disposition to at least profess to believe in evolution."

So one must conclude that this Act of 1925 in an attempt to settle the mode of Creation has perhaps done little more than again to put before the world the age-old conflict, or misregarded by smaller minds, between science and theology. It appears that the general agreement of educational leaders in a position to know public opinion is that the law has proven totally ineffective—that it has neither prevented nor stimulated the teaching of evolution, nor has it affected the religious life of the people.

If that be true why has not the law been repealed? Why is there such strong sentiment among lawmakers against repeal?

The first and most important reason is politics. The Honourable Austin Peay, since deceased, was Governor when the Bill became a law. A very dear friend of his, and one of the highest standing, writes:

"Since the Scopes trial evolution has been a dead issue so far as the rank and file of the people of Tennessee care. The law was the result of cheap politics. Governor Peay would have vetoed the measure, but he needed the votes of the anti-evolutionists to put through his education program. Had he known the ridicule the measure was going to bring on the State he would have acted differently."

Governor Peay is not to be criticised for that. He put on the statute books some of the best education measures the State has ever had, as well as other good laws. Leaders, in dealing with law-making bodies, often have to "trade" and accept the lesser of two (or more) evils to get good measures passed.

As ten years ago, so to-day there is a strong group of anti-evolutionists—people who are for ever on the defensive,

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jealously guarding their traditional concepts of religion against the encroachments of modern thought.

Going somewhat far afield, the writer conferred with a South Carolinian, formerly professor of psychology and education in a New England college, and one of the ablest of the younger group in American education. His views, in part, are as follows :

> "Your 'THE CASE OF TENNESSEE' as it relates itself to the total framework of the general religiosity of the South is most interesting. It raises a fundamental question as to why the South more than any other section of the country, with the possible exception of California, extends such a cordial hospitality to waves of religious fanaticism, and why in this modern scientific age we still find such large numbers of ardent defenders of the unchanging faith.
>
> "Psychologically fundamentalism serves as an escape. When life becomes difficult—when economic security threatens—when one is driven by the lash of hunger through the daily grind of eking out a meagre existence, the human mind is not very ingenious that cannot provide some form of escape that makes life bearable.
>
> "In the last analysis the anti-evolutionary laws, the racial prejudices, and the traditional pride of the South are basically economic phenomena. Provide these people with economic security, with adequate housing, and with the necessities of life and my guess is you will see a rapid breakdown of fundamentalism and a more cordial hospitality extended to scientific research and teaching, along with a diminishing of racial prejudices."

None of the above may be the answer, but when we realise what strife can be brought about over the simplest questions of religion or dogma, we can feature what would be in store for one who questions what has been taught and believed, so to speak, from the beginning. The final conclusion is that the Tennessee "Monkey Law" may remain on the statute books of the State so long as the social and economic structure of the State remains in its present form.

SAMUEL H. THOMPSON.

UNITED STATES INDIAN OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A.

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SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

BY the death of Constantin Ritter, Professor of Philosophy in Tübingen, on April 16, Platonic scholarship throughout the world has sustained a heavy loss. To him, he averred, Plato was "a philosopher second to none; an artist of first rank; a man favoured by God as few others have been; unforgettable for all time; releasing spiritual powers which have been a blessing to many and which will continue to be a blessing for all time." When some half century ago Platonic scholars in Germany began to pay attention to the linguistic evidence for the chronology of the Dialogues, they knew nothing of the results which Lewis Campbell had reached in his Introduction to the edition he published in 1867 of the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* (namely, that the *Sophistes*, the *Politicus*, the *Philebus*, the *Timæus*, the *Critias* and the *Laws* are the last works of Plato, and that the *Republic*, the *Phædrus* and the *Theætetus* form a group preceding them). And even Ritter does not appear to have been acquainted with Campbell's work when he published his early volume, *Untersuchungen über Platon*, in 1888, although it is a significant fact that by means of a different method he reached conclusions remarkably similar. However, in his monumental treatise, *Platon, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre* (Vol. I. published in 1910, Vol. II. in 1920), he did full justice to the work of Lewis Campbell, despite the bitterness which the war had occasioned. Other writings of his were *Die Kerngedanken der Platonischen Philosophie*, an outline of his more comprehensive work, and which was translated into English by Professor Adam Alles, under the title *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, in 1933 (London: Allen & Unwin), and *Sokrates*, 1931. He also wrote one of the best existing Commentaries on the *Laws*, and contributed for years detailed accounts of Platonic literature in various European languages to Bursian's *Jahresbericht*. It is noteworthy that he took the efforts to stamp Plato as a mystic to be wholly based on forged passages of the Epistles, which he could only regard as inferior achievements of spiritual poverty seeking to take refuge in occultism.—In our own country, the death of Archibald A.

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Bowman, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, in the prime of life, at the age of fifty-three, on June 12, is a grievous calamity. He was a son of the manse, and at Glasgow was a student under Adamson, Latta, and Henry Jones. Graduating with first-class honours, he gained the Ferguson Scholarship, open to all the four Scottish Universities, in addition to the Ewing and George A. Clark Fellowships. In 1912 he was appointed Professor of Logic at Princeton, but when the war broke out he obtained leave of absence in order to hold a commission in the Highland Light Infantry. His company was cut off on the Lys in April, 1918, and he was taken prisoner. Through his knowledge of German life and language he was enabled to be of great service to his comrades, but the privations he then underwent seriously affected his health. On peace being restored, he returned to Princeton, but in 1925 he was appointed to the Chair of Logic in the University of Glasgow in succession to the late Robert Latta, and two years later he was transferred to the Chair of Moral Philosophy, on the death of Sir Henry Jones. His students speak in the warmest manner of his inspiring influence as a teacher, of his great erudition, and of his acute philosophical insight; while public audiences were, we are told, charmed by him "in a few minutes out of their distrust of the academic, and led for once in their lives into the arcana of metaphysics." Although fluent in speech, Professor Bowman was slow and fastidious in writing; but there are several essays of his in philosophical periodicals that are of permanent value. For instance, in *Mind* (N.S., Vol. XXV., 1916) he published two suggestive articles on "Kant's View of Metaphysics" and "Kant's Phenomenalism in its Relation to Subsequent Metaphysics." And three years ago he read before the Aristotelian Society an elaborate and striking paper on "Spirit-Time" (published in that Society's *Proceedings*, N.S., Vol. XXXIII., 1933), in which he contended that, although the conception of space-time is valid enough in its own sphere, yet space is not the only correlate of time, but that time is no less characteristically correlated with the activity of spiritual beings—an activity which is by its very nature entirely non-spatial. Professor Bowman was one of the few remaining disciples of Edward Caird, and he held to a form of idealism based largely on that of Hegel, but characterised by his own independent thought and reflection.

No more original and suggestive contribution to the philosophy of religion has appeared for a long time than the William James Lectures (delivered at Harvard in 1933) of Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, and now published under the title *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, 1936, 17*s.* net). The idea thus treated is that of the universe as a "Great Chain of Being," composed of an immense or infinite number of links, from the most meagre of existents, through "every possible" grade up to the *ens perfectissimum*, everyone of the finite existents differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it by the

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"least possible" degree of difference. In that conception three principles came to be combined—those, namely, of plenitude, continuity and gradation. The genesis of the idea in Western thought the author ascribes to Plato. When, in the *Republic*, Plato introduced the idea of Good, he at the same time gave rise to that notion of other-worldliness which subsequently played so large a part in European speculation. If the word "God" be taken as standing for what the Schoolmen called the *ens perfectissimum*, there can, Professor Lovejoy holds, be little doubt that the Idea of Good *was* the God of Plato, and none that it became the God of Aristotle, and one of the "aspects" of the God of most of the philosophic theologies of the Middle Ages. The fundamental characteristic of the Good, that wherein it differed from all else, was for Plato its perfect self-sufficiency. But having arrived at the conception of absolute self-sufficiency, Plato strangely reversed his course, and found in just this transcendent and absolute Being the necessitating logical ground of the existence of the sensible world. The reason *why* there is a world of Becoming, in addition to the one supreme Idea, is, it is argued in the *Timæus*, that a "good" being must be free from envy, that the more perfect must needs engender that which is less perfect, and "cannot remain within itself." By a bold logical inversion the concept of Self-Sufficing Perfection was converted into the concept of a Self-Transcending Fecundity. Thus under the persistent influence of Platonism, Western religion, in its more philosophic forms, has had two Gods, although they were inconsistently identified as one being with two aspects. Furthermore, by the same dialectic it followed for Plato that the world of generation must contain *all* possible kinds of temporal beings, since the "best soul" could begrudge existence to nothing that could conceivably possess it. On the other hand, save for a few occasional lapses, Aristotle adhered consistently to the notion of self-sufficiency as the essential attribute of deity. The Unmoved Mover is no world-ground and generates nothing; his nature and existence do not explain why other things exist nor why there are just so many of them. The Unmoved Mover cannot, therefore, provide a basis for the principle of plenitude. Nevertheless, we find emerging in Aristotle's writings another principle—that of continuity, of infinitely delicate shadings-off of everything into something else—which was destined to fuse with the Platonic doctrine of the necessary "fullness" of the world, and to be regarded as logically implied by it. And it was Aristotle again who chiefly suggested to naturalists and philosophers of later times the thought of arranging all organisms according to the principle of unilinear gradation. While, however, the ingredients of the complex idea of a Chain of Being came from Plato and Aristotle, it is in Neoplatonism that they first appear as fully organised into a coherent general scheme of things. In the writings of Plotinus, more clearly than in those of Plato, it is from the properties of a rigorously other-worldly, and a completely self-sufficient, Absolute, that the necessity of the existence of this temporal world, with all its manifoldness and

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imperfection, is deduced. In a series of very interesting chapters, Professor Lovejoy traces the history of the idea of a Chain of Being in the conflicts of Medieval Thought, in the new cosmography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the writings of Spinoza and Leibniz, and in eighteenth-century thought, more particularly in Romanticism. Then, in a concluding chapter, he discusses the outcome of the history and its moral. In the eighteenth century there were several indications of the breaking asunder of the two conceptions of God in the Platonic scheme. It was, however, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the later writings of Schelling, that an evolutionary theology was more definitely advanced. Not only was the originally complete and immutable Chain of Being converted into a Becoming, but God himself was placed in, or identified with, this Becoming. The generativeness was now that of an insufficiency striving unconsciously for richer and more various being; and the fullness was not the permanent character, but the flying goal of the whole of things. I do not know how far Professor Lovejoy would wish to stand sponsor for this evolutionary theology; he certainly does appear to favour it. Yet, not only is it confronted, as he admits, with the difficulty of a first beginning, but the notion of evolution lands us in manifest contradiction when applied to the universe in its entirety, or reality as a whole. For the conception of "evolution" necessarily implies (*a*) something that is changing its character or evolving, and (*b*) an environment, which need not indeed be unchanging, but which must, at least, be relatively more stable than that which it encompasses. Clearly, therefore, the universe in its entirety cannot as such be said to be in a condition of "evolution," because there can be no environment of reality as a whole.

John M. Robertson, who died in 1933, in his seventy-seventh year, was a well-known public man and a voluminous writer on a vast variety of subjects in the fields of philosophy, ethics, sociology, economics, mythology, Christian origins, and literature generally; and he brought to bear upon whatever he undertook a thoroughness of research and a steady pressure of thinking rarely rivalled. One of his best-known books was *A Short History of Freethought*, first published in 1899, of which a second edition, in two volumes, appeared in 1906, and a third edition in 1914 and 1915. Shortly before his death he was engaged in revising and expanding this history so that it almost became a new work; and in its revised form, with Mr J. P. Gilmour as editor, it has just been published under the title of *A History of Freethought: Ancient and Modern to the Period of the French Revolution* (London: Watts & Co., £2 2*s*. net). It is a valuable and impressive record of liberal movements of thought from the earliest times, and a careful study of the leading personalities in those movements. There is, indeed, no other book in any language that covers, as it does, the whole ground; and, on that account alone, it should become indispensable as a work of reference. To bring within the compass of one survey the primitive freethinking of early

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Hinduism and of the tribes of South Africa and the thought of Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Kant, is, in itself, no mean undertaking. Necessarily the notices of the leading freethinkers are brief, and in some cases, as in the case of Hume, inadequate. But the author's judgements are always independent and worthy of consideration, while his mass of references to all kinds of literature cannot fail to be useful. The volumes contain a large number of photogravures and half-tone portraits.

A noteworthy treatment of Platonic philosophy comes to us from the pen of the well-known French scholar, M. Léon Robin, *Platon* (Paris: Alcan, 1935, 35 fr. net). The volume is divided into six chapters, dealing respectively with (*a*) the main details of the life of Plato, and the chronology of the Dialogues; (*b*) the Platonic conception of Knowledge; (*c*) the methods of obtaining true knowledge; (*d*) the relation of Being and Becoming; (*e*) Plato's cosmology; and (*f*) his theory of practical conduct, both from an individual and social point of view. The author is decisively of opinion that the real essence of Plato's teaching is to be found in the later Dialogues—the *Sophistes*, the *Philebus*, the *Timæus* and the *Laws*; and he holds that, if there be one Dialogue more than another which leads us to the very heart of the Platonic system, it is the *Philebus*. He lays stress also on the importance of allowing due weight to what Aristotle reports of the teaching of Plato. M. Robin's book is a genuine contribution to the study of Platonism, which no serious student can afford to neglect.—Dr W. D. Ross's edition of *Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, 36*s*. net) is a magnificent companion volume to his edition of the *Metaphysics*, published twelve years ago. The greatest care has been taken with the actual text, and the Introduction and Commentary place in the student's hands most valuable help in following Aristotle's devious lines of argument. But I only record here the appearance of the volume, reserving a detailed notice of it for a later number.—Attention should be drawn to an able article by Dr R. Leet Patterson on "The Argument from Motion in Aristotle and Aquinas" (*The New Scholasticism*, July, 1936). Dr Patterson maintains that a single train of reasoning underlies the arguments from motion, contingency and efficient causality. The contention of Aristotle and Aquinas is, in truth, twofold, namely, that the transient implies the permanent, and that dependent being implies self-subsistent being. This is virtually what Kant called the cosmological proof and which he held to presuppose the validity of the ontological argument. Aquinas never, however, attempted to step over the impassable gulf between essence and existence; and Dr Patterson urges that his argument, as also Aristotle's argument, is still alive, and that we owe to the Neo-Scholastics a debt of gratitude for having pointed out the fact.

Professor de Burgh has achieved what might have seemed a well-nigh hopeless task in his article on "Spinoza," the eighth of a series on "Great Thinkers" (*Philosophy*, July, 1936), that, namely,

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of giving a succinct and lucid exposition of this philosopher's main doctrines within the space of sixteen pages. It is, he points out, a basic assumption of Spinoza's metaphysic that eternity must needs manifest itself, for man's inadequate apprehension, under the form of temporal duration; but how this is so, Spinoza is avowedly unable to explain. An admirable summary is given of Spinoza's theory of knowledge, and due stress is laid upon *scientia intuitiva*, in which the human thinker was taken to apprehend God's unity in difference by a timeless act of vision, and therein is, and knows himself to be, eternal. The article concludes with some acute criticism of Spinoza's theory of Extension and of his ethical teaching.—Mention should be made of an able and suggestive article on "Value and Reality in the Metaphysics of Spinoza," by Dr D. Bidney (*Phil. R.*, May, 1936).—Five years ago the late Benjamin Rand published a draft of Locke's *Essay*, which he found in the collection of Locke's papers in the possession of Lord Lovelace. He took this to be "the original draft"; but in this, it turns out, he was mistaken. Professor R. I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb have discovered an earlier draft still, contained in the large commonplace book in the Lovelace Collection, and this has now been published under the title *An Early Draft of Locke's Essay* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, 12*s.* 6*d.* net), together with a number of relevant excerpts from his journals. This draft (Draft A) was written in 1671, probably in the early part of the summer, that of Rand (Draft B) was written in the autumn or early winter of the same year. (The first edition of the *Essay* appeared early in 1690.) Draft A is much cruder than Draft B. Yet, as the editors point out, in their judicious introductory essay, the former takes us back to what must have been almost the first of Locke's thoughts when he faced the problem of the extent and limits of human knowledge; and, rough as it is, it does cover the whole ground, whereas Draft B contains little which corresponds to Book IV., the most important book in the *Essay*. The publication of the early draft, in a carefully edited form, cannot fail to be of great value to everyone interested in the history of English philosophy.—There would seem to be of late a revived interest in the thought of Berkeley. Professor John Wild's massive volume, *George Berkeley: A Study of His Life and Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, 1936, 25*s.* net), is based upon the view that in interpreting his philosophy Berkeley's own wish should be respected, and his philosophical writings be read in the order in which he had written them. I do not know, indeed, that any competent expositor of Berkeley's teaching has ever disregarded this injunction; it is, however, another question whether biography and exposition of the successive writings are not better dealt with separately. Professor Wild proceeds throughout on the assumption that *Siris* contains "the final expression of that *philosophia prima* for which Berkeley's earlier writings only paved the way." In a sense, he declares, *Siris* "was always present to Berkeley's reflection, from the rude intuitions of the *Commonplace Book* to the strict methodological queries of the

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Analyst" (p. 422). Even those of us who have urged that to look upon *Siris* as showing an entire break from the position of the earlier writings is to misconceive the course of Berkeley's philosophical development would, nevertheless, recoil from a statement such as that. I cannot find the slightest evidence for supposing that prior to 1734, ten years before the publication of *Siris*, there is any indication that Berkeley was moving in the direction of Neoplatonism. In the *Commonplace Book* there is no mention either of Plato or Plotinus, and only two incidental allusions to Aristotle. Professor Wild holds that in the *Three Dialogues* Berkeley broke away from the "spiritism" or subjectivism of the *Principles;* and that, by viewing the self as "dependent" and by assuming an archetypal realm of ideas in the mind of God, he was making a decided advance towards the "transcendentalism" of *Siris*. Again, however, I remain unconvinced. For, on the one hand, in the third *Dialogue*, the mind or self is still regarded as a substance, the ideas of sense are still regarded as caused by the Divine will, and the ideas in God's mind are at a wide remove from the "Platonic eternal Archetypes." And, on the other hand, in the *Principles* the existence of ideas in the mind of God is obviously assumed (see, *e.g.*, § 90); and it is clear, I think, that the finite mind is there conceived as "dependent" upon the "Omnipotent Spirit." But, although one may differ from some of his interpretations of Berkeleian doctrine, Professor Wild's volume is that of an independent and vigorous thinker, and will amply repay careful study.—Another treatise on Berkeley comes to us from the pen of a Swedish scholar, Dr Ingemar Hedenius, *Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1936, 10s. net). It comprises four chapters, dealing respectively with Immaterialism and Empiricism, Sensationalism as a Metaphysical Doctrine, Berkeley's Theological Metaphysics, and Immaterialism as a Basis for Morality. This treatise, which is concerned only with the earlier writings, is, on the whole, a creditable and praiseworthy piece of work. Dr Hedenius wrestles resolutely with the question as to the precise difference Berkeley took to subsist between sense-perception and imagination. Sensations, he argues, differed, according to Berkeley, from ideas, not only as being caused by God, but as having more reality in them, as being stronger, more orderly and coherent than the latter. The author's account of the doctrine of minds or spirits is judicious and critical, although hardly sufficient stress is laid upon the importance of the distinction between perceiving and the object perceived (pp. 105–106). The examination of Berkeley's ethical and religious conceptions should be of interest, especially as an attempt is made to show that a study of them throws light on some of the motives which were operative in the moulding of his philosophic views.—In an article on "The Enigma of Hume" (*Mind*, July, 1936), Mr Ernest C. Mossner, accepting Kemp Smith's contention that, in the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Philo represents Hume, argues that Clarke and Butler were the theologians Hume had in mind in casting the rôles of Demea and Cleanthes.—Professor

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H. J. Paton's elaborate work, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, a Commentary on the first half of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in two volumes (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936, 30*s*. net), comes to hand on the eve of our going to press. A notice of it will appear later.

No serious student of present-day problems can afford to overlook the fifteenth Supplementary Volume of the Aristotelian Society, entitled *What Can Philosophy Determine?* (London: Harrison & Sons, 1936, 15*s*. net), containing the papers read at the Joint Session at St Andrews in July last. The volume opens with the inaugural address of Professor G. F. Stout on "Universals," in which he defends, against recent criticism, his view that there are no characters which are common characters. "What is called a character characterising a plurality of particular things is really a general kind of character. It is no more itself a character than the class of horse is itself a horse." Even in the case of specific universals, *e.g.* a determinate shade of red, this, he maintains, is true. The specific shade of red belonging to a particular thing is as particular as the thing itself. One of the most interesting of the Symposia is that on the question "Is there a Problem about Sense-Data?" Mr G. A. Paul denies, and I think rightly, that in order to give a complete and accurate account of any perceptual situation it is necessary to use a noun in the way in which "sense-datum" is used, for this leads to the notion that there are entities of a curious sort over and above physical objects which can "have" sensible properties, but cannot "appear to have" sensible properties which they have not got. Miss Helen M. Smith argues that there certainly are sense-data in the sense which Professor Moore described in a paper read before the Society in 1926. Mr A. R. M. Murray contends that the reality and importance of sense-data only become fully apparent when the facts of delusive perceptual situations are taken into account. He thinks (*a*) that physical objects and their qualities are very different from sense-data and their qualities; and (*b*) that these two sorts of entities are apprehended in different ways. Professor Price, Professor Laird and Mr J. N. Wright discuss the nature of "Memory-Knowledge." There is a symposium on the question: "Are there Synthetic *a priori* Truths?" in which Professor Broad, Mr A. J. D. Porteous and Professor Reginald Jackson take part; and another on the question: "Is Existence a Predicate?" forms the subject of debate between Mr W. Kneale and Professor Moore. The final discussion had for its subject: "Can Philosophy determine what is ethically or socially valuable?" Professor J. L. Stocks contends that it is the business of the philosopher to find out what is thought obligatory, not what ought to be thought obligatory; what is considered good, not what it is good to consider. It is no more his business to put himself in the place of the agent or politician, and think out his problem for him afresh, than it is his place to go into the scientific laboratory and attempt a new solution of the scientist's problem. Mr A. K. Stout holds that the philosopher's concern in the sphere of

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practice is not merely with what men actually believe, but with the truth of what they believe—not merely with what is or has been held to be good or bad, better or worse, right or wrong, but with what really is so. Mr W. D. Lamont considers philosophy to be essentially a theoretical pursuit directed to the discovery of truth; but, he holds, valuations are not theoretical assertions claiming to express truth, and the relation of philosophy to values is quite different from its relation to truth.

In an Address on "The Tragic Realm of Truth" (*Phil. R.*, March, 1936), Professor T. V. Smith, of the University of Chicago, maintains that the frustration of expectations raised by science is the larger part of the modern tale of intellectual disillusion. We as men have asked for generality; scientists have given us specificity. And as the scientist reduces great truth to little truths that are trivial, so the philosopher, escaping particularisation, promotes the quest for truth to the futility of an unattainable. No one of the so-called theories of truth will stand the slightest scrutiny. The ideals of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, while enriching immeasurably the private life of imagination, regulate the actual life of man in the smallest degree. The more they promise, the less they perform.—Readers will, I think, be glad to have their attention called to an extremely interesting lecture by Professor Barker Fairley on "Goethe's Attitude to Science" (*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, July–August, 1936). From early years, Professor Fairley points out, Goethe realised that when he saw clearly or deeply into what he called nature, he was seeing something which lives as a whole, and not as a series of parts or as the sum of its parts. It was his belief in this ruling idea which led him to reject Newton's theory of light, and to insist that white light, the whole light, could not be the product or sum of its coloured parts, but that it must be primary and fundamental, and the coloured parts merely accidents of it. Moreover, art, so Goethe held, expresses a wholeness of experience; the ideal in his conception of science proves to be an artistic ideal. And it is surprising how peculiarly this ideal fits his own poetry. His poetry has a psychology of its own, it works out one of the kinds of poetry fully and for the first time.

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REVIEWS.

Christian Morality, natural, developing, final; being the Gifford Lectures, 1935–1936. By Herbert Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham.—Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1936.—Pp. xiv + 340. —12*s.* 6*d.* net.

In the choice of his subject and in the method of its treatment, the Bishop of Durham has kept in view the interest of a wider public than his academic audience at St Andrews. He has shown a wise discretion in concentrating on a field of enquiry relevant to his own vocation, the history of Christian morality and its bearings on problems of the modern world. A life devoted to the practical obligations of the ministry leaves little leisure for original research in scholarship or speculation. The time is long past when a bishop could reply to the suggestion that he must be over-worked: "It is all a matter of organisation. I distribute my functions over three-year periods. In the first year, I go round half my diocese, confirming the dear young people. In the second year, I go round the other half. In the third year—well, I take a holiday." Dr Henson's candid remark in these Lectures (p. 273) that "it is severely normal that, in the modern world, . . . 'good business men' should tend to displace saints and martyrs in the regard of the churches" recalls to the present reviewer how the late Lord Haldane, after entertaining two eminent prelates at his Perthshire home, observed that they had been busy all the time with official documents, "just like railway magnates." In handling his theme, the Bishop, while acknowledging their significance, leaves metaphysical and ethical theories entirely aside. Moral philosophy, as he justly observes, has never exercised widespread influence over the conduct of the masses. "Pagan philosophy"—even Stoicism, for all its ethical grandeur—"was morally powerless to cleanse and elevate the habits of pagan society" (p. 129, *cf.* p. 194). He sets himself to show Christian morality as a dynamic power, leavening throughout its history the conduct of men in society and thus progressively realising the full potentialities of human nature. His method is empirical, proceeding from the facts of man's moral nature as disclosed in history to their universal implications as embodied in the Christian faith. "Instead of arguing from philosophy to theology, and from theology to morality, I suggest that the process may serviceably be reversed, and we may

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argue back from morality to the theology which inspires and determines it, and from this theology to the philosophy which properly it supposes" (p. 28, *cf.* p. 309). The Bishop confines himself to the first of these two stages in the argument. He gives short shrift to the aspersions unjustly cast upon theology even by religiously minded critics. Since theology, as "the rationalised expression of religious experience" (p. 13) is as necessary and natural as the religion that it strives to formulate, and since morality is essentially rooted in religion, the interpretation of Christian principles of conduct cannot be divorced from their theological implications. Man, "being intellectual, must needs cast his religion into an intelligible form, that is, express it in terms of theology" (p. 8). Conversely, "the theologian must needs become the moralist. Duty grows on the stock of faith. . . . Conduct cannot but become the authorised commentary on creed" (p. 10). This close integration of morality with religion leads the Bishop at times to blur the distinctions between religion and morality, and, again, between moral character inspired by religion—the *virtus infusa* of the scholastics—and the "mere" morality of the non-religious good man. On the one hand, religion is inspired, alike in contemplation and in practice, by knowledge of an other-worldly reality, by the vision of God. Hence the *praxis* that follows from this *theôria* is imperfectly described as moral. The words of Jesus cited by Dr Henson: "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect," express far more than "moral teaching" (p. 157). In other passages the Bishop shows himself fully aware of the difference, as when he insists that Jesus was no mere moral reformer, or when he draws with a firm hand, at the close of his sixth lecture, the distinction between a Christian and a purely secular civilisation (pp. 151 ff.). It is only the morality and the civilisation that are grounded on the Christian religion that are entitled, on his view, to be called "natural, developing, final."

These terms demand a word of comment. "Natural" and "developing" are, for the Bishop, correlative; the test of a "natural" morality and religion is that they unfold, in the course of their history, universally and to the full, the moral and religious capacities of man's nature. His claim is that this test is satisfied by Christianity and by Christianity alone; that Christian morality and religion are thus alone natural, in the teleological, Platonic, meaning of the word. "The claim that Christian morality is properly described as natural, that is, competent to express the moral demand for all sorts and conditions of men, is really bound up with its power to grow, to hold the allegiance of the human conscience in every variety of circumstance and at every stage of culture, to keep pace with the waxing knowledge and widening experience of mankind, and thus to vindicate for its essential principles their right to Divine authority" (pp. 148–9). Dr Henson is clearly right in rejecting the crude identification of the natural with the primitive, as also in holding that, on his (perfectly legitimate) use of the term, the traditional distinction of natural from revealed religion loses its point. Religion,

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he tells us, " is all natural, and it is all revealed " (p. 21). Quite so; but is he therefore warranted in holding that the distinction " belongs to an obsolete mode of thinking " (*Contents*, p. ix)? Is there not another, equally legitimate, use of the term " natural " to discriminate the religion and theology that lie within the compass of man's proper intellectual attainment from the religion and theology that presuppose faith in a supernatural revelation? In this sense, both natural and revealed religion characterise the highest stages of man's development. That reason and revelation alike have their source in God does not impair the validity of the distinction. Though relative, it is of real importance, and the Bishop, in other passages of his Lectures, accords to it ample recognition.

The course falls naturally into two halves, the first (Chs. II–VI) dealing with the historical development of Christian morality, the second (Chs. VII–XII) with its living potency in the world to-day. The earlier group is prefaced by a statement of the Bishop's views on the question of the historicity of the Gospel narratives (Ch. II). His position is that of a moderate conservative, put forward with the modesty and candour of one who is judging highly technical researches from the outside. The current application of " form-criticism " to the synoptics is visited with measured reprobation. " The evangelists," he concludes, " wrote as Christians for Christians, but they were not necessarily on that account the less trustworthy " (pp. 41–42). But is it quite true to say that " history in the modern sense does not differ in any essential particular "—save, of course, in range of knowledge and in technique—" from history as the Evangelists understood it " (p. 41)? The modern historian explains the facts solely by reference to temporal and this-worldly causes; if he happens to believe in supernatural intrusions into history, it is as a religious disciple, not as a historian. For the evangelists, on the other hand, the reference to divine agency was fundamental. They were " astonied " at their Master's acts and doctrine, and accepted them without question as supernatural. The three following chapters (III–V) deal respectively with the main determining factors in early Christian morality, the moral legacy of Judaism, its appropriation and enrichment by Jesus, and the morality of the non-Christian environment of the Græco-Roman world. The two former influences were essentially positive, the third chiefly provocative of reaction. It prompted Christians " to emphasise the necessity of ascetical discipline, to assert the final authority of the private conscience, and to magnify the function and claim of the Christian fellowship " (p. 137), as also, in the hour of triumph, to imitate the temper of their former persecutors (p. 135).

The sixth and seventh Lectures mediate the transition to the second part of the course by setting in clear relief the persistent principles that have governed and still govern the development of Christian morality as it works immanently in the world, and the main factors conditioning the process. Its ethic is necessarily and always an interim ethic, for it is an affair not of rigid rules but of spiritual

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principles, the manner of whose application is relative to the ever-changing historic situation. "Assimilation and transformation, the first the condition of the last, are the distinguishing features of development in Christian morality" (p. 143). Hence the astounding paradoxes presented by the ecclesiastical record, paradoxes which Dr Henson again and again acknowledges with truly admirable candour. "Christianity," he writes, "is the religion of peace, yet it has occasioned more, and more destructive, wars than any other: it is the religion of truth, yet no forms of falsehood have been more subtle and depraving than those which its casuists have imagined and defended: it is the religion of humility, and yet the extreme expressions of human pride have been seen in its ordained exponents: it is the religion of love, yet no persecutions have been more relentless and persistent than those organised in its professed interest: it is the religion of freedom, and yet no type and measure of bondage, social, political, and economic, have been absent from Christendom: it is the religion of spiritual franchise, yet nowhere else has sacerdotal pretension been more extravagant, or superstition more abject" (pp. 185–186). So indeed its Founder foretold: "Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?" The acquiescences of Christianity are not always "discreditable politic accommodations" (p. 176); and the resulting paradoxes find their liquidation in the obligation on the Christian Church to assimilate fact and adapt itself to circumstance, without imposing any *à priori* code of political, economic, or even ethical doctrine. It ever "stoops to conquer." The task of transformation lies "in the hidden sphere of motives and sanctions" (p. 154). Here, in the realm of spiritual agency, rather than in differences of overt behaviour, lies the distinction between the practice of Christianity and that of purely secular civilisation.

This two-fold principle, of assimilation and transformation, is illustrated in Lectures VIII–XI, in reference to four problems that beset the conscience of the present age, those of Sex, Racial Intermixture, Civil Allegiance, and Industrialism. The Bishop is here thoroughly at home, and can draw on the resources of his own thought and experience, without such extensive reliance on the labours of other writers. In fields where ecclesiastics often fear to tread, he speaks his mind with the courage, frankness, and intellectual integrity that mark all his public utterances. We cannot follow him through the reasoned and dispassionate discussions of the claims of Feminism, the Christian attitude towards divorce and contraceptives, the evil effects on native tribes of the inevitable demand for raw materials, the opposed rival errors of Erastianism and Ultra-montanism, the case for Pacifism and the baneful moral issues of industrial standardisation and the presence in our midst of the multi-millionaire. These chapters must be read *in extenso* in order to be appreciated; they do not lend themselves to brief quotation, for Dr Henson eschews floral decoration, and has rigorously curbed his gift for epigram. If the chapter on Race is the weakest of the group,

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being largely taken up with the past history of slavery, ample compensation is offered by the chapter on the State, which stands out in the volume as a masterpiece of reasoning. The pages in which the Bishop considers and determines the relation of Christian morality to the problems of war deserve to stand beside Mozley's famous sermon preached at the time of the Franco-German War of 1870, of which Gladstone is reported to have said that it was the most impressive example of massive inference with which he was acquainted. Here, as in other passages in the volume, we are led, both by the matter and the expression, to feel that Dr Henson wrote these Lectures with the portrait of his great eighteenth-century predecessor before his eyes.

The concluding chapter (XII) on the finality to be ascribed to Christian morality is less convincing; the central position, that "the authority of Jesus is final because limited to personal morality" seems to require more lengthy consideration. In one passage (p. 296) Dr Henson even suggests that the fact of survival of itself furnishes a test of the value of the Christian teaching. There is indeed an underlying tendency throughout the volume to stress the *quæstio facti* at the expense of the *quæstio iuris*. We appreciate the author's insistence on a realistic interpretation of the history of Christianity, in reaction from abstract theory and sentimentality; but we wonder how he would reconcile many of his arguments with the hard saying of Jesus: "When the Son of Man cometh, shall He find faith upon the earth?" The closing paragraphs touch on the Russian menace to Christian morals and to Theism, with a note of hope that the present policy of the Soviet leaders will prove, like the mechanisation of industry in other countries, to be a passing phase. The theme is developed in an appendix on *The Russian Mystery*, a trenchant critique of the conclusions drawn by the Webbs in their recent work on *Soviet Communism*. The criticism, here as elsewhere, is acute and interesting; but the reader is left unsatisfied by what is after all an array of one set of authorities against another. In closing this review of the Bishop's Gifford Lectures, we cannot refrain from the hope that he will some day treat this issue in a separate work with the same impartiality of judgement that he showed some years ago in his well-known Charge on the Group Movement. There are Communists in the diocese of Durham as well as Groupers; and Dr Henson would hardly be deviating from his episcopal responsibilities in setting his keen and vigorous intellect to answer the most serious of all modern challenges to Christian morality.

W. G. DE BURGH.

READING.

Philosophy and History. Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer. Edited by Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.—Pp. 360.—25*s.* net.

As is observed in the preface to this presentation volume, the variety of approaches to the central theme, the relation between philosophy

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and history may seem at first somewhat disconnected. Yet there stands out from the work as a whole one definite impression, namely, that a new and determined effort is being made to-day to probe to the nature of historic knowledge. This problem, so disconcerting to the thinkers of the Cartesian schools, seeking amongst the sciences for those in which "reason could rest satisfied" (Professor Lévy-Bruhl), so misunderstood in nineteenth-century attempts to treat history as an empirical science, whilst German scholars were already teaching that "the study of history and the natural sciences are to each other as pole and antipole" (Edgar Wind), did not receive a special philosophic solution in the idealist philosophies of history. For in these endeavours to "bring the singular realities which form the very thread of history within the framework of a general order, including indifferently the past and the future, the beginning and the end of time" (Professor Léon Brunschvicg), the history of mankind is assumed as material ready to hand, and the previous problem of knowledge is not really examined.

Thus some of the contributions might be grouped together as explaining, through the brilliant light in which they set the faith and method of Cartesianism, the early modern suspicion and contempt of the pursuit of historic knowledge. As Professor Lévy-Bruhl points out, the most accurate modern history would not be regarded by the Cartesians as possessed of rational evidence, because it cannot deal with anything except testimony. Other essays dwell upon the achievement of historical schools, especially the German, philosophically legitimised by Windelband and Rickert, in establishing "history's right to freedom from generalising interference." It must be recognised that history does not belong to the "quantifying" but to the "qualifying" sciences (Raymond Klibansky). Or the reason that is to be found in history is "its original autochthonous reason" (Professor Ortega Y. Gasset). The essential present-day point of view in regard to the relations of philosophy and history at the root is indicated in Professor Alexander's contribution. Instead of asking: How shall we fit history into a rational framework?, he inquires: How is philosophical thinking itself affected by the historic nature of things? Some essays, whilst not appearing to examine specifically the relations of history and philosophy, provide nevertheless material highly relevant for the task. Amongst these is Professor Gilson's consideration of Christian philosophy. Inquiring whether the supposed opposition between science and scholasticism in the seventeenth century was the inevitable result of mediæval thought, he argues that the very reasons which compel us to condemn "the scientific sterility of the Middle Ages" make us condemn to-day "the philosophic sterility of scientism." This sterility does not lie in the sciences but in the attempt to set up any one of them as a universal method. Neither was mediæval philosophy bound to the scientific errors associated with it. M. Bréhier asks how the historical attitude originated in philosophy itself, pointing out that prior to the end of the eighteenth century philosophers were interpreted,

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not in relation to their historic position, but in the interests of some belief or theory—as notably in the opposition of the Christian to the anti-Christian Aristotle. Professor Hoffmann's essay on St Augustine's Platonism suggests only a very general or spiritual relation between the two philosophies. To the Platonic dualism of being and becoming, he argues there corresponds Augustine's absolute contradiction of *Divinum et Terrenum*, grace and sin, holy and unholy. Dr C. C. J. Webb argues that in the crude origins of History and Philosophy from primitive Religion there must have been already immanent reason and the image of God. M. Groethuysen discusses the task of "critical anthropology" as determining the limits of all knowledge from the point of view of reflection on the self. The relativity of knowledge is insisted upon also by Dr H. Pos, from the standpoint of the relations of languages to the percepts and concepts of the worlds of different peoples, making impossible a *mathesis universalis*.

If philosophy and history were essentially identical, the Gordian knot of their relations as forms of knowledge would seem to be cut. But the *dictum* does not throw much, if any, light upon the problem. Professor Calogero brings out the ambiguity of Signor Gentile's principle of "The Identity of Philosophy and History." Is it the identity of philosophy with its own history which is signified? It seems clear that it is more than this, and as regards "the concrete activity of the spirit the historian can only repeat the process of the agent in his world of ideas." Gentile's own essay does not render less paradoxical his rejection of the ideas of the past, time, historic fact, as not necessary to the theory of history. It is not the activity of a purely contemplative mind which can give rise to the idea of history, through developing the object created by the subject, but of a mind inseparably related to an order of events in which it knows the experience of agency or "responsible doing and suffering" (Dr Fritz Medicus' phrase). The transcendental theory is too simple. Gentile's contribution on the "transcending of time" is aptly followed by Professor Stebbing's analysis of ambiguities which tend to appear in discussions of time. Examining McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time, which from its very clearness is the best illustration for her purpose, Professor Stebbing points with conclusive reasoning to the chief source of these ambiguities. The successive steps of her argument cannot be summarised, but the root of all is laid bare in the confusion of the treatment of the terms future, present, past (McTaggart's A. series), as though they were timeless characteristics, although the "is" in "M is present" is admitted to be temporal. Thus the contradiction McTaggart finds in the characterisation of one and the same event as future, present, past, is only a contradiction if the premiss "change" (and therefore time) "is unreal" has already been assumed. Yet this was the conclusion to be proved.

In regard to the expression in these essays of the present-day ferment in relation to the problem of historic knowledge, the first

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emphasis is on the character of relativity in this field. Professor Huizinga defines history as "the intellectual form in which a civilisation renders account to itself of its past." . . . "The idea of history only emerges with the search for certain connexions, the essence of which is determined by the value which we attach to them." The distinction thus involved between the nature of the cognitive activity in history and in other kinds of knowledge is evident also in Theodore Litt's consideration of the possibility of knowing the particular of history. He argues that the universal of the spiritual world has quite a different meaning from the classificatory universal. "It does not exclude particularity but retains it in itself." As in living speech the particularity pervades the predicate, although the meaning is universal. There are required "art in the historian, and inner sympathy in the reader"—attendants, we may note, that would be looked at askance, as handmaids to truth, in scientific knowledge. For historic knowledge, it seems, there is required not only the universal presuppositions of thought, but certain fundamental functions of spiritual being and doing—or, in fact, the very constitution of the world which is to be examined. This standpoint may be compared with that of Dr F. Medicus, who considers the differences between the relations of subject and object in different spheres of knowledge. The historical investigator cannot like the physical efface himself before his object. The personal perspective must count. "For we are able to understand history, only because we are ourselves history." Yet this is no inferiority of the historical sciences. Dr Klibansky, who defines history as "the mode of scientific contemplation under the aspect of image," argues similarly that the subjective character of history cannot imperil its value. Cognate implications appear in Dr Wind's argument that the contrast between the exactitude of method and instrument in science and the instrument in history has broken down. Science has discovered that "every instrument participates in the structure which it is meant to reveal," as is the case with every historic document. For we cannot use the document without assuming its relation to its own times, and therefore the nature of those times in which it shares. Thus there is for both an inescapable circle. Dr Ortega Y. Gasset, arguing that man is "nothing but a drama," and that "we are our past," is in general harmony with the position that it is because of our own historical essence that we understand history. But he goes further in his constructive argument on the nature of "History as a System." History has a reason, intrinsic to itself. Of the nature of this reason he cannot, however, say more than that it is "the system of human experiences linked in a single inexorable chain." To this it may be objected that whilst it is possible that the individual may know in his remembered experience the meaning of his own life, the interpretation of all history cannot be found in this way. Nor are we helped by the appeal to "collective man." For collective man as such has no memory.

The desideration for a new philosophical outlook upon history is

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perhaps most keenly felt through this essay. Shall we have to wait for this till the influence on philosophy itself of the historic view, as defined by Professor Alexander, has reached its full height? The historical approach means, firstly, that "the real world is made of particulars, and universals are but the patterns of their behaviour." The universal is an "arrangeability in events." The problem of knowledge of universals and particulars would then demand a fresh analysis, in the results of which the specifically historic problem would share. This might be termed the *revanche* of history on the philosophy which has allowed it no status in exact knowledge.

The volume is adorned by two attractively illustrated contributions. The author of one of these (Dr Panofsky) gives expression to an essentially historic idea based on the transience of all things, in the treatment by art of the text "*Et in Arcadia ego*." The author of the other (Dr Saxl) describes the part played by the motto, *Veritas filia temporis*, in illuminating with art phases of European politics. As we enjoy the illustrations by genius of the idea that truth must be brought up from the depths, used with equal effect and even by the same artist (Rubens) in the service of contending Princes and factions, we may reflect that if the modern artist shows a more scrupulous ethic, the seventeenth-century propagandist could summon to his aid a more splendid art.

H. D. Oakeley.

London.

Five Centuries of Religion. Volume III. Getting and Spending. By G. G. Coulton.—Cambridge: University Press, 1936.—Pp. li + 747.—35*s.* net.

Dr Coulton's vast and basic work on the history of monasticism during the five critical centuries before the Reformation gathers mass and momentum as it goes along. It is a task of stupendous dimensions steadily sustained by the enthusiasm of a life-hobby. "I was born," he writes, "under the shadow of the Greyfriars' tower at Lynn; bred in that Nar valley which once had fifteen cloisters in five-and-twenty miles. . . . My first schoolboy essay was an attempt to arouse interest in these things." During the last thirty-three years his main accumulation of notes has been monastic (Vol. I, p. 3). The range and thoroughness of his research are equalled only by the honesty of his mind. He has his own strong individual sympathies, and he expresses them with an engaging candour that makes him judicially free from self-deceiving prejudices while aiming at a severely "scientific" use of his materials.

The results are so surprising to religious students still complacently content with second- and third-hand opinions that he has been accused not merely of anti-Catholic bias, but of allowing that bias to distort his historical judgement. The irritation of some of his critics is natural enough, for he has had to expose many strange suppressions and mis-statements of facts, as well as careless or deliberate mistranslations of source-documents by historians of

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eminence and by popular authors of repute. But no scholar of intellectual integrity will regret that this controversial element has involved Dr Coulton in the necessity of multiplying his evidential extracts and of loading his volumes with references of priceless value. He craves for correction from reviewers and correspondents. "Having striven to tell the truth, I welcome criticism from other students who can convict me either of mis-stating facts or of ignoring essential evidence" (Vol. I, xliv, 2nd Ed.). He undertakes to supply gratis to purchasers of the work errata slips before the appearance of a second edition. This is an honourable offer which must act as a check on any temptation to tilt the beam and as a stimulus to extreme caution and conscientiousness.

The work was designed on a large scale, but its original plan has already proved inadequate and has been extended in the course of the undertaking. It may be recalled that the first volume, which was devoted to *St Bernard, His Predecessors and Successors*, 1000–1200 *A.D.*, and which appeared as long ago as 1923 (2nd Ed. 1929), contemplated two further volumes. The second volume, however, on *The Friars and the dead weight of Tradition*, 1200–1400 *A.D.*, which was published in 1927, announced that this part had swollen to two volumes and bore on the general title page "In four volumes." Now we have this Volume III on *Getting and Spending* (aptly suggesting the immediately following words in Wordsworth's sonnet) which has inscribed on it "In five volumes." Many readers will, like the present reviewer, hope that the next volume will bear the words "In six volumes," for we can hardly have too much of this pioneer research even should it be what Dr Coulton calls it, "less a history than materials for history" (Vol. III, p. 596)—a distinction easily overstressed in such an exploration as this. Many of the sources have been neglected by students and are in these volumes for the first time examined, translated, epitomised or reproduced. However regarded, the work so far published supplies an unsurpassed contribution to our knowledge of the Middle Ages in the most crucial epoch of growth and decay preceding the Reformation.

Not the least interesting features of this study are the welcome touches of personal confession and the refreshing asides and sparkling *obiter dicta*, dropped as it were impromptu from the lecturer's desk. These, with the natural and vivid style, make delightful reading even for the "general reader." Moreover, the facts themselves are startling enough to keep him excitedly awake over some two thousand pages—facts which will play havoc with many conventional misconceptions about medievalism and monachism. On the whole, the monks and friars, quite apart from saints like Benedict and Bernard, and Francis and Dominic, show up fairly well when viewed in the context of the life of the period. In detail, however, many of the realities are darker than even secularistic and protestant partisanship could wish to paint them. Dr Coulton has often recorded, in varying terms of praise and blame, his discriminating estimate of monasticism. This does not lend itself to facile generalisations. "After all the

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medieval monk was in himself our own potential self" (Vol. III, p. xxxvi). "Almost at every time and in every place the average monk behaved better than the average outsider, but worse in comparison with his profession and his opportunities" (Vol. III, p. xlvi). "The Religious Orders have been among the main forces of European civilisation; at certain times and in certain places they may perhaps have been the greatest of all civilising forces" (Vol. I, p. xxxvi). This general estimate is repeated in the second volume. When we come to the friars, he notes that "they accustomed society to the idea of voluntary poverty and this removed much of the mere snobbish stigma attaching to lack of means," though "some friars . . . familiarised the world with the spectacle of idleness and hypocrisy masquerading as self-denial." But the resultant truth is that "when all allowances have been made, there remains a very definite balance on the good side" (Vol. II, p. 133).

Monasticism, as the etymology of the word declares, was an individualistic and not a conventual or corporate phenomenon. St Benedict by his terrific renunciations and his masterly organising gifts transformed it into a social and economic power of first-class European importance. His Rule was a work of genius. But as we trace the rise of this movement to its zenith and decline in the first volume, we see that enthusiasm however exalted and consecration however intense have usually their own life-period and a short expectancy of vigorous and fruitful survival. Individual poverty was insidiously infected by the growing capitalistic affluence of the community which became the great economic power of the Middle Ages. The strict obligation of manual labour, emphasised in the Benedictine Rule, became annulled by genteel evasions and the employment of hired lay assistance. Even chastity was soiled with concubinage, and some nunneries were no better than brothels. Abbots became wealthy hunting and hawking lords with monks for their squires. They possessed enormous landed territories of hundreds of square miles comprising many towns and villages, with their thousands of feudal bondmen and serfs that passed with the soil and almost as part of it. Many of the greater abbeys, being exempt from episcopal or secular control and subject only to the direct authority of the Pope, became powerful states islanded within the surrounding political governments but free from their jurisdiction. Even as late as the outburst of the Revolution in 1789 there were on French Church estates probably 300,000 bondmen (Vol. II, p. 8).

Yet decay causes reaction and brings revival. When the intense puritanism of Benedict had spent its force, Bernard appeared and we have a magnificent fresh start and recovery through Clairvaux. But Bernard himself lived to see the old corruptions, which he did so marvellously much to cleanse, come back again. A new experiment became due and appeared in Francis and Dominic. The Franciscan movement was in many ways the most heroic, the most romantic and the most pathetically tragic of all. The rise of the friars was a salutary challenge to the monks who had betrayed their calling.

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Jounneaux remarks that " monks still burdened with the flesh which they devoured at supper, and drenched with drink, sigh not with devotion but from the gorge " ; and we are reminded of Chaucer's *Summoner's Tale* (Vol. II, p. 410),

> " Whan they for soulës seye the Psalm of Davit,
> Lo ! *buf !* they seye, *cor meum eructavit.*"

The brief success and general failure of the friars make familiar story, but to obtain a well-focussed and brilliant picture we must read Dr Coulton's second volume.

The present third volume deals with the economic sources of monastic revenue, its expenditure and malversation. This is in two parts ; the " getting " occupies the first 352 pages and the " spending " the remainder of the text and much of the 100 pages of appendices. It describes how money was made from burials, Masses (often fraudulently not said), *ad succurrendum* and other benefactions and bequests, relics, appropriation of churches and tithes, neglect of the poor, dowries and corrodies (dowries being paid by monks, and especially by nuns, for admission into the Order ; corrodies being pensions or annuities undertaken in consideration of a lump sum down). The monks became busily and most profitably engaged in trade and commerce (not least in that of ale and wine) and in banking and a traffic in indulgencies. There were feudal dues, even gallows-rights (in 1279 St Augustine's at Canterbury got the chattels of nineteen felons, Vol. III, p. 303), rights of wreck and booty of war. The pretence of voluntary personal poverty became transparent under the system of *proprietas ;* and with the *Commendam* system and its abuses monasteries became burdened with debt at usurious interest and took the obvious course of limiting the number of monks. There were noble instances of sacrificial efforts after retrenchment and reform, one of the most signally successful being that by Suger of St Denis in the days of St Bernard. As Dr Coulton's work proceeds we are driven to agree with him that " sooner or later, even though Henry VIII had never lived, some powerful prince must have found himself under Henry's financial and political temptations to defy the Pope ; and that fight must have been to the death " (Vol. I, p. xxxvii). Nothing but a *general* level of great saintliness and heroic asceticism among the monks and friars as a whole could have saved so exacting an ideal from repeated collapse. But the salt lost its savour to recover it in part only in modern times of small select communities of private individuals with a rare vocation. Many of us still believe that there is a future for the monastic ideal. Time after time, though it has seemed a lost cause and an impossible loyalty, it has shown extraordinary capacity for getting a second wind.

Over our own disillusioned and despairing populations it exerts a fresh fascination. Dedicated pioneers in novel enterprises such as our land-settlement and subsistence-production schemes organised for the unemployed in distressed areas have a curious and not widely remote

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affinity with its social challenge. Whatever may happen to these when the sources of outside financial support dry up, they can hardly fail to provide experiences suggestive of large-scale economic transformations. We may still see a new yet ancient monasticism emerge that shall establish a noble communism administered by a breed of ethical puritans—men of directive business ability and plain commonsense, fired and steadied by the one enduring and only genuinely Catholic Religion of the Spirit. *Quousque Domine?*

J. M. Lloyd Thomas.

Llanarth, Cardiganshire.

Jack, Jill and God. By R. A. Edwards. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1935.—Pp. 239.—5*s.* net.

After reading this book, I feel more sympathy than usual with the conventional phrase at the end of the Publisher's Commendation on the inside cover, announcing that "there is no other book quite like it." It is both a novel and a handbook to the Christian Religion. It might almost be called a theological detective story, were not this as misleading as any other description for someone who has not read it.

The subjects treated are familiar enough. A theologically-minded redactor might arrange the material under such well-worn headings as "Christianity and Social Problems," "Grounds for Theistic Belief," "The Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the Light of Recent Research," "Religion and the New Psychology," "The Ethics of Sex," "Church and Sacraments." Such subjects as these are simply and sensibly discussed. Those who disagree with Mr Edwards's conclusions may occasionally complain that the discussions are too short to be true, and that there is still a case on the other side, which he has neither stated fairly nor answered fully. But for the most part there is a sense of proportion and an eye for the main issue greater than that of many a weightier treatment. And in any case these are not the things with which the book is primarily concerned. It is about Jack and Jill.

Jack and Jill were typical "waifs and strays" of twentieth century civilisation. Not that they would readily have accepted that description. They were young and healthy, fond of each other, and in the eyes of their friends no doubt an "ideal pair." They shared a bungalow for two in the suburbs. Jack had a job. Jill could enjoy a good time with none of the cares of children or the servant problem. They had the friendly, candid outlook on life, typical of the younger generation. Above all, there was the cinema and their car, and through them a hundred easy ways of escape from the bothers and boredom of living. Yet underneath they and their like are the living embodiment of "Twentieth Century Blues."

"In this strange illusion, chaos and confusion
People seem to lose their way.
What is there to strive for, live or keep alive for——?"

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They are like cut flowers from an old garden; fairer and finer specimens than most, but without roots, and without the power to propagate their goodness. And with it all they have a sense that they are not where they belong; that their life is somehow artificial, that any moment its bloom may fade and leave them forgotten by a world that has many more flowers as good as they. Jack and Jill had not much use for Religion, though, like the earnest M.P. in the Bradlaugh debate, they believed "in a sort of a something." Jill had even tried to pray when Jack looked like losing his job. But the Church to them was something on a par with the Royal Geographical Society—right enough for those who were that way inclined, but for those whose interests lay elsewhere, irrelevant, and inclined to be "stuffy." Their "intellectual difficulties" about God were not properly speaking intellectual at all, but rather "a hang-over from that conceited nineteenth century," part of the penetration of society by "a kind of tradition that science had exploded Religion once and for all." It had not yet got through to them that science itself to-day is among the other discredited infallibilities. Their knowledge of the Bible was practically *nil*. "They've got nothing at all, no religious background. Not prodigals. They've never been in the home at all." Or, as Jack would have put it, Religion was on one side of the road and they were on the other.

With the skill and economy of a good novelist, Mr Edwards portrays his hero and heroine. They are not mere lay figures introduced to make a theological problem more palatable to ordinary people. They are the problem. The Church to-day is confronted not by the "Claims of Science," or "the Breakdown of Tradition," or "the Revolt of Youth," or any other of those conveniently vague generalisations; but by Jack and Jill. The Church, like her Master, is still here "to seek and to save that which is lost."

Step by step we are shown the Church, in the person of an elderly clergyman, learned yet sympathetic, absent-minded yet shrewd and humorous (is it Mr Edwards himself?) fulfilling its appointed task. Step by step Jack and Jill are brought from indifference to interest, from a vague suspicion that religion is out of date to a realisation that it is reasonable to believe in God—and so face to face with their own need and with Christ Himself. Then in the light of their new experience moral problems are dealt with. What before had seemed a justifiable expedient is now seen as a barrier between self and society, and between self and God. In other words, it is sin; something that needs to be undone, though undone it can never be by man alone. Hence the Cross, and mankind's need for a Saviour. The message of Good News, lost somehow among the *débris* of fifty years' critical scholarship.

In a final chapter, Jack and Jill, alone with their friend under a midnight sky, begin to understand the sacramental principle through which God works in the world, and feel themselves for the first time in their lives part of the great company of faithful people in the Community of Christ's Church. This is the weakest part of the book—

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not for what is said, but for all that is left out. The Church is the Beloved Community whose home is in Heaven, but it is also the Church Militant here on earth. And the fact that it so often resembles more the Church Somnolent, or that such militancy that it shows is at times that of the "heathen furiously raging together," does matter, and Jack and Jill, now they have come so far, will have to start and do something about it. They have been enlisted into an army, as well as received into an ark. It is not enough for them to pray and go to Communion, and take up the responsibilities of a Christian home, while the crazy whirl out of which they have come goes on its way. That might lead back to the old selfishness in a new form. It still leaves a sting in the time-worn taunt of the revolutionary that "Religion is the opiate of the people." King and country demand more than that of Jack and Jill in a time of national emergency, and God's demands are no less thoroughgoing than the demands of Cæsar. What is their responsibility to their friends and to the world to which they still belong? And how will the Church help them to discharge that responsibility?

Mr Edwards may reply that every book has to end somewhere, while no story about Jack and Jill can be complete so long as they are still alive. He is the last person to suggest that he has brought them to the place where we all live happily ever after.

Yet I wish he would give us a sequel to this fascinating book, and show us Jack and Jill as "Church-people." They would never be content to be the "stuffy" sort. But what sort would they be? The young people, for whom Mr Edwards has specially written, owe him much already. He has shown them clearly how much they might get through Christ and His Church. Will he show them now what they might give?

ALAN THORNHILL.

HERTFORD COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A Ministry to the Poor, being the History of the Liverpool Domestic Mission Society, 1836–1936. By Anne Holt, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. Liverpool: Henry Young & Sons Ltd., 1936.—Pp. viii + 136.—2*s*. net.

A NOTABLE instance of regenerative work, in the simplicity of Christian faithfulness and wise beneficence, is recorded with admirable skill in this little volume. The Liverpool Domestic Mission Society was founded at a meeting held in Renshaw Street Chapel in that city on Good Friday a hundred years ago. John Hamilton Thom was then minister of the Chapel, and James Martineau of the closely allied Paradise Street Chapel. They, with the William Rathbone of that day, George Holt, Christopher Rawdon, and other influential Liverpool laymen, were prime movers in the establishment of a new ministry to the neglected poor of the city. Miss Holt's centenary record is third of its kind, mission societies in Manchester and London

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having already marked their centenaries in 1934 and 1935 respectively by similar publications. London, however, was first in the field, the work there having begun in 1831 on the initiative of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association at centres in Spitalfields and Cripplegate, to be taken over by the independent society four years later. The inspiration for these various undertakings had come in the first instance from across the Atlantic, where at Boston, in 1826, Joseph Tuckerman, with warm encouragement from Dr Channing, had entered upon a ministry of devoted personal service in the homes of the poor, whom the Churches had failed to reach. How the work thus initiated, and the example of one man's individual faithfulness, kindled the ardour of other hearts to a like service in this country is well told in Miss Holt's narrative, in a right setting of historical perspective.

The deplorable condition of large masses of the people, crowded into town life as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, and left practically derelict in dreadful slums, had at last penetrated to the conscience of earnest Christian men and women, and the Domestic Missions were the answer of faithfulness, of compassion and brotherly love, to that appeal. Through such men as Tuckerman and John Johns, the first minister of the Liverpool Society, contact was made with the sufferers in that "hinterland of poverty," dark with hopeless misery and the festering of moral and physical disease. The personal touch of sympathy began the work, which grew into a widely penetrating influence of moral uplifting and religious fellowship. The first missionaries were pioneers in sanitary reform, devoted workers for temperance and thrift, and in various other efforts for social betterment. All such activities were centred in the homely place of worship, and the missionaries soon gathered about them many other helpers, men and women—those who had the gifts sharing with those who had not, and so finding for both a true enrichment of spiritual life and power to overcome the corroding forces of evil. Among the most devoted helpers, as time went on, were not a few who had themselves been brought up in the Day or Sunday School, or through other agencies of the Mission had been lifted out of degradation and destitution to higher levels of human capacity and endeavour. The Missions from the first were based on a broad Catholicity of spirit, entirely undenominational. On that fundamental principle Thom always insisted, and Martineau was at one with him, both at the foundation and when, after sixty years' experience of the work, appealing for adequate support, he described it as "the most Christ-like that can engage the zeal of good men in our time." The record is there for grateful remembrance, and no less as inspiration for all who, under whatever changed conditions, hear the same imperative call to service of their brothers' need.

BEACONSFIELD. V. D. DAVIS.

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A Fresh Approach to the New Testament and Early Christian Literature. By Martin Dibelius, Professor in the University of Heidelberg. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936.—Pp. 280.—5*s*. net.

ALL who are interested in the most recent phases of New Testament criticism will welcome the attempt of Professor Martin Dibelius to apply the principles of Form-Criticism to the New Testament writings as a whole. Hitherto the Gospels, and mainly the Synoptic Gospels, have claimed the attention of Form-Critics, but Professor Dibelius now extends the inquiry to the entire New Testament and to the early non-Canonical writings of the first Christian centuries. He has accomplished this great task in a comparatively small volume, with a sparing use of technical expressions and without attempting to discuss the opinions of other scholars, with the pleasing result that the general reader, as well as the expert, can follow his discussions with perfect ease and understanding. It is a happy inspiration on the part of the publishers to include such a volume in the new "International Library of Christian Knowledge" which they are issuing under the editorship of Dr W. Adams Brown and Dr Bertram Lee Woolf. The editors explain that the present translation represents a notable advance on the latest German edition, since it incorporates many additions contributed by the author. They record their thanks to those who have assisted in the work of translation, but unfortunately do not disclose the translator's name.

Professor Dibelius first discusses the question how the earliest Christians came to enter the field of literature, and how their writings were influenced by the peculiarities of the authors and the circumstances in which they wrote. "Literary ambition," he says, "was remote from these simple people who were expecting the end of the world and not thinking of readers in posterity. Readers of contemporary Hellenistic literature did not constitute their public, but rather, for the most part, the unlettered men and women of the first Christian churches. What they wrote down was either completely unliterary and thus a private record, or else half-literary and thus unpretentious writing intended for a certain class of people" (p. 17). If such were the conditions, it is not surprising that the primitive Christian writers did not employ the usual forms of literary expression beyond the "letter" and the "Apocalypse." They used the ethical exhortations, or "Paraneses," found in various folk-literatures, but "themselves created the category of the Gospel as a new and characteristic form, a semi-literary development of an originally unliterary tradition" (p. 19).

Throughout his discussion Professor Dibelius rightly stresses the importance of all the surviving literary witnesses, Canonical and non-Canonical alike, if we are to gain a historical understanding of primitive Christianity. Since, however, his controlling interest is in the *form* of these writings, classification leads to strange results, as when the Revelation and the Shepherd of Hermas are treated together; the Ignatian Letters and the Letter of Polycarp along with the correspondence of Paul; Ephesians and 1 Peter with 1 Clement;

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and James in company with the "Household Lists," the Teaching of the Two Ways, and the Twelve "Commandments" in Hermas. Since the value of the various writings is only subordinately the interest of the discussion, the reader needs to be on the alert in drawing conclusions when he finds familiar and classical writings treated along with secondary works which in nearly all cases rightly failed to make any lasting impression on the mind of the early Church.

Except in points of detail the section on the Synoptic Gospels in Part II adds little to what Professor Dibelius has already expounded in his *From Tradition to Gospel*, which appeared in an English translation two years ago. There is the same emphasis on preaching as a formative factor in the shaping of the short stories which end in a saying of Jesus, and on the influence of more "worldly" motives in the more detailed narratives, or "Tales," like the story of the demoniac and the swine (Mk. v. 1–20) and that of the daughter of Jaïrus (Mk. v. 21–4, 35–43). Professor Dibelius also repeats his conviction that it is characteristic of the Biblical tradition of Jesus that it contains very little narrative of a legendary kind, and he explains that the term "Legend" "does not exclude historical traits, but only says that the main interest of the narrator lies elsewhere than in the historicity; it is directed to the religiousness and sanctity of the hero" (p. 43). He believes that the earliest stratum we can reach in the Gospel tradition "stands on firm ground and is really old" (p. 46).

On the Fourth Gospel the most interesting section is the brief treatment of the problem of the identity of "John of Ephesus." Professor Dibelius identifies this enigmatic figure with the Elder John of whom Papias probably speaks, but, unlike many modern critics, he agrees with the late B. W. Bacon in refusing to identify the Elder John with the Evangelist, on the ground that "the apocalyptic tendencies of this John would agree poorly with the spirit of the Gospel" (p. 109). He thinks rather of the Elder John as "probably the founder and leader of a circle in which the Johannine writings on the New Testament were at home" (p. 109). One may agree that the Fourth Evangelist is neither the Apostle nor the Elder John; but to identify "John of Ephesus" with the Elder, rather than with the Apostle, seems to me an unsatisfactory solution of a very complicated problem. Professor Dibelius can carry his suggestion through only by accepting the dubious "Papias-tradition," that the Apostle was martyred by the Jews, and by assuming that the unnamed disciple of Jn. xviii. 15 is the Elder John and the Beloved Disciple. There is really no justification for saying that, according to Jn. xviii. 15, "the Beloved Disciple was acquainted with the High-Priest" (p. 107), nor for identifying him with the Elder John. It is much better to renounce the attempt to identify the unknown author of the Gospel, to identify the Beloved Disciple with the Apostle John, and to leave the wraith-like figure of the Elder John in the mists of uncertain tradition, unless he emerges as the author of the Apocalypse.

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Part III treats the Apocalypses, including the Synoptic Apocalypse of Mk. xiii., which Professor Dibelius thinks "at one time enjoyed an independent life" (p. 120), the Apocalypse of Peter, the Revelation of John, and the Shepherd of Hermas. It is in line with his theory respecting the Johannine Problem that he finds the author of Revelation in the Elder John. "According to all that we know about him, a book that is full of the sacred matters and terrors of the last days can be ascribed to this person with his apocalyptic tendencies, sooner than a Gospel which obviates the fulfilment of the last days by its mysticisms, and sooner than letters which transform the dæmonic Anti-Christ of the End into the heretical Anti-Christ of the present" (p. 129).

The discussion of the first section of Part IV on ancient epistolary literature and the primitive Christian Letters, although it is not wholly new, is of fascinating interest. No one, I think, has shown us so clearly before how questions of literary form may bear on problems of authorship. Is, for example, the case against the Pauline authorship of Ephesians strengthened because this writing is "entirely without any setting as a letter" (p. 169)? This is obviously a point for further consideration. In the meantime one may be pardoned for doubting if it means very much, and for thinking that the case will continue to rest on the linguistic affinity of the Epistle to Colossians and on its distinctive theology. Among other interesting opinions on the Pauline Correspondence may be noted Professor Dibelius's plea for the authenticity of 2 Thessalonians, his unwillingness to find the "severe letter" in 2 Cor. x.–xiii. or an Ephesian letter in Rom. xvi., and his restrained sympathy with the view that Philippians was written in Ephesus rather than in Rome.

In consequence of his estimate of Ephesians, this writing appears again in the first section of Part V, which treats "Treatises, Sermons, Tractates, in Letter Form." Professor Dibelius can find no element in 1 Peter which could be explained by circumstances peculiar to the churches to which it is addressed. In his discussion of 1 Clement, Chapters LIX–LXI are described as "the earliest example of a 'Common Prayer of the Church,'" and Chapters IV–XXXIX as "a general hortatory sermon" (p. 191). Hebrews and Barnabas are claimed as examples of Treatises on a Single Theme, and examples of sermons are found in the speeches of Acts ii., iii., x., xiii., and in 2 Clement. Jude, 2 Peter and the Johannine Epistles are classified as "Tractates for Particular Circumstances." One is tempted to think that at least 2 and 3 John appear strangely in this category, all the more as Professor Dibelius thinks that "we may best regard them as genuine letters which became canonical on account of their connection with 1 John" (p. 212 f.). His suggestion that we cannot altogether set aside the assumption that "even these letters are only letters in form" is due to his appreciation of the difficulty of identifying their author, and the author of 1 John, with the author of Revelation, the Elder John. This knot, however, is hardly to be cut by the conclusion that the two Johannine letters "only pretend to

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be the correspondence of the great John," but rather by the denial that the unknown Elder, to whom they are assigned (cf. 2 John i. 1, 3 John i. 1), is the Elder John. In any case, it seems a departure from the principles of Form-Criticism to decide the category to which writings belong by dubious inferences regarding authorship.

Part VI has as its subject "Exhortations dealing with Ethics and Church Government." Here Professor Dibelius treats the "Household Lists," illustrated in Col. iii. 18–iv. 1, and claims that even yet it can be seen that "they are of foreign origin and have only been faintly Christianised" (p. 220). Other writings examined in this section are the Teaching of the Two Ways, the Twelve "Commandments" in the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle of James, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Didache.

The extensive character of Professor Dibelius's investigation will be apparent from the summary already given; yet Parts VII and VIII remain to be mentioned briefly. The former discusses Public Worship in the early Church and traces signs of prayers and hymns in the extant writings. Besides the Magnificat (Lk. i. 46–55) and the Benedictus (Lk. i. 68–79), examples of early Christian hymns are cited in the Apocalypse, in Eph. v. 14 and in 1 Tim. iii. 16. Professor Dibelius also speaks of the Odes of Solomon as probably "the hymn-book of Gnostic churches" (p. 249), and makes the challenging observation that, if we note the manner in which the poet occasionally speaks in the first person of Christ, while describing himself as mystically one with Christ, "we shall understand how a person similarly qualified, though with a much closer spiritual relationship to the message of Jesus, came to the point of formulating Jesus's speeches like those in the Fourth Gospel" (p. 249). Part VIII, with which the volume closes, treats the "Histories of the Apostles," including the New Testament Acts, and the apocryphal works which attempt to cover similar ground.

This review, I hope, will have shown the comprehensive nature of the book, its great suggestiveness, and the challenging, not to say provocative, character of many of its suggestions. It is a study which no student of the New Testament can afford to miss, and yet a volume which those who do not profess to be students can read with interest and with profit. The principal criticism to which it is exposed is that the plan of the work makes it inevitable that the learned author must express many opinions on doubtful points without the detailed discussion which is really necessary. Again and again one feels a desire to interrupt the writer and ask why he assumes the truth of Wrede's theory regarding the "Messianic Secret," why he describes Mark as the "translator" of Peter, whether he is right in thinking the alleged signs of docetism in the Gospel of Peter are "doubtful," why he so confidently describes Jn. xxi. as a later addition by another hand, whether he is justified in saying that 1 Cor. "presupposes a thoroughly satisfying condition of the Church," and other questions of a like kind. But Professor Dibelius has already begun the next sentence, and we must resume the journey, confessedly a little

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breathless, in his ardent company. He has given us a book which cannot fail to stimulate thought, and to promote further study and research. He takes the New Testament books into the open air and shows us things we had not sufficiently noticed before or perhaps had not observed at all, and, while some of the disclosures are disturbing, I cannot but feel that he successfully shows that the Church possesses in her twenty-seven New Testament writings a more remarkable and wonderful heritage than as yet she has realised.

VINCENT TAYLOR.

WESLEY COLLEGE, HEADINGLEY, LEEDS.

The Story of an Old Meeting House. By J. M. Connell. Illustrated by Edmund H. New. Revised and enlarged edition.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1935.—Pp. xi + 142.—2*s.* 6*d.* net.

THIS is the well-told story of an Old Meeting House, and not of one particular Meeting House only, with its local colouring caught by the hand of a master and an intimate, but it is typical of nearly two hundred similar old Meeting Houses in the United Kingdom, and, to a less degree, of a number of similar ones in the New England States and in other States of America. I have read probably several scores of such "stories," yet I never remember one going into a second edition, and this is accounted for not only by the fact that it is a model of its kind, but that it has been illustrated by a master in another craft. And, apart from its own intrinsic worth, the late Mr Edmund New's pen-and-inks should give it an enduring value.

The whole early history is in that little word—*House*—"the venerable House," as Emerson aptly called it. It was a spiritual home, and not a church, and its ancient name was Meeting House. It was usually the simplest and barest of structures, without and within, in shape like a barn or cottage. Beauty was the last thing in the world its original founders thought of. They had no choice of frontage, fortunate if they secured a site in a side-street, hid away up some back-alley or yard, or were cheek by jowl with an inn, or a transformed barn, or a converted benefactor's residence. Westgate Chapel, Lewes, the subject of our story, was in part the annexe of an inn and in part the Elizabethan residence of a county family. To wind up the Meeting House clock you had to draw up a trust deed giving you right of access through the Bull! We seem to remember that Christianity in its beginnings had somewhat to do with an inn!

A mere glance at these old Meeting Houses, outside or in, unrolls the pages of history. An unpretentiousness, severe and even for bidding, characterised the buildings and the people. They issue out of stern times and confronted stark realities. To be conspicuou was to court persecution and even destruction. Yet their ver

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hiding-away had its compensations. You pass from a busy thoroughfare through by-ways to a haven of quiet restfulness.

As you pass through the porch into one of these old Meeting Houses and look around, the most outstanding and dominating feature is the pulpit. Preaching and praying are the main things here. The high-backed pews, cut down from an earlier date, hug the pulpit in a homely and familiar way, and are so arranged that all may hear the minister and catch his lightest word. So much depended on this that most of the old Meeting Houses had their sounding-boards. Westgate had, though it is now below the pulpit and not above it! There is no rood-screen between pastor and people. In the Church of England, if a pillar should block the view, or a fretted vault or dome dissipate the sound, all would not be lost: a different point of view characterises the two traditions.

It is seldom remembered too that hymns are quite a modern invention. When Westgate was built, and for many years thereafter, they sang Psalms in the metrical versions of Hopkins and Sternhold or of Tate and Brady. It was a revolution when they passed from the "Divine" hymns of David to the "all too human" hymns of a Watts or a Doddridge. And when the congregation sang, they used to sit, and the minister, or precentor, read out each verse before it was sung so that those who could not read might join in! And there was no organ in those days. The singing was heralded by a pitch-pipe, and was frequently unaccompanied, or accompanied by strings and other instruments.

In some such human way as this Mr Connell tells history, and nothing could well be more readable. The doctrinal history is given, too, from the original Calvinism to the Unitarianism and Liberal Christianity of our own day. In the new edition a supplement brings us up to date. Westgate Chapel now is more like a College Chapel. It is still simple in the old tradition, but all the severity has gone. The touch of beauty is all over it, but it is a tender touch that is reverent of the past.

But no one could sum up the present situation better than Mr Connell does himself: "The congregation in seeking the aid of beauty in its place of worship may be said to have broken in this respect with its Puritan tradition, but the ideal of a free faith and a catholic fellowship, which has been handed down by such men as Baxter and Calamy, still claims its loyal and enthusiastic devotion. . . It demands no uniformity of opinion in its members, as though it had already attained to the whole truth of God, but it expects them to judge reverently for themselves what is true and right, to live and follow it when they see it, and to look for an ever fuller revelation of the Divine will and wisdom and goodness."

H. H. JOHNSON.

BUXTON, DERBYSHIRE.

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Science in Antiquity. By Benjamin Farrington, Professor of Classics at the University College, Swansea. Home University Library. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1936.—2*s.* 6*d.* net.

THIS excellent little book forms a useful sequel to Mr Gordon Childe's more general work on the early stages of civilisation as a whole. It gives a sufficient outline of the definite achievement, in formulated laws or generalisations, of the thought which Mr Childe rightly discerns to be implicit in ancient art and technology. Moreover, Professor Farrington goes further, giving us the state of science down to the end of the Greco-Roman period. It is specially encouraging to find a professor of classics both interested and competent on this side of ancient thought which is customarily left to others or left out altogether. The fact that the author knows his classics properly on the linguistic side enables him to present Plato and Aristotle, in their relation to science, in a most intimate and understanding way. In both cases the soundness of his judgment and the clearness and often the brilliance of his exposition are remarkable. He accepts Jaeger's analysis of Aristotle without mentioning his name in the text, and on this point, here and in several similar cases, lays himself open to the only charge one feels inclined to make against his book. There are no references at all, except a short list of quite recent books given in an appendix. Popular as the series rightly is, one cannot help thinking that many readers would be glad of a note to the passages in Plutarch, Aristotle, etc., which are well chosen, well translated, and always aptly inserted in the right place. They kindle the desire for further enlightenment, which cannot be satisfied except by laborious setrch.

Two or three salient features in a book which everyone should possess deserve a word of special mention. Professor Farrington is well acquainted with the recent discoveries in Egyptian and Babylonian science, and gives adequate recognition to them without detracting from the supreme and unique contribution of the Greeks. Among the Greeks he gives special prominence to their scientific medicine, and, above all, to Hippocrates. He rightly points out that in the teaching of the Hippocratic school we have the first definite formulation of the destiny and use of science in the amelioration of human life. In his summary of Aristotle's contribution to science he makes admirably clear how the metaphysical distinction between matter and form served him well in biology but is largely responsible for his comparative failure in astronomy and physics. But the book is full of equally suggestive points, is extremely interesting and attractive to read, and is brought to a conclusion by a useful schedule of dates and names concerned with the development of ancient science.

F. S. MARVIN.

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

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